

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT
OF THE
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 22, 23, AND OCTOBER 12, 1970

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THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1970

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT
OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee on Economy in Government met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-407, the Capitol Building, Hon. William Proxmire (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Proxmire; and Representatives Conable and Brown.

Also present: John R. Stark, executive director; Courtenay M. Slater, economist.

Chairman PROXMIRE. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning, we are beginning an examination of the effectiveness of the Nation's criminal justice system. The Subcommittee on Economy in Government has, of course, a strong and continuing interest in the efficiency of all major Federal programs. I use the term "efficiency" in its broadest sense to refer to the allocation of available resources among various components of a program so as to produce the most effective overall result.

Our examinations of other Federal programs have often revealed examples of gross misallocation of resources. In some cases these misallocations arise from legislative restrictions on the use of funds. Other misallocations arise simply from our failure to take a comprehensive look at a program and to ask systematic questions concerning the most effective way to achieve stated objectives. Our recent study of Federal transportation expenditures, for example, uncovered both of these problems. We found that, despite the establishment of a Department of Transportation, the objective of comparing the effectiveness of different types of transportation for meeting a given transportation need remains far from realization. We also found that legislative constraints, such as the highway trust fund, impose serious barriers to an effective allocation of transportation funds.

In 1968 Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. This act established within the Department of Justice the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and it required each State, as a prerequisite of Federal assistance, to establish a criminal justice planning agency and to draw up a comprehensive State criminal justice plan. The basic objectives of the new criminal justice programs are clear enough. There are few things which the people of this country desire more earnestly than they do the reduction of crime and the restoration of a society in which citizens can live without fear of sudden violence. It is also clear that it was the intent of Congress that

all the elements of the criminal justice system—police, courts, and correctional institutions—be effectively utilized and coordinated as inter-related parts of a comprehensive program to reduce crime.

Federal expenditures on programs for the reduction of crime have been increasing rapidly. Outlays in fiscal 1970 were close to 50 percent higher than in the previous year. Further large increases are anticipated this year and in 1972. Only if these increased outlays are wisely utilized will we succeed through these programs in achieving a major reduction in serious crime.

In order to utilize our resources effectively, we need much more complete information concerning the incidence of crime and the effectiveness of different approaches to law enforcement and crime control.

The whole science of criminal justice planning is in its infancy—if, indeed, it exists yet at all. We have no really reliable data on the incidence of crime, much less on the more complicated question of what measures work most effectively to reduce crime. One mandate given the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was to improve our statistical knowledge. We intend to inquire at these hearings what progress has been made to date in this area, and what efforts are planned for the future.

We intend to inquire also how the system of comprehensive State planning is working. To enact a law requiring comprehensive planning is clearly not enough. We must also take steps to insure that appropriately trained personnel are available to undertake the planning. What, if anything, is being done to train people to plan effective criminal justice programs?

A distressingly large proportion of crime is committed by young people between 15 and 25. Yet, where are our Federal programs for youth development and the prevention of juvenile delinquency? In 1968 Congress enacted not only the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act but also the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act. Do the programs established under this act show any promise of fulfilling their potential? Can we expect to make law-abiding citizens of our young in a society where unemployment among young people 16 to 21 years of age has been allowed to reach 16 percent?

Finally, these are only a few of the questions which need to be examined with respect to our criminal justice system. The list of unanswered, indeed, almost completely unexamined, questions relating to criminal justice is disturbingly long. For so much ignorance to exist in an area of such major social concern seems shocking. It is time to begin asking and finding answers for the right questions.

Our first witness this morning is Senator Alan Bible, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business. The work that the Small Business Committee has done in measuring the impact of crime on small business and in identifying measures which could be taken to reduce such crime stands as a model for the kind of work which so badly needs to be undertaken with respect to the criminal justice system as a whole. We are most fortunate to have Senator Bible with us this morning to describe the work of his committee.

Our other witnesses this morning are Mr. Sheldon Krantz, who is a professor at Boston University Law School and who was formerly executive director of the Massachusetts Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, and Mr. Paul

Nejelski, assistant director of the Criminal Justice Research Center of Harvard Law School. Mr. Nejelski formerly was head of the Center for Law and Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration at the Department of Justice. Both of these gentlemen are unusually well qualified to evaluate the criminal justice system, and particularly the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. We are grateful for their willingness to appear this morning and look forward to hearing their testimony.

Senator Bible, we are delighted to have you. You are an old friend and an extraordinarily able Senator.

Representative CONABLE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question at the outset here?

Chairman PROXMIRE. Yes.

Representative CONABLE. I quite agree with the thrust of your remarks. It seems to me that Congress has an oversight responsibility which all too frequently has been neglected and that this is one aspect of our legislative obligation that we need to pay greater attention to. This committee can make a crucial contribution in this function. The question I have is why we have not called the Justice Department. It may be that you have invited them and they have asked to be postponed.

Chairman PROXMIRE. That is exactly right. We asked the Justice Department. I talked to Attorney General Mitchell personally and directly late last week and he said he wanted very much to come up, but he had a full schedule; he would get back to us and let us know when he can come. Unfortunately, he cannot come this week, so we will have him later.

Representative CONABLE. Will we have him before the Congress adjourns?

Chairman PROXMIRE. I think so. We did not get an absolute commitment out of him. If we cannot get the Attorney General, we will try hard to get one of the top people in the Justice Department to appear in his behalf.

Representative CONABLE. We are dealing with a new program here, Mr. Chairman, which is in the process of implementation at this point. It seems to me it is awfully important, if we are going to have effective oversight, that we talk not just with people from colleges, who may have theoretical views of what we should be doing with a program already in the process of implementation.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You mean not only with people from colleges.

Representative CONABLE. Not only with people from colleges.

Chairman PROXMIRE. These people have a great deal to contribute, as I am sure you will agree.

Representative CONABLE. I certainly do, particularly in the formulation of programs. But our function at this point, as I see it, is primarily one of oversight. We ought to know what the Justice Department is doing, what its plans are in the field of implementation, and where we are headed in this program.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I told the Attorney General that his testimony and that of his Department would be of crucial importance to us. We wanted to build our hearings around them. He understood it but we had scheduled these hearings some time ago. But I do think it is important to get this kind of expert testimony as a background so as better to evaluate the Justice Department's testimony.

Representative CONABLE. I would not want anything I say to be construed as critical of the people who are coming before this committee to testify. I do not consider Senator Bible merely a theoretician.

Senator BIBLE. I have been called worse than that.

Representative CONABLE. But I want to be sure the other element is present, and that is the element that knows about the actual implementation of the program, before our hearings are allowed to sputter out.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I am sure our hearings will not sputter out. They will end in a blaze of smashing glory and we will reach the peak of our performance breaking the tape.

Representative CONABLE. I have found that your hearings usually end with a bang and not with a whimper.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you, T. S. Eliot.

Go right ahead, Senator Bible.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN BIBLE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA

Senator BIBLE. Chairman Proxmire, Congressman Conable, I am happy to be here this morning. I am responding directly to an invitation directed to me on September 10 and received on September 14, suggesting that your committee would be interested in learning about the estimates of the cost of crime to small businessmen, and our suggestions for more effective policies to control crime and reduce these costs. I am delighted to contribute whatever I may be able to in line with the request from your distinguished chairman. As the chairman of the Small Business Committee of the Senate, I have, over the past 2 years, held a series of hearings on this problem and its impact on the country's 5 million small businessmen, an impact that costs business generally, as best it can be estimated, some \$5 billion per year.

Our committee initially centered its interests on an exhaustive crime study completed by the Small Business Administration under the authority of the Small Business Protection Act of 1967. We were more concerned with seeking to develop preventive solutions about how businessmen could help out in their crime crisis rather than the sociological or psychological factors. We have taken the approach that crime against property represents preventable economic injury to the business community.

This SBA survey represented the first time that any national data were gathered to describe in hard numbers the magnitude of the problem that confronts society. As I stated, at hearings before the Small Business Committee, which I chaired, approximately a year ago:

This report makes it plain that thievery and vandalism have reached such proportions that survival of the small businessman in high-crime areas has reached the crisis point. . . . It shows graphically the deep impact crime is having on the small businessman, whose losses are proportionately 35 times greater than those sustained by big business.

Our hearings initially touched on SBA's recommendations for such measures as improving protective hardware and architectural design, developing improved and more rapid police communications technology, revamping of the insurance structure to equalize costs of protection, establishing better managerial practices, and providing for Federal coordination and support of a research and development program designed to improve prevention and apprehension.

That report, offering a shocking profile of lawlessness in America, surveys managerial measures which businessmen may take to help protect themselves. It suggests building security code procedures and architectural steps as protective measures.

This report declares that burglary losses cost the businessman \$958 million annually, with the small businessman suffering 71 percent of the losses. Shoplifting, costing \$504 million annually, with the small businessman taking 77 percent of the loss. Vandalism, costing \$813 million annually, with the small businessman taking 58 percent. Employee theft, costing \$381 million annually, with the small businessman taking 60 percent. Bad checks, costing \$316 million annually, found as its target the small businessman, taking 77 percent. Robbery, costing \$77 million annually, with the small businessman taking 68 percent.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Could I interrupt at that point, Senator Bible, to ask, to put this in perspective, what proportion of the total sales does small businesses constitute?

Senator BIBLE. I cannot give you that figure right off the top of my head, but I can certainly supply it for the record.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Or any other measure which would give us an idea of the proportion of assets, proportion of employees, proportion of sales, any figure that would let us know.

Since small business, for example, suffers 77 percent of the loss in shoplifting, would they, for example, constitute perhaps 50 percent of the overall market?

Senator BIBLE. Well, this represents 5 million small businessmen, which is one mark that you can use. As to the amount of total sales that they represent as compared to the gross sales, such as the wholesalers and everything else, I do not have that figure. I am sure it is available. I do not happen to have it before me, but I can certainly, very easily supply it for the record. But measured against even that yardstick, the small businessman, I think we can all recognize, is one of the backbones of this Nation, from the North to the South to the East to the West, when you get the total. I cannot give you the amount of sales, but I can certainly supply it for the record.

(The following information was subsequently supplied for the record by Senator Bible:)

TABLE 1.—LOSSES BY TYPE OF CRIME AND BY SIZE AND LOCATION OF BUSINESS

Item (1)	Total (2)	Bur- glary (3)	Robbery (4)	Vanda- lism (5)	Shop- lifting (6)	Em- ployee theft (7)	Bad checks (8)
A. Losses:							
1. Amount (in millions).....	\$3,049	\$958	\$77	\$813	\$504	\$381	\$316
2. Percent.....	100	31	3	27	17	12	10
B. Indexed ratios of losses to receipts by size of business:							
1. Total.....	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2. Under \$100,000.....	323	357	333	283	225	350	50
3. \$100,000 to \$1,000,000.....	205	200	167	167	250	300	200
4. \$1,000,000 to \$5,000,000.....	127	129	133	167	50	250	50
5. Over \$5,000,000.....	9	7	1	17	8	20	25
C. Percent of businesses burglarized or robbed by location:							
1. Total.....		14	2	15	15	8	37
2. Ghetto.....		28	9	37	24	11	30
3. Nonghetto central city.....		18	3	18	14	10	33
4. Suburbs.....		16	2	17	15	9	31
5. Rural.....		9	1	9	15	4	36

Source: Small Business Administration.

TABLE 2.—ORDINARY CRIME LOSSES, NUMBER OF BUSINESSES, AND RECEIPTS BY SIZE OF BUSINESS

Size by receipts	Losses		Businesses		Receipts		Losses as percent of receipts	
	Amount (in millions)	Per- cent	1,000	Per- cent	Amount (in billions)	Per- cent	Per- cent	Indexed ¹
Under \$100,000.....	\$862	28	6,890	85.7	\$121	9.0	0.71	323
\$100,000 to \$1,000,000.....	1,198	40	1,013	12.6	245	19.6	.45	205
\$1,000,000 to \$5,000,000.....	644	21	113	1.4	223	16.5	.28	127
Over \$5,000,000.....	217	7	24	.3	740	54.9	.02	9
No receipts information.....	128	4						
Total.....	3,049	100	8,040	100.0	1,349	100.0	.23	10

¹ Calculated on percentages carried to 4 decimals.

Source: Small Business Administration.

Senator BIBLE. Using the FBI data from 1967 to 1969, we found that robbery of commercial houses rose by 35 percent; chain store robberies increased about 80 percent; overall burglaries (residence and nonresidence) rose by over 22 percent; and shoplifting increased by over 30 percent. Consequently, the dollar losses today to businesses are much more than the \$5 billion, which was originally suggested in this first overall, nationwide, detailed study of the Small Business Administration.

I would like to submit for your record a very detailed statement summarizing the findings and recommendations of the SBA study as prepared by the Small Business Committee.

(The information referred to above for the record follows:)

THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON SMALL
BUSINESS—PART I

REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ON

AN OVERVIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF CRIME ON
SMALL BUSINESS BASED ON HEARINGS BEFORE
THE COMMITTEE, MAY 21 AND 22, 1969



DECEMBER 16, 1969.—Ordered to be printed

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

[Created pursuant to S. Res. 58, 81st Cong.]

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THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON SMALL BUSINESS—PART I

DECEMBER 16, 1969.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. BIBLE, from the Select Committee on Small Business, submitted
the following

REPORT

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to highlight and summarize the findings of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business concerning the impact of crime on small business. This report is intended to be only a guide for your committee as it pursues an investigation designed to delineate the causes and to recommend solutions to prevent this most serious threat to the economic stability of the small business community in this country.

Your committee has long been concerned with the problem of crime against small business. In 1967 hearings were held on this topic, and it was learned that the dimensions of the problem are staggering.¹ That same year, your committee asked the Science Policy Research Division of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, to report on the Contributions of Science and Technology to Federal Crime Insurance. That study found substantial agreement among law enforcement authorities and victims of crime on the potential rewards offered by technological methods of crime control. The report also showed that proper application of existing and new crime prevention and detection technology depended upon prior collection and analysis of data describing the problem and its causes.²

To further explore the problem of crimes against small business, with the aid and support of your committee, the Congress passed the

¹ U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Small Business. Impact of Crime Business. Hearings before the A Review of the Impact of Crime on Small Business in the Washington, D.C., area. April 24, 25, and 26, 1967. 90th Cong. 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 148 p.

² U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business. Contributions of Science and Technology to Federal Crime Insurance. Report prepared for the . . . by the Science Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. August 10, 1967. 90th Cong. 1st sess. Committee Print. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 175 p.

Small Business Protection Act of 1967 (Public Law 90-104). This act directed the Small Business Administration to "conduct a special study of the impact on small business concerns of robbery, burglary, shoplifting, vandalism, and other criminal activities. . . ." The administration was directed to report to Congress on steps that could be taken by the small businessman, and by the executive and the legislative branches of the Federal Government, to help reduce the incidence of such crimes and alleviate the resulting burdens on the small business community.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) submitted its report to Congress in January 1969. At the request of your Chairman, that report, "Crime Against Small Business," was printed as a Senate document.³

The SBA study has provided for the first time data to describe the scope of the problem of crime against small business. Of primary importance in the SBA report is the field survey, which used as a working universe, a sample of all U.S. small business, randomly selected from Internal Revenue Service rolls. Chosen for intensive examination were 5,200 businesses studied by means of a 45-page questionnaire administered by SBA field personnel. Some of the variables on which data were gathered are: types of security protection; number of crimes, with some measurement of incidence of various types of crime, location of the business, and type of business management structure.

The SBA supplemented the field survey with advice and assistance from numerous authorities in all segments of society. Federal officials, sociologists, police officers, security specialists, manufacturers of alarms and other protective devices, insurance industry officials, and representatives of the SBA, all contributed their talents. Six appendices and two summary sections contain the data, source papers and other materials submitted by these experts to the SBA. Many of these papers are comprehensive, scholarly works which constitute an authoritative collection of information on the crime problem.

One of the more shocking findings of the study reveals that crime costs all business \$3 billion in losses annually; and that the smaller the business, the greater the impact of the loss. This is the first time that any national data have been gathered to describe, in hard numbers, the magnitude of the problem that confronts society. Your Chairman, in commenting on this finding, stated:

This report makes it plain that thievery and vandalism have reached such proportions that survival of the small businessman in high crime areas has reached the crisis point. * * * It shows graphically the deep impact crime is having on the small businessman, whose losses are proportionately 35 times greater than those sustained by big business.

Of particular importance in the report are SBA's recommendations for such measures as improving protective hardware and architectural design, developing improved and more rapid police communica-

³ U.S. Small Business Administration. Crime Against Small Business. A Report of the Small Business Administration. Transmitted to the Select Committee on Small Business, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong. 1st sess., S. Doc. No. 91-14 April 3, 1969. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.) 279 p.

tions technology, revamping of the insurance structure to equalize costs of protection, establishing better managerial practices, and providing for Federal coordination and support of a research and development program designed to improve prevention and apprehension.

As part of its continuing effort to provide the Congress and the Nation with assistance in solving the burdensome crime problem confronting small businessmen, your committee has reviewed the SBA report and held hearings on May 21 and 22, 1969, to further illuminate the main points of the study, gather additional expert opinions on the scope and nature of the problem, and to assess its recommendations, with the intent of considering legislative proposals to implement them. This report highlights some of the major findings of the SBA study. Its main purpose though is to encourage continuation of investigation, research, and development of policies to enhance solution of the problem of property crimes against small business.

APPROACHES TO CRIME PREVENTION

The Small Business Administration finds that a major strategy to solve the problem of crime against small business consists of improving deterrence by (a) obstructing and delaying intrusion by the criminal, and (b) accelerating the time of arrival of the police on the scene of the crime. Short- and long-range tactics relate to these two general objectives. Recommendations as to specific measures to be taken to implement these strategies are made for all sectors involved with the problem:

Small businessman,
Police,
Community,
Insurance industry,
Architectural and building professions,
Hardware manufacturers,
Crime researchers, and
The Federal Government.

Sociological understanding of causes of crime

In treating the subject of causes, SBA concluded "that the criminal chooses his calling because he does not think he has a more attractive alternative that is legal and socially productive."⁴ This conclusion is consistent with many sociological treatments of the subject. Illustration of the costs society must pay for such antisocial behavior is given by citing Oakland, Calif. police figures:

The cost of capture, investigation, and conviction of a first degree burglar is \$1,670. The direct cost of 3½ years of imprisonment is \$7,000, for a total of \$8,670. Should the burglar have a wife and two children who must go on welfare at \$172 per month, the additional cost is \$7,224. The total direct cost of this one incident to society is \$15,894. The net gain to society, had this burglar been productively employed, would have been substantially greater.⁵

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

General recommendations made by SBA to treat the causes of crime relate both to prevention and apprehension, including:

- Increase the complexity of the criminal act,
- Reduce the "take,"
- Provide proper social environment to reduce the attractiveness of crime,
- Improve and facilitate capture, and
- Increase the coordination between the various groups combating crime.⁶

SBA did not probe deeply into the social, or underlying motivational causes of property crimes against small businesses. This area of investigation is judged to afford important opportunities for further research, to yield guidelines in the refinement of anticrime strategies.

Accumulation of soundly based and disciplined information on the behavioral and sociological aspects of criminal behavior would be beneficial in the design of strategies both to deter crimes and to rehabilitate convicted criminals. Such research might be sponsored by the newly created National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice, perhaps in coordination with appropriate activities of the National Institute of Mental Health, a part of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

MANAGERIAL MEASURES AND BUSINESS PRACTICES

Recommendations in the SBA report for many specific measures that can be taken by the businessman to cut his crime losses relate primarily to good housekeeping and management practices. The most important are:

- Taking special care to lock up, to secure loose access points, and to employ suitable hardware fittings;
- Providing a clear view of merchandise and safes to enable unobstructed surveillance and to facilitate prompt detection of criminal activity;
- Improving lighting of all areas of criminal activity or transit;
- Solving the false alarm problem;
- Placing less emphasis on compensatory insurance in lieu of protective measures; and
- Improving community relations looking toward mutual self-help and business-police cooperation.

These housekeeping and managerial measures are given extended treatment by SBA in appendix F, "Business Management for Crime Prevention." Your committee endorses these recommendations and commends them to all businessmen. Sloppiness in daily business operations undoubtedly exposes such businesses to criminal deprecations.

During the hearings, your committee heard from Hilary J. Sandoval, Jr., Administrator of the Small Business Administration, who testified that his agency:

- as a byproduct of its crime study, has stepped up its program of publications, movies, seminars for small businessmen on how they may better protect themselves against crime.⁷

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁷ Hearing before the Select Committee on Small Business, 91st Cong. 1st sess., on Impact of Crime on Small Business—1969, May 21, 22, 1969, p. 16.

Your committee encourages implementation of this proposal and urges that the Small Business Administration continue to improve the content and frequency of distribution of information to small businessmen on improved managerial measures to cut crime losses.

Money handling

Missing from the section on managerial practices, however, is discussion of one specific measure that can be taken in improvement of money handling. cursory mention is made of the old-fashioned money basket trolley system :

There are a number of measures which the business manager himself may take to increase intrusion times, beyond architectural measures. In oldtime hardware stores and other shops, for example, the cashier was located on an upper balcony and communicated with the sales counter via a basket on a trolley. This complicated and lengthened the time to rob money, and tended to disinvite robberies.⁸

Improvements in today's technology offer a wide array of modern variants of this scheme, all providing for inaccessible and centralized money handling remote from public areas. None were discussed in the section on managerial improvements, and the SBA made no recommendations as to the need for research and development for improved money handling. The committee believes that such research would be of significant benefit and recommends that ways be found for the SBA to investigate thoroughly existing technologies of this kind. It is also possible that further technological development, perhaps sponsored by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice might be beneficial in helping to reduce the accessibility of cash to criminals.

PROTECTIVE DEVICES, CENTRAL STATION PROTECTION SYSTEMS, AND COMMUNICATIONS

The SBA report was intended to establish a first benchmark of the present state of technology and near-future possibilities. With this aim accomplished, your committee believes that further assessment is needed of the costs and benefits of technological systems for crime protection and deterrence. The assessment should include analysis of the tradeoffs between preventive physical security systems and detection-oriented alarm systems and designs combining both approaches. Data should be developed concerning the effectiveness of these systems in reducing losses from property crimes; current technology of deterrent and detection systems should be reviewed to yield information as to technology needs for the future.

SBA recommendations for R. & D.

The SBA report offers several recommendations for research and development of passive, active, and communications device technology.

The major SBA recommendations for passive protective devices relate to physical security features. These recommendations include

⁸ SBA report, op. cit., p. 36.

development and increased installation of ax-resistant glass, and improvement of the current "primitive" technology of locks, windows and door designs.

Recommendations for alarms and central station protection systems include: more vigorous exploitation of electronic techniques in defense and space industries, improvement of central station alarms technology (movement away from electro/mechanical to modern computer/electronic technology), emphasis on solving the problem of false alarms, and lowering costs and widening the protective alarm industry by trying "to approach in extensive service the character of a privately owned and operated and competitive public utility system."

With respect to communications, the report finds that special attention should be devoted to overcoming problems relating to saturation of communications wavelengths and to problems in voice communications security.

Your committee believes that the Federal Communications Commission could usefully review the employment and allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum, to determine ways to optimize its contribution to police communications and remote alarm systems. Technological aspects of radio communication for anticrime purposes might well be given specific attention in appropriate government laboratories, such as the Electronics Research Laboratory of NASA.

Installation of protective devices

In addition to recommending research on protective devices, the SBA recommends that small businessmen would profit from installing alarms and other systems, and that they should undertake to investigate the benefits of such devices for their operations. The SBA lists a series of factors which it says the small businessman should weigh before installing more protective devices. These are:

- Kind of business,
- Neighborhood,
- Architectural characteristics,
- Management,
- Police availability,
- Protective device systems,
- Guards,
- Insurance,
- Size of business, and
- The time frame: today and about 1975.⁹

SBA field survey

Data generated in the SBA field survey supported the conclusions reached in the followup survey. (Furthermore, the summary discussion of the field survey reflects some inexactness in distinguishing between deterrence and detection. While indicating, for instance, that the ensuing discussion would relate to protective device systems, the subsequent material concentrated upon assessing alarm systems.) The data gathered showed that those businesses with alarm systems reflected a higher crime rate than those without:

Nominally, it would be expected that protected establishments would have lower burglary rates. The statistics

⁹ Ibid., p. 44.

gathered in SBA's field surveys, however, do not show a clear-cut difference in burglary rates between protected and unprotected sites.¹⁰

Nevertheless, in summing up its recommendations, SBA reported that "the insurance companies favor alarm protection." With respect to advice to businessmen, the SBA concluded:

Each business must base its evaluation of protective devices available to it in the light of its specific degree of vulnerability and the prospects for effective protection in its environment. * * *

The charge for installment of equipment (which applies to alarm systems, the only system discussed) will vary from \$200 to \$250, and the monthly cost from \$15 to \$40, depending on location, telephone line rentals, central station competition, et cetera. With installation costs amortized over a period of 5 years or more, the total cost will run between \$200 and \$500 per year.

Against this cost, the businessman's direct saving will be the sum of reductions in crime losses, physical damage to buildings in the course of burglaries, and disruption to business; plus the availability of any discounts for insurance, and peace of mind.

The ultimate decision of the businessman will vary with the complex of factors described above. A key factor will be the degree to which he and his immediate neighbors are experiencing crime losses.¹¹

Data on protective devices

In the SBA field survey, appendix A, information was gathered to describe the extent in installation of various protective systems, and to describe businessmen's conclusions about how effective they judged each device or service to be in protecting them from crime. Protective measures and systems assessed were: local and central station alarms, reinforcing devices to deter entry to premises, security guards, subscription to protective service, firearms, and antishoplifting devices such as mirrors, cameras, and locked display cases.

First it was shown that many businessmen do not install protective device systems:

Within any community location * * * a substantial number of all businesses and of retail establishments go without protective service of one kind or another. The average U.S. business possessed only minimal protection such as a firearm or some reinforcing device. And, finally, a substantial majority of businesses go without any major form of protection such as a central alarm or a protective service.¹²

Next, the study illustrated that many businessmen have removed protective devices previously installed:

* * * except for central alarms and firearms, a sizable proportion of the businesses that removed a form of protection

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 120.

or service said they did so because it was not effective. This accounts for 80 percent of removals of antishoplifting devices, 50 percent of local alarms, and 41 percent each for reinforcing devices, and guards or protective service.¹³

Not only were such protective arrangements judged to be ineffective; their costs of installation and maintenance often exceeded past or expected future losses.

The field survey yielded no data on the relationship between specific types of crimes, specific protective device systems, and specific losses due to crime. Thus, with respect to assessing the effectiveness of any one device or combination of devices in deterring crime the study reported:

The SBA survey cannot satisfactorily answer the question of effectiveness of any protective device or service. These matters relate to elements in design and gathering of data. * * * Lacking information on how many crime attempts might have been made were the devices not there (or a reasonable approximation to it in terms of like, but unprotected, businesses in the area) and lacking information on how the installation of devices has affected the pattern of crimes against, and business losses from, crime (a matter not measured in the survey and difficult to measure in a cross section survey because of memory effect) or analysis of the relationship between patterns of crime and protection from it is suggestive of effects rather than a definitive demonstration of them.¹⁴

Some information was gathered and assessed on the topic of relationship between installation of local alarms, central alarms, reinforcing devices, security guards, firearms and burglary protection for businesses differentiated in two categories: All businesses and retail businesses. These data illustrated that businesses with such protective systems tend to have higher burglary rates than those that do not. Vulnerability of the establishment was given in explanation for this finding. More research, with proper data, was recommended:

This finding does not prove that protective devices have no effect. Protective devices may not affect the burglary rate but their installation may cut dollar losses from burglary, a matter that is not examined in this report. Protective devices may not reduce the burglary rate for other reasons. Their effectiveness—particularly of burglar alarms—depends partly upon police response to an alarm. A quick response can at least cut losses. The deterrence effect of any protective device thus may be much lower than its capacity to cut losses. A likely explanation is the high vulnerability of some businesses to burglary, so that protective devices can reduce their rates, even though the rate remains higher than that of unprotected (and less vulnerable) businesses. More research is needed to determine whether protective devices reduce crime rates and cut losses.¹⁵

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

SRI study

The Stanford Research Institute (SRI) study, appendix C of SBA's report, used SBA field survey data and descriptive material on current and projected preventive and detection systems. An attempt was made in this study to provide a cost/benefit analysis of different types of systems.

The study presents much descriptive material on different types of physical security and detection systems. However there is no systematic attempt to identify technological imperfections, to evaluate hardware effectiveness, to provide the businessman with an estimate of its current cost, or to provide him with an estimate of the combined costs of systems which might be most effective in protecting various types of business establishment.

In their attempts to give a cost/benefit analysis of system configuration for both decreased TAP (time of arrival of police) and increased TI (time of intrusion of criminal), the SRI researchers were handicapped by deficiencies in data.

* * * During the period of this study it has not been possible to obtain data from which a precise determination would be made concerning the relative effectiveness of the various (protective) systems. * * *

There appears to be no data correlating TAP with any of the systems listed. * * * Apprehensions have been effected using all the systems, but the proportion of successful TAP's as against police failures to arrive in time, for any given number of criminal attempts, is not recorded.¹⁶

Research needs

Your committee believes that the question of the efficacy of protective devices in general, and of specific devices, has not been adequately answered in the SBA report. According to the SBA, "the final decision as to countermeasures [must be] made by the proprietor."¹⁷ It is apparent that the individual small businessman would profit from more precise advice about these factors, their bearing on each other, and their relevance for his particular situation. As noted above, many recommendations are made in the study for more adequate data collection and appropriate research. The SBA recommends that the National Crime Institute in the Department of Justice coordinate research and development operations of other Government agencies relating to crime prevention and detection hardware. Your committee endorses these SBA recommendations for further research, and encourages the support and conduct of such research by both the public and private sectors.

During the hearings on the impact of crime, May 21 and 22, 1969, your committee heard that some insurance agencies give premium rate discounts for installations of particular security devices which they have determined to be beneficial in cutting the incidence of crime. For example, Sam Pickard, vice president of the Monsanto Chemical Co., testified:

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

With UL certification, laminated security glass is now rated in the same insurance category as metal screens, gratings, and frames for protecting show windows, side windows, and glass doors. In November 1968, the insurance rating board, which acts for its member companies to establish insurance rates in various States, requested a rate revision in what is called the Mercantile Open Stock Section of the Burglary Insurance Manual. This revision * * * allows a reduction in a store burglary insurance premium. * * * The lowered rates have now been accepted in several States and are pending in most of the others.¹⁸

Your committee encourages the insurance industry to expand its own efforts to conduct research on the development and efficacy of existing and newly developed protective devices. It also endorses insurance industry efforts to cut premium rates for businessmen installing dependable protective devices.

PHYSICAL SECURITY DESIGN

The SBA data on physical security appear to offer significant promise for development of a sound strategy to the problem of crimes against small business. For instance, in the appendix on Protective Devices, the Stanford Research Institute made an effort to analyze the comparative benefits and costs of protective devices versus physical security measures. The researchers concluded:

Using the cost/benefit model and currently available data, certain significant findings were indicated. * * * Among currently available alternative measures considered, it appears that improvements in physical security will provide the greatest cost benefits.¹⁹

Your committee believes that the recommendations made by the SBA for giving increased attention to physical plant and security provide a promising alternative for improving crime prevention and warrant careful consideration.

Special mention was made by the SBA of the failure of the architectural profession "to design security into plans and specifications."

Your committee heard testimony from Mr. Abbott Harle of Victor Gruen Associates, that architectural clients—landlords, builders, and businessmen—frequently do not recognize the need to encourage architects to design physically secure buildings and areas.

What is needed, of course, is recognition by our clients of the seriousness (of crime against small business). Our clients have for many years—sometimes begrudgingly—recognized that it is their responsibility to protect life and property through suitable construction and fire protection measures. They have been educated to the fact that building and fire codes establish the rules and regulations for building, but except for very few cities, no such regulations exist for protection against burglary and robbery.²⁰

¹⁸ Hearings, op. cit., p. 99.

¹⁹ SBA report, op. cit., p. 211.

²⁰ Hearings, May and July 1969, op. cit., p. 74.

Your committee also heard testimony that crime diminishes appreciably if city blocks, and indeed, whole urban areas are well designed.

The Small Business Administration report recommended that landlords, architects, and officials of public and private agencies make a concerted effort to design systems which would drastically increase the time of intrusion and the physical and psychological burdens of criminal attempts to enter the premises of small businesses. SBA also specifically recommends formation of an architectural task group on crime, Federal R. & D. support and assistance in design and standards, and local government efforts to promulgate building codes and standards for security against crime.

Your committee agrees with these recommendations and advocates a well-formulated program of architectural research and development leading to the preparation of design guidance and sound security specifications that it believes would yield a significant payoff in preventing crimes against small business.

Your chairman has been in communication with William H. Scheick, executive director of the American Institute of Architects (AIA), regarding the need for architectural research and development leading to better prevention of crimes against small business. The AIA recommends that:

1. A study and report be authorized under the leadership of the American Institute of Architects. Funds should be made available by the appropriate Government agency designated by Congress, such as the Justice Department, Housing and Urban Development, or Health, Education, and Welfare.
2. Scope of study to include all buildings and groups of buildings subject to major criminal intrusion.
3. Purpose of study to include all buildings and groups of buildings subject to major criminal intrusion.
4. Purpose of study is to arrive at rationally conceived criteria for establishment of recommended uniform standards to provide basis for local regulatory efforts.
5. There should be adequate provision in the authorization to permit indepth research, statistical surveys, and recommendations by behavioral scientists, crime prevention experts, research and testing laboratories, environmental planners, standards-writing organizations, and other such groups as can make substantial contributions to the study.²¹

Your committee agrees that a comprehensive, well-thought-through program of research in this area offers important promise in the development of guidance for the prevention of property crimes against small business.

Accordingly, your committee seeks the establishment of a special task force on building design and physical security, under the leader-

²¹ Letter from Mr. Wm. H. Scheick, executive director, American Institute of Architects, May 21, 1969, to Senator Bible. (Committee files.)

ship of the American Institute of Architects. Membership of the task force should include the following: military security experts, public and private law enforcement officials, criminologists, behavioral scientists, builders, the physical protection device industry, and urban planners.

This task force should address itself to the following topics for research and policy:

(a) Understanding of businessmen's motivations and actions in their attempts to make businesses more attractive and more easily accessible (and consequently less physically secure) to the public.

(b) Research on ways to provide greater physical security with minimum impairment of esthetic values.

(c) Development of a program to educate businessmen and architects on ways to improve physical security.

(d) Encouraging the participation of, and improving the capability of local police departments, to provide architects and builders with assistance in developing building codes and standards giving greater physical security.

(e) Determination of the most effective ratio between improvements in internal and external security.

(f) Development of a strategy to include the objective of physical security in planning urban renewal and community development practices.

(g) Advisability of securing the advice of, and of including in the architectural task force, the expertise and organization of the Building Research Institute of the Building Research Advisory Board in the National Research Council.

(h) Advisability of providing a tax writeoff for businesses subscribing to building codes and standards promulgated by a local or Federal law enforcement or regulatory body.

(i) To support the SBA recommendation that businessmen provide for better lighting, seems to call for an assessment of the deterrent effect of better illumination and development of a set of proved design principles as to the effect of illumination levels and practice on the incidence of crime.

Your committee also desires that the Small Business Administration take prompt steps to encourage awareness of small businessmen of the advantages of designing physical security into new buildings. For example, the Small Business Administration might develop security regulations whose terms must be met for granting of loans to small businessmen. The SBA might also consider formulating recommendations for tax incentives, to encourage small businessmen to adhere to appropriate standards of security design and practice.

INSURANCE INDUSTRY

The SBA report includes a wealth of information describing the insurance problems faced by the small businessman—the problems of cancellation, nonrenewal, above-standard rates, and underinsurance. Graphically described in testimony before the committee on May 21,

1969, by Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (director of the Center for Research in Social Organization, University of Michigan), who directed a major part of the SBA study, were the vicious cycle of crime, higher insurance premiums, and no coverage :

Since at any given time, crime losses fall disproportionately on some businesses than others, most particularly the small businessman who is sole proprietor of a retail trade outlet, his competitive position is at stake. There may even be a kind of cycle where crime losses lead the business to invest in various forms of protection and to get additional coverage through insurance at increased cost to the business. Failing to reduce his victimization from crime substantially, he incurs additional costs that arise through increased insurance rates and finally even cancellation of his insurance together with no opportunity to get a new policy. The only way to cover any of these costs is to raise prices which endanger his competitive position. For the ghetto retail businessman, the problem may be even greater. Higher prices due to crime costs lead to customer discontent which in turn may be reflected in even higher crime losses, such as increased shoplifting.²²

Your committee encourages the insurance industry immediately to take every possible step to provide property and crime insurance to every small businessman at competitive rates.

A major recommendation in the section of the SBA study dealing with insurance (app. F) urges industry initiative in providing crime insurance at standard rates for all insurees regardless of environmental vulnerability to crime or location. This would be accomplished by widening the basic geographic ratemaking unit to equalize insurance rates. Your committee encourages careful attention to this recommendation.

Also important is the recommendation of SBA for establishment of a committee composed of industry representatives, State officials and officials of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Small Business Administration to restructure insurance policies along functional lines.

Other recommendations for the insurance industry are: to educate businessmen in measures that they might take to reduce losses from crime; to overhaul the insurance industry reporting system to provide valid, comprehensive, and comparable statistics; and to give discounts for the installation of protective devices. These measures also merit prompt attention.

A report issued by your committee in 1967 discussed the merits of a well-developed insurance program. The report stated :

In essence, a complete crime insurance program might take on something of the character of a "system" against crime. It could operate to "harden" the resistance of its policyholders, while relieving the burden of cost on those whose protection failed. Its data flow would serve the essential system function of feedback and self-correction. At the same time, it could interact constructively with local agencies charged with the related function of law enforcement.²³

²² Hearings, May and July 1969, op. cit., p. 37.

²³ Contributions of Science and Technology to Federal Crime Insurance, op. cit., p. 54.

Your committee wishes to encourage creative initiative by private officials and governmental authorities at all levels in solving the insurance problem.

During the hearings, your committee received a recommendation from Herbert S. Denenberg, who directed the insurance study of the SBA report. Mr. Denenberg described the benefits of group property and liability insurance to cutting crime losses. He also told the committee about the illegality of such marketing arrangements in most States. "States," said Mr. Denenberg, "should act without delay to make these advantageous marketing methods available to their citizens."²⁴ Your committee urges that State legislatures speedily investigate the merits of this form of insurance to small businessmen. The committee also encourages States to investigate the merits of writing security codes, regulations, or ordinances and proper methods to provide insurance on the basis of compliance with such codes.

Also treated in the committee hearings were descriptions of deficiencies in the existing Fair plan insurance programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Particularly, it was stated that directors at the local level are paying more attention to the insurance industry than they are to the small businessman. The committee urges the Department of Housing and Urban Development to carefully review implementation of this program.

The SBA report recommended that Fair plan insurance coverage also be promptly extended to include crime insurance. In particular the SBA recommended that:

The Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development require insurers to participate in Fair plan and other programs designed to improve the availability of burglary, theft, and vandalism and malicious mischief insurance as a condition to purchasing from the Department reinsurance against losses from riots and civil disorders.²⁵

During its hearings, the committee heard testimony that HUD has not yet acted to extend the Fair plan to cover crime insurance. The District of Columbia is the only local jurisdiction indicating it intends to include crime insurance in its Fair plan. Mr. Denenberg urged that immediate action—by HUD and the States—is in order to see that essential crime insurance is made available to all property owners.²⁶ Your committee urges prompt attention to this recommendation.

MUNICIPAL SECURITY ORDINANCES

Your committee has heard evidence that a large part of the problem of crime against small business can be attacked successfully by careful attention to development of municipal security ordinances in conjunction with crime prevention community relations programs. All communities in the Nation are urged to investigate the appropriateness and feasibility of such programs for application within their jurisdictions. It is important to stress that these programs have two interrelated parts: (1) installation of protective hardware and

²⁴ Hearings, op. cit., p. 53.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

security programs by the individual business; and (2) closer relations between businesses and police.

During the hearings, your committee heard testimony from Sgt. John G. Kearns, of the Oakland, Calif., Police Department. "As part of its extensive crime control program," said Sergeant Kearns, "the community enacted, in 1964, a burglary prevention ordinance which requires minimum standards of physical security for certain types of commercial establishments. Implementation of this program—with its essential supporting activities designed to heighten community interest and participation—have been instrumental in cutting crime in Oakland. The features, which are an integral and indispensable part of implementing the ordinance, include:

- Periodic filing of insecure premises reports;
- Followup investigations and consultations between police officers and businessmen;
- Periodic surveys designed to detect patterns of crime and apprehension;
- Establishment of a coordinating committee composed of manufacturers, building designers, landlords, tenants, and law enforcement officials to develop and improve the physical security ordinance;
- Establishment of well-publicized robbery prevention programs;
- Encouragement of close community relations between law enforcement officers and businessmen;
- Education of all segments of the community; and
- Encouragement of self-help crime prevention programs.²⁷

Sergeant Kearns testified that, since promulgation of the ordinance, commercial burglaries, while increasing, have done so at a rate approximately 83 percent less than for increases in residential burglaries.²⁸

Your committee urges that all municipalities and local law enforcement jurisdictions in the Nation consider the advisability of following the Oakland, Calif., lead in developing municipal security ordinances and programs of community relations to attack the problem of crimes against small business. While development of an effective ordinance and community relations programs are inherently local responsibilities, the committee recommends that the Federal Government cooperate in providing guidance and funding aid for such efforts. The National Commission on Urban Problems recommended establishment of a special group to provide for the functions of formulation of improved standards for building design, for research and testing of improved technological innovations, and for assembling and disseminating technical data.

Your committee urges that officials weighing this proposal also consider making physical security against crime a major responsibility of the proposed group.²⁹ The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration would also be in a position to assist local police juris-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 81 ff.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

²⁹ *Building the American City. Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems to the Congress and to the President of the United States. H. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., first sess. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 266, 318-9.*

dictions and communities in designing effective ordinance and community relations programs. In addition, the proposed Task Force on Physical Security can provide essential technical and sociological guidance to national and local officials in these important areas. Likewise, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Department of Justice can provide useful guidance in particular functional areas. The committee urges all concerned to begin work at once to develop local security ordinances in conjunction with crime prevention community relations programs.

POLICE DEPARTMENTS

The SBA report identifies two functions of police in the control of crimes against small business: (1) to assist in deterring intrusion of the criminal, and (2) to assist in apprehending the offender. Recommendations for improving apprehension relates to the SBA objective of lowering TAP (time of arrival of police). A suggested goal was a TAP of 60 seconds; this goal was judged feasible of attainment within 10 years. Other police-oriented recommendations are for police assistance in helping small businessmen reduce the number of false alarms, and development of multiple uses for communication alarm systems by police, civil defense, and fire departments.

Several general recommendations are offered for improving the crime prevention function of police operations. The recommendations include: Providing the police with special training in community relations, in utilization of a systems approach to coordinate crime deterrence efforts of the community, and in advising architects and builders developing and promulgating building codes. Your committee believes that these recommendations merit close attention, and encourages the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice to increase assistance to local law enforcement agencies in these endeavors.

THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The SBA study recommended that the Federal Government play a significant role in future efforts to combat the problem of crimes against small business. Specifically it recommended that:

The National Crime Institute, with an advisory body of industry professionals and officials from other agencies, coordinate the conduct and support of research and development relevant to the control of crimes against small businesses;

There be established an advisory group (composed of officials from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, The Crime Institute, and the Small Business Administration) to monitor the progress of the insurance industry in providing adequate crime insurance, and

Provision be made for the Government to conduct a bi- or tri-ennial followup of the SBA crime survey.³⁰

³⁰ SBA report, op. cit., p. 18.

The study also recommended that SBA take the initiative to educate businessmen in crime prevention measures, and that it provide for loans to improve facilities, and other cooperative efforts.

Your committee commends these recommendations for Federal stimulation and coordination of research and development geared to eliminating the problem of crime against small business. The need for such a role is prompted by the gravity of the problem and the complex tactics which must be taken to solve it.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The SBA study represents a start in the direction of attacking the problem of property crimes against small business, but much remains to be done.

First, more data need to be gathered, such as: determination of types of business establishments that are most vulnerable to crime, and the correlation of this information with data concerning location, socio-economic characteristics of locale, and types of protective systems employed. Determination of the causes and effective deterrents of crime against small business is one necessary first step in developing a preventive program and ascertaining its costs and potential payoff.

A second problem relates to systematically assessing the causes and solutions to the crime problem. The SBA stated its intention to conduct a systems analysis study of the problem of crime against small business. It was not able to complete this task because of the lack of appropriate data. In recommending solutions, the SBA said that it would attempt to deal with the problem in a coordinated, systems analysis fashion but was again unable to do this. For example, the report stated that all segments of the community with the cooperation of the police should confront the problem in a coordinated fashion, yet all components and interrelationships and tasks of such a strategy were not identified.

The cost/benefit analysis of the SRI study in appendix C may also be considered to suffer from misdirection of emphasis. Here, as throughout the report, the deterrent or preventive effect of protective devices is sometimes too readily equated with the detection function, especially in discussing alarm hardware. The SRI group used estimates of costs of devices and of losses due to crime 10 years hence. No specific devices were discussed, and there was no attempt to evaluate the estimated data against changing sociological patterns of crime against small business. No items were singled out for priority research and development. In order to provide the small businessman with precise estimates of his best strategies for preventing crime, these investigations might perhaps be extended.

Recommendations

The foregoing report delineates the problem as evidenced by the report of the Small Business Administration and your committee in its hearings. It provides clear guidance for further study and offers certain remedial solutions to these most serious problems.

Recommendation 1.—Your committee should conduct an indepth study of crime against small business.

This investigation should begin by examining thefts of goods that enter the distribution network. It should then examine theft from warehouses and terminals. Following this, the inquiry should examine crimes against retail and service-type industries and should include an examination into: burglary, robbery, shoplifting, employee theft, check and credit card fraud, and other such property crimes.

Integrated into this inquiry would be an examination of peripheral areas having relevance which include insurance, technological innovation, and organized criminal activity.

To offer interim relief, the following additional recommendations are proposed:

Recommendation 2.—Your committee urges continued implementation and greater emphasis by the SBA on its program of providing information on managerial practices which will aid small businesses secure their establishments against many types of criminal activity.

Recommendation 3.—As outlined in this report, your committee urges the establishment of an architectural task force to begin consideration of building security. This task force should be composed of representatives of the architectural profession, industry, and government.

Recommendation 4.—The Department of Housing and Urban Development should begin a review of the Fair insurance program to determine if it is meeting the insurance requirements of the small businessman operating in high-crime areas, and/or if further strengthening of this program is in order to enable it to meet the needs for which it was designed.

Recommendation 5.—That the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice should continue and expand its activities in assisting the development of new technological systems and devices to prevent criminal activity directed at small business.

These recommendations do not constitute an end in themselves, but are offered as interim, remedial measures which might afford some relief to the small businessman whose very existence is threatened by the specter of increasing crime.

Your committee hopes that with extensive research and investigation meaningful preventive measures might be developed which will offer permanent relief to the American small businessman.

Senator BIBLE. The second phase of our committee's examination of the impact of crime on small business centered on crime-oriented losses in the cargo theft-pilferage area, from the entry of goods into the commerce cycle until their delivery to the ultimate consumer. Thus, we began an investigation and hearings into theft from each of the different modes of transportation—air, water, rail and truck, which is costing American business upwards of \$1 billion per year and inflating prices of ordinary household products for the general public. To capsule the problem, our hearings and investigations show a carrier cargo crisis is upon American business and consumers today, whether we choose to admit it or not. Up to this point, our law enforcement agencies, our Federal shipping regulatory and policy bodies and our transport industry generally have been unable to mount an effective response. Meanwhile, the public pays the heavy price of crime.

As the President of the National Association of Transport Security Officers told our Committee:

Too many carriers have not yet identified the problem in their record keeping, too many law enforcement bodies have thrown up their hands at the magnitude of the problem and choose to ignore it, and too many prosecutors have chosen not to pursue what they do not understand . . .

And we found all kinds of testimony of prosecuting attorneys dismissing cases because of a lack of sufficient evidence and sometimes because the amount involved was not large, other times because of the difficulty of connecting it up to prove the case.

Mr. Chairman, there seems to be no argument that the cargo-theft pilferage problem is at the heart of the biggest multi-billion dollar racket nationally today—stealing from business. What concerns me most is the fact that as the problem accelerates, there is no real coordinated effort on the part of the Federal, State, or local government to seek a solution.

And what kind of dollar losses are we talking about? Because of the surprising fact that no Government agencies and no trade or service organization keep comprehensive records of total tonnage or of value of freight shipped in this country, accurate totals of crime-oriented losses are difficult to compute because there are no required uniform loss reports either. However, the Senate Small Business Committee has developed some meaningful statistics we believe are both conservative and as accurate as possible. Crime-based cargo losses nationwide for 1969 totaled \$1.2 billion. This was led by truck thefts and hijackings at \$828 million and airlines at \$50 to \$100 million, and probably more.

And let me give a summary of crime losses as we developed them in our hearings. Cargo thefts from air carriers more than tripled last year. John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City reported freight cargo thefts last year of \$3.5 million. Airmail parcel post thefts of securities, cash, diamonds, and other high-value items were \$65 million from 1967 through 1969 at Kennedy Airport, where Post Office officials are critical of airline security efforts. Shippers there lost more than \$1 million in 1 week last year, while the American Watch Association testified that its cargo losses there exceeded \$2.5 million between 1967 and 1969. If you relate that to a company such

as General Motors, it would be similar to General Motors losing \$300 million worth of automobiles. Our concern obviously, as I have tried to make clear, is the impact upon small business.

Truck thefts and hijackings cost \$828 million in 1969, according to the American Trucking Association's Theft-Hijacking Committee. Estimates show these losses jumped from \$275 million in 1966 to \$325 million in 1967 and to \$600 million in 1968. For 1970, losses for the first 7 months were already 12 percent over the 1969 total.

Reported waterfront losses were \$100 million last year but our projections would indicate \$170 million is more accurate.

Railroads had a freight loss-damage total in 1969 of \$210 million, compared to \$182 million in 1968, according to statistics given our committee by the Association of American Railroads. Estimates are that 50 percent are crime-oriented losses but a number of railroad special agents told our committee investigators that this 50-percent figure should be doubled for crime losses.

And what about the skyrocketing world of air cargo transport as it breaks all tonnage records? Freightling of goods by air has grown more than 20 percent annually in recent years. In 1958, domestic air carriers flew 725,717,000 ton miles. That tripled in 10 years by 1968 to 2,910,000,000 ton miles in 1968. Air cargo is projected to quadruple in the 1970's with the larger aircraft coming on and I know the interest of the chairman in one of those aircraft. Cargo valued at \$9.5 billion passed through the world's largest air terminal, New York's Kennedy Airport, in 1969, 22 percent more than 1968.

To meet the cargo-moving crime challenge of the 1970's, 1980's, and beyond, a broad, businesslike examination of the whole cargo transport spectrum with a Government, carrier, labor, and businessman-shipper partnership involved is imperative lest the theft problem paralyzes our free flow of commerce.

On March 16, 1970, I introduced, along with eight Senators as co-sponsors, S. 3595, to establish a temporary presidentially appointed Commission on Security and Safety of Cargo. This Commission would be charged with developing preventive measures to deal with this growing problem. I submit for your record a copy of the bill and remarks I made upon its introduction, plus an article from the September 14 issue of U.S. News and World Report, about cargo theft.

(The information referred to above for the record follows:)

91ST CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 3595

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 16, 1970

MR. BIBLE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce

A BILL

To establish a Commission on Security and Safety of Cargo.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECLARATION OF POLICY

4 SECTION 1. (a) The Congress finds that one of the
5 fundamental bases for the development and growth of com-
6 merce and trade on an interstate and international basis is the
7 security and safety of movement of such goods and cargo.
8 The Congress has become aware that there is an alarming
9 growth of criminal activity which results in loss of and dam-
10 age to goods moving in interstate and international commerce.
11 Such loss and theft are increasing to the degree that it repre-

II

1 sends a clear and present danger to the national economy,
2 especially American business and particularly the small
3 business community, which bears the greatest portion of such
4 losses. The Congress further finds that the Constitution places
5 the control, regulation, and stimulation of interstate and in-
6 ternational commerce and trade within the purview of the
7 Federal Government. Prevention of larcenies and malfea-
8 sances in connection with goods in interstate and interna-
9 tional transit is an inherently difficult phase of crime control;
10 goods in motion or in large-scale storage are hard to watch
11 closely; the multijurisdictional nature of thefts facilitates
12 criminal evasion; and protection arrangements impose un-
13 welcome and often disastrous expenses in terms of operational
14 delays, added paperwork, and increased costs for insurance
15 and protection. The Congress finds that common carriers
16 in cargo transportation by air, truck, rail, and water, mani-
17 fest a serious deficiency in the level of coordination and
18 effort needed to establish deterrents and preventive measures
19 and utilize resources to combat criminal activity. These
20 criminal activities and attendant losses pose an especially
21 serious threat to the economic stability of small business.
22 The apparent magnitude of the resultant costs suggests that
23 the Federal Government make a further detailed and con-
24 tinuing inquiry to determine whether remedial measures can
25 and should be implemented by cargo carriers, their agents

1 and assigns, possibly supported by Federal assistance, to
2 minimize criminally inspired losses of cargo during storage
3 and transit.

4 (b) The Congress further finds that State and local gov-
5 ernments, through exercise of their regulatory powers, have
6 an equal responsibility in stimulating measures to enhance
7 the safety and security of cargo storage and transport. Ac-
8 cordingly, attempts by the Federal Government to deter and
9 curb such losses, thefts, and pilferages should be coordinated
10 at various levels of government.

11 (c) It is the purpose of this Act to establish a commis-
12 sion which shall conduct an inquiry and research into matters
13 of cargo security for the purpose of designing programs to
14 achieve maximum security and safety for such cargo when
15 in storage and in transit in interstate and foreign commerce.
16 It is a further purpose to create an organization which will
17 administer this Act and implement its purposes by establish-
18 ing liaison and coordination with, by, and between the com-
19 mon carriers, their agents and assigns, as well as supporting
20 organizations such as private terminal operators, port authori-
21 ties, and others, engaged in all modes of transportation, dis-
22 tribution, and storage of goods and cargo in transit, and by
23 fostering consultation and coordination with appropriate gov-
24 ernmental and private agencies and concerns.

1 ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION

2 SEC. 2. (a) For the purpose of carrying out the intent
3 of Congress as expressed in this Act, there is hereby created
4 a commission to be known as the Commission on Security and
5 Safety of Cargo (hereinafter referred to as the "Com-
6 mission").

7 (b) The Commission shall be composed of individuals
8 who, by virtue of their education and experience, demonstrate
9 an ability to discover causes, develop solutions, and imple-
10 ment strategies to solve the problem of cargo loss and theft.
11 Members shall include one representative from each mode of
12 the cargo transportation industry, air, truck, rail, and water:
13 one representative from the cargo handlers labor organiza-
14 tions; one representative from terminal operators and inde-
15 pendent warehouse and storage concerns; and three repre-
16 sentatives of the Federal Government, consisting of the At-
17 torney General of the United States, the Secretary of Trans-
18 portation, and the Secretary of Commerce.

19 (c) The members of the Commission, other than those
20 designated to represent the Federal Government, shall be ap-
21 pointed by the President. Not more than four of such ap-
22 pointed members shall be members of the same political party.

23 (d) The Chairman of the Commission shall be elected
24 annually from among the members of the Commission.

25 (e) The following shall be ex officio members of the

1 Commission: the Chairman of the Interstate-Commerce Com-
2 mission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Mari-
3 time Commission; the Commissioner of Customs; one repre-
4 sentative having expertise in providing security for the stor-
5 age and movement of Federal cargo appointed by each of the
6 following: the Secretary of Defense, the Atomic Energy
7 Commission, and the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
8 ministration; one representative of the National Bureau of
9 Standards appointed by the Secretary of Commerce; one
10 representative from the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
11 ministration appointed by the Attorney General; and one
12 representative from the cargo underwriters-insurance indus-
13 try. Ex officio members of the Commission shall not partici-
14 pate except in an advisory capacity to the Commission in
15 the formulation of its findings and recommendations.

16 (f) Vacancies on the Commission shall be filled in the
17 same manner as initial appointments.

18 (g) A quorum of the Commission shall consist of five
19 members, but two members shall be sufficient for the pur-
20 pose of taking testimony, or conducting any hearings on a
21 matter within the purview of the Commission's jurisdiction.

22 COMPENSATION OF COMMISSION MEMBERS

23 SEC. 3. (a) Members of the Commission who are officers
24 or full-time employees of the Government shall serve without

1 compensation in addition to that received for their services
2 as such officers or employees; but they shall be allowed travel
3 expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence as au-
4 thorized by section 5703 of title 5, United States Code, for
5 persons in Government service employed intermittently.

6 (b) Other members of the Commission who are not
7 officers or officials in the employ of the United States shall
8 be compensated at the rate of \$50 per day when engaged in
9 the actual business and duties vested in the Commission, and
10 in addition be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in
11 lieu of subsistence as authorized by section 5703 of title 5,
12 United States Code.

13 STAFF OF THE COMMISSION

14 SEC. 4. (a) The Commission may appoint such person-
15 nel as it deems necessary without regard to the provisions of
16 title 5 of the United States Code concerning appointments in
17 the competitive services and such personnel may be paid
18 without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subtitle
19 3 of chapter 53 of such title, relating to classification and
20 general schedule pay rates.

21 (b) The staff of the Commission shall be composed of,
22 but not limited to, individuals having expertise determined
23 to be pertinent to the conduct of a systematic operations
24 research study of the problem of cargo theft, such as persons
25 qualified in statistical mathematics, applied mathematics,

1 human factors engineering, security engineering, cargo opera-
2 tions and movement, police and law enforcement, social
3 psychology, criminology, business management, traffic en-
4 gineering, security architecture, and deterrence, detection,
5 and apprehension technology and methodology.

6 POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

7 SEC. 5. (a) The Commission, or any two members
8 thereof as authorized by the Commission, may conduct hear-
9 ings anywhere in the United States or otherwise secure data
10 and expressions of opinions pertinent to the study. The Com-
11 mission shall publish notice of any proposed hearing in the
12 Federal Register and shall afford a reasonable opportunity
13 for interested persons to present relevant testimony and data.
14 In connection therewith the Commission is authorized by
15 the majority vote—

16 (1) to require, by special or general orders, cor-
17 porations, business firms, and individuals to submit in
18 writing such reports and answers to questions as the
19 Commission may prescribe; such submission shall be
20 made within such reasonable period and under oath or
21 otherwise as the Commission may determine;

22 (2) to administer oaths;

23 (3) to require by subpoena the attendance and testi-
24 mony of witnesses and the production of all documentary
25 evidence relating to the execution of its duties;

1 (4) in the case of disobedience to a subpoena or or-
2 der issued under this subsection, to invoke the aid of any
3 district court of the United States in requiring compli-
4 ance with such subpoena or order;

5 (5) in any proceeding or investigation to order
6 testimony to be taken by deposition before any person
7 who is designated by the Commission and has the power
8 to administer oaths, and in such instances to compel tes-
9 timony and the production of evidence in the same man-
10 ner as authorized under clauses (3) and (4) of this
11 subsection; and

12 (6) to pay witnesses the same fees and mileage as
13 are paid in like circumstances in the courts of the United
14 States.

15 (b) Any district court of the United States within the
16 jurisdiction of which an inquiry is carried on may, in case
17 of refusal to obey a subpoena or order of the Commission is-
18 sued under subsection (a) of this section, issue an order re-
19 quiring compliance therewith; and any failure to obey the
20 order of the court may be punished by the court as a con-
21 tempt thereof.

22 (c) The Commission is authorized to request from any
23 department, agency, or independent instrumentality of the
24 Government any information it deems necessary to carry out
25 its functions under this Act; and each such department,

1 agency, or independent instrumentality is authorized to co-
2 operate with the Commission and, to the extent permitted
3 by law, to furnish such information to the Commission upon
4 request made by the Chairman or the Vice Chairman when
5 acting as Chairman.

6 (d) The Commission is authorized to enter into con-
7 tracts with Federal or State agencies, private firms, insti-
8 tutions, and individuals for the conduct of research or sur-
9 veys, the preparation of reports, and other activities necessary
10 to the discharge of its duties.

11 (e) (1) When the Commission finds that publication
12 of any information obtained by it is in the public interest
13 and would not give an unfair competitive advantage to any
14 person, it is authorized to publish such information in the
15 form and manner deemed best adapted for public use, ex-
16 cept that data and information which would separately dis-
17 close the business transactions of any person, trade secrets,
18 or names of customers shall be held confidential and shall
19 not be disclosed by the Commission or its staff: *Provided,*
20 *however,* That the Commission shall permit business firms
21 or individuals reasonable access to documents furnished by
22 them for the purpose of obtaining or copying such docu-
23 ments as need may arise.

24 (f) The Commission is authorized to delegate any of its

1 functions to individual members of the Commission or to
2 designate individuals on its staff and to make such rules and
3 regulations as are necessary for the conduct of its business,
4 except as herein otherwise provided.

5

DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION

6 SEC. 6. It shall be the duty of the Commission to under-
7 take and compile inquiries and studies to determine the
8 causes, and practical and effective measures for the preven-
9 tion and deterrence of loss, theft, and pilferage of cargo in
10 interstate and international commerce. It shall be a further
11 duty of the Commission to encourage the use of existing pre-
12 ventive technology and to promote the development of new
13 techniques, procedures, and methods to enhance the safety
14 and security of cargo storage and transportation. Such duties
15 shall include, but not be limited to—

16

(1) definition and description of the causes, scope,

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and value of losses due to cargo theft;

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(2) evaluation of methods to deter cargo theft,

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including analysis of labor-management practices; pack-

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aging and labeling of cargo; containerization; personnel

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security; prevention, detection, and apprehension sys-

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tems and devices; physical security protection, including

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lighting, fencing, gate placement, and other similar

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means; sociological and psychological deterrents and

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remedies; liaison of cargo security programs between law

1 enforcement agencies and cargo terminal operators, for-
2 warders, and transporters;

3 (3) design, implementation, and analysis of pilot
4 experimental programs to demonstrate the effectiveness
5 of different security systems;

6 (4) establishment and maintenance of liaison with
7 the various modes of transportation of cargo to exchange
8 and disseminate data to promote safety and security of
9 cargo;

10 (5) periodic consultations with appropriate govern-
11 mental and private agencies to discuss problems and
12 investigate solutions;

13 (6) complementing programs and activities of dif-
14 ferent modes of cargo transport to produce an effective
15 and low-cost program of safety and security;

16 (7) development of a system of comprehensive,
17 continuous and uniform loss and damage reporting by the
18 different modes of transportation;

19 (8) study and evaluation of present carrier liability
20 limits for losses incurred in the transport of cargo by
21 the different modes of transportation, and evaluation of
22 the adequacy of such limits of liability;

23 (9) development of physical facility security stand-
24 ards and encouragement of voluntary implementation by
25 the various industries involved;

1 (10) continuous reassessment of programs, plans
2 and operations to determine necessary revisions; and

3 (11) recommendations for legislative, administra-
4 tive, or other actions deemed necessary to promote the
5 safety of cargo transport.

6 **REPORTS**

7 **SEC. 7.** The Commission shall report to the President
8 and to the Congress its findings and recommendations as
9 deemed desirable and necessary, but in no event less often
10 than annually.

11 **AUTHORIZATION**

12 **SEC. 8.** There is authorized to be appropriated for the
13 purpose of this Act not to exceed \$250,000 for each fiscal
14 year.

15 **TERMINATION DATE**

16 **SEC. 9.** The Commission shall continue in existence until
17 December 30, 1975, at which time it shall cease to exist.
18 Prior to such date, it shall provide the Congress with a com-
19 plete report on its activities pursuant to this Act, and its
20 final recommendations.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN BIBLE, CHAIRMAN, SENATE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, RE INTRODUCTION OF BILL TO ESTABLISH A FEDERAL COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND SAFETY OF CARGO, MARCH 16, 1970

Mr. President, I send to the desk for appropriate reference a bill to establish a Presidentially-appointed commission to investigate and recommend steps to seek out methods to curb alarming increases in cargo theft, pilferage, and hijacking in the air, truck, water, and rail transport industries that today have pushed normal cargo movements to a crisis point for some businesses. This is especially true in incoming international air shipments.

The time is overdue for a hard look at both the short and long run approaches to this growing problem which is the heart of the biggest multi-billion-dollar racket nationally today—stealing from business. Its worst victims are the small businessmen, who can least afford it, and the consumer public who, in the final analysis, pays a crime-inflated price for his needs.

As an example, the Civil Aeronautics Board has before it a tariff revision application that could on April 1 stop interstate shipments of furs by air to and from the New York City area, the nation's fur manufacturing center. Air Cargo, Inc., the ground service organization owned by the nation's airlines, has asked permission to cancel pickup and delivery service for fur shipments as a result of growing thefts. Exactly what effect this will have on the fur-raising industry of Alaska and many northern and western States cannot be accurately forecast right now.

Is this the forerunner of other high-value cargoes which the airlines may find it impossible to handle in the normal course of ordinary commerce because of thievery? Likewise, is this an admission that the problem is so severe that the airlines find it impossible to control?

The Committee on Small Business, of which I have the honor to serve as Chairman, has been actively involved for the last two years in an investigation and hearings into cargo theft in air commerce and at waterfront docks and terminals and its impact on the small business shippers who rely on public carriers to deliver their products. We are pleased that the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Transportation have recently turned their attention to the cargo crime problem.

What the exact crime cargo losses are in our domestic-international commerce cycle today cannot be accurately measured because loss-reporting systems for all transport modes are not in use. But our Committee has some information that serves as an indicator of the real dimensions of the problem.

The growing severity of crime in air commerce is provided by the American Institute of Marine Underwriters which reveals that the theft of goods from air carriers has tripled over the past year. Stolen cargo on incoming international air shipments insured by the Institute's member companies had a value of \$6 million in 1969.

Because no loss reports are kept by airlines, some estimates place domestic-international air cargo losses in this country at \$20 million to \$50 million or more in 1969. Most air cargo is not insured and small businessmen, as a result of loss-induced high insurance premiums, generally self insure.

As another example, the American Watch Association testified that air cargo losses for one year exceeded \$2½ million, comparable to a company like General Motors losing some \$300 million per year in automobile thefts. Shippers lost more than \$1 million in one week last year at New York City's Kennedy International Airport.

Another hard-hit transport mode is in truck thefts and hijacking whose losses reached over \$600 million for 1969, according to figures provided to the Committee by the American Insurance Association. Babaco, a private alarm company serving trucking companies, estimates 1969 losses were \$702 million, 17 percent above 1968.

What the exact dimensions of thievery are in the water-front dock category are not accurately known. For one reason, no loss-reporting system is in use. We are aware of the Treasury Department's plans to submit proposed legislation to the Congress seeking to deal with this problem. We do hope it will not provide for a Federal police force on the docks and thereby add another layer of a Federal bureaucracy.

As demonstrated preliminarily by our hearings, present Federal agencies with authority over maritime shipping unquestionably require stronger powers. And equally important, more effective and closer cooperation by all Federal, State, and local law enforcement and regulatory agencies, plus more realistic and af-

firmative cooperation by private industry, business and labor areas involved would assist.

But, Mr. President, most of all, the cargo theft problem must be attacked on all fronts within the entire transport chain—truck, air, water, and rail.

My bill, for which I invite co-sponsors who are disturbed by the skyrocketing cargo thievery, seeks to take a businesslike, hard look, with a government, industry, labor, and shipper partnership involved.

As a summary, my bill would establish a Commission on Security and Safety of Cargo, with nine members drawn from air, truck, water, and rail carriers, cargo labor unions, terminal-warehouse operators, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Commerce. Ex-officio members would include Federal transportation regulatory agencies and the insurance industry.

Briefly, the Commission's duties would be:

- (1) To define the causes, scope, and value of cargo losses and their disposal methods.
- (2) To evaluate cargo theft deterrents including packaging, containerization, personnel security, physical security, law enforcement liaison.
- (3) To establish a uniform, centralized loss-reporting system for all cargo.
- (4) To examine insurance liability limitations.
- (5) To encourage development of crime prevention technology.
- (6) To recommend appropriate legislation to Congress.

Mr. President, hearings by the Small Business Committee to date have demonstrated that too little attention has been paid to fundamental efforts to achieve security and safety of cargo. Testimony showed that unless conditions are improved in the transport of air and maritime cargo, some major shippers and importers would begin to consider Montreal, Canada, as a port of entry for the purpose of assuring safe delivery of cargo by circumventing the congestion, theft, and pilferage at the New York waterfront docks and airports.

That losses, thefts and pilferages have produced inestimable damage in cargo is no longer a matter of dispute. The question is: What shall we do to bring about some remedial reforms? Some attempts have been made by some segments of the transportation industry to promote voluntary improvements to increase the safety and security of cargo. But, it is convincingly clear that despite sound motives, the solution is not solely there. Insurance payments can no longer be substituted for good security. Cargo loss reimbursements have brought insurance companies to their knees, bringing policy cancellations.

The need for safekeeping, protection, safe and secure delivery of cargo is a matter of community interest within the transportation industry. One segment of the industry, whether it be air, truck, rail, or ship, cannot succeed without continuity of protection and security of its cargo.

Notwithstanding the competitive character and different modes of transportation, cargo in many instances will run the entire gamut from point of origin to point of delivery, involving every form of transportation. Protection of cargo must be uniform, continuous and uninterrupted.

The instability and lack of uniform protective procedures for safe and secure delivery of cargo demand establishment of a body consisting of representatives of both government and private industry which would function as a coordinated unit.

The Commission on Security and Safety of Cargo which I propose, will form a partnership to amass all resources available through research, assessments, and intelligence data of the private sector and of government. This sharing of responsibility can produce an effective impact.

There are those who believe the transportation industry, faced with the economic demands of a burgeoning population and the complexities of the economic-social changes of the 1970s, needs a new burst of innovative enthusiasm. Since transporting cargo is its business, possibly it requires new ideas, new variations, new dimensions, and new answers, lest the theft problem become uncontrollable.

Our primary focus must always be what will be beneficial to the American businessman and the consumer. A reduction in cargo theft will produce beneficial economic effect upon both because they will be relieved of some of the undue and unfair burdens of additional costs which transporters and shippers have imposed upon them to make up for the major increases they have suffered through losses, thefts, and pilferages of all commodities, including those which are necessities of life.

The time to try is here and now. Delay will only accentuate the problem.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of what I believe are the purposes and goals of the proposed Commission on Security and Safety

of Cargo, be inserted in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks together with the full text of the bill.

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND SAFETY OF CARGO

FUNCTIONAL OPERATIONS

I. Scope and Purpose

The Commission would be a coordinate body of the private and government sectors exercising jurisdiction over the safety and security of cargo transported in interstate commerce, whether by air, truck, rail or marine carrier. It would function to promulgate policies and procedures for regulatory control to assure maximum safety and security of cargo through advisory powers. The primary mandate of the Commission would be to curb and deter losses, thefts, and pilferages, and various forms of criminal activity inflicted upon cargo, and to promote operational measures for implementation by carriers, while serving as a clearing house for research and expert technology to enhance the security of cargo transport.

Due to inherent and intrinsic operations of cargo movements in the different modes of transportation, the bill recognizes that there is an imperative need in the transport industry :

(a) To establish and promote continuing liaison among the various carriers transporting cargo.

(b) To confer periodically with the cargo transportation media, to exchange information and cause dissemination of the same which is of mutual interest for cargo security.

(c) To complement the various security activities of cargo transport to achieve optimum effectiveness and efficiency at minimum costs and maximum economy to small business and the consumer.

(d) To serve as a catalytic agent to improve cargo safety and security among cargo carriers, and

(e) To encourage private industry in cargo transport to serve as an adjunct to the law enforcement community, where responsibility is vested for investigation and prosecution of such criminal activities.

The Commission would serve to provide unity of direction and purpose in the promotion of cargo transport security by combining and correlating the collective efforts of the cargo transporters.

II. Implementation of Policies and Purposes

The Commission would achieve its mandate in a gradual and methodical approach by a preliminary analysis of the current activities, operations and procedures currently utilized for the security of cargo transport and defining of this must be accomplished within a broad perspective by ascertaining the policies and functions of the various transport carriers relative to those areas involving :

(a) Personnel Security

(b) Physical Facilities Security for Cargo

(c) Liaison and Coordination of Cargo Security Programs and Procedures

(d) Uniform and Centralized Reporting Procedures for Cargo Losses, Thefts and Pilferages

(e) Training of Cargo Transport Personnel Security.

The implementation process would be accomplished through five steps progressively by :

(a) Analysis through research, surveys and inspections,

(b) Evaluation of the findings made,

(c) Recommendations for voluntary compliance by the carriers and wherever appropriate recommended legislative remedies,

(d) Implementation of recommendations by the carriers, and

(e) Revisions as appropriate to assure continuing maximum security and minimum economic impact upon all concerned.

Guides, standards and procedures would be promulgated and requests made for voluntary compliance by the industries. Where deemed necessary, or appropriate, specific recommendations for corrective activities and procedures would be made to the Federal regulatory agencies having jurisdiction or to the Executive or Legislative branches of the Federal government. In essence, the programs sponsored by the Commission would be designed to fill the void existing among the law enforcement agencies as a result of manpower shortage.

From the U. S. News & World Report, Sept. 14, 1970

TRUCK HIJACKING: Fastest-Growing Racket

A new crime wave has hit the U. S.—cargo "piracy." Gangs have taken it over, built it into a racket that baffles police—and costs consumers billions of dollars.



One of the fastest-growing crimes in this country is the stealing of freight cargoes. It has become an organized racket that costs Americans more than a billion dollars a year.

Increasingly, trucks loaded with valuable merchandise are hijacked on streets and highways. Warehouses are looted systematically. So are railroad freight yards and waterfront docks. Now airports are becoming prime targets.

Most of this massive stealing is masterminded by crime cartels, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Modus operandi. This is often the way it works:

Criminals are placed in key jobs inside the transportation industry. They "finger" the cargoes to be stolen, frequently take part in the actual theft.

Then the stolen merchandise is funneled into the nation's markets through wholesale and retail outlets controlled by organized gangs—and sold to an unsuspecting public at enormous profits.

"It is alarming that much of the loot moves through channels of legitimate business," says Gilbert Meyer, in charge of cargo-theft investigation for the American Insurance Association, whose member companies bear much of the mounting loss. "Professional thieves have established footholds in many manufacturing, distributing and merchandising industries."

U. S. Attorney General John N. Mitchell has charged that organized crime has virtually taken over the air-freight industry at one of the nation's largest airports.

A determined battle against this thievary is developing. Federal, State and local governments are moving into action. The transportation industry is tightening its security.

So far, however, it is a losing battle.

The racket keeps growing. The big rise began in 1967. How it has grown is shown in the chart on pages 28 and 29.

Here is an idea of the size of the problem: In the year ending on June 30, the FBI received reports of 20,349 cargo thefts in interstate commerce alone. In these cases, there were 1,013 convictions and goods worth 15 millions were recovered. This does not include countless cases handled by State and city police.

Getting away with it. Relatively few of the cargo thieves are caught. And Mr. Meyer expresses doubt that more than 5 per cent of the stolen goods is ever recovered.

Cargo theft has spread all across the country. But it is worst along the East Coast from Boston to Washington—especially in the New York area.

On average, about 10 trucks are hijacked and some \$300,000 worth of goods stolen each week in New York City and its vicinity.

The garment district in midtown Manhattan is a hotbed of piracy. Truckloads of ready-to-wear clothing are hijacked in broad daylight in heavy traffic while being transferred only a few blocks from one place of business to another. Many of the loads are valued at \$100,000 or more.

Truck hijacking is done in many ways. Sometimes a driver finds himself looking into a gun muzzle when he stops at a red light. From a car which has drawn alongside, several men emerge to take over his truck. Usually the driver is released unhurt several hours later.

Often the hijacking is done without weapons. A thief may simply present forged documents to claim a load and drive it away. Frequently, trucks or trailers are driven off or towed away when they are left standing unguarded.

Well over half the hijackings, experts say, are "giveaways" or "inside jobs." Drivers, dispatchers or other employees of a trucking firm tip off the thieves to valuable cargoes and their travel routes. Often they arrange to have the loaded truck given up without resistance or left somewhere unguarded.

Watching the market. Many cargo thieves steal on order, and what they take may depend on market conditions.

Recently, shipments of metals have been in demand. In the last few months, hijackers in the New York and lower New England area have taken more than 1 million dollars' worth of ingots of silver, copper, tin and nickel.

When the price of coffee went up 25 per cent recently, coffee beans became a prize item along the waterfront. A truckload of stolen coffee beans might wholesale for as much as \$20,000.

Hijackers even fit their operations to the season. In spring, when stores are preparing for the Easter trade, clothing is a prime target. In autumn, snow tires are favorites. As Christmas approaches, hijackers concentrate on whisky and gift items such as cameras, radios, television sets and electrical appliances.

Cigars and microscopes. Ready-made clothing is the biggest single category of stolen goods, the year around. But almost anything that can be sold is stolen. Recent hijackings in the New York area have included a load of typewriters worth \$300,000, a shipment of cigars costing \$205,000 and microscopes valued at \$120,000.

A new trick of the trade is stealing containers—the huge, truck-size metal boxes designed to prevent pilferage. The hijacker simply drives off with the entire truck and container or lifts the container

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TRUCK HIJACKING

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onto his own trailer. Fifty containers were reported stolen in the New York area in 1969. Three of them contained Scotch whisky worth \$255,000. Because of such thefts, some marine-insurance companies have raised their rates on containers 50 per cent.

The growth sector. Airport robberies are a recent and fast-growing development. Airports are inviting targets because high-value cargoes are continually moving in and out, the volume of air freight is rising enormously, and the air-freight industry is relatively inexperienced in coping with thievery.

Claims against insurance companies for air-cargo losses have almost tripled in the past two years.

A prime target among airports is the John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Losses reported there totaled 3.5 million dollars in 1969—including one load of currency and jewelry that was valued at \$478,000.

Attorney General Mitchell did not name the airport he said has been virtually taken over by organized crime. But he said its entire freight industry "is trapped between a racketeer-dominated trade union on the one hand and a racketeer trade association on the other."

One large shipment of antibiotics, he said, was stolen from the airport terminal and sold on the European black market through a syndicate's connections.

The Post Office Department—a major victim of shipping thefts—suffers its biggest losses in airmail. Its losses are reported at 2 million dollars a month through thefts at major airports.

Suffering in silence. The exact amount of losses from cargo thievery is not known.

One reason: Congressional and insurance investigators find that most business firms do not keep complete records. Investigators surmise that some companies do not want to become known as prone to robberies, fearing rises in their insurance rates or cancellation of their insurance policies.

Others are said to fear gangland reprisals if they "put the finger" on criminal employees. Investigators say some firms simply shirk the red tape involved in reporting losses from thievery.

Still another reason the total losses are not known, according to investigators, is this: Importers often report stolen cargo as "not landed" so they won't have to pay the customs duties on the missing merchandise.

The New York Waterfront Commission estimates that only about one fourth of sea-tarگو thefts are reported to it.

As cargo thefts mount, governmental agencies, insurance companies and the transportation industry intensify their search for ways to combat the racket.

The U. S. Department of Transportation has organized a new unit on cargo protection. The Post Office Department and the Customs Bureau have tightened procedures for handling cargo at airports and on the waterfront.

The Post Office now requires such precautions as the use of covered carts for carrying mail in airport areas and the packaging of valuable items in heavy containers instead of in cloth bags that can be slit open easily. The Department also has announced plans to fine airlines as much as \$1,000 for each piece of airmail lost.

Senator Alan Bible (Dem.), of Nevada has proposed a bill to set up a federal commission to assemble facts about the hijacking problem and to co-ordinate efforts to solve it.

After extensive hearings by the Small Business Committee which he heads, Senator Bible commented:

"What concerns me most about cargo thefts generally is that as the problem accelerates, there is no real, co-ordinated effort on the part of either federal, State or local governments to seek a solution."

Senator Bible has accused the air-

lines of being "lackadaisical and slipshod" in guarding their cargoes.

Some trucking officials have charged their own industry with a share in the guilt for security laxity.

An investigating committee set up by the American Trucking Associations last year has reported:

"A widespread general apathy toward the problems and challenges of security has been found at all levels among shippers, receivers, manufacturers, carriers by all modes, and warehousemen."


"The consumer gets hit." Edward Burban, chairman of the security council of the New York State Motor Truck Association, says:

"The feeling seems to be that the insurance companies will handle it.

"So the insurance companies take the brunt, and they pay, and the rates go up, and the cost of the rates gets passed down the line until finally the consumer gets hit again."

Insurance rates have gone up on cargo shipments of all types. Insurance companies also have begun canceling the policies of companies that appear to be theft-prone. They have increased the "deductibles"—the amount of an insured loss that must be borne by the shipping company.

Law-enforcement agencies report frus-



tration in their attempts to catch hijackers or other cargo thieves.

The FBI is limited in the scope of its authority. And local police, who already are overburdened with other types of crime, often lack the resources to deal with such well-organized and fast-moving operations.

Everywhere law-enforcement officials turn, they find organized crime at the root of the cargo-theft problem.

As many as 75 per cent of the truck hijackings are done under "contract," some officials estimate.

A gang will line up a buyer for a specified type of merchandise. It will have agents planted inside the shipping industry to spot the kind of goods that is desired. And a gunman may be paid as much as \$1,000 to hijack a load and deliver it to the gang.

"Fencing" the goods. How does all the loot get into the market for sale to the public?

Prosecuting authorities express suspicions that some so-called "discount stores" are "fences" for much of the stolen goods—such as clothing, cameras, radios and appliances.

FBI reports tell of such incidents as this: Two truckloads of imported shoes were hijacked recently in an Eastern city. Then the shoes, valued at \$18 a

pair, were sold in stores in a residential neighborhood for 50 cents to \$1.50 a pair.

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover has appealed to the public to be alert to such "fencing" of stolen goods and to inform the FBI or other law-enforcement agencies when they are offered "bargains" that appear suspicious.

Whisky and cigarettes are cargoes that are easy to sell. They usually turn up in gang-controlled saloons and automatic vending machines.

How some hijacked cargoes are disposed of, however, is a mystery to investigators. For examples, they cite such items as copper pipe, metal ingots and animal skins. These, they point out, would have to be sold to factories or processors.

"The markets are already established and the property moves just like it is absorbed into our economic system just like a huge dry sponge. It just sucks it all up and it disappears," says Mr. Meyer of the American Insurance Association.

"No one person, investigative organization or law-enforcement agency has consistently been able to penetrate the veil of secrecy that envelops the criminal activity of receiving and fencing stolen property."

To get at the hijacking racket, Mr.

Meyer suggests, law-enforcement agencies first must find the "fences" and put them out of business. This, however, is becoming increasingly difficult as organized crime expands its ownership of "legitimate" business enterprises.

Many security officials estimate that there are only a relatively few criminals employed by the trucking industry. But Earl W. Taylor, president of the National Association of Transportation Security Officers, says trucking companies have great difficulty in preventing crooks from being hired—and in getting rid of them even after they are detected.

Mr. Taylor tells of numerous instances where truck drivers are known to have been involved in thefts but prosecutors were unable to try them for lack of conclusive evidence—and under union rules a driver cannot be fired unless he is convicted. One driver who was fired had to be rehired and given \$25,000 back pay.

Some trucking companies are spending large amounts on protective devices such as alarm systems, steel fences and floodlighting. They are tightening identification of employees. They even send out high-value cargoes in truck convoys, with armed guards.

Yet the robberies of cargoes continue to increase. And officials see no signs of a letup.

LOSSES FROM HIJACKINGS AND OTHER CARGO THEFTS

Senator BIBLE. It is the plan—first, maybe, before I develop that, I should say that it is a week from today that we will have hearings before the Commerce Committee, chaired by Senator Magnuson, of Washington, who is out of the city this week. We originally had it for this very day, but it will be heard a week from today in front of his committee on this particular bill. I am frank to say that this bill I introduced leaves much to be desired. I think it needs amendment, it needs tightening up, more teeth in it. Rather than another study commission, I would hope we could do something affirmatively to try to come to grips with this problem. It is multifaceted and deals with many Federal programs. It is a plan of our committee to examine crime at the retail and commercial levels in greater detail next year. This will include burglary, shoplifting, and check and credit card fraud. The committee also plans to conduct an examination into peripheral areas, including availability of insurance coverage for businesses, physical security in building design and other associated areas.

Mr. Chairman, crime against small business particularly and business generally in this country today represents a curse on our economy which is difficult to measure. I hope that your hearings are helpful in focusing public attention and governmental action on this difficult area which is a tragic drain on this country's vigor and worthwhile purpose.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you, Senator Bible, for a fine and helpful statement. I am delighted that you were the opening witness, because you certainly got us off to an excellent start.

What I was trying to get at in my questioning was trying to put these statistics you have with respect to small business into perspective. I was trying to determine when you said that small business, for example, suffers 77 percent of a certain kind of crime, how that related to the portion of all business that small business represents. Small business, I know, represents about 98 percent of the business firms. But, of course, the big firms that have many outlets and that kind of thing—that is what I had in mind.

Senator BIBLE. As I stated previously, I can supply that figure for you, and I do not want to give you a percentage figure that is not reasonably accurate. The \$5 billion in losses is a rough estimate based on the FBI data of the total of all losses suffered by small business in the year 1969. Of course, we have always attempted, though it is hard to do, within the small business framework under which we operate, to limit our inquiry to the impact on small business. I think it goes without saying that the small businessman who gets hurt by repeated thefts is more apt to have his back to the wall and go into bankruptcy than the large businesses.

Chairman PROXMIRE. In the long run, and the long run is not very long, I would think this would have to be passed on to the consumer.

Senator BIBLE. It is.

Chairman PROXMIRE. If the small businessman is driven out of business, the consumer in some areas does not have a place to shop. If the businessman stays in business, one way or another, he has to survive and what is going to happen, I think, is that he is going to have to increase his prices. When this is as uniform and universal as it is, I would think this \$5 billion could be interpreted perhaps as \$5 billion in higher prices to the American consumer. I think that is generally true here.

Senator BIBLE. I think that is correct. We all know that when the businessman suffers losses, he certainly passes it on. My father was a small business groceryman and I know he put up a loss figure, I think, of 2 or 3 percent per year on bad accounts. In those years, we were not concerned about thievery and thefts of this kind that we are discussing here today. Obviously, when he charged a bad accounts item, he offered credit, and when certain people would not pay for various reasons, he obviously passed that on to the consumer. I think that is generally true here.

Of course to me, and we have tried to relate this, though it is hard to get the statistics—the small businessman is robbed time after time after time—and we can look at Washington as an example, because we have been devastated by crime here, the small businessman can only get insurance up to a limited time. Then all of a sudden, his policies are canceled. Then if he cannot pass it on to the consumer he is forced into bankruptcy. And many, many bankruptcies can be directly related to thefts and pilferage of this kind that I have been describing. I cannot, again, give you a percentage on it. It is hard to measure these figures and there is no central agency. The best study we have ever seen is the one that has been done by the Small Business Administration in 1967 and 1968.

Chairman PROXMIRE. One way of fighting inflation, in addition to the very commendable objectives which your committee has to assist small business and to protect them from the tragic losses which they suffer—but one way of fighting inflation is to make this fight on crime and prevention of crime more effective.

In relating the problem to Washington, it is interesting that the Federal Trade Commission study, one of the most comprehensive studies, I think, ever made of a marketing area, studied the prices in the inner core area of Washington and the surrounding areas, and found that in many stores, especially those selling appliances, and so forth, prices were 60-percent higher for the identical goods, in the inner section, selling to people with lower incomes, than they were in the suburban areas surrounding it. There were many reasons, but one of the reasons was because of the higher incidence of theft and burglary and insecurity on the part of the businessman. They were not making any more money, in fact, making a little less, but they had to compensate in higher prices. I am sure that that crime atmosphere was one of the reasons for it.

Senator BIBLE. That is true, and I might just comment on it, because I think it is significant. I at one time spent a number of years on the District of Columbia Committee as chairman, and we wrestled with many of the crimes.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You were the unofficial mayor for 10 years, were you not?

Senator BIBLE. Many years, and I am glad they have a regular mayor now. But you can watch things right here in the Nation's Capital. As the businessman moves out of the inner core area into the suburbs, it is not too much time after that that the crook and the criminal and the thief and the burglar moves out into the suburbs with him. This can be well documented by taking a look at the metropolitan statistics. They are alarming here in the inner core section of Washington, right in the heart of it, within a few blocks of where we are

having this hearing today. But now you can go into Silver Spring, Md., into Arlington, Va., into Alexandria, Falls Church—you name them—and we see that the Safeways, the other chain stores, particularly the drug stores, the liquor stores—are getting hit more often. So the criminals move along where the trade and the traffic are.

Chairman PROXMIRE. The emphasis in all the work your committee has done has been, has it not, on preventing and deterring crime?

Senator BIBLE. That is right.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You have examined many measures—alarm systems, stronger window glass, and so forth. It is possible, is it not, to evaluate these devices in terms of their cost-effectiveness? That is, if in a neighborhood or a certain city, if they do follow a policy of buying stronger window glass, you can show that the cost of that window glass is saved with a big return in the amount of burglary which is prevented?

Senator BIBLE. We think it can be proven. We had many demonstrations from those who were interested from a dollar standpoint in selling glass that you could not even shoot a bullet through, to glass of lesser protection. Of course, it becomes very expensive. But I am sure all you have to do is walk down on E or F Streets, where you run into the jewelry stores. You will find most are protected by this very heavy glass. It is almost impossible to get in. On a cost basis, it obviously pays off, because almost any jewelry store today that I have been in—I do not go into them very often; it is a bad habit, for many reasons—have this protection. In San Francisco, you can hardly go into a jewelry store where you do not have, not only bulletproof glass, but you have a security guard there when you walk in. This kind of deters me from going in and it saves me money, saves me from buying things my wife might like to have.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Is it your general conclusion that there are many things that the businessman could do in installing devices—

Senator BIBLE. I do not think there is any question about it. Our report says this.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You think it would be cost effective. Is the best Federal procedure, in your judgment, at this time, this kind of informational encouragement, or do you think we ought to do our best to encourage laws which will require them to install these? I know in the banking area, for example, we have passed legislation which requires them to install cameras and various other devices. But, of course, they are regulated and other business is not.

Senator BIBLE. I think you come from a State which has a good many small businesses, just as I do, and I think all the representatives of this committee come from States where one thing the small businessman does not want is continuing Federal regulation of every facet of his life. So you have some resistance there. I can understand that. Up to now, I think it is more or less by way of suggestion. I think it becomes primarily a local problem in many areas with improved zoning and specifications for the building of new structures.

You can build in a lot of safety devices at a low cost. It costs more money and you do pass it on to the consumer, but in the long run, I think you can very effectively demonstrate the cost effectiveness of it.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You have said there is no real effort on the part of State or local government to seek a solution to this problem

of cargo theft. Yet this represents a major loss to the businessman and ultimately to the consumer. We have increased appropriations for criminal justice substantially in the last few years. Why so little effort on this problem? What should the appropriate Federal response be?

Senator BIBLE. I think this Federal Government, this Congress, when it completes its deliberations, will have done a great work in this area. I know that S. 30, which has been one of the controversial crime bills, will be reported out of the Judiciary Committee of the House, I think today. We passed it earlier this year. If you take all of these bills together, they give you an effective legal framework for moving into the problem.

The next step is implementation of greater cooperation among the agencies. This is what we are attempting to accomplish by the bill which I have introduced and which the Commerce Committee will have hearings on a week from today. I am not suggesting that that will pass this year, and I am not suggesting that the bill as introduced is a perfect bill; it is not. It needs doctoring up and needs some teeth in it. But with it there will be improved coordination and cooperation.

One has only to go into New York City to see it. I am not picking on one city. Chicago is the same, Baltimore is the same. There has been a lack of cooperation between State and Federal officials all down the line.

Chairman PROXMIRE. My time is up.

Congressman CONABLE?

Representative CONABLE. Thank you.

Senator, I would like to compliment you on your statement also. I would like to ask you to what extent you feel that the Federal Government is justified in creating new Federal authority, realizing the limited extent of the Federal police power? Do you generally favor the approach of the so-called Safe Streets Act, establishing the requirement that States have coordinated plans for attacking the problem of crime and that that be a prerequisite to Federal grants aiding specifically in the area of—

Senator BIBLE. I grew up as a district attorney and as an attorney general of my State. I believe that law enforcement is primarily a local responsibility. I think the Federal Government moves in only when you find a breakdown in that local enforcement, and then largely by offering cooperation and research money and aid of that kind. I certainly do not advocate a Federal police force. I think that would be wrong. But in many of these problems which we have examined, there is the interstate commerce feature, the movement of goods in interstate commerce, and I think that Federal action is completely justified in that area.

Representative CONABLE. I notice the emphasis you put on cargo thefts, for instance.

Senator BIBLE. Correct.

Representative CONABLE. Do you feel there is more to be done by the Federal Government in this area because of the interstate nature of transport?

Senator BIBLE. Indeed I do. In looking at the New York airports, we found there a lack of the close cooperation which I thought should

exist between the Customs Bureau of the Treasury Department, for example, the Secret Service and the FBI. It is a rugged problem because it is so hard to come to grips with all of the causes of it. One of the problems is the companies involved themselves, going to the air cargo area for a moment. They have a different sense of where their responsibility lies. In other words, they bring the plane from overseas, they unload the cargo, it is checked in through Customs and then the Federal Government, by and large, figures, this is where their responsibility stops. From that point on, we have found great leakages and great thefts caused by poor carrier practices.

Then the New York Port Authority, the authority in charge of the airports, disclaim obligation there, so there are a number of loose ends that have to be tied together.

Representative CONABLE. Senator, the chairman asked about the relationship between small business losses and big business losses. I wonder if your committee has done any analysis of the nature of those losses, if they were due to the pilferage by the amateur shoplifter or by the professional criminal operating in a sophisticated way. I am sure, for instance, that the cargo losses you mentioned are primarily due to the professionals.

Senator BIBLE. There is no doubt about it.

Representative CONABLE. They are not due to the shoplifter type of criminal. I wonder if you have made any analysis of that that would have some bearing, for instance, if organized crime were deeply involved in the cargo theft business, that would have some bearing on whether or not it should be a Federal crime, because organized crime is, of course, multistate in its operation. Have you made any analysis?

Senator BIBLE. Well, I think we have tried to analyze it—again it is pretty hard to analyze some of these things—but there is no doubt in my mind that organized crime is in this overall major theft area in a large way. We have responsible testimony of the areas where they moved in around the airports. That is not the inhouse pilferage, nor is it the shoplifter. That is big, organized crime, operating in a big business manner.

You asked me what the percentage was. As best we can estimate it, we think the total cost, overall, is something in the range of \$5 billion a year as of 1967 for all businesses, and of that, something in the range of \$3 billion is against the small businessman. That is about the best percentage figure I can give you, and it is not completely accurate as these figures have measurably increased as of 1969.

Representative CONABLE. The nature of the crime, of course, is going to determine the degree of Federal response to a certain extent?

Senator BIBLE. I think that is right.

Representative CONABLE. We are always going to have our kleptomaniacs—

Senator BIBLE. No doubt.

Representative CONABLE. The housewife who, for some personality reason, simply can't resist picking up things on the counters, and we are not going to be able to control that by establishing more Federal crimes. However, something of an organized and professional nature is going to be something that we may want to respond to if local authorities are not able to cope with it. So I think that is a germane subject.

I guess that is all I have right now, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Mr. Brown?

Representative BROWN. Senator, I want to compliment you also on your testimony. I have found it very interesting and very worthwhile. I am curious about two or three points and I would like to pursue them with you, if I may.

Senator BIBLE. Surely.

Representative BROWN. One is how can we really judge statistics on crime with reference to not only the degree of the degeneration of our society, but also in comparing our society to others? I just heard you mention that your father had reserved some of his resources in his commercial establishment for bad debts to the tune of 2 to 3 percent.

Senator BIBLE. Something in that range. My memory is not too good, but it is in that area.

Representative BROWN. I think that is common in business.

Senator BIBLE. It is common business practice.

Representative BROWN. If I look at the figures you gave, for instance, on cargo losses at JFK airport in 1969, that loss percentage amounts to 38/1000 of 1 percent.

Now, the thing that leaves me a little confused is whether 2 or 3 percent for bad debts is now high or low by comparison with what has been in the past, whether cargo thefts of 38/1000 of 1 percent is high or low compared to what it has been in the past based on the volume of things handled and how we really put all these things together. I am not trying to suggest that the crime problem is not a severe one. I feel sure that it is and I feel sure there has been a worsening. But I would like to have your comment on how we make these comparisons.

Senator BIBLE. Well, I think, number 1, it is certainly true that crime is increasing whether we like it or not. I think it is also equally true that it does create a drain, particularly on the small businessman. The small businessman has, in many instances, attempted to protect his business by carrying insurance. After repeated thefts, the insurance companies cancel him out. With that, he had no insurance coverage and if he had repeated losses, of course, he went into bankruptcy.

As to what I think your suggestion is, that a certain percentage could be carried on his books as a loss due not to bad accounts but to thefts, even in the absence of an insurance carrier, the difficulty, of course, in the end result is if the figures are valid of a \$5 billion loss per year, that is ultimately passed on to the consumer. So the consumer, and the consumer after all, no matter how you measure it, whether it is in a percentage for bad debts or percentage for losses through thefts, is going to pay the bill. So this becomes an economic drain on the ultimate consumer and the taxpayer.

Representative BROWN. Really, that is exactly my point. Whether you reserve 2 or 3 percent of your cost for bad debts, whether you reserve it for theft loss and decide that you are going to have to make a little more to make up for the theft loss and not have it insured, whether you have to pay a higher insurance premium, or whether you pay a low insurance premium and have to pay more in taxes or to Federal, State, or local police who will do this job, it all comes out of the hide of the consumer in the long run. Really, I might say that the consumer who is honest and does not have bad debts, who does not

shoplift, who does not heist the interstate commerce shipping vehicle, is the guy who pays for the one who does.

Senator BIBLE. I think that is right.

Representative BROWN. I would like to know the relative change in our society over a long period of time. Certainly in recent years, we have seen an increase in crime. I do not know whether statistics exist to compare our society to others.

I recall my experience in the Korean war where the common comment by American servicemen serving in Japan was that in Japan, theft rates were quite low; in Korea and I guess in China, the mainland Asiatic areas, theft rates were quite high. The question was why? The suggestion was that that had a lot to do with the ethical developments of those societies, the things that they believed in, and the kinds of training and education that they had as young people, the ancestor worship and that sort of thing.

The question is whether we would be better off in our efforts to get at this problem by approaching it as a matter which should be handled by enforcement or protection or insurance or allowance for this aberration of society or by some effort to educate society and put this into our school systems, as we used to have it in the old McGuffey readers, and so forth, and to try to return to some more specific respect for property rights in the youngsters that we are raising.

Would you care to comment on that?

Senator BIBLE. I think it takes a combination of everything you suggested. In other words, I think it does take education. I think when you have poor housing and inadequate recreation facilities—again, we can use Washington, because that is where we are located today, as a good example. The hard crime laws are not going to be the complete answer. They are going to be a part of the answer. There has to be greater respect for the laws. A lot of it breaks down within the family, within the church, within the schools. So I think it takes a combination of everything you have suggested to try to come to grips with this problem.

I do not think it is peculiar to the United States of America. I think this is a part of a worldwide—I do not know whether the word “phenomenon” is the right word or not, but I think it goes on around the world in increasing intensity. So I think you probably try to hit the problem from all these different angles.

I certainly agree with you that greater education and respect for law and order, many of the things they have done here in Washington by the new police chief is a good example, the police boys clubs and things of that sort. They all help. I do not think we can hit it on too many sides.

Representative BROWN. Let me ask you if I may specifically, as an expert in this area—

Senator BIBLE. I do not know as I am an expert.

Representative BROWN. I mean in the statistical area—whether or not there is a way we can compare the degeneration of American society in this area with what has occurred in other societies around the world?

Senator BIBLE. I imagine that there are statistics probably, in the particular area in which I have addressed myself today, maybe no more reliable than ours. I do not know that there are statistics avail-

able. My guess would be that you are going to find this upswing in practically every country of the free world that you look at today.

Representative BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you, Senator Bible, for an excellent job. We are most grateful and indebted to you.

Senator BIBLE. I am very happy to be here this morning, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I would like to ask our other two witnesses to appear together at the table, if they will.

Our next two witnesses are Sheldon Krantz, former executive director of the Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice of the State of Massachusetts, and Paul Nejski, assistant director of the Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School. He was formerly head of the Center for Law and Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice.

Gentlemen, we are happy to have you here.

Professor Krantz, why don't you go ahead first?

STATEMENT OF SHELDON KRANTZ, PROFESSOR, BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, AND FORMER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. KRANTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here today.

Since 1968, through the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the Federal Government has, on an increasing basis, made a substantial financial commitment to assisting State and local governments in improving their systems of law enforcement and criminal justice. Both in my experience as a staff attorney for the President's Crime Commission and until recently as the director for 3 years—

Chairman PROXMIRE. When were you staff assistant? What President was that?

Mr. KRANTZ. It was President Johnson's Commission, 1966-67.

And until recently as director for 3 years of the State criminal justice planning agency in Massachusetts, which administers the Crime Control Act for that State. I am convinced that the Omnibus Crime Control Act is conceptually sound and that it takes a very exciting Federal approach for dealing with a very serious domestic problem. The reason I am generally supportive of the act is that it requires that States and local governments develop comprehensive plans and strategies for dealing with crime and that action funds are then expended pursuant to these plans. Under the act, planning is not a one-time process. It must be a continuing process, and strategies, based upon new data and evaluation, can change; if a program succeed or fails, the plan can be adjusted on that basis.

I think this is significant in terms of the Federal program. Also under the act, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice was created and it was its responsibility to undertake research to analyze new approaches to the problems of crime control.

I also think this was a very sound concept as part of the total act.

Finally, the act called for technical assistance. In other words, it went on the assumption that since the problems of crime are so com-

plex and have been with us for so long, local governments and State governments would desperately need assistance in trying new approaches to crime.

So overall, I would like to state again my support for the program. I think it was well thought through and I think in general, it has very exciting potential.

With that being said, I must say also that I am very concerned about the future of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. As you know, we live in times when the issue of crime is a highly controversial and sensitive one. There is continued pressure on legislative bodies such as the Congress to do something about crime now, to immediately get massive amounts of money into the hands of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies so they can immediately put it into use on the street. This pressure has resulted in the Crime Control Act appropriation increasing from \$69 million in fiscal year 1969 to close to \$500 million for fiscal year 1971. And based upon continued pressures on the Congress, obviously much of it justified, the chances are that this program will reach \$1 billion quite soon. So we have moved from a fairly small program in 1968 to a major domestic program in 1970 and 1971.

Now, without question, the criminal justice system is grossly underfinanced, and it can be argued that \$1 billion is not even enough to shore up the system. But I would like to suggest at the outset of my testimony that just pouring money into the criminal justice system alone will do very little to turn the devastating tide of crime. The President's Crime Commission and other keen observers of the field over the past few years have indicated very well that we need basic changes in the way we approach crime, basic changes in our police, in our courts, our correctional systems, our concept of what is criminal and what is not criminal, and our attitude toward prevention, particularly as we deal with youthful offenders. And if without careful thinking, we pour a lot of money into the criminal justice system as it now exists, we may in the process just be perpetrating what is wrong with the system.

This gets me to my major concern. It is that I think we desperately need the time and the support for planning in State and local governments as it relates to crime control. In many other areas, I think we have begun to demonstrate the success of careful planning which allows a jurisdiction to take a comprehensive look at a problem, to establish goals, to develop programs, and then move toward those goals to see if they can be achieved.

Now, as I will point out in 1 minute, the way we are moving under the Omnibus Crime Control Act, this will not be possible. Therefore, what was conceptually sound about the act will probably not be realized. I think we are going to find fairly soon that it is going to be impossible to evaluate what we are doing with what will become a billion dollar program if we do not have any idea of what we are trying to achieve. Just pouring money into the system without any preplanning will move this program toward a colossal failure within a fairly brief period of time.

As I stated earlier, I strongly support the Crime Control Act and I think the legislation in general allows us to do what has to be done to make a major impact on the way the criminal justice system

operates over the next few years. What I would like to do is raise about five or six points which I think can shift this act from becoming a serious failure to one that can become substantially successful. The first point relates to planning. As I mentioned, under the act, there is a requirement that State and local governments engage in comprehensive planning and that action funds be expended based upon careful thought through strategies.

This concept is being defeated by the amount of the appropriations that have been given for planning purposes under the Omnibus Crime Control Act in the past 3 years. In 1969—and I am talking about Massachusetts, but the figures would be similar for virtually all States—41 percent of the funds that went into the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under the Crime Control Act were for planning. In other words, these were funds to State and local governments to develop plans, to administer the program, and to engage in research and evaluation; 59 percent of the funds were for action. The totals in the State were \$510,700 for planning and \$725,800 for action. In 1970, the percent of planning funds was 9 percent, compared to 91 percent that had to go for action. In 1971, the appropriation for this fiscal year, Massachusetts is going to get \$16,790,000. Four percent of this is for planning; 96 percent is for action. In other words, the State now will have over \$16 million for action, funds that have to go out for programs, and \$745,000 for planning.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Can you give us the amount for planning each year—not the percentage, but the absolute amount—in 1969, 1970, and 1971?

Mr. KRANTZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The figures I have are for 1969, \$510,700; for 1970, \$591,000—

Representative BROWN. What figure is this?

Mr. KRANTZ. These are funds for planning. In 1971, \$745,000.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you.

Representative BROWN. I am sorry. I am not sure I understand. These are just the planning funds.

Mr. KRANTZ. Yes. It is important to put into perspective how these funds have to be used. It is not even just for planning. These are funds that go to the State planning agency. They can retain 60 percent of the planning money; 40 percent goes to local units of government.

Now, out of the money that is designated for planning, the State planning agency has to administer the program. In other words, if \$16 million comes into the State, the agency is responsible for developing program criteria, for making sure the funds are used for their intended purpose. In addition, to the extent that a State planning agency is capable of taking on research, planning funds are typically the source for research projects as well. The same can be said for evaluation.

So under the act, the State planning agency is the key to the success or failure of the crime control program. There is valid question how a State planning agency can continue to plan intelligently; to gather data; to evaluate the success or failure of its programs with its limited resources. Thus, if criminal justice planning agencies are making gross misallocations in terms of what the money should be used for to deal with crime, there is little they are going to be able to do about it over

time. And there is every sign that control over the program will get worse as the appropriation gets up to \$1 billion.

So I think what is at the core of this act—the planning function—is quickly being lost. We are moving away from comprehensive planning, evaluation, research, to strictly an action program. This potentially, is disastrous.

My second concern relates to technical assistance. In the 3 years that I dealt with the cities and towns in Massachusetts, I found a perceptible difference in attitude. In other words, when I first went to Massachusetts 3 years ago, the tremendous concerns were about police salaries and equipment. That is what funds were being asked for. Over time, as cities and towns became more sophisticated and better understood what this act could do, then began to realize the wide range of concerns they have to have—such concerns delinquency prevention, correction, whether it is law reform. But the truth of the matter is their interest and concern is not enough. They do not have people working within city government or county government or State criminal justice agencies that have the capability alone to innovate, or even to adopt programs going on in other places. Agency personnel are faced on a daily basis with crises. Just responding to daily crises prevents them from innovative approaches. They need help.

The Omnibus Crime Control Act offered the hope that the Federal Government could, through its own capability, through utilizing consultants, or through providing funds to State governments, could begin to develop a cadre of people who could work with the local and State agencies and could train existing personnel. But the amount of money available under the Crime Control Act over the past 2 or 3 years for technical assistance has been minimal. I think now, I may be mistaken on this figure, but for the coming year only \$3 million out of a total of a half billion dollars is specifically earmarked for technical assistance.

Local governments frankly are confused and overwhelmed by this program and do not have their own personnel to innovate or to try new demonstration efforts. We desperately need therefore to expand the concept of technical assistance in the criminal justice field.

My third concern relates to people. In 1968, when this act was enacted, there were very few criminal justice experts who understood the system as a whole, who could engage in planning, who were experts in demonstration, development, or evaluation. The tragic thing is after 3 years, I can still make the same statement. There are very few people who are capable today of expending available funds or in helping cities and towns or State agencies expend this money intelligently. We need a new cadre or a new generation of criminal justice experts if we are going to deal intelligently with crime. There just are no programs now or no stimuli that I can see to develop such experts.

It should be pointed out that the skills of many disciplines can be utilized in the criminal justice field. In other words, experts in other fields whether it be in private industry, in other areas of public service such as transportation or health services, in the university—can be transferrable to criminal justice problems. But right now, the criminal justice system has very low status. There is little interest in working with a police department or a probation office or correctional agency, or even with a State planning agency. I have serious concern

after working at the State level trying to recruit people to work for our planning agency or to work at the local level in criminal justice programs in terms of where the people are going to come from. As you know, in the final analysis, even if you have a good idea for a program—say a drug treatment program at the city level—if you do not have intelligent people who can operate that program, it is not going to work no matter how good the idea is. There is no reason why working in the criminal justice field should be inherently unattractive. I think the reverse is true; I think it can be very attractive. We have to do something though to stimulate people to get involved in the criminal justice field. Oftentimes, the salaries in criminal justice are quite low. Whether we are going to begin partially subsidizing the salaries of people to move from private industry or to move from the universities into the criminal justice field is not clear, but something is going to have to happen soon.

Two other matters concern me. One is the time pressure that States and local governments face in proving that they are reducing crime. Under this act, each year you have to develop a comprehensive plan, along with getting funds out, getting programs started. Then annually, as you know, on the floor of the Congress or on the floor of the State legislature, a few months after you get money, the question is how did you do? Did you reduce crime? Obviously, it is simplistic to assume that complicated problems that have been with us for many years can be resolved in a matter of months. Somehow, provision must be made for giving State agencies or city governments more time to implement these programs. Possibly, we ought to give more time for planning, more time for getting funds out, as ways to reduce the pressure. Congress or the administration by amending the legislation or in other ways should extend the planning and program deadlines to give the States and local governments more time to respond. Otherwise, they will be faced with the same kind of day-to-day crisis, as typical operating agencies are. Planning agencies are working with very complicated concepts and new programs. Thus, Congress should take a look at the unrealistic time pressures imposed by the act.

Another point related to that is how do we evaluate the success or failure of this crime program? I am afraid there is a tendency now to say that if we train 5 million more policemen or send them to school, we are achieving something. In other words, we are only taking a quantitative look at utilization of Federal funds. I think it is very important that we stop looking at the numbers of people we are training or the numbers of new people we are hiring and begin to look more and more at what they are doing. I have seen in the past 3 years, under pressure from the old OLEA program, examples of quantitative thinking. For example, approximately 73 new police science programs were started across the country in junior colleges under the OLEA program. Everyone now feels that thousands of policemen are now newly educated. If you take a look at what these educator programs are doing, however, you will find that the education is very shallow indeed and that we are probably wasting a gross amount of money. At the most, we have transferred police training to the universities and are giving policemen college credit for a range of very technical courses that are probably not well taught.

Thus, it is important that when we begin to evaluate this program, we consider different measures of evaluation rather than how many hours of training we are giving, because that, in and of itself, is not going to be a good measure of the success of this program. In addition, funds should be specifically earmarked under the act for evaluation at national, State, and local levels.

Just two quick final points. I hope I am not taking too much time, Mr. Chairman.

I have always been concerned about the Federal approach of grant in aid on demonstration programs which has existed in other fields and now exists in this field. Demonstration grant programs too often hold out promise of things they can never fulfill. For example, the Federal Government can give a city a billion dollars to demonstrate a new approach to crime. Say the city, because it is fortunate enough to have good personnel, demonstrates that a new program can work. Typically, then, the Federal funds fall away and the city is left to its own devices to implement such a program. Based upon my work in Massachusetts with cities and towns, I have learned that cities do not have the tax base to implement major new programs on their own. My point of concern is that if, hopefully, over the next few years, we begin to develop and find programs of proven success to deal with crime, whether it is delinquency prevention or new community rehabilitation programs, Federal support can't drop off at that point. We have to develop ways of subsidizing, probably under careful standards, on a continuing basis, basic changes in the way our criminal justice system operates. I think when we reach a billion dollar level with the Omnibus Crime Control Act, those funds, to the extent possible, should be used in finding new approaches.

But, we are going to need another device to make sure those programs are put into effect, are implemented on a continuing basis, under rational standards. I do not see anything in the act now that is going to allow this to happen.

Thus, first we need continuing pressure to use present crime control funds not just to shore up what we have, but to find new approaches. Second, I think we need, once we find these approaches, a way of having the Federal Government support implementation of proven programs.

My only remaining comments relate to research and the Juvenile Delinquency Act. As I mentioned very early in my statement, the Crime Control Act created the National Institution of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. There was great hope for this program because it would allow at the Federal level, with substantial resources, hopefully, some very good people to take a look at basic approaches, new techniques to deal with crime. States and local governments are, for the most part, not capable of doing this. They do not have the people, they do not have the resources. A lot of things can be developed at the national level that could be extremely helpful to the 50 States. The thing that concerns me greatly was debate on the House floor just a few months ago over the administration's request for \$19 million to allow the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice to expand upon its very limited work.

The Institute has a very small appropriation—I believe it was \$7 million—the year before. In the debate on the floor, one Congressman

made the point that we do not need theoreticians or fuzzy-headed intellectuals to tell us what is wrong with our system. We have to get the money out into the hands of the police departments so they can do something about crime. That was the tenor of the debate. As a result of that debate on the House side, the amount of money for the Institute was maintained at its present level of \$7 million. The \$19 million figure was rejected. This is the second year in the row that there has been similar debate about the National Institute. I just want to say that after talking to policemen in Springfield, Worcester, or Boston that they understand the critical need to have research done at the national level. They know that they do not have all the answers, that money alone is not going to help them deal with crime. I do not think we can pass blame off on the police department by saying they are the ones who are against research. This is now a large program. Seven million dollars for research in a half billion dollar program this year, a billion dollars next year is ludicrous.

My final comment is on the Juvenile Delinquency Act you alluded to in your statement. At the same time the Crime Control Act was enacted, the Juvenile Delinquency Act was also enacted and given to the Department of HEW to administer. At the time of passage, the feeling was that two types of acts were really needed, one for general criminal justice, but one specifically to deal with youth crime. And since the feeling was that youth crime was basically an educational and rehabilitation problem, HEW, with its resources and expertise should have major responsibility in the field.

Since that act was enacted, it has not gotten off dead center. It has been operating at a 5 to 15 million dollar appropriation level. The program has had virtually no staff. Since the Department of Justice, under the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, had tremendous resources, it has and maybe rightfully so, taken over the grant program for delinquency prevention and rehabilitation and has relegated the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to a very minor role in the field. I do not see any signs of the administration trying to change that. In other words, I have not seen the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare argue that it should have a stronger role in the field of delinquency prevention and rehabilitation.

I think there is a role for the Department of HEW. I think we desperately need to concentrate resources in the field of youth crime. I am not sure the Department of Justice should be the agency that should staff up completely to deal with this problem. I think this matter should be surfaced, both in terms of whether we want to give priority to the delinquency field, and if so, what the role of HEW should be and how its role should be coordinated with the Department of Justice. That has not happened yet. I think the Department of Justice, although it is trying to do a very good job in the delinquency field, is doing so with virtually no staff that has expertise in this area. So I would hope in the course of your hearings, that you would look into the question of what role the Department of HEW should have, whether we should give a higher priority to youth crime—I think we should, and how its role should be related to that of the Department of Justice.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Krantz.

Mr. Nejeski?

STATEMENT OF PAUL NEJELSKI, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, AND FORMER HEAD, CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. NEJELSKI. I am still smarting over Representative Conable's comments about theoreticians.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I am sure he did not imply any criticism in his comment about theoreticians. He was just commenting on the Attorney General's absence.

Mr. NEJELSKI. I would like to say it was my pleasure to serve, up until this May, over 6 years in the Department of Justice, under four attorneys general. I have worked as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, as a trial attorney in the Criminal Division, as the head of a litigating unit in the Criminal Division, and as one of the first employees of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in LEAA. I am also Deputy Chairman of the new American Bar Association Committee on Criminal Justice Planning. But I am here today speaking just for myself. I do not speak for the ABA, nor do I speak for Harvard Law School nor anybody else.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You come with the best possible credentials. You are not only a theoretician now, but you have been a practitioner.

Mr. NEJELSKI. Thank you.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that research is the eyes and ears of the criminal justice system.

I was particularly struck last week by an advertisement I happened to see in the New York Times. The headlines read "Crime Prevention—Now a Blank Company Franchise Opportunity." Excerpts from the article:

Blank Company has developed an electronic system to protect families and homes against burglars, vandals, intruders, fire, accidents and other emergencies.

ONE BILLION DOLLAR OPPORTUNITY

In time, the market may become all the millions of people who are defenseless against crime, fire and other emergencies in their home. For now, think only of the immediate market for the system Blank Company is manufacturing today: families with incomes of \$25,000 or more, living in homes worth \$40,000 plus.

By 1980, there will be 3.2 million single-family homes in that category. We estimate that this will make a \$1 billion market opportunity for our franchises . . .

Mr. Chairman, quite obviously crime does pay. Or rather, the taxpayer and the citizen will spend a great deal on the altar of law and order in the years to come. My point is that, unless we have adequate research, we will never know whether these expenditures are helping or aggravating the situation.

In the case of the device just described, for example, will its installation mean that criminals will concentrate their efforts on those segments of the population which cannot afford the device? Does the cost of the system exceed the losses which might be sustained. This is the same question which came up in Senator Bible's testimony about protective glass. What is the relative tradeoff in terms of investment versus what is going to be received? Will the device cost the taxpayer money because, if it has a high malfunction rate, the police will have to answer more false alarms? Will the device lead to the apprehension

of more burglars? Will this device increase or reduce police response time? Will this device increase police needs for new equipment or manpower to interface with the new system?

In short, Mr. Chairman, the question is: "Do we need the thing?" Without research, we don't know.

Does the police chief need helicopters or radio cars or better trained men or new methods of recruiting? Do our judges need individual calendaring of cases, video-taped testimony, appellate review of sentences, or computer retrieval of legal reference materials? Do corrections officials need halfway houses, drug and narcotic treatment facilities, increased parole services, or more counseling personnel?

It is very appropriate for the Joint Economic Committee to study the allocation of resources in law enforcement and criminal justice. My argument is a simple one: that allocation needs a rational basis which can only be provided by research.

As Mr. Krantz has indicated, the need for research should be obvious, but it is not. The research appropriation for law enforcement and criminal justice is a joke. In addition, most criminal justice agencies are not research oriented.

Research is essential to any discussion of criminal justice planning. Research provides the basis for the rational allocation of resources.

A threshold concern is that the term "research" has several meanings. Perhaps "research" is an unfortunate term. It has connotations of scientists in white coats performing controlled experiments in the laboratory. While criminal justice researchers would like to borrow as much methodology from the physical and social sciences as possible, criminal justice research is not as esoteric as its name might imply. Criminal justice research to me simply means using the best available tools to evaluate existing programs and to plan for the future.

Traditionally, criminal justice research has been limited to strictly legal concerns such as the proper powers of various participants in the system or the theoretical nature of the criminal process from arrest through parole. This type of research is usually conducted in a library and has a heavy emphasis on what ought to be. In contrast, "research" is coming to mean empirical research—the collection of data and the examination of the real world in which police, court, and correction administrators must operate.

Then too, there is a continuum of levels of complexity. At the simplest level, there is inventory research, which might count the facilities in a particular area, such as how many jails do we have? How many policemen do we have? We do not even have the answers to those basic questions. At a higher level of abstraction, scholars may summarize and analyze the data in a critical fashion. Next, the formulation of hypotheses might suggest a rationale for behavior. At the most sophisticated stage, and I am afraid we are very far from it, comes the testing of hypotheses.

As you suggested in your opening comments, Mr. Chairman, criminal justice research is still in its infancy. These are a few of the problems confronting criminal justice research:

(1) I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Krantz that there is a lack of trained personnel to conduct, interpret, and disseminate criminal justice research. The President's Crime Commission in 1967 was notable for bringing together and, in some cases, training significant numbers of researchers.

(2) Effective standards for judging criminal justice research are often lacking. There are few quality controls, other than the sometimes easy virtues of a professional reputation. Some criminal justice research is terrible. If price alone is going to determine the selection of grantees and contractors in this field, there is every reason to believe that inferior products will result.

(3) The existing reporting and information systems are completely inadequate. It is impossible to monitor the effects of change if we don't know what is going on in the system.

(4) A series of important problems stem from the fact that the criminal justice system is also a political system. It is political not only in the sense that many of its participants, such as district attorneys and judges, are elected. More significantly, each component of a criminal justice system is a self-contained bureaucracy with a strong desire for survival. Few organizations—be they labor unions, businesses, or units of government—are very enthusiastic about extensive analysis from outside. Any normal political problems in research are compounded in the criminal justice area where government (1) is the subject of the research, (2) often must give its consent before it can be studied, and (3) is increasingly providing the source of funds for research.

(5) There is an interesting analogy between national defense research and criminal justice research. Some of the topics are identical: riot control, weapon systems, command and control networks, the regulation of radical internal dissent. Many organizations founded to serve the national defense components of government are turning increasingly to conducting research in criminal justice problems. Rand, RAC, HOMRO, CRESS, and IDA are only a few of the Federal contract agencies bidding upon or receiving criminal justice research money. A better understanding of the defense experience might lead to a better understanding of the limitations of research in criminal justice systems.

(6) Another similarity between the criminal justice and the national defense scenes should give us pause. Recently, attempts to cut back the national defense budget were defeated in large measure because these cuts might have caused unemployment—even though the product might admittedly be useless. Industries are now rapidly expanding in response to increasing Federal expenditures in criminal justice—weapons, uniforms, communications equipment, transportation such as police cars and helicopters, building materials, electronic snooping devices, computers, better things through chemistry—such as mace, napalm, defoliants, and a variety of gases—alarm systems, security guards, and even research. American industry has thrived on selling an unsuspecting public products or services which they may not need or which may be unsafe. I would submit that only research—impartial research—can save the criminal justice system vast sums of money.

(7) Assuming that the number of trained individuals in the field dramatically increases, assuming that information systems are created that greatly facilitate data collection—the question still remains: What organizations in our society are to be allowed to know about the criminal justice system? There are a variety of groups conducting or having the potential to conduct criminal justice research—police, court,

and corrections operating agencies; statewide organizations such as the State planning agencies that Professor Krantz used to head; on the national scene, LEAA, the Department of Justice, HEW, the Census Bureau and other agencies; Federal contract research centers similar to those created for the needs of national defense research; private foundations; university-based research centers; academics working as individuals; a wide variety of private corporations including computer and other hardware manufacturers, management consultants, and accountants; last but not least, surely, the work of congressional committees such as Senator Bible's, who gave us such a good picture this morning of the problems of crime in small business. I would suggest that there is a relationship between the type of organization doing the research and (1) the quality of the research, and (2) the chances of the research being translated into action. I would like to emphasize that second point, because unless research is translated into action, it does not help anybody. That is one of the toughest jobs we have.

(8) One way of doing that is to create a continuing relationship between the researcher and the criminal justice agency. Too often, the researcher files his report and then moves on. The manager hardly has time to read the end product, much less attempt to implement it. The Vera Institute of Justice in New York City has pioneered the long term action-research approach. This relationship has been so successful that the police department has assigned a full-time staff to Vera headquarters to work on projects and to facilitate liaison between the Vera staff and the New York police department.

(9) Both sides—researcher and criminal justice manager—need to have realistic expectations of what research can and cannot do. Some researchers oversell their product; and, when the claims are not met, the busy and hard-pressed manager dismisses research completely.

(10) One frustration in criminal justice research is that a fair amount is already known about the system but it is not communicated to other researchers or operating agencies. For example, at least five recent court studies have been made at considerable expense. None of the reports of these studies, as far as I know, are in general circulation. Usually, a few hundred copies were printed. They quickly become collector's items instead of serving as the basis for further research.

(11) The proper funding of a project is crucial. Empirical research can be very expensive. Too little money, and the project is doomed from the start. Too much money, and the only economizing is in the thinking.

I have raised a wide variety of problems which I see inherent in criminal justice research. Unfortunately, I do not have an equal number of answers. In many instances, there are no permanent answers, there are only temporary accommodations between competing forces—the researcher's right to know and the bureaucrat's natural caution.

In conclusion, there is one recommendation which I cannot stress enough. As wide a variety as possible of organizations and viewpoints should be included in the criminal justice research community. With increased governmental spending, criminal justice research is in danger of becoming simply another organ for dissemination of "State truth." It is an inherent danger in the system of Government research. I think this problem would occur regardless of the personalities in-

volved or regardless of the problems involved. Unless we diversify and decentralize criminal justice research and funding, we shall lack the information necessary for making reasoned decisions about that system.

Thank you.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I thank both of you gentlemen for most interesting statements. Your position comes through loud and clear. Congressman Brown and I may disagree with it more or less, but we certainly have no question about where you stand.

As I understand it, you feel that while the Federal Government is putting greatly expanded resources into the fight against crime, your feeling is that we do not know where we are going, really, in terms of their effectiveness. We have not made adequate analysis. We have not done the research and we have not tried to follow up to determine whether the money we are spending is effective and whether more should be spent in a particular area or less, or how it should be modified and changed. This is something that I think tends to plague new programs, especially when there is a strong emotional drive to fund them vigorously and it is politically attractive to do so. I think that your criticisms are very, very timely. Certainly they are excellent analyses.

Now, I would like to go back to some of the details here. Mr. Krantz, I want to get those figures straight because they are so astonishing—what was the amount provided for law enforcement assistance by the Federal Government in 1969?

Mr. KRANTZ. The total amount for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts?

Chairman PROXMIRE. No; for the entire country.

Mr. KRANTZ. I believe it was about \$69 million, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman PROXMIRE. And in 1971, about \$500 million?

Mr. KRANTZ. I think it is \$480 million. I am not sure that figure has been sent to the White House yet, but that is the figure the Congress has been working with.

Chairman PROXMIRE. And you point out that the increase in research has been, in absolute terms, moderate, from \$510,000 in 1969, to \$745,000 in 1971, but a vastly diminishing percentage. So there is no relationship between the amount for gathering information about the amount we are spending, as to whether it is doing a job or not.

Mr. KRANTZ. Right. The figures you just alluded to were figures for Massachusetts alone.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do you know any reason why those figures should not be projected as roughly accurate?

Mr. KRANTZ. I think on a national basis, they would be projected as roughly accurate.

Representative BROWN. You said those were figures for research. Those are figures for planning in the generic term of planning within the legislation.

Mr. KRANTZ. That is right.

Chairman PROXMIRE. That is a useful correction. I meant to say planning. That is correct. I appreciate that.

Now, you make a very positive statement—you are such a persuasive person that I think a lot of people would agree, but I am not sure it is correct. You say traditional methods will not work. You say that in the context of talking about traditional methods of crime control. I just wondered what that means. It seems to me that more police, more judges, more prosecuting attorneys are certainly not the whole answer, but it would seem to me also that they do work in the sense that they provide some greater protection against crime. I have been very critical as the chairman of the District of Columbia appropriations subcommittee of our concentrating so much just on the number of policemen in the District, although I think it is a good thing, and I am for it. Although numbers will not do the job alone, it has helped, it seems to me, to slow down the increase in the incidence of crime. How can you make such a dogmatic statement that it will not work? How do you know it will not work?

Mr. KRANTZ. I think although it may have sounded in my statement like I am opposed to trying to improve what we have, I do not think that is entirely what I meant. The point I tried to make was that even improving the system the way it is now to a minimal standard which, say, was recommended by the President's commission when they talked about having X number of probation officers per client—I do not think that that alone is going to make a significant impact on the crime problem. We might improve police services, for example, by having more policemen.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Higher salaries for policemen, higher standards?

Mr. KRANTZ. Correct, or more judges. But in spending the last 3 years working very closely in the city of Boston, we began to analyze the complexities of the crime problem there. For example, the police can probably do very little overall about preventing crime. So increasing police effectiveness is probably not doing much about crime prevention. If we want to do something about preventing people from getting into the criminal justice system in the first place, we have to identify the potentially dangerous person early and work with him within the community. In other words, if we want to make basic improvements in crime prevention, we will have to drop the traditional methods of giving the police the aspects of prevention that they cannot handle.

I am not against shoring up certain resources now that desperately need to be shored up to minimum levels. But I think we are fooling ourselves if we assume that shoring up police departments, shoring up correction agencies, to do what they have been doing all along but with more people, is going to make a major impact on the crime problem.

Mr. NEJELSKI. One reason Mr. Krantz and I are so upset about the argument that we just need more of the same is there is no way of measuring the effects of what has been happening. For example, take the juvenile court area. Pioneered in 1900 in Illinois, 70 years of existence and we have no research, no idea of whether it is doing any good, whether it would be better to treat those people as adults or to treat them in some wholly different way. Yet the juvenile court is under great change now with the Gault and the Kent decisions, requiring due process to be applied in that court.

One other point, while I am obviously a firm believer in research, I do not think we should use the lack of research as any excuse for not acting. We have to act. We have to do something in these areas.

For example, the Harvard Center is studying the criminal effects of the methadone project in the city of New York. There are enormous problems in trying to evaluate whether people on methadone commit more or less crime than people on hard narcotics. But that does not mean that we cannot experiment. We have to experiment and have to try to do the best we can, even though there are enormous problems.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Let me ask you gentlemen, do most State planning agencies employ outside consultants and how well qualified are these consultants? If we are going to get at this problem, are there people qualified now to do it or do we have to start a whole new educational program to build enough people? I do not know if there are in Wisconsin, Ohio, Massachusetts, and New York.

Mr. KRANTZ. A lot of States have relied upon outside consultants to come in and help them do their planning. These are people from the private sector who spend some time and then leave and are not responsible for what happens thereafter. I would certainly agree with Mr. Nejeleski that there are a lot of people who are out peddling their wares in the private consulting field for profit that know very little about criminal justice problems and needs.

Chairman PROXMIRE. What I am getting at is what role should the Federal Government be playing in trying to develop qualified personnel?

Mr. KRANTZ. I think there are three or four different approaches that can be taken. One is, I think, in terms of support of universities to develop curriculums that may be necessary to attract new people into the field of criminal justice as a career. That is one avenue that can be pursued.

Second, I think if there is one way we can possibly stimulate people who are already in existing careers with very good capability, say in private industry or working with other types of domestic problems, if we can somehow stimulate them to move into criminal justice areas, that would be very helpful.

Third, I think there are people now working in the criminal justice field that have the raw material to be very good. Therefore, with some advanced training or educational opportunities, they could gain the ability to see more broadly and could become tremendous assets.

I might say there are Civil Service restrictions right now that are phenomenal that make it very difficult for people in the criminal justice field to further themselves. Traditionally, police departments are a monolithic structure. It is virtually impossible to break in from the outside at a higher level. There are problems with civilian versus sworn personnel working in law enforcement. These are going to have to be overcome. I think we have to have some changes in the civil service system so people from California can move into Massachusetts, for instance.

Chairman PROXMIRE. They do that at the top level.

Mr. KRANTZ. It is done at the top level, but in many jurisdictions now, in order to become a chief of police at X police department, you have to come up from the ranks. At middle management, it is almost impossible to move from one department to another. Problems arise

with retirement, pension, and fringe benefits. Under the Civil Service restrictions, an officer from one department will not even be able to take a competitive exam in another department, which locks him into the department he is presently in. This is a serious problem which I hope can be overcome soon.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Let me ask Mr. Nejelski, do you think we are putting too large a share into equipment? Do we have enough research to know whether equipment is helping in police matters, whether it represents a wise investment, or do they know when they receive Federal funds for this purpose?

Mr. NEJELSKI. I think there is great room for improvement of evaluation. Evaluation is a word of art. Sometimes the terms research or planning describe the same function. There is supposed to be an evaluation component in any action program.

Chairman PROXMIRE. There is supposed to be. You mean the Federal law requires it?

Mr. KRANTZ. There is an indication that there should be evaluation.

Mr. NEJELSKI. It is a suggestion.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do you think the Federal law should require it?

Mr. KRANTZ. I do. But I think Mr. Nejelski's point is, it is very hard to know what criteria you use for evaluation.

Mr. NEJELSKI. As we have said over and over this morning, there is a shortage of people to do this evaluation—if you are going to have a letter back from a chief of police saying, “those 10 helicopters are wonderful, and we love riding up and down in them.” That is a rather meaningless kind of evaluation. If that is the best we can do, then, putting in a mechanical requirement for evaluation really will not help a great deal. We have to have the substance to back up that evaluation.

Mr. KRANTZ. If I could comment very quickly on your statement about equipment. I think law enforcement agencies desperately need more equipment, all the way up and down the line. I think, though, that there is a question of how we can most effectively use the Federal funds that we have now versus what should be local and State responsibility. I found that many cities that applied for riot control equipment, even though they have tax problems, could probably have purchased that equipment for themselves.

But here is a big new Federal program, and if they have the option to supplant local expenditures and get Federal funds to buy the equipment, they will.

So I think there is really a need to determine what we want this program to do.

If its objective is to be a pace setter program, which is eventually going to make some breakthrough in the criminal justice field, then large expenditures on equipment out of this program are not going to help us very much. That is why I would hope over time that if departments need riot equipment—and some departments do—it could be strongly urged that this be a local responsibility and that the Federal funds be used primarily for other things.

There may be cases where there are new kinds of equipment that are experimental and very expensive. Federal funds might be used to test this equipment. But I think it is important that States and local agen-

cies not use Federal money for supplanting what should eventually be a local responsibility. Then Federal funds become nothing more than part of State and local budgets and are used to carry on day-to-day operational responsibilities. I think this act should do more than that.

Chairman PROXMIRE. My time is up. If you would like to reply, with the permission of Mr. Brown, go ahead.

Mr. NEJELSKI. I think we are gadget happy as a country. Hardware is very visible. It is an easy way to spend your money. And we need a lot of it. I have talked to police chiefs whose headquarters are just unbelievable in terms of the command and control, if you can call it that, that they have over their forces.

Representative BROWN. Unbelievable in what way? You lose me on these terms. Try to be a little more precise, if you can.

Mr. NEJELSKI. OK. For example, I was visiting Howard County in Maryland—

Representative BROWN. I do not want an example. I just want to know what you mean by "unbelievable." Unbelievably good; unbelievably bad?

Mr. NEJELSKI. No; bad. They just lack any kind of modern communications equipment. They lack even a safe building to operate out of. But the use of Federal funds for hardware is not any kind of a plot. The police know what they want to spend money for. They come in with reasonably good plans.

The courts, in my opinion, are really the worst area and the weakest link in the criminal justice system. If we are going to have more respect for law and order, we are going to have to have faster trials. And if somebody is going to be arrested and wait 2 or 3 years before a trial, before there is some disposition of his case, I do not think that is going to encourage much respect for law and order.

But the courts are the most resistant to change, the most bureaucratic, and the least interested in any kind of research. This is why we have been spending on hardware: Because the police and some corrections people have plans and they have done some research. They have done their homework, and they have some ideas.

Thank you.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Congressman Brown?

Representative BROWN. I hardly know where to start with the questions, because I am not sure I understand the testimony. I find it highly contradictory.

The suggestion has been that we certainly need additional equipment for police forces, but that additional equipment for police forces is bad. I just do not understand what the conclusion is out of all that.

I am baffled by a couple of the statements that are in Mr. Nejelski's testimony. I do not know what they mean, I am sorry to say.

The one thing that you have chosen to underline is what organizations in our society are to be allowed to know about the criminal justice system. What does that question?

Mr. NEJELSKI. If I may give you an example. When I was at the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, we wanted to do a study on preventive detention. What is the recidivism rate? How many people awaiting trial commit crime?

There are about 36 different data sources that you have to go to in the District of Columbia when you want to answer that kind of question.

In order to get access to that data, you have to get permission of the Mayor, you have to get the permission of the Police Chief, you have to get permission of a wide variety of people. That poses some difficult ethical or political problem. How are you going to do research about someone who has the complete power to kick you out in a minute's notice—if he does not like what you are going to do or he does not think you are doing it properly?

That is one reason why I suggest the need for continuing relationships, so the researchers and the people in the criminal justice system can build up a mutual respect and mutual confidence.

But right now, Congressman, the very system that is being studied and supplying the funds has ready the power to control that research and control who is going to know about the criminal justice system.

Representative BROWN. OK.

Mr. NEJELSKI. It is the same problem, as I suggested several times in my testimony, with the Defense Department, with which I believe this committee has had some experience.

Representative BROWN. All right. Let me go on to the statement you make at the termination of your testimony:

With increased governmental spending, criminal justice research is in danger of becoming simply another organ for dissemination of "State truth."

What does that mean and what is the rationale for it? Is there an established argument that that is true? I mean, is there some argument that is going on that the criminal justice research is some State-propaganda weapon?

I just do not understand what your testimony means. I am sorry. I wish I could grasp it better. But what does that mean?

Mr. NEJELSKI. Coming down on the plane last night, I was reading the annual report of the American Sociological Association. They have several committees devoted to this topic, studying the problems of Government research. In particular, the problem that, if the Government is going to be the only provider of funds for research and if you are not going to give the kind of research the Government wants to hear, you are not going to have funds and you are not going to be in business to do that research. I think it is about that simple.

Representative BROWN. What you are suggesting then—I just did not understand what your suggestion was—is that you want other people to be in the research area?

Mr. NEJELSKI. Yes; I hope this will fall on fertile ground in Republican ears.

Representative BROWN. I think it would fall on more fertile ground if it were not stated in such abstractions that I do not understand it; I am sorry.

Mr. KRANTZ, as to the question of who should do research in this area, why do you suggest HEW over Justice? I gather that you are suggesting that Justice is the funded area that was doing a juvenile study. Is that right?

Mr. KRANTZ. I think, Congressman, I was quite clear in my statement that there is room for both agencies. I said the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1968—

Representative BROWN. I am sorry. You see, that is the difficulty of not having a prepared statement in front of me. I thought you suggested that it ought to be done by HEW over Justice.

Mr. KRANTZ. No; my point was that HEW has responsibility and authority under the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act, but little or no funds. I said, there was little or no coordination between HEW and the Department of Justice. I said there are two things I would hope would be done. One is that HEW, because of its expertise in the field of education and rehabilitation programs, and its concern in other areas for youth, should have an increasing responsibility in the field of youth crime.

The second point I made was that there should be very close coordination between the Department of Justice in its program and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. I said that was not true as of now.

Representative BROWN. So you are for coordination between the departments which have expert knowledge in this area?

Mr. KRANTZ. That is right. I also made the point that the Department of Justice does not have the expert staff to deal with delinquency right now.

Representative BROWN. Now, is it a proper assumption that police departments are underpaid, undertrained, and underequipped?

Mr. KRANTZ. Yes.

Mr. NEJELSKI. Yes.

Representative BROWN. Now, should the money, then, that we have available go into planning or into action, which I guess would mean taking care of this problem of being underpaid, undertrained, and underequipped? Because apparently, if this is so, that they are underpaid, undertrained, and underequipped, it is because State and local budgets have not sufficiently funded them so they would be properly equipped, paid, and trained; is that correct?

Mr. KRANTZ. I would be happy to allude to that, and also refer back to the earlier question.

I think it is a little naive for us to assume that the Federal Government is the primary source of money to law enforcement and criminal justice.

Representative BROWN. I cannot let that pass. The taxpayer is the source of money, whether it comes through the organization of Federal taxation and redistribution, or whether it comes through local or State taxes and redistribution, it does not make any difference, it is going to come from the individual.

Mr. KRANTZ. But the fact is that the Crime Control Act is not the only source. It will never, under present funding, be able to deal with undertrained, underfinanced, underequipped police departments.

Representative BROWN. But the basic point, I would suggest, is when we get into this business, the problem was that State and local agencies, governmental agencies, had not supplied the funds to provide either adequate pay, training, or equipment. Is that not correct?

Mr. KRANTZ. Yes.

Representative BROWN. So we got into the business because the Federal Government had to take some action. Is that right?

Mr. KRANTZ. Yes, but let me finish my point, which is that under the Crime Control Act, it is quite clear from the language that the

purpose of this act was to develop new approaches. It is recognition that we have not been effective in dealing with the crime problem and, hopefully, the Federal Government, with some financial support, could lead the way in finding some new answers.

Now, I think there are a lot of ways that the Federal Government, aside from giving direct funding, can stimulate change and deal with questions like salary questions. For example, in the city of Boston something like \$30 million or \$35 million out of a total of \$175 million of the city budget goes to police services.

Even though cities are strapped for funds, there is a good chance, with better planning and better understanding of the system, that they can make a better allocation of the funds they have.

There is also a very important role that the States can probably play in the criminal justice field. States have traditionally given very little money to cities and towns for crime control.

With the stimulus of Federal funds, we can encourage the States to do more. I think the question is, If we have x number of dollars right now under the Crime Control Act, how can we best utilize these funds to make major breakthroughs? Although equipment is important, in terms of Federal leadership under the program we now have, I do not think it is the best way to use Federal funds for the most part.

I think, incidentally, that local governments are now doing far better in terms of salaries, training, and equipment than they did 3 or 4 years ago. I suggest that will improve even more in the future.

Representative BROWN. I would suggest that it might be part of the answer, because funding proper pay may be able to attract some of the experts that you suggest are not attracted to the field because they are underpaid; it seems to me that this whole problem is really a chicken-and-egg proposition. I am not sure that I expect it to be resolved overnight. I get the impression from your testimony that you expect it to be resolved overnight.

I find that a contradiction within the testimony.

Mr. KRANTZ. I think it is puzzling that that would come up, because I think I made the point that I had one great concern, and that is that Congress, through its public debate, would expect too much too soon. I think in making that point, I illustrated—I have now spent 3 years butting my head on a very political system in Massachusetts, and I am very impressed with what is happening. That is why I strongly support this program.

This program can be the basis of some major things happening over the next few years. So my feeling is the opposite, that we have to be patient.

But if we decide, for example, that salaries are the key to improvements in law enforcement and criminal justice, fine. I think we ought to move money into salaries. The point I was making earlier is that we have no basis for knowing that. We must take a look at what we are doing and what we expect it to achieve before we start doing it. It may be that your comment will be a perfectly logical answer to the problems that we have.

Representative BROWN. What comment is that?

Mr. KRANTZ. The comment that maybe if we put a lot of money into salaries, that will attract good people and we will make an impact on

the crime problem. What I am saying is that that may be true. But initially it requires analysis. In one State where we have \$16 million for a year, do we put \$4 or \$5 million into salaries? That is a lot of money. We ought to think through what we want to achieve by that so that at the end of a year or two or three, we can make a measurement and determine whether or not it will have any impact. If not, we had better do something else with those funds.

Representative BROWN. I would suggest I would be totally dissatisfied with the program if, as suggested in passing here, the input in Federal dollars meant a reduction at State and local levels of money in law enforcement. There really is very little in the way of hard information in your testimony. Nobody has suggested facts and figures that would infer that that is true or not true.

I would like to know that. But it occurs to me that what you are saying is that this program has not come full blown like Venus on the halfshell out of the U.S. Congress or out of the proposals of the administration, and has not, in a very short time, resolved all of the problems.

If that is the thrust of your testimony, then I would agree with you.

Mr. KRANTZ. If you think that is the thrust of our testimony, then I have really failed in making the point I was trying to make. I think there is probably no one who was as firm an advocate of this program as I was when it was in the Congress in 1967.

Representative BROWN. You mean you are for the program?

Mr. KRANTZ. Yes.

Mr. NEJELSKI. Yes.

Representative BROWN. That is one thing that is clear in my mind.

Mr. KRANTZ. I think I probably made that statement three or four times. I think it is conceptually sound and I think it is a good precedent for other types of Federal programs. What I would like to see it do over time is succeed. I think it has potential for doing so.

Representative BROWN. We both want it to succeed; we are agreed on that. We are agreed that there is not adequate research done at any level of crime; right?

Mr. NEJELSKI. That is right.

Representative BROWN. And there are a lot of other inadequacies. But the question is, until we get some research on priorities, we do not know what those priorities should be.

Mr. NEJELSKI. One point I shall like to emphasize is that my comments are not necessarily directed to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration or to the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968. I tried to address them to criminal justice over all. There are a lot of different sources of funds.

For example, the Ford Foundation just gave \$30 million to start a police foundation to study the problems of police and to give action grants to police. I think that is great.

The best thing is to have a variety of funding sources, so that no one small group of people in this country, inside or outside of government, can say: "This is the kind of research that is going to be done. These are the kinds of questions we are going to ask about the criminal system."

We did some study when I was at the National Institute of how many Federal agencies have an interest in criminal justice programs, action, research, whatever you want to call it.

I think we stopped when we got to 23. HUD has a real interest in safe housing, in locking devices, in protecting people living in developments. The Post Office has a great interest in mail frauds and thefts from the mails, and so forth.

I think each one of these agencies should be conducting research, should have programs. It would be a great mistake for the Congress to say: "Well, now, we have an LEAA. They are responsible for crime. They have all the answers. Let them solve it." I think LEAA can surely serve as a clearinghouse and as a focus. They are doing that. But let us realize that we need a decentralization and a diversification of people working in this area.

Representative BROWN. My time is up. I find no argument with that. I find no argument with many of the things that we have tried to develop here in my few minutes of asking questions.

I must say, gentlemen, the testimony seems to me to be a collection of sort of generalized comments about the problems with the whole area, with few suggestions as to answers and no reasons why those would be the answers.

If I may have just one more moment, Mr. Chairman, the suggestion that sending police to technical schools so that they could develop additional knowledge has not been a terribly successful program, and what we need in the program is people with more knowledge; I am just lost in that kind of argument. I just do not understand it.

Mr. KRANTZ. Congressman, what I would hope, and I apologize for not having a prepared statement—

Representative BROWN. It would have been helpful.

Mr. NEJELSKI. It did not help me.

Mr. KRANTZ. When my statement is transcribed and after you have read it, I would be more than happy to try to clarify any of my testimony. I did not come here with any intent to confuse. I am very concerned about this program, based upon personal experience.

If I did not convey the concern I have, I would certainly like to have an opportunity to do that after you have had a chance to see the statement.

Representative BROWN. Again, with the sufferance of the Chairman, if you would list the concrete proposals for improvement of the program just item by item, it would be helpful. I would like to see that.

Mr. KRANTZ. In my notes, I had eight points that I made, starting with the point that the act is conceptually strong, talking about planning, talking about technical assistance. I think those are listed in my testimony. I would be happy to talk about those.

In closing, I think the administration can do a great deal now with the legislation it now has. I think there is no need to be defensive about the program at all. I think now some clear steps can be taken under existing authority to do far more to insure that, over time, this program will be successful. That was, through the eight proposals I made, that is what I tried to state very strongly.

Representative BROWN. Very good. I must apologize for my lack of understanding.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I do not think you should apologize at all. I think this has been a very helpful colloquy.

I think Congressman Brown is a very able man, even though he and I happen to disagree on some things, or have recently, at least. We

certainly disagree on this testimony this morning. I think it has been immensely valuable. I think these two witnesses have shown how well qualified they are. They have both had extensive experience in this field. They have both been telling us what the problems are in the legislation, and they have been telling us in meticulous detail, it seems to me, what we have to do in order to get the kind of information we need to evaluate this program and then determine how the programs can be made really effective in combating crime.

I would like to ask you gentlemen, one function of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration is supposed to be to improve our statistics on the incidence of crime and the effectiveness of criminal prevention and rehabilitation efforts. You are very critical of the information we have. What is wrong with the existing crime statistics?

Mr. NEJELSKI. For one thing, they are fragmented. Each agency keeps its own statistics without common definition, without common references. As I mentioned before, when we did a study of the need for preventive detention in the District of Columbia, we had to go to 36 data sources in the District of Columbia.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Are there comprehensive national statistics brought together by the FBI with respect to many crimes?

Mr. NEJELSKI. Yes, there are, in major crime categories. They are a help. I am sure the people in the FBI would be the first to admit that there are needs for improvement.

I might mention one thing that the LEAA has done in the area of statistics. It goes under the acronym of Project SEARCH, which is the system for electronic analysis and retrieval of criminal histories. One of the great problems is that there is no one document that a judge or a policeman or a corrections official can look at and see what the man's record is. The corrections person can say, well, this individual was here 3 years ago and that is all I know about him.

Project SEARCH was a grant to 10 States, 10 pilot States, to try to come up—among themselves on a decentralized basis—with common definitions and a common method of handling statistics in a uniform offender record. This project is generally a year old.

One of the problems we found with that project was that the people in the State planning office, such as Mr. Krantz, were happy and anxious to do this project. But when you get down to the lower levels, it is very hard to get the police talking to the corrections people, or any of the members of the criminal justice system to really cooperate. Each wants their own information system, they want to do things in their own way.

It was hard enough for us to exchange information on the national level. But, before you can do that, each State has to get together within the State, and that is a difficult problem.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I understand that you were involved in setting up the statistical units with the Law Enforcement Administration. I wonder what kind of information you think should be looked for from that unit?

Mr. NEJELSKI. There are two kinds of information. One is the development for a uniform offender record. Another is the aggregate statistical data. The data we need to make rational decisions as managers—whether you call it output information or whatever. We lack it

in any timely form. I think the FBI statistics are many months behind, and they are the best we have.

I know a State court system, for example, that has not published an annual report for 2 years because they lack the staff even to put together a simple report. When you are trying to do evaluation or research under those conditions, it is very difficult.

In summary, there is a need for a uniform offender record and also for timely aggregate statistics.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Is this something LEAA can do under present law, or do you need a new law?

Mr. NEJELSKI. That is a question, really, for LEAA. The Census Bureau has done some work in the past in criminal justice statistics, and I think that is fine. We need a number of agencies collecting data.

I know that the LEAA had plans to expand in this area, and I think you should ask them when the representatives of the Justice Department appear.

Mr. KRANTZ. Mr. Chairman, I think as part of that, the Federal Government, possibly through LEAA, could play a valuable role in developing some model State systems of gathering information. I know many States would like help and technical assistance on what kind of information is needed, what agencies should get it. I think that is something that should probably be done at the national level that would be of immense help to the States.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do you think the kind of economic analysis that we use with respect to some investment, and that many cities have been using—that is, based on a benefit-cost method—even HEW has done it in some respects. Do you think this is a practical method that could be used to determine what equipment should be bought, to determine the wisdom, for example, of spending a certain amount of money on additional police personnel as compared with the wisdom of spending more of it on training and more of it in some other area?

Is this, on the basis of your experience, practical? Will this give us practical results, or do we have to find some other way of evaluating this information?

Mr. KRANTZ. No, I think that the tool you suggested is one that, over time, would be a very important component of planning. As you know, I think before you can do that type of analysis, you do need data. You need to develop some sense of what you want to achieve so you can begin to make measurements.

Maybe in the field of criminal justice, because human factors are so intimately involved, efficiency cannot be the only criterion. In processing people through the courts, you need other ways to analyze the problem as well. But I think I see the potential that you describe. I just do not think the planning capability nor the data is available yet.

I would hope we are moving in that direction.

That is why, as my first point, I supported the concept of planning, because I think out of planning can come the kind of data and ability to establish the goals and objectives that would lead into good criteria for evaluation.

Chairman PROXMIRE. It seems to me if you have this as an objective, you are going to be in a stronger position to elicit the data you have been calling for all along.

Mr. KRANTZ. I think that is very important. I think you can list that as an objective right away. I think the States should begin to realize it.

Chairman PROXMIRE. To take something specific, I understand there is a small radio sending and receiving set which the police have been trying hard to develop, without much success, because it is very expensive. Without this, the policemen have to carry a heavy radio set and because of this, they sometimes just do without. This is something I think we could do in advance on the basis of a statistical study, rather than relying on other data.

Are you familiar with that?

Mr. KRANTZ. Yes, I am.

Mr. NEJELSKI. I would like to make one other point.

Whether or not you have the data or the trained people to carry out cost-benefit analysis or PPB's, or whatever you want to call it, it is a legitimate exercise because it raises some very hard questions about the criminal justice system. Why does someone need a 50-percent increase in force? Why do you need new buildings? Why do you need hardware? Those are good questions to be asking, even though we do not have the data.

Chairman PROXMIRE. That is what I mean. I think it would be a mistake if you were chained to the data. The data should never make decisions for you. But if you have the data there, it could keep you from making a grievous error where we do not have these programs, because you would do it on the basis of a good salesman for equipment or a good salesman, for that matter, for a training program.

Mr. NEJELSKI. That is right.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I think you talked, Mr. Krantz, about the increase in crime, the devastating increase, among young people, from 16 to 21 years old or so. This past year, they have been having trouble finding jobs. Youth unemployment was 16 percent this summer; 30 percent for black youth. What has happened to the Federal youth programs and programs to prevent delinquency?

And what should be the Federal approach to problems of juvenile delinquency? You touched briefly on that, Mr. Krantz. Could you give us a little more detail on it?

Mr. KRANTZ. It would be hard for me to accurately respond to your question about what is happening to Federal youth programs. It is a good question to ask, and I think State criminal justice planning agencies should be able to answer that question, for this reason: A lot of the crime I alluded to as youth crime before cannot be intelligently responded to by criminal justice agencies. They are the first to recognize that.

As I stated, police, criminal justice agencies, courts, are not equipped, do not have the staff to engage in the mental health services, the vocational training, the guidance counseling, that has to be done. I think you can relate this very closely to the crime problem, not as an abstract problem but as a real problem.

I think, over time, we are going to be planning—we have seen this happen in Massachusetts—to tie the Federal crime program to other programs such as those by OEO and the Department of Labor. For example, if a youth appears before a juvenile court, rather than send him into a juvenile institution which has a very bad record in terms

of rehabilitation, there is a good chance that he can be diverted out of the system, say, to a Labor Department training program, if that is what he needs.

We are just at the point now in Massachusetts where we have reached out; we are checking into programs that can be tied in and coordinated with our own. I think over time, we should put money into community mental health centers, who can work in conjunction with the police on mental health programs, for example.

Getting back to your question, I do not know the success of some of these programs, whether they are successful, and I think the States should become cognizant of these programs, as well as others which relate directly to the problems of crime.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do you have any more questions?

Representative BROWN. No, I have no more questions.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Gentleman, thank you very much. We have a divided court here. I think Mr. Brown's attitude and his participation has been very helpful. He has elicited some specific responses which were revealing.

Mr. NEJESKI. Just one comment on Mr. Brown's remarks, if I may. People in research need to be more concrete. Instead of having, perhaps, a National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, which is a god awful long and highfalutin name, perhaps we should have an Institute for Reducing Police Response Time to the Scene of the Crime; an Institute for Reducing Court Delay, and so forth. Let us have an input to the real problems that confront the criminal justice system.

The response of the academic world to the problems of the criminal justice system has unfortunately not been overwhelming. I think professors have different interests—perhaps writing a book. This detachment is upsetting to the people in the criminal justice system to have to wrestle with the real world problems.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you, gentlemen.

Tomorrow, we shall reconvene to hear three witnesses: The chief of police of New Haven, Conn., James F. Ahern; Alfred Blumstein, the director of the Urban Systems Institute; and Edwin Young, the chancellor of the University of Wisconsin.

We are recessed until tomorrow morning at 10.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene, at 10 a.m., Wednesday, September 23, 1970.)

THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1970

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT
OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee on Economy in Government met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-407, the Capitol, Hon. William Proxmire (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Proxmire and Percy.

Also present: John R. Stark, executive director; and Courtenay M. Slater, economist.

Chairman PROXMIRE. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning we are continuing our examination of the Nation's criminal justice system. Yesterday we heard testimony describing the way in which Federal expenditures on criminal justice have been growing rapidly and how they are expected to continue to grow. We also heard very disturbing testimony that our present knowledge of how to put these funds to wise use is all too limited. The problems of crime and violence are with us now. We cannot wait until research has given us all the answers before we begin to take action to deal with the problems. We must, however, conduct continuous evaluations of our criminal justice programs as they develop and expand. We must ask hard questions about whether we are utilizing our resources in the most effective manner. We must be sure that some reasonable fraction of our total criminal justice expenditure is devoted to planning and evaluation.

One of the hard questions we must ask ourselves, and ask urgently, is how we can best come to grips with problems of campus violence. In this phenomenon of campus violence, we face a new problem which is national in its scope and which represents a new challenge to our criminal justice system. We face a type of disruptive activity with which, in the past, law enforcement officials have seldom had to deal. The motivations which lead to campus violence are a puzzle to us. We are deeply concerned for the well-being of our young people and for the preservation of our colleges and universities as havens of free inquiry and the exchange of ideas.

An examination of the proper role of the Federal Government in assisting our colleges and universities in coping with the problem of campus violence is an important part of any comprehensive examination of the Federal criminal justice system. The subcommittee is most grateful that Dr. Edwin Young, the Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, is able to meet with us this morning and to give us his views not only on the situation at the University of Wis-

consin—and that in itself is cause enough for concern to all of us—but also on the appropriate national response to what has become a national problem.

In addition to Dr. Young, the subcommittee is also fortunate to have as a witness this morning Mr. James F. Ahern, the chief of police of New Haven, Conn. In addition to being well qualified to evaluate the criminal justice system from the viewpoint of those who must actually put programs into operation, Mr. Ahern, particularly in view of his current membership on the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, is perhaps in a position to answer some of our difficult questions about the campus situation.

Our third witness this morning is Dr. Alfred Blumstein, director of the Urban Systems Institute at Carnegie-Mellon University. Dr. Blumstein has pioneered in developing cost effectiveness techniques for the evaluation of criminal justice programs and in the training of criminal justice specialists. We are looking forward to his testimony.

Just yesterday, it was revealed that the President of the United States announced a program of trying to meet the problems of campus violence, including a very substantial addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's investigative agents, and including a determination to act wherever Federal funds are involved on campuses, even if the authorities do not request Federal action. It will be interesting to get reactions to this latest proposal by the President.

Chancellor Young, we are just delighted to have you here. We know how busy you are at the university. The university session has just begun. We are most grateful, under the circumstances, that you could be with us this morning.

Go right ahead.

STATEMENT OF EDWIN YOUNG, CHANCELLOR, MADISON CAMPUS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much for the invitation to come. I certainly do not come as an expert in the matter of criminal law, but I must admit that I have had in the last 2 years a great deal of experience in dealing both with police and legal matters. Our campus is a place of great tension these days, and at times, this tension breaks into serious disruption.

I am not going to take time to talk about the causes of campus unrest. This is being handled by others. I do want to talk a bit about the costs of this unrest. They are increasing. This year, we are doubling our last year's expenditures of some \$700,000 for protection and security.

Chairman PROXMIER. Last year, it was \$700,000; this year, it will be \$1.4 million?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, something in this order. In addition to this, there are costs for additional local police in times of emergency; the very high cost of calling up the National Guard—it has been called up at least two times in 3 years—not only the out-of-pocket costs but the very real cost to members of the National Guard in disruption of their lives and their income; the cost in terms of foregone research and classes that are, if taught, taught in an atmosphere quite opposed to that of learning and contemplation. And there is another cost to us which, again, can't be put in dollars, but is a very real one: the likeli-

hood that there will be a loss of public confidence in higher education that will take the form of reduced appropriations or lesser appropriations than we need from legislatures and a falling off of gifts from private donors. So we have a very high cost situation and a very disturbing one.

I agree with the President of the United States who has said recently that the task of solving these problems lies with those who are directly involved—the students, the faculty, the administrators, and the trustees. And we must and we are trying very hard and I am going to leave for your records a copy of a statement by a thousand of our faculty members, by our regents and by myself, as we begin this school year, of what we propose to do.

But no matter what we do internally in meeting legitimate and proper requests for change, there are those in the university communities who are determined to destroy the universities. Some of them are students, some are not. Their numbers are small, but their influence is very great and their ability to do damage is very great. So we find ourselves working with law enforcement officers. We have to call them in, as I have suggested—the National Guard, local police, and our own police.

The task they face is a different task from the traditional police task. It is one of dealing with mob psychology; it is dealing with persons whom I would call political criminals. They are proud of their activities, they want the publicity, they want to incite more of the same, and they want public and long-drawn-out trials.

Many of our police officers have now had some experience in handling large crowds, but many have not. One of the areas that we need help in is in both the recruitment and the training of riot and crowd control personnel. I have seen in 2 years at Wisconsin a tremendous improvement. Some of that is due to Federal funds under the Omnibus Crime Act, where there has been training for officers in crowd control.

There is also a need, in addition to the recruitment and training of individuals, some need for equipment, particularly communications equipment, scientific equipment; but the basic job we face, I think, and this, I believe as a citizen, goes beyond the campus, is the quality of people we are able to attract, because they must be people of a very high caliber of self-control, of judgment, and often, a policeman acts alone against a number of people who are trying to excite him.

The second thing I would say to you is that one of our very difficult problems is the vagueness and inappropriateness of the laws that the police are called upon to enforce at this time. Unlawful assembly, disorderly conduct, vagrancy statutes are antiquated in their phraseology, overbroad in their coverage. Often, the cases are thrown out, and perhaps rightly so, by the courts. Therefore, something must be done about this and the police must be provided with proper tools to meet this situation. I would suggest to you that we need more research and more scholarship in this area of the law. We need something that will help our lawmakers, who are eager to pass legislation but who do not really know what kind of legislation can be most helpful.

Another thing I would say is that the whole field of the law is one which causes great dissatisfaction among concerned students. I

am not talking about revolutionaries, I am talking about those who have a sense of social injustice. They feel that the law does not apply equally to everyone in our country, that there is a different law for the rich and the poor. Insofar as Congress or any group can help change the situation, I think it most important.

Let me then summarize. One would be research, research on the law itself; the second would be in the recruitment and training of police officers; and third would be in the sense of helping to reform the attitude toward the law by making the practices of law enforcement conform with the idealism of the country.

You will forgive me if I have not read my text, but you have it exactly in hand and I think I tried to summarize it a little bit. I would be more than happy to answer questions.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Without objection, Chancellor Young, your full prepared statement will appear in the record.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWIN YOUNG

My name is Edwin Young. I am Chancellor of the Madison campus of the University of Wisconsin.

I want to thank the committee for extending me the invitation to appear at this hearing. A few years ago, I would have thought it incongruous for a university administrator to be invited to appear before a Congressional committee inquiring into the effectiveness of our criminal justice system. Times have obviously changed.

The campuses of great universities in this country have never been free from ferment. We have, in fact, consistently encouraged the open discussion of ideas. We have promoted the expression of conflicting ideas in the belief that it is only through such a process that the truth can be established.

While the campus was never a peaceful place in the conventional sense of the word, we did feel that whatever criminal law problems we might encounter could be handled by a small staff of university security personnel. However, university campuses have recently become the focal point for demonstrations, disruptions, strikes, and other expressions of unrest about those conditions which prevail within and without our universities. Now it no longer seems odd for the head of a university to appear before a Congressional committee to express his views about the status and enforcement of criminal law in this country.

I should make it clear at the outset that I make no claims to a special expertise in the fields of criminal law or police problems. But I do speak as one who has had frequent need in recent years to rely on the help of lawyers and police to assist in maintaining the security and continuity of a great educational institution. I also speak as an economist—one who understands the financial ramifications of campus turmoil.

The costs of campus unrest in this country are already considerable. And they are increasing. On my own campus, we are spending large amounts of taxpayer's money for increased protection and security. I lament the fact that we have to spend money for additional police and security officers when we could be using these funds for strengthening our academic programs and for finding ways to improve the quality of life for our citizens.

In spite of this situation, most of us feel quite strongly that the problems of our universities should be solved by those who are directly involved in their operation—students, faculty, administration, and trustees. I personally feel that these are the people who have a proper understanding of the issues and problems as well as the desire to preserve and defend our universities in their present hour of crisis.

If we are to achieve significant reforms within our universities, we must be able to insure an atmosphere that provides for tolerance and respect of differing ideas. We have not been able to achieve this kind of atmosphere in recent years. The level of disruption and destruction has risen on our campuses. Administrators throughout the country have had to call in local and state law enforce-

ment personnel, and in some cases the National Guard, to protect people and property. We have used police to prevent aggressive minorities from imposing their will on others within the university community.

We do not like to have to call police to the campus. However, we feel quite strongly that no group, no matter how supposedly honorable its intentions, should be able to achieve its ends through the tactics of intimidation and terror. At this point, I think it is important to point out that disorders on the campus are not unique. They have much in common with the disorders that are occurring in other parts of our society. The anonymity and psychology generated by a crowd present special problems for law enforcement officials. Police who are able to deal with volatile crowds are highly valued in a campus crisis. Many of our university and local police officers have had the experience and training to meet the special kinds of law enforcement problems presented by large crowds. But we need to recruit and train more officers who have those personality traits necessary to function effectively in crowd control situations.

The federal government, through allocations of funds to law enforcement programs, could support programs designed to improve the individual officer's capacity to perform well in those tense situations which characterize an increasing number of campus and urban demonstrations. The government could also provide additional crowd control equipment to local agencies. But the key to any creative response to civil disorders is found in the quality of the man who is called upon to face the taunts, obscenities, and assaults of the mob.

I have the impression that another major problem police face in dealing with large civil disorders is the vagueness and inappropriateness of the laws they are called upon to enforce. For example, the unlawful assembly, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy statutes in nearly all jurisdictions are antiquated in their phraseology and overbroad in their coverage. I have been told that there are serious difficulties in interpreting these statutes and that they have, in many instances, been declared unconstitutional, for one reason or another.

There may be several perfectly understandable reasons why such longstanding statutes are just now being found deficient. But the fact remains that the police are left with fewer tools to meet the problems of disorder in its modern dress. It is not surprising that there is oftentimes discouragement among law enforcement officials on this score. Compared with the vast scholarship which has gone into the definition of homicide over the years, the intellectual effort which has been addressed to refining the law's response to broad, civil disorder has been embarrassingly little and late. The formulation of such definitions may be matters for state legislatures, but the research, thinking, and drafting which is needed to restructure the substantive law is a matter where the federal government could be of help. In the process, we must be careful to find ways which will protect the peace of the community and, at the same time, allow for the maximum liberty in the expression of legitimate dissent.

There is another side to this question which I think important for the committee to consider. Many of our students are deeply concerned about the status of criminal justice in our country. These students believe there are inequities in our judicial system. They perceive certain faults which limit the effectiveness of our courts and the police. They see no identifiable signs of progress toward change or improvement in the conditions which currently restrict our courts and the police.

I realize that there are many complex issues involved in this question and that student perception of these problems may be superficial. But the attitudes students have about the ability of our criminal justice system to respond to present conditions are shared by other people in our society. As a result, I feel that the improvement of our criminal justice system must be considered a top priority item. And I am convinced that effective progress in this area will produce a greater respect for the law—among our students and our citizens.

When I mention federal assistance for the problems which face our campuses and our cities, I think there are several possibilities. You will be able to gauge the relative merits of each better than I. Perhaps one answer can be found in the research carried on by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Or you might consider providing our nation's law schools with funds to permit extensive attention to these questions. Or you may want to involve, such respected agencies as the American Law Institute, or the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

On the campus, we need to know the answers to specific questions if we are to effectively cope with disorder and disruption of the academic process. It is important to know, for example, whether law enforcement officers can exercise some control over a group before it breaks into violence without violating the constitutional rights of those in the group. Also, we would like to know how officers can properly deal with those masses of students who are present at and contribute to the substance and mood of a demonstration, but who do not directly take part in violent action.

Some of the difficulties involved in understanding what laws can be used dealing with a disruption seem to originate in disagreements between judges who have concurrent jurisdiction. There is no question that many of these differences in interpretation are in good faith. These are also probably inevitable. But we need to narrow our differences. To assist in this, the federal government might promote devices which would encourage smoother coordination of state and federal judges. Chief Justice Berger suggested a beginning recently when he proposed the creation in each state of a judicial council for federal and state judges. I understand that a few years ago, Congress did invite federal judges to meet and work toward minimizing sentence disparity through the Judicial Conference of the United States. Perhaps a similar technique could be used to help provide clearer guidelines to police and university administrators on what the law and the Constitution permit and command.

We naturally want to do the right thing, but we are sometimes uncertain about just what that is. No federal action can wholly resolve this problem, but we would certainly welcome assistance in providing greater clarity and understanding of the law. This would certainly be one of the most effective responses we could make to those challenges that presently face us on the campus.

Chairman PROXMIRE. This is a very useful contribution. As you say, this is something new, brand new from the Federal standpoint. It is difficult for us to know how to cope with it effectively.

Yesterday, we had some very fine witnesses who explained to us statistically what has happened to the very large amount of money that the Federal Government is beginning to put into the criminal justice operation. One witness pointed out that in 1969, I think—the figures stuck in my mind, because it coincided with the year—we spent \$69 million of Federal money for supplementing and complementing and assisting local law enforcement. In 1971, that amount will be close to half a billion dollars, an enormous increase, and the anticipation is that in 1972, it will be perhaps close to a billion dollars.

It was also pointed out that the amount for Federal assistance for law enforcement research has increased very little. It has increased a little bit, but very little. It was 41 percent, as I recall, of the total amount expended in 1969, but only 4 percent in 1971. For this reason, much of the stimulative and imaginative use of Federal funds—that was the initial conception behind much of the Safe Streets Act—has gone by the wayside. It has gone to provide for higher pay for police officials, which of course is essential, and to enable them to procure more equipment, which of course is also important, and to permit them to have more training. The complaint was that, of course, we do not have a method of finding out what kind of training is most useful and effective and what kind of equipment is most cost-effective. This is something which it was felt that the universities, especially, could help us find some answers to.

Do you feel that the University of Wisconsin, for example, would be able to give us helpful research in these areas? Would the personnel capable of making these studies—are they available? Is there enough interest at the university, do you think, in making these studies?

Mr. YOUNG. I think we could help with this. I would like to make a general comment about research.

I feel that I share some of the—

Chairman PROXMIRE. I misspoke. I think I said research and I made the same mistake yesterday. I mean to say planning money. It is related to research, of course.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes.

I would think in the short run the research might be more directed in university research. There are a lot of questions that we academicians would like to get answers to, but the impact is a long time in the future. This problem is so pressing that I believe you can either call it planning or applied research, where we would attack some specific problems. Several major universities have some capacity. At Wisconsin, for instance, we have Professor Goldstein in our law school. He is not a lawyer. He is trained in criminal justice. He was the, I think, chief adviser to Chief Wilson at Chicago at one time, in the police department there. He is interested in the kind of problem we are talking about.

There are ways of designing studies on a comparison of ongoing activities and some of our legal people work on that.

Every major law school has at least some persons who are involved in the revision of statutes, either at the national level of uniform practices or at criminal law, as some of you undoubtedly know. Some of these people ought to be putting their minds to the law that we are dealing with.

I find that the policemen I deal with and the lawyers I deal with are always fighting the present fire and they do not have a plan looking ahead or some planning of this kind, of what kind of responses we ought to make to particular situations, what kind of comparisons of trying different things in a scientific fashion. Perhaps we have been doing the law the way we do universities. Perhaps I should not throw this in, but in my own business, we are very scientific about other people's business, but we do not do much research about how we run the university, and we need to do more of that. I think perhaps the law needs the same kind of applied research rather than what I would call broad sociology at the moment.

Chairman PROXMIRE. What we have in mind is this: The overwhelming amount of funds still come and will continue to come from State and local sources.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, for enforcement.

Chairman PROXMIRE. We all want to have local police forces and not a national police force, of course. With that in mind, the feeling was that Federal money should go into the area of providing innovation, providing some comprehensive studies of problems which have general application, and not go into the specific, day-to-day needs of local police officials, and so forth, although that is very pressing. Of course, we all know how hard it is to raise money to meet any local need these days. This is why I stress that.

I would like to get back to one point that you mentioned in your summary remarks that did not appear, it seems to me, in your statement that you submitted for the record. You say there are those who are determined to destroy the university. You say there are very few of them, but they have great influence; it is a peculiar kind of criminal, because they want publicity, they want to be tried, they want to go to trial, they want to prolong the trial and they feel they are martyrs and so on. This does present us with a new kind of problem, certainly.

Just in general terms, without reference to any specific problem you have now at the university, of course, how do you view the problem of using undercover agents in this kind of thing?

I have had a little experience with that. In World War II, I was in the Counterintelligence Corps, so I know a little bit about it; not very much, but some. So I am aware that when you are dealing with this kind of problem, you probably have to use undercover people. At the same time, in a university atmosphere, it can be quite a serious problem because people do not like the use of informers, they do not like to feel that they are being watched by "Big Brother." What are your views on how we can do this?

It seems to me that one reason why the FBI and others appear to have been successful in identifying at least some suspects in that terrible bombing that took place is that there apparently was some pretty good professional, effective undercover work.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, there is, of course, a conflict between the openness that a university ought to have and the freedom to express views, unpopular views and the views that the young ought to be allowed to have without it affecting their lives, and at the same time, persons who are engaged in revolutionary activity. I would make a great distinction between those who are talking and arguing for a point of view and those who are planning to do physical violence or a physical disruption. It is important to the police in any community, whether it be a university community or any other community, to know, if they can know, what plans for actual physical violence are going on. So it becomes necessary.

I have determined that there shall be no student status lent to anyone at Madison who is not a genuine student. What does this mean? I do not know what other schools are doing. It means that there are no persons on the campus with false credentials. There is no way that I or anybody else, however, can guarantee that law enforcement agencies will not be using students as informers. But I am quite opposed to putting someone in a classroom who is not a genuine student.

But I have told all our faculty that they must assume that any time they talk or lecture, anyone in the classroom, as he always could, can report what they have said. I do not think that this is the problem.

The problem is really in the plotting off the campus of small groups that we need to be concerned about. I know of no way, without undercover agents, of getting information in advance about that. This is not something that a university administrator is skilled in doing, and I want, really, no part in it in the sense that—I am not saying I want to wash my hands and be holier than thou, but rather, I think the use of surveillance of this kind needs to be in the hands of very skilled people and those who can distinguish clearly between lawful behavior and unlawful behavior and who do not confuse opinion with action.

Chairman PROXMIRE. As you said in your superlative statement shortly after the bombing, the university is fighting for its life.

Mr. YOUNG. That is right.

Chairman PROXMIRE. It is that serious. And you have to take action which a few years ago would have been considered to be something a university would never consider. You just have to do it.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes. I have urged, for instance, that our attorney general's office take responsibility within the State for intelligence activities and exchange of information among various jurisdictions. This requires a level of competence that small communities can't have.

Chairman PROXMIRE. How about your relationship with Federal agencies, say with the Federal Bureau of Investigation? When they come on the campus, do they come directly to you or to other campus authorities and work with you, keep you informed to the extent that they can? How do they operate?

Mr. YOUNG. Recently, with the bombing—let me use that as an illustration. We were most anxious to find a Federal involvement and the first things we did in calling in the FBI was to—we wanted very much for the FBI to come. The local law-enforcement agencies wanted the FBI. The question was was there a jurisdictional basis. We found that some of the equipment that was destroyed was owned by the Federal Government. This is why I was pleased at the President's suggestion that Federal agents be available on campuses.

Chairman PROXMIRE. When you say that, you mean—

Mr. YOUNG. Last night's statement.

Chairman PROXMIRE. This relates to the President's statement of yesterday?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes.

Chairman PROXMIRE. And you support and are in favor of the action both of increasing the number of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and saying that they will move onto the campuses whether or not they are requested to do so, where Federal property is involved?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes. I am not advocating a national police force. I am advocating their help and support for local agencies to bring the specialized talent and their communications network, their laboratories, and what they already know to bear as they did in Madison. I think if it turns out, as I think it will, that the solution to our bombing is pretty well arrived at, it will be because of the cooperation between the various police groups.

I do not think it could have been done without the FBI. It might have been. But the cooperation is very real. I know a good deal about it. I was involved. I think they played an important role.

But their role, I think, was possible because they had such cooperation from the local people—the chief of police of Madison, the sheriff of Dane County, our own security chief—all worked very closely. They pooled all the information. This is the kind of thing we need, a sense of working together, rather than one superimposing itself on the other.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Dr. Young, we in Congress have to walk a narrow line. There are actions Congress ought to take to come to grips with what has become a national problem of campus violence, there are actions we have to avoid if we are to keep our colleges and universities free of Federal control. Because of the difficulties you have had at Madison, you have recently acquired some experience with Federal officials. Has the right amount of Federal resource been made available to you at the right time?

Mr. YOUNG. In this recent involvement, yes. Now, I do not know about past situations, but we had what only the Federal Government or a very large urban police force could bring—that is a large number

of trained people available at the time, a number that no community could afford or should support as a normal matter. They were available for us, they will be available for us tomorrow and so on. So I think we have had that.

I think there has to be somebody providing information to local police officers about known persons who are committed to violence moving about. This is something that none of us likes in this country. In fact, I have long been on record against anything that smacks—and I will always be—of a police state. But if someone has already demonstrated that he believes in violence, I think that we need to know when he is coming to Madison and that the FBI can be useful in this. I feel sure that they are doing this kind of thing.

But let me say another thing. I realize that I am talking for the record. I have a policy coming from security days that it is best not to know things you do not need to know. So I tell our police people not to tell me things that I do not need to know. Then I cannot tell you and make it public.

Chairman PROXMIRE. There are certain practical things the Federal Government can do to reduce the probability or possibility of violence. One is the regulation of the sale of explosives. Is the ready availability of explosives an important part of the problem? In that particular bombing, as I understand it, it was mainly a matter of the crude knowledge of chemistry and the use of fertilizer and—what was it, fertilizer and oil?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, which is in the handbooks that our extension division and our State government distribute to farmers, telling them how to blow stumps and make ponds. So this is information that is widely available to any farmer or any chemistry student.

But there are other things. I think the control of dynamite would be very useful, because persons buying fertilizer and oil in large quantities will now be spotted. But I think the control of dynamite, for instance, would be useful, knowing who has dynamite and some rules for handling it.

Perhaps more important in our community right now would be a gun registration law. We find that there are guns in the community.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, now, that is a very difficult problem for us here in Congress, as you know.

Mr. YOUNG. I know.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I am glad you brought it up.

I know. I have read those reports, frightening reports, in the Milwaukee Journal, about rifles coming into the university. With 33,000 students there and just a few hundred with rifles, a few score, for that matter, it can be a frightening situation. But I think it is impractical for the State legislature or the Congress of the United States to impose a registration or licensing of rifles. Is there some way this can be done without being too conspicuously discriminatory, confined to a situation like this? After all, we have had a demonstration of violence. Could you confine it to the university?

Mr. YOUNG. It is illegal to bring a gun on our campus, but a person can walk up and down the public street between two of our buildings and carry a rifle, and it is perfectly proper.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You can carry a concealed handgun or some other weapon?

MR. YOUNG. You can't carry a concealed weapon anywhere. It is illegal. But you can carry it openly.

I would like to make a point about the guns. I am convinced there are not nearly as many guns around Madison as has been suggested by some student leaders. But the fear that they are there, the atmosphere in which it is possible for them to be there, people believing that they are there, is unfortunate. So this has to be done.

I have read carefully all of the testimony and the actions of Congress on the rifles and gun registration and I understand, since I come from a rural background and started carrying a gun myself at the age of 12, I know what some of the issues are. But aside from that, any information that can be made available to local officers about the purchase of weapons—purchase of guns, not weapons; usually they are not weapons in the sense of weapons—by persons in the community, or bringing them in, would be useful. It would be useful because it would tend to discourage it.

Chairman PROXMIRE. How do you feel about proposals for attaching various conditions to Federal aid to higher education? Does Congress have a right to demand certain standards of behavior from students receiving Federal aid, or should this be left to the university?

MR. YOUNG. Congress, I believe, has a perfect right to set standards. I question sometimes the wisdom of particular forms of legislation, particularly if it says that students who have to borrow money can't borrow it unless they live up to a certain standard, but those who are wealthy enough can do it for free. I would prefer that our rules punish people for the act they engage in, not by cutting off their funds.

Chairman PROXMIRE. When you say that, do you imply that it would be proper or improper to cut off funds for those who have engaged in some kind of act of violence, cutting off Federal funds?

MR. YOUNG. Well, I would say that the Congress can do it, but I believe the more important thing is for the university to discipline all persons, whether they are receiving scholarship funds or not. If the Congress and the legislatures keep cutting off funds available to the universities because of what happens on the campuses, they will destroy the universities and the radicals will have won. So I would prefer that we treat all our students alike in the penalties.

I will not spend a great deal of time, however, arguing that the Congress does not have the right to do it. I am not excited about it, so to speak. I just think that the best solution is to approach it directly and say if a person breaks the law, he should be punished by the law for the act he did, rather than through the cutting off of funds as a solution.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Over the last couple of years, the University of Wisconsin has had a whole series of difficulties. I understand there were a number of firebombings last year—23, I heard somewhere. That may be an exaggeration, but it was a large number.

MR. YOUNG. What is a firebombing? Is it somebody dropping a match in a wastebasket?

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, cases of arson—the Kroeger store, several buildings.

MR. YOUNG. There were a number of them, yes.

Chairman PROXMIRE. In the University.

MR. YOUNG. Yes; a large number of them.

Chairman PROXMIRE. These are fairly recent, but have you had an opportunity to evaluate what effect this has on the financial support of a State university, both from State legislative sources and from private gifts? I am trying to get at the cost of this.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes. Our alumni last year gave us more than they have ever given us at Madison.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Was that because of one or two big gifts?

Mr. YOUNG. No; I think a broader number of people giving.

Chairman PROXMIRE. That is very encouraging.

Mr. YOUNG. Some of them did it, I suspect, with some misgiving. The legislature was not generous, but it is very difficult in these times to separate the taxpayers' revolt from the cause and effect. To say it was due to the campus unrest—they were not generous with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, either. And again, maybe there was some reason. So again, I think we have to be very careful in making quick cause-and-effect statements.

I do believe, myself, however, that if we can't keep order on the campuses, the public will say they have better uses for their funds than supporting universities that cannot maintain their programs. But in the short run, I am not sure what the legislative intent was. We have a conservative Joint Finance Committee, as perhaps you know.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Yes, I know. I served in the State legislature. But that was some time ago.

Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Dr. Young, I very much appreciate your being here. I sympathize with the problems you have through my own close colleagues and neighbors. Arthur C. Nielsen is a benefactor and spent many hours in the hotbox trying to get me to go there 25 years ago. I have followed with great interest the activity on your campus. I have a nephew and niece up there now.

I wonder if you could tell us if the violence that is evidenced at the University of Wisconsin is only from the Left, as in California, where the Minutemen really began some of the bombings out there, or is there evidence that the violence is from the extreme Right as well?

Mr. YOUNG. I have seen no evidence whatsoever on our campus. I have had one phone call saying, you want me to, or some of my neighbors, to come down and help you clean Madison out? Then the fellow said, well, I am really joking; I am upset.

That is about the nearest thing to it. In other words, even though he talked about it, he really did not mean it. I continued the conversation and he turned out to be a very concerned citizen who felt we were overly permissive.

No; I think our danger is from the loss of confidence of the public rather than from a vigilante-type reaction. There has been no, as far as I know, movement at all in that direction. Now, that might come, but it does not seem likely. I do not sense that mood.

I get a great deal of mail. I talk to a great many citizens. They are troubled and very concerned that there is any——

Senator PERCY. So it is essentially the radical Left that seems to cause the problem.

Mr. YOUNG. That causes me trouble.

Senator PERCY. Are the problems fomented generally by the students, or do you feel that there is a considerable amount of outside organizational activity fomenting the problem and providing leadership to it?

Mr. YOUNG. The outside leadership is increasing, but very often, they are former students. You see, we expel some——

Senator PERCY. They might be alumni, then.

Mr. YOUNG. Near misses.

Senator PERCY. With a dishonorable discharge, would you say?

Mr. YOUNG. Of the people that are alleged or suspected to have done the bombing, one was a high school dropout, one had withdrawn from the university, and two were students. The people traveling around the country urging violence, many of them had university connections at one time or another. They have become almost professionals. I do not want to cite examples by name. I guess I do not want to get into the problem of libel and slander, but I think we all know the sort of person.

One would distinguish in that group that there are some whom the revolutionaries call ultrarevolutionaries. They are not identified closely with a particular political doctrine.

Then there are groups such as the Trotskyites who believe in violence, but not now, but later on when we get everything organized, we are going to throw it over all at once, but are building the cadres. Their literature is quite interesting.

The difference I see right now is ultraradicals who are using terrorism now rather than talking about it in the future. When I was a student, there were always some students around who talked the party line and talked about the revolution coming, but they had no personal intentions there. But I would say the people are for the most part, the ones who give us the most trouble, are in some way related to the student community. They have been students or they live in the student community.

Senator PERCY. Do you believe the radical Left is perpetrating its violence for the purpose of encouraging and bringing on repression, which would enable them to bring in far more people, perhaps millions of people, to try to overthrow that repression, and in that overthrow, they may then be able to destroy the institutions that make up our American society?

Mr. YOUNG. Some of them say this and talk to each other this way. Some do not believe this and are saying, well, it is so bad we just have to tear it down.

An ultraradical movement attracts many people who are not very well balanced. These people are, some of them, very strange psychological cases. They are almost egomaniacs in order to believe that they can make the decisions for society.

For instance, I get ultimatums—if you do not do so and so, we are going to bomb something. Well, most of the ultimatums are empty threats. But some people will do it. It is very hard to say. So I would say that some of the people are calculating in this respect, but many are not.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, indeed, Doctor. I appreciate a great deal you being here to testify.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I would like to ask a couple of questions along the lines that Senator Percy so ably opened up. Do you feel that there is a national organization, Weatherman group or whatever group, that is determined to foment confrontation where they feel the violence would be helpful to their cause to use violence throughout our university community, throughout our country?

Mr. YOUNG. I do not know how well organized, but there are people on a lot of campuses who know each other well, and there is a great deal of traveling back and forth as between these groups. They provide shelter for each other and they exchange information.

After all, this is true of all young people, college people. When I was a student, fellows who went from one university to another stayed at the fraternity house. Students are a mobile group.

Chairman PROXMIRE. What I am talking about, Doctor, is the charge that some of our top law enforcement officials have made, I have heard them make it, that this is a concerted national program and a plan to strike at the country through the universities and foment violence, to foment revolution, and it is on a concerted national basis. It is not a matter of something developing from a few people who have psychological problems at the University of Wisconsin or have some notion of Leninism or Mao or somewhere in California. These people are working together and know what they are doing and have a program of disruption.

Do you think this is a valid charge, or do you think it has not been established, in your view?

Mr. YOUNG. I think it is a question of degree. I think there is a great deal of communication, a great deal of mutual support and discussion. But how well organized the ultraradicals are, I do not know. I just do not have enough information. But they know each other, they move around, they reinforce each other. They have the same general goals.

Now, when you talk about the more traditional groups such as Trotskyites or young Communists, then, of course, they are following traditional goals. They are well organized and they have a common literature. They have periodicals that have national circulation.

Chairman PROXMIRE. What I am talking about are the ones who are concerned with actual violence, with using bombing, arson, whatever, to achieve such disruption and lack of confidence and so forth that maybe they excite action, repressive action, from the Right and they can achieve disruption in the society.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes. I do not say how well organized they are nationally. They cooperate nationally, I am sure, and they visit each other and they shelter each other.

Chairman PROXMIRE. One other question. We expect a report from Governor Scranton's committee within a few days. There have been all kinds of speculation on what Governor Scranton's committee is going to say. We have the report of Mr. Heard's earlier commission which came down pretty hard on the argument that much of the difficulty in the campuses is because these revolutionary people can work in an atmosphere that is friendly to them and helpful to them. This is based on a widespread disillusionment with the Vietnam war and a widespread concern with the failure of the Government to act to redress social injustice. Do you put stock in this notion, and if you do, do

you think that the fundamental Federal solution should be to end the Vietnam war and to act more expeditiously and convincingly in the areas of social justice?

Mr. YOUNG. It is clear that there is great dismay about the war on the campuses—well, throughout the whole society. It is also clear that many of our students are very idealistic. They are concerned about race problems, they are concerned about problems of poverty. But we were concerned in the 1930's and 1940's, too, about poverty and unemployment.

I can remember our dream of someday having full employment and a high GNP in solving these problems. We did not succeed. We have to work at these things, obviously. But I do not think we can take the view that because injustices exist, therefore, people are free to lash out at the society and to destroy it. We have to work on both fronts, basically, to work at solving our problems. Here we cannot get solutions, but we can at least demonstrate our attempt to get them. At the same time, we have to say to people who are violating the laws, you cannot violate the law. You must live within a rule of law and you must work within this system, with the widest latitude to criticize it, to be unhappy about it, but you cannot use force and violence to disrupt it. Because that destroys even the possibility of making it a better society.

Senator PERCY. Could I ask this question, Dr. Young? Someone commented yesterday that everyone in the country who is running for public office seems to be running for county sheriff. The "hard line," repression, the law and order theme is almost a necessity of life for any candidate today who is up before an audience of American citizens and trying to relate to their concerns. Are you concerned about the effects of this continuing emphasis on the theme of law and order, meaning by that the need for "cracking down?"

Mr. YOUNG. Of course I am. I am opposed to this. But I must say that the majority of the members of the Legislature of Wisconsin that I have contact with do not take this line. Both of the candidates for Governor in the State are against violence, but they are also in favor of dissent and the right of people to have different views.

As far as the sheriff of Dane County is concerned, I have been working with him—he is running for reelection, so maybe I should not say anything good about him and be charged with partisan politics. I shall not even tell you which party he is in.

Chairman PROXMIER. He is a Republican, so I am sure Senator Percy would forgive you.

Mr. YOUNG. But he has behaved most responsibly. I have not read any statement of his in the press along these lines. Nor have I read anything about his opposition. In fact, the campaign for the district attorney's office in our community seems to be between a man who is really very, I would say, conventional in the best sense of the word, and the good, and the man who wants to be more lenient. So we are not getting a law and order campaign in Dane County.

Now, perhaps there are a lot of student voters. That may have some influence. But I do not think so.

No, I have great respect for the good sense of the American people. As I get out around the State and talk to parents and to alumni and to the legislature, of course, the first thing they say is why do

you not do something about them? I say what? They say, well, I know, we have a nephew down there and we know what it is like.

Senator PERCY. Maybe some of the parents should do a few more things at home first and that would make your problem not so hard.

Lastly, Dr. Heard has had some things to say about the effect of the rhetoric of the administration on the situation. Do you consider the rhetoric of the administration consequential or relatively inconsequential as to its effect on your campus?

Mr. YOUNG. There are people on my campus, to put it mildly, who feel that the Vice President's language is—contains what I accuse my wife of, having hyperbole. I do not think this is a very significant thing.

I must say that I have found myself in much agreement with what the President said at Manhattan the other day. I listened to it very carefully. I was asked to comment by one of the radio stations on it.

Maybe it is being too careful, but I really believed that this is a matter which cuts across party lines and administrations, that I find people in both parties were saying things that I would not agree with, but that most of the leadership people in this country at the State and national level are more concerned than trying to take advantage of a situation. And I think that any help that we can give them by showing that we know what we are doing and take the campuses out of politics, fine.

Now, I have not said—let me again answer your question, because I want to be very careful what I am saying in this sensitive area. I do not think the rhetoric is very—it may be important, but this is not the basic thing. The basic thing is what is going on.

The other thing I sometimes say to some of my faculty members who are critical of legislators and regents and Congressmen and Senators for what they say is why do you want to deny them their freedom of speech, something we cherish on the campus? We academicians, and I am a professor—I am temporarily a chancellor, but I am basically a professor. I feel one of our roles is to be critical of other people, of society. And I think other people have a right to be critical of us. And I do not get disturbed when somebody says something.

The reason I do not get disturbed is this: I have such faith in the good sense of the people. When somebody makes an outrageous statement, I can have good sense about it. I do not have to get excited about topping it.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much. That is very encouraging.

Chairman PROXMIER. Thank you very much, Doctor. I must say you have done a very, very skillful job, especially skillful about keeping us out of politics. I might say when you say the Republicans are running for law and order and against this terrible disruption in the Wisconsin campus, they have had the board of regents, the district attorney, the sheriff, they have the State legislature, and they are accusing the Democrats of being responsible for the disruption.

I do want to thank you, Dr. Young, for a most informative statement. It has been most interesting and I am sure it will be helpful to all members of the committee.

Mr. YOUNG. May I be excused to get back and find out if the place is still there?

Chairman PROXMIRE. You certainly may.

Mr. YOUNG. May I leave with you two things that may be of some interest; my own statement, the statement of our regents, and a resolution, a petition provided by a thousand faculty members in support of order on the campus?

Chairman PROXMIRE. Good. Yes, indeed. We would like very much to have that.

(The documents referred to follow :)



THE STATE OF THE CAMPUS

The University of Wisconsin

**A Report by Chancellor Young
to the Regents, September 11, 1970**

**A Statement by the Regents
August 26, 1970**

A Report by Chancellor Young

The initial wave of shock and horror which we felt on August 24 is being experienced fresh each day on Charter Street. Almost at any hour, one can see faculty and staff, returning from vacations and summer assignments, come to stare in disbelief.

Next week, thousands of students will pass the area and they, too, will stop and look. And surely they will wonder what the ugly scars of this tragedy signal for the coming year.

The immediate costs of the bombing have already been published—the cost in human life, suffering, knowledge, and property. The long-range effects may not be known for years, but it is no exaggeration to say that they will depend almost totally on how we react—regents, administrators, faculty, and student body.

It is the intent of terrorists to create fear. To harass. To intimidate. The student who fears for his physical safety is not expected to be in a mood for effective classwork. A faculty member whose home has been threatened with rocks or firebombs may be understandably more reticent to speak his opinions in the future. An administrator who has watched funds being diverted from educational to security needs may be tempted to wonder if peace at any price is not desirable.

When we are attacked—either men or institutions—our first instinct is to fight back. And we *will fight back*. But the *nature* of the fight is all-important.

For the answer to fear is not panic. The answer is not to lash out in angry, blind vindictiveness. The answer to fear is really quite simple—the answer to fear is *courage*.

In the coming year, we will concern ourselves with the past. We will continue to expend whatever energy is necessary in cooperating with the lawful authorities to bring perpetrators of violence to justice. Not in any attempt to set a vengeful example, but because we believe that the orderly administration of justice is basic to the freedom of us all.

We will be concerned about the past—but we will be even more concerned about the future. In facing that future, what form must our courage take?

More than the courage to keep the University open—although we have said many times, we *do* intend to keep it open.

We must also seek the courage to progress; to proceed with the orderly change and reform of the University which has already begun. For the danger to our institution does not arise strictly from one source. Destroyers of lives and buildings are obvious menaces who can and must be dealt with under the law.

But there are others who threaten. Those who would react by demanding certain beliefs as a requisite for faculty status—they are a threat to the University, also.

They are a threat because they would destroy the atmosphere of free and untrammelled thought without which no university can remain great.

Those who demand that student voices be silenced by arbitrary and oppressive disciplinary methods—they are a threat; because they refuse to recognize the vigorous and positive contribution the vast majority of today's young people are capable of making to the academic community. A loss of this resource would be tragic to any university.

Those who propose such extreme measures are acting out of fear—without courage.

We believe it is possible to deal with advocates of violence, to punish those who put their theories to practice and break the law, to stand firm against attempts to disrupt and destroy—and at the same time, proceed with enlightened and responsible programs for change.

For this to be done, we must have the energetic cooperation of all—regents, administrators, faculty, and students. This cooperation already exists in substantial degree, but it must be heightened.

Committees exist in many departments to solicit the ideas and talents of the students to apply to academic problems. Others are being formed.

One hundred and forty combined faculty-student committees are now in operation, but we need new and better ways for helpful interchange between these two groups.

It is time to reexamine faculty-student relations on a broad level. The proportion of emphasis given to graduate and undergraduate instruction. The size and nature of undergraduate classes.

Individual faculty members will want to examine carefully the expenditures of their energies—the proportion of time given to research versus that given to teaching and student contact.

This Board of Regents has probably had more direct contact with faculty and students than any board in the University's history. It has recognized the urgent necessity for such contact and undoubtedly will seek additional ways to achieve it.

The board, in its forceful statement of August 26, made clear its determination to stand up to the forces of terrorism and, at the same time, preserve our traditional role as a forum for free exchange of ideas and opinions. It needs and deserves the strong support of the legislature and the citizens of the entire state in carrying out this objective.

By having the *courage* to move forward in spite of disruption and lawlessness, we can harness the enormous reserves of genuine human concern and channel them to constructive purposes.

We must make clear that those of us who are responsible for the operation of the University are not interested only in budgets, rules, and applied research. That we are also personally concerned about the terrible problems of national and world society—environment, racism, war, population growth, and all the rest. That

we are willing to help devote the resources of the University to finding solutions to those problems.

We must encourage our students to participate in the politics of their government. We must understand that theirs is a special problem, in that their residence on campus usually means they are unable to participate in the campaign activities of their own districts. The University has indicated that it does not consider a two weeks recess to be the proper solution, but a faculty-student committee is currently seeking other methods by which students may be encouraged to participate in the selection of their government. It will report at the first meeting of the faculty Senate October 5.

The year ahead is implicitly a critical year for us all. And yet an atmosphere of crisis can be a positive thing. This week, on the television news, a hostage in the Jordanian desert was asked if the passengers were friendly with each other. He replied, "In a time of crisis like this, everyone relies on everyone else—and everyone seems to come through."

In its crisis, the University needs to be able to rely on courageous support from its alumni, its friends and, above all, from the members of its own community. Only with such support can it stand solidly against terrorism and move with imagination to new standards of greatness. If it gets such support—and I am confident it will—there is no way the forces of intimidation can prevail.

**Statement by Board of Regents
August 26, 1970**

Violence on The University of Wisconsin Madison campus has reached a new dimension with the tragic loss of a human life sacrificed needlessly by those who seek to destroy the University. The Board of Regents, sorrowed but resolute, will continue efforts to preserve the University and help fulfill its mission in the fields of education, research, and service to our people.

The University of Wisconsin, belonging to the people of this state, also serves as a national and international resource. It has, therefore, obligations beyond the boundaries of the state. The regents, sensitive to their responsibilities and obligations, feel it necessary at this time to review the purpose of the University.

Approximately 80 years ago, a declaration of purpose was made by the Board of Regents, later embossed in bronze and erected on the Madison campus. In essence it charged the regents with the task of maintaining for everyone interested in higher education, an atmosphere conducive and responsive to a free exchange of ideas and opinions. Whenever any of the forces present in a university community cause this process to get out of balance, they must be reminded of our mission.

It should be no secret any longer that there are those among us who are systematically and violently attempting to destroy this free exchange of ideas—this tradition of sifting and winnowing which has made our University great. The regents therefore call upon all members of the University community, as well as the people of the state, no matter what their individual beliefs or feelings might be in the wake of this terrible act, to rededicate themselves to the preservation of The University of Wisconsin as a great educational institution. The vast majority of students and faculty are here to learn and to teach. Most students are here at a great sacrifice to themselves and their families. Their quest for knowledge must not be denied. We owe it to them—and to those who follow them—to preserve this University as a genuinely open institution of higher learning.

The nihilists who struck at our campus with no regard for human life or property have announced their intent

to change University, state, and federal policies. The ultimate target of their vengeance is the structure of our government and the freedoms on which this country was founded. However, the governor, regents, and people of this state will not buckle under or be weakened by intimidation. Closing the University or allowing interruptions of our educational function will in no way protect us from those who seek to destroy.

The months ahead will test the strength of our convictions, and the ability of Wisconsin to unite against destructive forces which have no bounds. The strength of our educational structure will also be tested. The federal, state, county, and city agents, by their cooperative effort following the tragedy of August 24 have assured the people of Wisconsin that their resources will continue to be used for the preservation of this University.

However, if future tragedies and disruptions are to be avoided, the citizens of the University community must join together in a determined effort to identify, isolate, and reject those who condone, encourage, or participate in actions which do violence to persons, property, and the concepts of academic freedom. With such a community of effort, The University of Wisconsin will continue to grow and develop as a great University.

A STATEMENT BY FACULTY FOR DEFENSE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

We, the undersigned members of the faculty of the Madison Campus, believe that the University of Wisconsin is facing one of the most critical periods in its history. Not only its greatness but its very existence as an educational institution is threatened. The rising tide of intimidation and violence on the campus in the last few years has made normal educational and scholarly activities increasingly difficult. There has been a steady escalation of destructiveness that has culminated in an act of homicide. Academic freedom, meaning freedom of expression for *all* ideas and viewpoints, has been steadily eroded until now many are questioning whether it exists on the Madison campus. The freedom of students to pursue their education along the avenues of their choice has been seriously curtailed. The result has been a gradual erosion of confidence of the people of the state in the University and the distinct danger that the University will have to further curtail its activities or even shut down.

In order to prevent this calamity we believe that determined action is needed. We do not advocate authoritarian or dictatorial rule on the campus. On the contrary, our purpose is to re-establish an atmosphere of free intellectual inquiry. Only in such an atmosphere can learning and scholarship thrive. We seek not repression but liberty in the University. Toward this end, steps must now be taken by the faculty, the student body, the administration, and the Regents, acting together in a spirit of mutual support and respect, to defend the University. We advocate the following:

1. The disciplinary system must be improved to provide prompt action against all violators of University rules. The acts of a few must not be allowed to endanger the rights and privileges of all members of the academic community.

2. Every member of the faculty and student body must accept a personal commitment to the orderly functioning of the Madison Campus and to restoring and defending the freedom of all faculty and students. We pledge ourselves to support and defend all who accept this commitment.

3. Faculty, students, and administration, with the support of the Regents, must put an end to violence, intimidation, coercion, and harassment on the Madison Campus. We pledge ourselves to support and defend all who accept this commitment.

4. Means must be provided for canvassing student opinion on campus issues and for expressing the full range of student opinion.

5. Students and faculty alike must recognize and discourage the destructive purposes of those who call mass meetings designed to instigate violence.

6. The design and conduct of instruction and research of the Madison Campus must remain the responsibility of the faculty. Student advice and criticism must be welcomed. Decisions, however, must be made by the faculty, subject only to review by the administration and the Regents.

The University of Wisconsin at Madison is in grave danger. We call on the faculty and the student body to stand to its defense as a free university and, in cooperation with the administration and the Regents, to ensure its survival and continued development among the world's great educational institutions.

Chairman PROXMIER. Our next two witnesses are Chief of Police of the New Haven Police, Mr. James F. Ahern, and Alfred Blumstein, Director, Urban Systems Institute, Carnegie-Mellon University.

I hope you gentlemen will come together to the table. Unfortunately, Senator Percy has an 11 o'clock appointment he has to keep.

We are delighted that you are here. I have had an opportunity to see your prepared statements this morning. Both of you gentlemen have fine backgrounds. I would like to ask Chief Ahern to start off, then Mr. Blumstein.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES F. AHERN, CHIEF OF POLICE, NEW HAVEN,
CONN.**

Mr. AHERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored by the invitation to speak before the members of the subcommittee. I am especially anxious to share with you my thoughts about the Federal Government's

omnibus crime control legislation and how its implementation has affected local police departments.

I would also like to offer several suggestions on how the law can be changed to better enable the country's criminal justice system to meet its pressing needs.

For nearly 2 years the national government has provided substantial financial support for expanded and new programs to the various agencies in what is commonly called the "Criminal Justice System."

To date, nearly \$1 billion has gone to support the creation of 50 new State bureaucracies to administer the program. In addition, they perform long-range planning for police courts, and corrections and fund action programs to meet whatever needs are determined at the State level. Besides, this law has created a new Federal agency, LEAA, to oversee State activities and provide financial assistance for various programs.

What these funds have produced should be looked at and some assessment of their impact made. But any hard look at so-called "results" must be done in light of the law as written by Congress, and the condition of the system prior to the act, especially the police.

The criminal justice system in this country, including the police, is in a sad condition. There are serious questions whether in fact the system is capable of acting in the best interests of justice. The police have been ignored by the communities they serve for decades. The courts, log-jammed with cases, are rapidly reaching the point of total collapse. Correctional institutions are underfinanced with meaningful rehabilitation still a utopian concept.

More bluntly, little attention has been paid to the Nation's criminal justice system. And when it is given, it has sometimes been less than helpful.

The police, with which I am most familiar, have tended to be used by local and State politicians more responsive to partisan needs than professional goals and criteria. Not only have local police agencies been starved financially and not encouraged to improve, but they also have been manipulated in the worst way. No other major local service has been so obviously subject to political intervention and control. Small wonder that police are a target of the young and others concerned with governmental change.

When "law and order" became an important political issue—one that nearly every politician irrespective of his party or beliefs attempted to use—it was clear that police had an opportunity to make the important improvements so long needed. For the first time there was broad concern and attention to begin adequate financial support of police service. Of course, change and improvements for the courts and prisons also became possible.

One penalty for the years of community neglect and disinterest, at least for the police, was that when legislators became interested they did not know what to do. Instead of writing a bill that helped focus the problem and suggest solutions, a grant-in-aid program was developed that provided money for a series of unknown efforts.

The law gave broad indications of courses for action that missed the target rather than provide a mandate for substantial change in how the system operates and the types of skills required to make it run effectively.

While I am not suggesting that Federal funds be legislatively earmarked for a narrow range of projects, I am saying that more direction and clarity could have been written into the law. Several provisions also were written into the act that resulted in largely unworkable planning and administrative requirements on an improperly and inadequately prepared level of government—the States.

The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 established the worthy goals of planning while never appearing to take into account whether or not there was a capacity to accomplish such a task.

It assigned this duty to States which, in the vast majority of cases, had never been responsible for solving the problem nor evidenced any inclination to do so.

The law also imposed heavy matching requirements on already overburdened cities where many of the new programs were expected to take place. The experience of the past several years has clearly shown that cities are not able to produce new sources of income; that somehow the State and Federal Government must help them out of a financial crisis. Nevertheless, the Crime Control Act requires local agencies to provide two-fifths—40 percent—of the cost of nearly all programs. In addition, the law says that any request for personnel be matched on a 50-50 basis, with the locality contributing \$1 for each the act provides.

One result of the law has been confusion. And this lack of clarity has resulted, I think, in a number of serious problems that must be remedied if the police, specifically, and the criminal justice system, in general, are to meet today's needs.

The confusion of which I speak has been on each level of government. Its results have been poor planning, mundane programs, and certainly a high level of frustration among user agencies. Compared with other Federal grant programs, I know of few individuals or groups that care about the crime control legislation. Even the expected constituency of self-interested parties has not developed.

I have heard some criticism about alleged heavy expenditures of these Federal funds for hardware or consultants. Some commentators have implied that crime control means purchasing tanks, guns, and other implements of destruction. Yet, in Connecticut for example, I know of no program for police that has supported armaments or heavy "riot" equipment. I am aware, however, of the great need for new radios, computers, and other equipment items. I am also aware of the difficulty in obtaining them, not because there is no money but because the delays in getting the funds from Washington through the State planning agencies to cities are immense.

Equipment needs are paramount to agencies that have been poorly supported over the years. A large number of equipment projects also reflect the need for assistance to develop more meaningful programs and the lack of either direction or assistance by the Federal Government or State agencies.

Police departments are required in most cities to recruit from the high school level. From this body of manpower they are expected to produce chiefs, top level administrators, and specialists such as systems analysts and trainers. Police departments are relatively unsophisticated agencies yet they are expected to solve problems similar to those facing any large bureaucracy and business. They desperately

need planners with new skills, for example. Yet the Crime Control Act allocates 60 percent of the planning funds to the State level and only 40 percent of the planning funds to help bring skills and talent on the local level where it would have the most impact and make for substantial change.

No matter how much is given to the States, no matter how large a staff is hired there to develop grandiose schemes, when their plans filter to the local level they will be rejected, misused or misunderstood. Change cannot be imposed without participation and access to individuals able to accomplish it.

Police departments in this country are desperately in need of new talents, improved policies and modern approaches to solving their problems. Yet few, if any, suggestions are offered either from the Federal Government or the State planning agencies on how best to obtain these goals.

Funds provided by the Federal Government can be most effective if efforts were made to develop guidelines that realistically helped localities—cities and regions—meet their needs. The Federal Government should closely monitor how money is used to insure that it does not supplant a city's normal budget expenditures but rather stimulates innovations, develops new programs, and allows the components of the criminal justice system to expand and grow.

Those guidelines should not be rigid and inflexible, but developed with the awareness that change and innovation is a relative phenomenon. The use of advanced techniques or highly skilled staff in one city may be normal; but having a civilian planner, for example in Jackson, Miss., may be shockingly innovative.

The state of the art differs dramatically from city to city, State to State. The Federal Government must be aware of this and be flexible but demanding, understanding yet firm.

Perhaps one of the greatest failings of the current law, in addition to limitations written into it, is the lack of imagination and poor administration of it from Washington.

No other important Federal agency is run on a day-to-day basis by three administrators. Yet the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) has a "Troika" of equally powerful administrators, each with full veto power over the other two. I suppose it is unrealistic to believe an organization operated in such a fashion could provide imaginative and forceful leadership for 50 newly created State planning agencies and the 40,000 local and State police agencies in this country.

Although most of the action funds in the law area are allocated to the States for local distribution, 15 percent is left at the national level for discretionary purposes. To date, these funds have been granted for a series of projects without any apparent strategy or focus. There seems, nowhere within the funding pattern, either nationally or at the State level, a commitment to modernizing police service.

The law enforcement education program (LEEP) also is a disappointment. It is a system of direct Federal grants to colleges where police and others in the criminal justice system attend school. What this large program has resulted in is a crop of new courses designed more to attract Federal dollars than to be relevant to the student's needs. The money spent on these efforts has produced a second rate system that has more training than education. In fact, the police science

courses supported have tended to segregate police on campuses and limit severely their educational experience.

My comments today must belie the deep sense of frustration that I as a chief of police feel about the Crime Control Act. These feelings are compounded as I serve on my State's planning committee, a group responsible for allocation of Connecticut's action funds.

As in most other States, the police are underrepresented on this board, with largely inexperienced administrators making recommendations about what police departments should be doing. Too often, State planning agencies are created for political purposes, with most of its members uninterested in changing an already poorly functioning system. Although the vast bulk of the money allocated to Connecticut is spent by local law enforcement agencies, there are only two local police officials on the 28-member board. Only two other members represent urban areas. The vast majority of the members are attorneys, with a particular point of view that is not balanced by others. No one at the national level has moved to remedy these kinds of situations, which are not unique.

My frustration with the Crime Control Act and its administration stems, in large part, from the fact that for too long the police of this country have been the forgotten child of municipal services. That police departments are in need of substantial change and improvements is not the question. But that they are unable to fully utilize the support offered by the Federal Government for the first time in our history is difficult to accept.

The Federal law does not promote the kind of programs and approaches that police departments must take in order to meet today's demands for service. Funds coming through State agencies—ones unfamiliar with urban problems—are seldom shaped in a way that deal effectively with city police problems.

The law, the Federal and State agencies administering the funds, also do not promote the kinds of changes necessary for today's police agencies. Law and order is not, nor should it be, limited to simply reducing crime. A police department is no longer best characterized by smooth talking detectives in snap brim hats.

Today's police officer deals with some of the most complex human problems facing our cities. He, and the agency he works in, must be equipped to handle a family dispute or the teenager experimenting with drugs. To accomplish such an important objective means that money must be available for a wide range of programs and these programs will differ from community to community, city to city. No so-called statewide comprehensive plan, as put together by most States and encouraged by the Federal Government is sensitive to these needs. And, unfortunately, there is no indication that the patterns established in the past 2 years are being rethought or changed in light of operating experience. What began as one of the most important steps by the National Government to meet the most urgent urban problem is being diminished by layers of bureaucracy and lack of direction. Unless immediate steps are taken, ones that will encourage police to experiment with new types of staff, improve training and recruitment of new kinds of people, much of the money being spent at present will be wasted.

Several steps can be taken on the congressional level to begin to solve the problems I have outlined. These include:

Reduction of the matching requirement from 40 percent in most cases to a more realistic 10 percent. Moves to have States contribute matching funds for local efforts should not be imposed immediately, but phased in so that legislators have adequate time to consider the proposition.

Unworkable restrictions on personnel (especially civilian staff members) should be eliminated from the current law.

Planning funds, heavily weighted toward state planning bodies, should be made available to major cities in each State. Funds for planning also should be increased. At the same time, a national effort to attract capable people into the field and train them to be planners should be made. Planning requirements should be rethought and made more realistic, in line with local capabilities.

Direct action grants should be made to cities and other major population centers. These should be from both the National and State funds available through the act.

These suggestions, if implemented, would at least provide a framework for police departments to begin making changes. They should also receive technical assistance and support from the Federal Government.

Much time has already been lost. Police departments are not measurably improved despite the notion that much has been done. It simply has not. Unless the Congress and the people you represent become aware of the problems facing police and provide the support they need, past practices will continue.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you very much for a most powerful indictment and a very wise and helpful one.

Mr. Blumstein, we will be happy to hear from you.

Incidentally, if you would like to abbreviate any part of your prepared statement, the entire prepared statement will appear in full in the text of the record.

STATEMENT OF ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, DIRECTOR, URBAN SYSTEMS INSTITUTE, CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. I have a number of parts I would like to leave out. Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you.

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. I am particularly pleased and honored at the opportunity to appear before this distinguished committee and to contribute to your deliberations on the problems of crime and particularly the operation of the criminal justice system in the United States.

President Johnson's Crime Commission, with which I was privileged to serve as the Director of the Science and Technology Task Force, paid particular attention to the need to deal in an integrated way with the component parts of the criminal justice system. It is necessary to recognize that what police do has an impact on the courts, that defendants pleading guilty or convicted in the courts must be dealt with by corrections, and that the failures of corrections are subsequently visited upon the police and the society at large as offenders back on the streets committing more crimes.

This emphasis on the "systemness" of the criminal justice system was reflected in the 1968 Omnibus and Safe Streets Crime Control Act, which created State criminal justice planning agencies in each of the States, established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and within it the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice to undertake a significant research program.

The State planning agencies were to develop plans and programs to deal with the crime problem, to foster innovation within the time-encrusted criminal justice system, and to do this by allocating Federal resources across the total criminal justice system.

Unfortunately, far too few States have engaged in meaningful planning. In most cases, the State planning agencies react rather than initiate—they approve or reject grant applications generated by the existing agencies much more than they plan in the sense of making projections into the future and testing alternative programs against such projections. Some important ideas have been generated at these levels, but it is understandable that because of inertia, the system has not been particularly creative in generating change or in fostering closer interaction between the police, courts, and corrections agencies.

In large part, these State planning agencies have been limited by the very inadequate methodology that has been available to them for doing planning. We know very little in a quantitative sense about what causes crime, and about the consequences in terms of crime of the many things we try to do to control it. We still cannot definitively say how much good we accomplish with better street lighting, more intensive police patrol, stiffer maximum sentencing, or smaller caseloads for probation officers.

This great gap in our knowledge makes it extremely difficult to project about crime and to plan rationally the operation of the criminal justice system. These conditions should cause deep concern and should bring about a concerted effort to reduce our ignorance. Nevertheless, the Congress has seen fit to appropriate only \$7.5 million for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the research arm of LEAA. Thus, it is not very surprising that the State planning agencies do more grant management than planning.

Part of our efforts at Carnegie-Mellon University this past year have been devoted to developing a computer model to aid State criminal planners in planning for their State criminal justice systems. By using this computer, with data that describe the flow through the system, and placing the planner directly at a computer terminal right in his office, he can make changes in the policies of the system and see the consequences of those changes. How much resources would be required, what the cost implications would be.

Just last week, we ran a general training course in systems analysis for key personnel of each of the State planning agencies in the mid-Atlantic region of LEAA. We were all very impressed with how quickly these planners—most of whom had no technical education and most of whom had never used a computer terminal—learned to use this planning tool. Within just a few hours of operation, these people were exploring the downstream effects of a wide variety of changes. They were seeing the effects on courts and corrections of changes in arrest patterns. Each of the groups worked at developing a plan and it was impressive how sophisticated they became in terms of dealing with the total criminal justice system.

For example, if we were to consider speeding up the processing of cases at court by means such as introducing more judges, then we might well expect to reduce the time that dependants have to spend in pretrial detention. This cost saving in some jurisdictions may well be large enough to more than pay for the additional judges assigned to the courts. Again, the cost advantage is simply an addition to the much more fundamental social values of a speedy trial; that is, avoiding excessive detention of the innocent and swifter punishment for the guilty, as well as reducing the need for preventive detention. Thus, the interaction between the various parts of the system is particularly important to bring into focus, and it then becomes particularly important to provide means for dealing with it.

The comments by the participants in this course reflected the considerable value of even this very preliminary system planning model. One of the fundamental shortcomings of this model, however, is that it does not yet incorporate feedback effects; that is, it does not tell about the reduction in crime, reduction due both to recidivism as well as due to the deterrents resulting from various possible action programs. So far, we still have to get at those effects, largely because the data are not available and organized. We hope in our future work to bring in such data on recidivism in order to reflect those feedback effects.

The saddest part of our exercise—

Chairman PROXMIRE. This is a very fascinating and elaborate kind of work you are doing. Could I ask how much money is involved in this kind of operation?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. Our effort over this past year was supported by the research arm of LEAA and our grant totaled \$50,000.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You also had Carnegie-Mellon money or private foundation money?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. Not really.

Chairman PROXMIRE. That was the entire amount?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. That was the entire amount of the grant. My salary did not come out of the grant.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You had a computer available?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. That is right, a computer was available, but computer charges were included in our costs.

I might add that in the course we had 30-some-odd planners organized into four teams, each of which generated a plan. Our two terminals were used for about 30 hours during the course, day and night. The total cost of it came to about \$400, using an on-line computer terminal.

Chairman PROXMIRE. The planners were working full time for you? They were not full time—

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. The planners were there full time for a 1-week course. So the cost in terms of educating 30 people, in terms of developing State plans when and if the data became available, is really quite small compared to the costs of operating the system, and certainly the costs of inefficiency—

Chairman PROXMIRE. These people were all from Pennsylvania?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. They were from region II of LEAA, which is the Middle Atlantic States—Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware—

Chairman PROXMIRE. It did not include Connecticut?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. It did not include Connecticut.

The saddest part of the exercise was the universal feeling that while the model was exciting and the availability of the tool was particularly important, their own States did not yet have the data that was needed to use it today. They acknowledged the value of the device for identifying how to collect the data, and particularly to make the data consistent and relevant to the planning decisions to be made—a characteristic not shared by most criminal justice data—but they were skeptical that their States would soon commit the effort to collect the data. This was a particularly unfortunate reflection on the status of our social data.

Think of where economics and business management would be today without the enormous commitments made by the United States over the past three decades for the collection of a wide variety of economic data. Think of where the physical sciences would be were it not for the basic data collections that have been made there. In the social sciences, generally, and particularly with regard to crime, we are still very much in the middle ages in terms of the data we have and our understanding of it.

In most States, particularly those with a minor judiciary, all the criminal action that goes through them, most of it passes virtually unnoticed by anyone other than the individual magistrate. For instance, in the United States last year, there were about 7½ million people arrested for non-traffic offences, this rate, incidentally, having increased by about 25 percent in the last decade, and about doubled for persons under 18 years.

These arrests are reasonably well reported, but as soon as we try to follow these arrests through the courts and into corrections, we lose well over 90 percent of them, since an average daily prison population, where again data are reasonably well recorded, has dropped down to about 200,000 persons. We do not know where in the courts they drop out and for what reasons. We have only a very poor idea of how many are languishing in what form of jail. The institutionalized population, thus, in State prisons, is only a small portion of those who run afoul of the law.

These data also emphasize that in our determined concern to use the criminal sanction for deterrence, we see many arrests but a very small amount of imprisonment. It may just be, for instance, that we may be extending our arrest sanction far too broadly. Our studies for the Crime Commission some years ago indicated a projection that a 10-year-old boy would have about a 50-percent chance of being arrested sometime in his life for a nontraffic offense. This was based on a projection of 1965 arrest rates, and those rates have been going up since, so that estimate is probably conservative today.

It may well be that making all these arrests could reduce rather than enhance deterrence. To the extent that people are deterred by concern over the stigma of an arrest record, we reduce that concern once we give that man an arrest record. He may have less to lose the next time and so may be less deterred. It may just be that in this respect, as well as in others, the criminal justice system operates in a counter-productive way.

Furthermore, the job discrimination suffered by those who do have an arrest record, particularly if his potential employer thinks arrest

is a rare phenomenon, can be a serious hindrance to avoiding the consequence of joblessness, for instance, that lead to his arrest in the first place.

We should, therefore, consider purging minor arrest records after a reasonable time so that we can renew this stigma aspect of deterrence as well as enhancing the habilitation of what may be half of our male citizens.

It may well be that we are blunting the criminal sanction by using it for such private behavior as gambling, prostitution, homosexuality, drunkenness, and marihuana smoking. We thereby clog the courts, jam the jails, and weaken our ability to use these weapons against the crimes of robbery, murder, and burglary which concern us all so much more.

Consider, perhaps, a theory which suggests that a society strives to keep a constant proportion of its population imprisoned. This might posit a conservation law, conservation of imprisonment, much like the conservation of energy law associated with physics. If that proportion gets too large, then the society would have to build more jails, and it may not be willing to pay that expense. Or it may not want to come to see too large a segment of its population thus ultimately identified as deviants.

On the other hand, if the proportion in prison gets too small, then the society would not want to appear excessively permissive, so it sends more people to prison.

If this theory were correct, then with all the increase in arrests, the courts and corrections would have to find means of dropping people out of the system through legal technicalities, through nolle prosequie, through acquittals and dismissals, through probation or other community treatment, and through shorter sentences or earlier parole.

The evidence in fact does seem to indicate that the United States does have such a stable imprisonment rate, a rate of about 100 to 120 per 100,000 population, consistent with that 200,000 per year in prison in the United States. And we are finding more and more means to avoid imprisoning the greatly expanded number of arrested individuals. Perhaps this theory lies at the heart of much of the conflict between the police and the rest of the system. Perhaps people have been getting worse, or perhaps the police are merely resorting more often to the formal mechanism of arrest rather than the informal lectures many of us received as boys. Perhaps we must finally clear up our criminal laws to focus them on those issues that concern us most and not to mock them by appearing to apply them where they are ineffective and where they may well do more harm than good.

I recognize that changing such concepts is a long, slow, difficult process. How many legislators are willing to come out for adultery or gambling or prostitution by voting to repeal those laws? And certainly, changing the relationships within the criminal justice system is similarly difficult. Our perceptions of crime and criminals seem impervious to the knowledge that most people in fact report that they do commit crimes and that most young males will at some time or other get arrested.

The component agencies of the system still seem to be working more in conflict than in concert. The institutions within the criminal justice system have been specific targets of the LEAA program. Nevertheless,

one would have great difficulty identifying many significant, positive improvements as a result of the LEAA program. We can only hope that as the program significantly expands this year with the infusion of a half billion new dollars, significant forces for innovation and change will be gathered. I must confess that I am not overly optimistic. How much can we expect with an investment of one-tenth of one percent of the total U.S. criminal justice budget in research, less than one-thirtieth that which any responsible corporate executive would spend in improving his operations?

(The prepared statement of Mr. Blumstein follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALFRED BLUMSTEIN

Senator Proxmire and Members of the Committee: I am particularly pleased and honored at the opportunity to appear before this distinguished Committee and to contribute to your deliberations on the problems of crime and particularly the operation of the criminal justice system in the United States.

The members of this Committee know very well the frequently repeated statistics regarding the annual increases of about 10 to 15% in crime rate statistics. There may be some question about how much of this increase is due to reporting rate increases and how much is due to more crimes. There may be some question about how much is due to people becoming more criminal, and how much is due to having more people with higher criminal propensities in the population. But very few people will deny that the crime rate has seriously increased over the last decade.

In response to these trends in the crime rate—or to focus more directly on the issue of concern, the victimization rate—President Johnson's Crime Commission paid particular attention to the need to deal in an integrated way with the component parts of the criminal justice system. It is necessary to recognize that what police do has an impact on the courts, that defendants pleading guilty or convicted in the courts must be dealt with by corrections, and that the failures of corrections are subsequently visited upon the police and the society at large as offenders back on the streets committing more crimes.

This emphasis on the "systemness" of the criminal justice system was reflected in the 1968 Omnibus and Safe Streets Crime Control Act, which created state criminal justice planning agencies in each of the states, established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and within it the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice to undertake a significant research program.

The state planning agencies were to develop plans and programs to deal with the crime problem, to foster innovation within the time-encrusted criminal justice system, and to allocate Federal resources across the total criminal justice system.

These state planning agencies are the closest approximation to "system managers" within the criminal justice system. They are the channel through which Federal block grants are routed to the states. They can thus exercise a significant influence through the \$480 million Federal program, a sizeable increment of almost 10 per cent over the current six billion dollar state and local expenditures on the criminal justice system.

Unfortunately, far too few states have engaged in meaningful planning. In most cases, the state planning agencies react rather than initiate—they approve or reject grant applications generated by the existing agencies much more than they "plan" in the sense of making projections into the future and testing alternative programs against such projections. While there have been some important ideas generated at these levels, it is understandable that the inertia of the system has not been overly creative in generating change or in fostering closer interaction between the police, courts, and corrections.

In large part, these state planning agencies have been limited by the very inadequate methodology that has been available to them. We know very little in a quantitative sense about what causes crime, and about the consequences in terms of crime of the many things we try to do to control it. We try an innovative community treatment program in one jurisdiction and it proves to be a remarkable success; when it is picked up in another jurisdiction with less innovative drive than the first, the success is less than remarkable. When a new director of a police planning bureau allocates his forces efficiently and someone else tries to apply

those methods in another jurisdiction, statutes or police rules and regulations prevent him from adopting those procedures. We still cannot definitively determine how much good we accomplish with better street lighting, more intensive police patrol, stiffer maximum sentencing or smaller caseloads for probation officers.

This great gap in our knowledge makes it extremely difficult to project about crime and to plan rationally the operation of the criminal justice system. These conditions should cause deep concern and should bring about a concerted effort to remedy this situation. Nevertheless, the Congress has been fit to appropriate only \$7.5 million for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the research arm of LEAA. Thus, it is not very surprising that the state planning agencies do more grant management than planning.

Part of our efforts at Carnegie-Mellon University this past year have been devoted to developing a computer model to aid state criminal justice planners in planning for their state criminal justice systems. This computer model treats the criminal justice system as a sequence of processing stages through which crime reports, suspects, defendants, cases, charges, and offender flow. At each of the stages in the system, the flow of offenders is characterized by "branching ratios" which depict the proportion of units processed at that stage that flow to each of the possible output stages. Using data on the costs and resources (such as judges or prison cells or patrolmen) used at each of the stages, it becomes possible to examine the resource implications of any contemplated changes within the criminal justice system. This computer model has been developed so that it is available to any state planner and is usable at a teletype terminal at his desk from some central time-shared computer facility.

Just last week, we ran a general training course in systems analysis for key personnel of each of the states in the midAtlantic region of LEAA. We were all very impressed with how quickly these planners—most of whom had no technical education and most of whom had never used a computer terminal—learned to use this planning tool. Within just a few hours of operation, these people were exploring the effects on the downstream parts of the criminal justice system of a wide variety of changes. What happens if we introduce public defenders into the lower court? An important argument limiting the expansion of the use of public defenders is the cost involved. It was found, however, that greater use of public defenders reduced the workload on the superior court and reduced the number of offenders sent to corrections. These cost savings would more than compensate for the cost of the additional lawyers. This, of course, is an advantage beyond the enhancement of the quality of justice dispensed.

Similarly, if we were to speed up the processing of cases at trial by such means as introducing more judges, then we might expect to reduce the time defendants have to spend in pre-trial detention. This cost saving may well be large enough to more than pay for the additional judges assigned to the courts. Again, cost advantage is in addition to the many other social values of a speedy trial—avoiding excessive detention of the innocent and swifter punishment to the guilty.

The comments by the participants in this course reflected the considerable value of even this very preliminary system planning mode. Police officials were intrigued by being forced to face the consequences of what happens eventually to the people they arrest.

All the planners were forced to consider what happens in the system when they introduce a new program like expanded use of public defenders. Are more cases nolle because of an effective defense presented? Are more cases brought to trial? Are more cases plead guilty in order to receive lighter sentences? In the process of making such assumptions, the system planner has a tool by which he can test the implication of a variety of assumptions regarding the system he is planning. If he finds the consequences of his assumptions unacceptable—e.g., more demand for trials will call for too many judges—either he made the wrong assumptions, or he had better revise his intended plan for the criminal justice system. Thus, a model like this provides the planner with a tool which he can use to explore a wide variety of revisions within the criminal justice system.

One of the fundamental shortcomings of our model is that it does not yet incorporate the "feedback" effects, that is, it does not tell him the reduction of crime—both due to recidivism and due to the failure of deterrents that result from his various possible actions. He must still guess at those effects, largely because the appropriate data have not yet been collected and organized. We hope

in our future work to be able to bring in data on recidivism probabilities in order to reflect the effect of the programs on crime rates.

The saddest part of the exercise involving our criminal justice planners was their universal feeling that, while the model was exciting and the availability of the tool was particularly important, their own states did not yet have the data necessary to use it immediately. They acknowledged that the model was a particularly valuable device for identifying how to collect the data in a consistent form relevant to the planning decisions to be made, but they were most skeptical that their states would soon commit the effort to collect the data.

This is an unfortunate reflection of the status of our social data. Think of where the science of economics and the practice of business management would be today without the enormous commitments made by the United States over the past three decades for the collection of a wide variety of economic data. Think of where the physical sciences would have been were it not for the major commitments by institutions such as the National Bureau of Standards, to collect basic physical measurements. In the social sciences and particularly in dealing with crime, we are little beyond the Middle Ages in terms of our understanding. In most states, particularly those that have a "minor judiciary" or local lower courts, all the criminal action that passes through them goes virtually unnoticed by anyone other than the individual magistrate. In the United States last year, we had about 7.5 million people arrested for non-traffic offenses, a rate that has increased 25% since 1960 and has about doubled for persons under 18 years. These arrests are reasonably well reported by the FBI.

As soon as we try to follow these arrestees through the courts and into corrections, however, we find that we lose well over 90% of these, since an average daily prison population in the U.S. is about 200,000 persons. We don't know where in the courts they drop out and for what reasons, and we have a very poor idea of how many are languishing in what form of jail. The institutionalized population in state prisons is thus only a very small portion of those who run afoul of the law.

This high dropout rate suggests that the threat of imprisonment may not be the effective deterrent force many would wish it to be. One might, for instance, run a very simple calculation to try to measure the "expected risks and benefits" to a burglar contemplating a burglary. The average value of property stolen in a burglary is about \$300. An individual who commits a burglary, on the average, has about a 1% chance of ending up in prison for that burglary. If he does go to prison, his sentence may be about three years or 1,000 days. Thus, his "expected sentence" is one per cent of 1000, or about 10 days. Thus, if he were to value his time at any less than \$30 per day, then he might be quite "economically rational" to undertake the contemplated burglary. This very superficial review, of course, does not take into account the complexities of the "irrationalities" in the decision-making behavior by a potential burglar, the details of his own case (an individual with a prior prison record is much more vulnerable than one without), nor does it try to account for the wide variety of factors that he individually takes into account. It does serve to highlight, however, the fact that most offenses do not result in a direct punishment for that offense and that the deterrent threat of the criminal sanction is inherently limited.

These data also emphasize that in our determined concern to use the criminal sanction for deterrence, we see many arrests, but a very small amount of imprisonment. It may just be, for instance, that we are extending our arrest far too broadly. Our studies for the Crime Commission some years ago indicated a projection that a 10-year-old boy would have about a 50% chance of being arrested some time in his life for a non-traffic offense. That was based on 1965 arrest rates, and those rates have been going up since, so that that estimate is likely to be conservative today. It may well be that making all these arrests may well reduce rather than enhance deterrence. To the extent that people are deterred by concern over the stigma of an arrest record, we reduce that concern once we give a man an arrest record. He may have less to lose the next time, and so may be less deterred. It may just be that in this respect, as well as in others, the criminal justice system operates in a counter-productive way. Furthermore, the job discrimination suffered by those who have an arrest record, particularly if his employer thinks arrest is a rare phenomenon, can be a serious hindrance to avoiding the conditions that led to his arrest in the first place. We should consider purging minor arrest records after a reasonable time so that we can renew this stigma aspect of deterrence as well as enhancing the habilitation of half of our males.

It may well be that we are blunting the criminal sanction by using it for such private behavior as gambling, prostitution, homosexuality, drunkenness, and marijuana smoking. We thereby clog the courts, the jails, and thereby weaken our ability to use these weapons against the crimes of robbery, murder and burglary, which concern us all so much more.

Consider, if you will, a theory which suggests that a society strives to keep a constant proportion of its population imprisoned. If that proportion gets too large, then the society would have to build more jails, and it may not be willing to pay that expense. Or it may not want to see so large a segment of the population identified as ultimate deviants. On the other hand, if the proportion in prison gets too small, then the society would not want to appear excessively permissive, and send more people to prison. If that theory is correct, then with all the increase in arrests, the courts and corrections must find means of dropping people out of the system through legal technicalities, through nolle, through acquittals and dismissals, through probation or other community treatment, and through shorter sentences or earlier parole.

The evidence, in fact, does seem to indicate that the United States does have such a stable imprisonment rate (about 100-120 per 100,000 population). And we are finding more and more means to avoid imprisoning the greatly expanded number of arrested individuals. Perhaps this lies at the heart of much of the conflict between the police and the rest of the system. Perhaps people have been getting worse, or perhaps the police are merely resorting more often to the formal mechanism of arrest rather than the informal lecture many of us received as boys. Perhaps we must finally clear up our criminal laws to focus them on those issues that concern us most, and not to mock them by appearing to apply them where they are ineffective and where they may well do more harm than good.

I recognize that changing such concepts is a long, slow, difficult process. How many legislators are willing to come out "for" adultery or gambling or prostitution? And changing the relationships within the criminal justice system is similarly difficult. Our perceptions to crime and criminals seem impervious to the knowledge that most people commit crimes and most males will get arrested. The component agencies of the system still seem to be working more in conflict than in concert. The institutions within the criminal justice system have been specific targets of the entire LEAA program. Nevertheless, one would have great difficulty identifying where there have been significant positive improvements as a result of the LEAA program. We can only hope that, as the program significantly expands this year with the infusion of a half billion new dollars, that significant forces for innovation and change will be gathered. I must confess that I am not overly optimistic. How much can we expect with an investment of 0.1 per cent in research, 1/30th that which any responsible corporate executive would spend in improving his operations.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Blumstein, for an excellent statement, most useful.

You have some fascinating statistics there. In your prepared statement you talk about a 10-year-old boy and the prospects being 50/50 that he will have an arrest record, on the basis of projections a couple of years ago, and now it is much more than 50/50. If you apply this to a black 10-year-old-boy from a low-income background, I take it his chances of getting through life without being arrested for a serious action—at least more than a traffic ticket—would be very great indeed.

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. Our projection there was over 90 percent for a black boy in the city.

Chairman PROXMIRE. That is a very interesting statistic, because, as you say, it can be so discriminatory in terms of employment, in terms of blighting his life.

I was fascinated by your statistic on the imprisonment rate. It looks like we are being mighty hypocritical, or trying to show that we are more concerned about crime and cracking down on the criminal, and making a lot more arrests. But we have just about the same record per capita for criminal imprisonment. As you say, we find all kinds of excuses for making the arrest ineffective. People complain about the

Supreme Court, but we have all the other things that in aggregate, may be more important.

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. Let me point out that the notion is not definitely proven, but the data seems to support it very strongly. If that is a fundamental phenomenon driving the society, then each individual part of the society believes it is doing its best by passing more strict laws, by trying harder to arrest. But we may just be operating in conflict with something that is more fundamentally driving us.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Chief Ahern, there seem to be some very fuzzy questions about how Federal law enforcement system funds are allocated. These funds are growing, as we know, rapidly. I do not know if you were here when I pointed out the statistics on the terrific increase in Federal funds since 1969, an increase of about eightfold. Do I understand your position to be that the Federal Government should offer more guidance rather than just accepting whatever plan the State may put together?

Mr. AHERN. I think what I am saying is that they ought to be sensitive to the various problems that differ from one locality to another. The Federal guidelines are very rigid and very inflexible. It is actually a bureaucracy that has grown old very quickly and may be dying, I think.

The courts and police are surprisingly different from California to Connecticut and from Connecticut to Mississippi, let's say. Yet this same kind of application is made on a nationwide basis.

I would encourage them, at the same time, to be sure that State planning agencies in awarding grants promote innovation, promote some kind of research, promote some kind of forward move in police departments, and in courts and corrections, rather than support some past practices that are really horrible. In fact, that is the way the money is being spent now, and it is being spent to reinforce the very worst things in the criminal justice system.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Why is that? Is that because the local pressure from the local people is that they want to continue, as they always do, what they have been doing and they apply pressure to Congressmen and Senators?

Mr. AHERN. I think it works something like this. The police department is told to make an application. That is a new ball game to them. They have very few skills to do this. They will generate very pedestrian requests for such things as equipment. The State planning body, which is itself fairly unsophisticated and fairly unequipped to deal with these situations, particularly police department problems, rather than working with localities and providing the skills or the planning momentum at the local level, will just react to those applications and they wind up funding very bad things. There is absolutely no thrust, from my personal experience, to change the system. Rather, it is to support it.

In Connecticut, for instance, we have minimum standards for police. That is 5 weeks of training, which is absolutely ridiculous, considering the scope of activities that a patrolman handles and considering the very tense kind of scene.

Chairman PROXMIRE. How does that compare with the national average of various States?

Mr. AHERN. I think planning for police is a fraud—I mean training for police is a fraud. I do not know of any department that has one that is really relevant to what a policeman does.

Chairman PROXMIRE. But five weeks is not untypical?

Mr. AHERN. Five weeks—you could not really start.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I know that, but I say this is common throughout the country?

Mr. AHERN. I would say so, yes. That is probably the norm. In Connecticut, for instance, 12 weeks of training is required for a hairdresser. It gives you some indication of the type of concern for police. Yet that same 5-week training program, which trains suburban and urban police departments, which have different ranges of activities, is reinforced and supported by Federal money, without any demand for change, without any demand for new kinds of people, without any demand or reassessment to see how effective it is. I can tell you very personally it is not effective at all.

Chairman PROXMIRE. It would seem to me that especially Connecticut—Connecticut, as I understand it, is not the second richest State or the third or the fourth, it is the richest, per capita; right at the top, at least on many statistics I have seen. If any State can afford to carry the load, it would seem to me it ought to be Connecticut.

Mr. AHERN. You have to make the distinction.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You were telling us, you were kind of weeping about how you are having a terrible time getting along with local funds and you have to have the Federal Government assist because you just do not have the funds available to provide the kind of pay, the kind of training, the kind of equipment that you need and this is what the Federal Government should do in a substantially bigger way. At least that is what I got from part of the flavor of your testimony. It is most effective coming from you because you are not the poorest State. As I say, you are richest, the very richest.

Mr. AHERN. I think you have to make the distinction that per capita wealth is not necessarily reflected in city or State budgets.

Chairman PROXMIRE. It ought to be.

Mr. AHERN. That is personal wealth. Very little of that personal wealth goes into police departments.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do you have a State income tax?

Mr. AHERN. No; we do not.

Chairman PROXMIRE. In our State, we are of average income, but we have a very high State income tax, a sales tax, we have the works, as well as a very big property tax.

It is partly whether the citizens in the State really are concerned enough about law enforcement to make this kind of an effort, is it not?

Mr. AHERN. It is also partly the political structure and the legislative bodies that do set budgets. It is how they perceive priorities and how serious the problem is. It is also how they perceive the criminal justice system, and police in particular.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You see, no matter how you try to safeguard this, and I think all of us want to do so, I have found in the years I have been here that power does follow the dollar. If we provide money for any kind of a program, we want to have something to say about how it is done. We will provide our standards and our control.

Now, you can look at it in several ways. Some people are very concerned about the possibility of a Federal police system. They think it can be very dangerous for a democracy. Others are concerned, as you seem to be, that you will get the dead hand of a Federal bureaucracy. That is a very healthy and wholesome concern. Either way, you lose.

It would seem to me that of all of our local spending, this is one that should be, as much as possible, funded on a local basis or at least a State basis, rather than a national basis, except in a research area, where we can provide some innovation and some checking of what works and what does not, but not where we would have the power, rather because of our appropriations, to control police policy and police activity.

Mr. AHERN. Senator, I do not think it is really a problem in terms of Federal control of local police departments. I would not sit here and argue the bloc grant system as being effective or ineffective. But I think the Federal Government can demand some kind of demonstration of effectiveness for their money. That demand can be made on State planning committees to see that their money is spent effectively. I do not see that as control of the local police departments or a national police department.

One of the problems with police departments in this country is that there are 40,000 of them. They all differ very much. There is no profession per se. There is nobody who speaks for local police. There is no major body pushing for improvement, which they need drastically. You can witness some of the things that have happened around the country.

I think, you know, to diminish the number of police departments in this country would be a very healthy thing, either to regionalize them or find some way of coordinating their activities. It is a very mobile society, as was demonstrated by the chancellor's comments and the police departments really are not equipped to handle the kind of society we live in.

Chairman PROXMIRE. This seems to me to be both unrealistic and I am not sure it would be desirable to work toward a 90-10 allocation of the kind you request. There is lots of unhappiness about the highway funds. There you have the rationalization that it is a user tax, anyway, that the person who uses the highway buys his gasoline and that the tax money should go back into building his road. But if you have a 90-10 funding of police programs, it would seem to me that in the first place, you would get a lot resistance here. In the second place, you are likely to get Federal domination that neither you nor I would want.

Mr. AHERN. The amounts of money that the Federal Government will put into local police departments is really dissipated. It would come to a fraction of the existing local budget. So I doubt very much whether there is any serious problem of control. But police departments, urban police departments, faced with the financial crisis that cities have, have a bare-bones operating expense. It is absolutely just rubber tires and gasoline and there is no money in there for innovation or experimentation. I would expect that the Federal Government should support those kinds of things.

Now, I think the Federal Government has a vested interest in good and proper law enforcement in this country. If cities are faced with

the kind of tense scene and the kind of social crunch that they really are faced with and police departments handle these things in inept ways or ways that contribute to the escalation of violence, then it affects everybody and not just States and localities. I would encourage you to look very closely at the 90-10, because without that, I know in the city of New Haven, I in fact can't make application for additional money this year because I have not the matching requirements. I think you are going to find that a good deal of that money is just going to sit there and wait. Because cities just do not have it to spend.

Chairman PROXMIRE. It sounds as if they do not have that much interest in improving your police operations.

Mr. AHERN. I would agree with you. I think police departments traditionally have been the stepchildren of city government. An awful lot has been demanded of them with very little attention given to their needs. I think things have caught up with cities. They would be more inclined to give you additional cars, more inclined to support operational measures. That kind of thing is coming only out of necessity.

What I am advocating is more Federal money, not to replace the budget, but to supplement it, to bring the kinds of skills into the police department that they desperately need, give them the planning capabilities so they can at least spend that money in a worthwhile way. If those matching requirements are not changed, I think the Federal Government is going to find itself at the end of this fiscal year with a good deal of money lying at State bureaucracies, not being able to be spent.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You speak feelingly and it certainly makes sense that the troika administration of the LEAA is unworkable and should be changed. Would the amendments now before Congress take care of that?

Mr. AHERN. I am not that familiar with them, Senator. I believe there is one that has passed the House to have a single administrator.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Has this administration by committee really been a major factor in inhibiting development of an effective LEAA program?

Mr. AHERN. I believe it has. I base that on information I have received from employees of LEAA who face tremendous problems in getting programs pushed into the operational stage. I think there is some ideological and philosophical difference between the two members who are there now, or three members who were there. I do not think you can operate an action kind of agency, funding agency, and keep it dynamic and keep it responsive to the user agencies with that kind of system. I think you need a single administrator.

There have been a number of problems on discretionary grants and money sent directly by the Federal agency to the cities because of these difficulties. I can speak of this personally.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I want to ask both of you gentlemen about the number of crimes committed by young people. We know they are dissatisfied, restless, having trouble finding jobs—16-percent unemployment among teenagers this summer, 30-percent among black youngsters. They are exposed to drugs as our generation never was, increasingly exposed to temptations of that kind. What has happened to the Federal youth programs and programs to prevent delinquency?

As I recall, Congress passed a juvenile delinquency prevention control act in 1968 which contained some requirements for comprehensive planning parallel to the Safe Streets Act requirement. It gave responsibility to Health, Education, and Welfare, as well as to Justice.

Our witnesses yesterday said that these programs just never got off the ground. What should the Federal role be? What do we have to do to get these programs moving and effective?

Mr. AHERN. Very honestly, Senator, in terms of youth or juvenile problems, I think we really are in a disastrous situation. I can speak only for the State of Connecticut on this.

The juvenile courts—if you think there are problems with the criminal court system, the juvenile court system is so bad as to be actually not functioning at all—not functioning. The caseload for youth social workers in the juvenile court system in Connecticut is something like 150 per individual. Recommended by the Crime Commission, and at the time it was thought to be quite high, was 35. It is just a system that marks a young person deviant, marks him bad, and then rejects him.

The only alternative is freeing him, which 90 percent of them are, with a letter to their parents—very few ever go before any kind of tribunal. Very few are ever offered any kind of psychiatric or social help in solving their problems. The State of Connecticut, which puts it in the forefront in terms of what is going on around the country, just at this point, just two months ago, decided to give psychiatric help to young people on a part-time basis—two psychiatrists for the entire State. How much help can they really be? But that is an advanced step by the standards of the juvenile system.

I do not know what is going to become of that. I do know that on the State level and certainly in an urban environment, it presents tremendous problems to a police department, because that is the only way we have to turn. That is the only system we can plug kids into.

I can say that the social service agencies have become more interested in themselves than in their clientele. An urban police department is faced with this—when the city comes alive at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, every social service agency closes down, a very odd scene. There is very often no support, no help, for a police department. They can only handle it in one way.

I admit that we make too many referrals, some of them for violations that would not be violations if they were adults, for instance.

I think the police are at fault by putting too large an input in there. I think that certainly ought to be changed, and we are making some attempt to change it. Juvenile delinquency is not a problem that the police departments can handle alone. You need the concentrated support of every social service agency, and you need the support of the courts. Those courts, themselves, to the best of my knowledge—and that problem seems to be pretty much the same around the country—just are not working.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I would think this kind of situation would lead to a completely ineffective police operation with regard to many kinds of juvenile crime, so that pretty soon the kids would get the word that they are just going to be talked to by policemen, have a letter written to their parents, who, if they cared, the kids would not be in trouble in many cases, at least, and that is the end of it.

So there is no real deterrent, and they have a contempt for the law because it is not enforced, there is no punishment. They hear a lot of stuff about how they are going to go to prison or something and suffer real punishment, but they are not, they know their friends are not.

So I would think this would be a very demoralizing kind of situation.

Mr. AHERN. It certainly does nothing for the police department's relationship with young people, and it certainly does nothing particularly in terms of minority groups. Because we become the first hand, the first that reaches out and grabs them and puts them into a system that does nothing to support them, nothing to help them.

Chairman PROXMIRE. All it does is keep them from getting a job.

Mr. AHERN. It just marks them down.

Chairman PROXMIRE. As you say, marks them as deviants, as bad.

Mr. AHERN. That is right.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Mr. Blumstein?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. That is just exactly the kind of thing I was trying to focus on in this discussion, that we just cannot deal with that, and it is a mockery to make believe that we can. The mockery comes from the passage of a Juvenile Delinquency Act and an appropriation of, I believe, \$50 million, or two bits per person to do something about all of this.

Chairman PROXMIRE. The problem, No. 1, as far as Federal sanction is concerned, is you need more money.

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. You need more money, perhaps. The fundamental problem is even if you had all the money, what are you going to do with it?

Chief Ahern testified, I think, most eloquently about the limited imagination among not only the people who administer the system, but also among the people who try to create ideas for it. People on the line do not very well know how to do very much better than they are doing. There are many creative ideas that are floating around in theoretical literature. But when it comes to the run-of-the-mill person whom you can hire for \$6,000 or \$8,000 a year, who has to put these programs into action, these very interesting, complex, sophisticated programs just will not work.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Let me be specific. Supposing you have a 17-year-old boy who has been a purse snatcher. He has been arrested two or three times for this, and he obviously is a real problem. What would happen under these circumstances?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. Under which circumstances?

Chairman PROXMIRE. Under present circumstances.

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. Chief Ahern can testify much better than I, but I would think that in a community which has many armed robbers among 17-year-old boys, their institutions would be filled with armed robbers. Their probation officers would be busy dealing with the more serious offenders, and the purse snatcher must therefore be treated as a minor offender. They just do not have the time, skills, nor resources to deal with him, because they are too busy dealing with other kinds of individuals, who are of greater concern.

Chairman PROXMIRE. So this kid just goes on and on and he gets into something else. It is harder for him to get a job because he has been identified as a criminal. But in many cases he is not incarcerated,

no psychiatric treatment given to him, no attempt to find out what can be done to straighten him out, no motivation changes for him.

So we just kind of give him up, surrender, and forget about him in many cases?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. In many cases I think that is the way we end up operating, in large part because there is nothing else we can do, given the resources that are committed to it, and the skills.

Chairman PROXMIRE. My question was, what can the Federal Government do? What should we do? You say money will not solve the problem by itself. It will help, but you have to find out how you can use that money, first.

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. And you have to find out new ways to use that money that are going to be more effective than the things we are doing today.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, the objective of this hearing, of course, is to find out how we can improve the Federal action so that we can assist the States here.

Chief Ahern indicated that we need more psychiatrists—that is just a tiny beginning there.

He indicated that they need more Federal money so that there will be more innovation on their part, more criticism on the part of the Federal authorities so that the funds are requested for innovative purposes and for proven purposes, where they have stated that this is going to work.

What else?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. I would very strongly second Chief Ahern's suggestion that the emphasis be placed on getting new and innovative programs that will serve as models.

Second, I think there is a very severe gap between innovative programs and the people who organize them, on the one hand, and practice, on the other hand. We need a link there.

People in universities, with some exceptions, tend not to communicate very well or very frequently with the people who have to put into practice their research findings.

I would say that the notion of the county agriculture agent, which did so much for translating agricultural research into farm practice, is desperately missing in our criminal justice system.

We need a whole corps of people who are sophisticated enough to deal with, to understand, and to view critically new innovative programs, to find out what is going on at the forefront of practice and of knowledge, and then to translate this information, experimentation, and evaluation into practice. To do this, they must also appreciate the problems of practice.

Chairman PROXMIRE. What you want, then, is something like a county agent to work with the schools, to work with any other community that you can.

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. To work with all the agencies within the criminal justice system.

Chairman PROXMIRE. And to work with the police departments?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. These would be the kinds of individuals that I think Chief Ahern had in mind when he talked about "planners" being needed, people to fill a technical assistance role to help management identify what new programs should be undertaken, to feed knowledge

much more rapidly into the operation, because far more is known than is applied.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Yesterday our witnesses indicated that the courts are often the biggest bottlenecks in the criminal justice system. Jails are clogged with people awaiting trial; people are losing their respect for law because they know they can often indefinitely delay being brought to trial. Do you agree that our court systems are often antiquated and resistant to change?

Mr. AHERN. I could not agree more heartily.

Chairman PROXMIRE. What steps, particularly what Federal steps, should be taken to bring about court reform?

Mr. AHERN. I see Federal money as seed money, really as pilot money to bring forth change. I see change as not being thrust upon the courts, but—

Chairman PROXMIRE. Would you say you need more judges?

Mr. AHERN. You need more competent people in courts, you need more full-time prosecutors, you need speedy justice, and you need more open files.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Would you agree with Mr. Blumstein that we need to take a more careful look at the arrests and see that some of the arrests should be forgotten because they are too minor?

Mr. AHERN. Oh, I agree completely. Connecticut has just had a complete revision of its criminal code that has deleted or taken off its books—not yet; it will be effective a year from now—most moral crimes.

I would recommend, for example, that gambling be legalized. What we do is keep the Mafia in business, in fact. I would recommend that State governments provide the same kind of service, legitimized and get the tax fund on it. It is an unenforcible thing.

Chairman PROXMIRE. How about the very difficult political problems Mr. Blumstein suggested in prostitution, adultery, and marihuana?

Mr. AHERN. It is my personal feeling that I would not legalize prostitution. I would legalize anything between consenting adults. I would prohibit solicitation or anything as it affects minors. I would condemn that.

Connecticut has moved in that way. It is interesting to point out that Connecticut has revised the Criminal Code, and this is what the policeman deals with in an operational way every day of his life, yet Connecticut has not seen fit to spend 10 cents to train the police officer for when that becomes effective in December 1971.

Chairman PROXMIRE. So he will not know?

Mr. AHERN. He will not know at all. To show you how advanced the State is, the city of New Haven asked for \$90,000 to develop a training program that would be applicable statewide, a training and instruction program for police officers, every police officer in the State.

We have just become a contractor for it, and it costs us a considerable amount of our own staff time to implement it. They did this kicking and screaming, I mean absolutely reluctantly, and then cut the appropriation in half, to \$50,000.

So that is what is available, and that initiative had to come from the local level; certainly nothing from the State or from the State planning committee that expends Federal funds.

But that just gives you some indication of how people perceive that law and order syndrome. I mean it is shiny cars and nothing to support the system and to make change in good ways that you really need.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I am still trying to get at what the Federal Government can best contribute to this court problem.

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. One thing that they might well do is foster the creation of administrative officers in courts. In most courts a judge—the chief judge typically—is responsible for administering the courts.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Foster it by the use of funds that would pay for the cost?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. By the use of funds. This obviously avoids the very difficult problems of administrative control over the courts and Federal intervention into the substance of judicial decisionmaking.

But the big problems you have talked about are those of administration, moving business through in a more efficient, expeditious way. It seems that the introduction of administrative skills, data processing equipment, and facilities would be extremely effective in identifying how the courts could operate more efficiently and in fostering that improvement in efficiency.

Simple techniques like better scheduling to make better use of judges' time, improved calendaring, avoidance of continuances for trivial reasons, the frustration of witnesses who show up a dozen or more times for a case that ends up by getting continued—these are all factors, I think, that lead to a very sad state of affairs in the criminal justice system and in the minds of our citizens about the criminal justice system.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Suppose, Mr. Blumstein, we should make your computerized data system that you discussed in your paper available to Mr. Ahern. Would he be able to use it? Assuming he has a fairly typical operation. Or would his data probably be inadequate?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. In its present form, it is designed for looking at the total criminal justice system, so he would use it as a police chief in terms of assessing the consequences to courts and corrections, of increased enforcement by picking up more drunks, for instance, or by reducing the arrest of drunks.

Chairman PROXMIRE. How could he determine that? Does this depend upon some commensurate assumptions that you program into the computer? If so, why do you need a computer for that?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. Because the computations get rather complicated. However simple they may be, most people are quite reluctant to go through those numerical calculations. As you start looking at the wide variety of crimes for which we have arrests, as you start looking at the rather complex paths that individuals can trace through the complex criminal justice system network, then the computations just get very tedious.

Also, it requires pulling together lots of data on how people do move through the system.

Now, regarding Chief Ahern, he is one of the very few police chiefs who would be interested in the consequences for courts and corrections of changes in his policies. I must confess that there are not very many police chiefs in the country who care, who look beyond the arrest in terms of their role in law enforcement.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Then how can the Federal Government take advantage of your suggestion, your experience, to give this tool to police departments, if you say most of them will not care about it?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. I am urging that it be given to the State criminal justice planning agencies, which specifically have the responsibility for dealing with the whole system, as well as to regional groups of the same character, operating under the State planning agencies, who have the same responsibilities in their local areas.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Chief Ahern, would you find this, on the basis of what you heard this morning, is it sufficiently detailed for you to make a judgment as to whether this might be of value to you?

Mr. AHERN. This model here?

Chairman PROXMIRE. Yes.

Mr. AHERN. It may or may not. I would just like to make a comment on your comment, what would be the sense in doing this if, in fact, most police departments would not accept it or not use it.

Senator, I see LEAA money failing very badly in the past 2 years, it has not created that kind of attitude or acceptance of change or a new kind of leadership in police departments that would be responsive to that. That money has been used to reinforce the very worst kinds of things, and the very worst practices, that have been going on over past years.

Chairman PROXMIRE. What would make police chiefs and other top police officers interested? You would have to have people, salesmen, almost, going out to convert them to an understanding of how this could help them, would you not?

Mr. AHERN. I think the point was made by the Chancellor this morning that most police departments just react and operate on a day-to-day basis because of the great pressures on them. Very little time is given—as a matter of fact, a planner is a unique thing in a local police department. Very little time is given to long-range planning, or even short-term planning, for that matter.

I see the Federal money as being most useful in providing that kind of skill, that kind of talent to be able to put aside three or four people to look at the long-range consequences of how we are performing.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do you have any staff for that in New Haven? It is how big, 150,000?

Mr. AHERN. 150,000, yes. I do, I have seven people in planning.

Chairman PROXMIRE. That is unusual.

Mr. AHERN. It is the largest in the State, including the State, which says something about Connecticut.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Larger than Hartford?

Mr. AHERN. Yes.

Chairman PROXMIRE. These are planners?

Mr. AHERN. These are planners, supported by the local budget, two of which are paid for by Federal money. In fact, we plan for the region in New Haven, for 14 towns.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Under those circumstances, why would not this computer operation be useful to you?

Mr. AHERN. It would. I would have some problems with the operation.

I do not accept the theory, for instance, that if I knew that by making drunk arrests that it was clogging the courts, I could in fact stop. There are some things I can do and some things I cannot do.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You have a political problem.

Mr. AHERN. It is not even political. It is a safety problem. Drunks—everybody says you should not make drunk arrests, and I think they make something like 10,000 a year. But it is safety feature. The drunks would get killed walking across the street, or they would freeze to death.

Chairman PROXMIRE. How many are Yale students of those 10,000 a year?

Mr. AHERN. Very few. Most of them are on Saturdays, after the football games.

Chairman PROXMIRE. And those are the old grads?

Mr. AHERN. Yes.

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. Most of the computations of the sort I am talking about are not the determiners of policy. All I am proposing is that we have a means of assessing some of the resource implications of alternative policies. There may well be very good value reasons why you want to spend resources in arresting drunks. But you want to know when you are contemplating the question of not arresting drunks, how much you are going to save if that is an issue of policy.

Chairman PROXMIRE. This goes right to the heart of what I am interested in, or what a lot of us are interested in here. We want to know if we can develop some method of evaluating these law enforcement programs so we know where the greatest payoff is, where we can expand our limited resources and get the greatest results.

I know you just cannot do this on the basis of strict arithmetic.

But I think Mr. Blumstein's point is that this will be of help in giving you some objective criteria. Then you make your judgments and you may determine that you have to pick up these drunks whether or not the report shows that there are reasons why you should or should not. You have to make your judgment, maybe, independently.

But that kind of requirement that you consider all of the elements involved, that you put them together, even if you do not use the computer, that you put them together; the computer would help you to do it.

It would, it seems to me, give a much more satisfactory basis for a reasonable, logical investment of limited criminal justice resources; would it not?

Mr. AHERN. There is no question about it. That information in the State of Connecticut is not available now. It has even greater payoff than that, because if I had privy to court information in terms of convictions and terms of ones that are nulled and things that are thrown out of court, that, in some ways, is an index of efficiency for a police department. It may affect training, it may affect policy in a police department, it may go a long way toward making a substantial change.

But without that information, without any basis for it, you may have a problem that you have not really identified.

A policeman may be behaving improperly and that is not being brought to the attention of the police department, or they may not be investigating properly.

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. I may say that we have obtained some data from Connecticut and I would be pleased to share it with Chief Ahern.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I would like to ask you gentlemen, one function of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration is supposed to be to improve our statistics on the incidence of crime, on the effectiveness of crime prevention and rehabilitation efforts. What is wrong with the existing crime statistics and what needs to be done to improve those statistics?

Mr. AHERN. No. 1, Senator, it is a voluntary method of reporting. Very honestly, crime rates go up and down according to political pressures, and it is done with a pencil.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Is it really that, so that what you can do—

Mr. AHERN. In all candor and all honesty—I do report honestly; I will make that as a flat statement. I question whether all States and all cities report honestly. There are all kinds of factors that come into play on that.

For instance, when is a burglary, a burglary; when does attempted burglary come into it? When is a theft a theft? Was a door open?

Say the police department gives a general order to all precincts to cut the crime rate. You can just expect—

Chairman PROXMIRE. So they cut the crime rate by not reporting their crimes.

Mr. AHERN. The crime rate, astoundingly, does go down. Any precinct commander with half a grain will do the same if he likes his job and wants to get along well with the boss. It is that inflexible and that consistent.

There is no indication, for instance, of the narcotics problem in the crime rate. That is really the nub of the crime problem, as I see it, or the increasing crime problem. There is absolutely no way of gauging that. There is no way of reporting on it, it does not figure into the statistics at all.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Are there not reports of arrests for narcotics violations? Would that be helpful?

Mr. AHERN. They are not included in the crime rate, that I know of. Certainly narcotics offenses are not included.

Chairman PROXMIRE. That is astonishing.

Mr. AHERN. It is, especially to me.

Chairman PROXMIRE. We have been told again and again, by Jerry Wilson, for instance, who I think is a very fine police chief—

Mr. AHERN. I do, too.

Chairman PROXMIRE. He has said that if he could find some way of cutting the crimes of the two or three hundred hardcore drug users and abusers in the District, he would have a great drop in crime.

Mr. AHERN. That is right.

Chairman PROXMIRE. And we do not have any statistics on this at all.

Mr. AHERN. You have very raw statistics, and nowhere is it assembled in cumulative fashion.

Chairman PROXMIRE. After all, drug abuse is a violation of law. Why is that not kept as a statistic? When you pick somebody up as a violation, a user or possessor or pusher of heroin, is that not entered as an arrest for violation of the narcotics laws?

Mr. AHERN. I think we are talking about two different things. We are talking about arrests, and we are talking about the incidence of crime, which is offenses reported, which does not necessarily mean

there has been an arrest. What I am saying is that the crime rate has no way of reflecting the tremendous impact that the narcotics problem has on crime.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I see.

Mr. AHERN. Therefore, it is irrelevant.

Yes, we have information on how many arrests were made for different kinds of narcotics by age groups. I am not even sure that is in the FBI report—it is. But it does not, when the FBI annual report comes out and gives a city-by-city rundown with some kind of an index of crime, it really does not tell you very much.

You really do not know, for instance, about Buffalo, N.Y., whether they do in fact use the criteria that the FBI said. You do not know whether they shade it for political reasons. There is no way of holding you accountable for it. So consequently the different levels in the police departments, some of it will not be dishonesty, just inefficiency or incompetence.

Then, given that crime rate, you have no way of gaging what the total impact of narcotics is on that. That, in itself, makes it kind of irrelevant.

Chairman PROXMIRE. In view of the great variation of reporting crime statistics, and I assume the tendency is to report them more as time goes on, and we have more law enforcement officials, could it possibly be argued that incidence of crime may not have increased at all? This may simply be a statistical illusion?

Mr. AHERN. I very honestly, and this is only a personal belief, I do not think it has increased to the extent that the case has been made. I think there is better reporting now and I think the public is more apt to report crimes to police, which has put a greater burden on the police department in terms of service provided. I also think the public is apt to report more things that they would have overlooked prior to this.

I also think that some police departments use it as a budgetary device, a way of getting additional money into their budget, which may or may not be legitimate. I think it is good to get increased budgets, but not necessarily to tamper with the crime rate.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I have one more question, and I apologize for keeping you gentlemen for so long. You have been very fine witnesses, very responsive to the questions I have asked.

Mr. Ahern, you are chief of police at New Haven. I was at New Haven for 4 years, at Yale University. I know you have problems with that great campus. It would be impossible this morning, especially with Dean Young of the University of Wisconsin as one of our witnesses, our initial witness, to entirely overlook the fact that you are a member of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest.

There has been a lot of speculation about what this Commission will report and how the administration will react. We are not going to ask you to leak the report in advance, but perhaps we can get some of your personal thoughts on this problem that troubles us all so much.

What motivates the perpetrators of campus violence? What do they hope to gain?

Mr. AHERN. I would imagine social change. I think you have to separate the dissenters, the people who peacefully dissent, from the perpetrators of violence.

As was mentioned here this morning, I think they have psychiatric problems beyond belief. I also think that they feel completely frustrated in terms of having any impact on the system or their inability to make change or make any headway with institutions in terms of reform.

Now, in some ways, this is justified, and I would anticipate over the next decade—and these are all my personal feelings and do not reflect the other eight members of the Commission, or the Commission report, for that matter—I would anticipate that over the next decade the amount of dissent, the amount of campus unrest will continue at least at the pace it was this past spring, if not more. Because, in fact, institutions have failed to respond.

Government has not responded properly in terms of reform. There is a kind of hypocrisy in this country that is perpetrated through the bureaucracies, the institutions. The educational institutions, I think, have been less than responsive and fairly rigid. In fact, change is only made under the gun. It really is. It is at the threat of violence or when violence has been committed to make this change.

That encourages the radicalization process, I think.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Dissent is one thing. Everybody, or almost everybody, regardless of political persuasion, seems to agree that dissent is wholesome, desirable, should be encouraged, but violence is something else. Almost everybody agrees that is must be stopped.

You spoke of the psychiatric hangups of some of these violent people, and Dr. Young spoke of how there were very few of them. In view of the fact that we have highly selective methods of selecting students in many universities—Yale, especially, but I think many others, too—would it be possible, do you think, to determine those who are so psychopathic and so psychologically confused that they should be or could be weeded out, not admitted to college? After all, we do turn people down. It is heartbreaking when they are turned down, but you turn down an awful lot of people for college education.

Less than half of our young people, even now, today, go to college.

If people are going to be so psychologically constructed that they are likely to burn or bomb, or whatnot, they should not be there.

Mr. AHERN. Senator, I have not had very much success in police work with psychological testing. I would imagine that same thing would be applicable to universities. Those people are just not very easily identifiable.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I would be afraid of that. I just asked that question. It is a far out try. But I think it is something we ought to discuss and develop.

Mr. AHERN. I think even if you could, you may miss the point. Universities are fairly open. There is a kind of subculture developing around them, as witness what is happening in Cambridge. There is a whole environment of student-related or ex-students, or dropout students.

Chairman PROXMIRE. The same thing at Madison.

Mr. AHERN. Madison is another; Lawrence, Kans.; Berkeley. They are very closely related to the student body, have tremendous influence with them, are maybe involved in the drug culture, are avant garde if not radical, extremists. They have a tremendous influence on that student body, irrespective of who may be a student.

That is the world you are going to have to deal in, I am afraid.

Chairman PROXMIRE. What needs to be done to equip our law-enforcement people to deal with this kind of campus violence?

Mr. AHERN. I really think if a department has not the philosophy and if a department is not convinced that their obligation is to protect the right of dissent—and that may be a long time coming in some cities—there is not very much you can do to respond to just that particular problem, because it is only one of the problems that police departments face. I think police departments have to see themselves as the referee in these kinds of things and not get emotionally involved, and certainly not get politically or philosophically involved. They are there to protect the right of dissent, and the whole politics of confrontation involves that confrontation, involves that physical act that radicalizes the crowd.

There is no question that people move to these crowds and move through the dissenting process to bring it to a violent stage. Many times police departments have played the willing role in this. I personally think that it can be avoided. But once a policeman sets foot—once that crisis exists on campus and the first policeman has to go on, all the sins of the system come to bear on that.

All the neglect of police departments, all the lousy training or lack of training, all the lack of good skills and talent, all the lack of planning will come to bear on that. And police departments really do not handle them very well.

That is why I think it is important not to address yourself just to unrest on campus. It is also unrest in cities. We live in a tense period. Urban centers are very explosive places, given hot summer nights. You have to deal with those kinds of scenes and do it on a long-term basis.

I do not think, for instance, that sending policemen in, in lockstep fashion or any kind of tinkering thing is going to handle it.

Chairman PROXMIRE. What role can the Federal Government play in this sort of thing? Do you think the State and local authorities can be left to handle it by themselves, or is there anything the Federal Government can do assist them?

Mr. AHERN. I think LEAA, not to harp on that again, but through LEAA to encourage new systems, get new talent into police departments, to encourage some kind of national curriculum for effective training of police departments that is applicable all over.

Chairman PROXMIRE. And relates to campus violence.

Mr. AHERN. Not necessarily campus violence.

Chairman PROXMIRE. That is what I am thinking about right now.

Mr. AHERN. A well-trained, balanced police officer, if he handles things well in the city, he will intuitively handle it well on campus.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You think as far as the Federal Government is concerned, it is a matter of action to improve police activities generally, rather than in one area?

Mr. AHERN. It is to encourage police departments to operate in a professional, impartial, fair, and objective manner.

Chairman PROXMIRE. How about the President's decision of yesterday to request Congress for authority to hire a thousand additional FBI agents, most of whom, presumably—some for hijackers, yes, but most of whom would be used to combat campus violence and be kept

to move in wherever Federal property is involved, which would cover almost every big institution, whether urged to do so or invited by the institution to do so or not.

Do you approve of this action, or not?

Mr. AHERN. I have no problem. The FBI is very intricately involved in almost every bombing. Most of their intelligence, most of their information is through the police departments.

Chairman PROXMIRE. This is bombing, arson, terrorist activities.

Mr. AHERN. That is very broad. I would like to see that defined. I am not sure what terrorist activity is or what arson is. There is an awful lot of arson in cities today, some of it because of the racial scene, some of it just because it is good business to commit arson. If you have a failing business, there is a good deal of that, too.

If they would take over that vice, it would be a great support for me.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I am talking about the university problem.

Mr. AHERN. I realize that.

I have no problem with Federal support in those investigations. I would make the point that I think it has been there, and it is very easy to find a jurisdictional way of getting Federal agencies to come in, the way they did in Madison—a piece of Federal property is involved, so you can ask for assistance in it.

They have cooperated in those investigations, and they do, with their laboratory, give technical assistance to the local departments. It is just six of one and a half dozen of the other. They just do it in a more overt way and take complete jurisdiction when it comes to that kind of investigation on campus.

I have a question about the effectiveness and the need, but I have no problem with it.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Mr. Blumstein, do you have any comment on it?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. No, sir.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do you have any position on the President's proposal, one way or the other?

Mr. BLUMSTEIN. No. I have not seen the proposal.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Gentlemen, thank you for a most interesting and informative morning. You have given excellent statements and have been most responsive to these questions.

The subcommittee will stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair. We expect to hear from the Attorney General later.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

MONDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1970

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT
OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee on Economy in Government met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-407, the Capitol, Hon. William Proxmire (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Proxmire and Representative Conable.

Also present: John R. Stark, executive director; Courtenay M. Slater, economist; and George D. Krumbhaar, economist for the minority.

Chairman PROXMIRE. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning we are resuming our hearings on the effectiveness of the American criminal justice system. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which was established under the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, is the principal focus of Federal efforts to improve the criminal justice system. This new law enforcement assistance program holds great promise because it provides an opportunity to look at the criminal justice system as a whole, rather than to look only individually at police, at courts, and at prisons as if they were separate and unrelated institutions.

Furthermore, the new authorizing legislation which passed the Senate last week will make substantial financial resources available for the programs administered by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

In view of the promise offered by this new program for crime control and law enforcement, and of the funds being made available to it, the testimony this subcommittee has heard from previous witnesses at these hearings has been most disturbing. These witnesses, who were persons experienced in the administration of various components of the criminal justice system, have told us that the comprehensive planning process is not working well; that we have too few persons trained to do this planning, and an inadequate allocation of funds for planning. They have told us that the police, although they are being helped to buy additional equipment, are not getting the help they need and want with research, with improved management techniques, with education. We have heard the police education programs severely criticized.

We have been told that our courts are so antiquated and overloaded that they scarcely function at all, and that little is being done to improve their functioning. We have been told that the juvenile court system functions even less well than the adult courts, and that Federal

programs for the prevention of juvenile delinquency have "not gotten off dead center."

Our witness this morning is Mr. Richard Velde, Associate Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Mr. Velde, particularly in view of the fact that the office of administrator of your agency is currently vacant, you bear quite a heavy responsibility for the development and execution of new and innovative programs of law enforcement assistance. We are grateful that you could arrange to meet with the subcommittee this morning, and we are anxious to explore with you the directions that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration is going to be taking. We also want to ask what further responsibilities we in Congress may have for helping to build a really effective law enforcement program.

Mr. Velde, go right ahead.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD W. VELDE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACCOMPANIED BY DANIEL L. SKOLER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS, LEAA; AND PAUL L. WOODARD, GENERAL COUNSEL, LEAA

Mr. VELDE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have accompanying me this morning, on my left, Mr. Daniel L. Skoler, who heads our Office of Law Enforcement Programs, and our general counsel, Mr. Paul L. Woodard.

Mr. Chairman, I have a rather lengthy prepared statement.

Chairman PROXMIRE. May I say that if you want to abbreviate the prepared statement or summarize it in any way, the entire prepared statement will be printed in full in the record.

Mr. VELDE. All right. With your permission, I shall just briefly highlight the contents of the prepared statement and then be pleased to respond to any questions or receive any comments you may have.

We appreciate this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee today to discuss the program of LEAA. Since its beginning slightly more than 2 years ago, LEAA has been the object of intense interest and considerable scrutiny, by both the public and private sectors.

Such attention is not only proper, but in a sense it is mandatory. Part of the reason is that LEAA awards in grants, and contracts, large amounts of funds. They are public funds, and the public has a right to know whether they are judiciously used and whether maximum value is extracted from every dollar.

But there is another reason, and it may be even more important. LEAA was created by Congress to provide financial and technical assistance to help improve the Nation's entire criminal justice system at the State and local level. The reduction of crime and the improvement of law enforcement comprise one of the Nation's most urgent domestic priorities. It is a demanding and complex task. It also is one of considerable sensitivity, because the rights of people are involved—the rights of our citizens to be free from crime and the fear of crime, the rights of the people to be properly served by their criminal justice system, the rights of those who are defendants or convicted offenders to be treated fairly and humanely.

The Nation's criminal justice system has long been in a state of disrepair, in large measure because there has been deep apathy on the part of both the public and public officials for decades. That apathy is ending, as it should, for lasting improvements in crime control can be fashioned only if there is deep-rooted and broad commitment to the enormous task of making this society safe and just for all of its citizens.

During the past 2 years there has been both interest in and study of the LEAA program by the general public, public service organizations, public officials and their organizations, criminal justice officials, and the Congress. We not only welcome all scrutiny and criticism of the LEAA program, but we encourage it as well. In addition, we pay attention.

Your subcommittee, in inviting me to testify today, indicated it had questions involving a number of the areas embraced by LEAA's operations. I am pleased to respond and attempt to answer all of the questions—some in this prepared statement, others in the questions and answers you indicated would follow my formal remarks.

To put the total LEAA program in perspective, I think it is important to note that the first year budget, for fiscal year 1969, was only \$63 million—certainly not enough to meet the needs of all parts of the criminal justice system across the country, no matter how these funds were stretched. In addition, it should be remembered that this program began from scratch in fiscal year 1969. Every State had to create a State planning agency, and then work in cooperation with its city and county governments, first, to draft statewide criminal justice improvement programs, and then to implement them. When we consider this had to be done in every State, in a matter of months, it is clear it was a complex and demanding task. It also must be stressed that these things were accomplished, and the nationwide crime control program became a reality in its first year of operations.

In addition, fiscal year 1969 was the year in which several months passed before administrators were appointed and LEAA actually went into operation. We have never denied that this late start caused problems. We have never denied that because the police were equipped to make immediate requests they often received a larger share of their State's grant money from the State planning agencies than might have been the case had the council been operating for longer, had more experience or had more time. We have never denied that other areas such as corrections and courts posed more difficult problems for criminal justice planners and were slower in seeking funds. We have never denied the fact that a large number of cities were very slow to request funds from their State councils and, therefore, received inadequate funding, even though they often got everything they asked for. We have never denied that those problems existed—but we set out vigorously to correct them by the end of fiscal year 1969.

We believe we made substantial progress in fiscal year 1970 in dealing with those problems. Fiscal year 1970 was not only the first full year of operation for LEAA, but was also a year during which our funding level was more than four times as great as in that first difficult year—a total of \$268 million. In fact, as far as action grants are concerned, fiscal year 1970 funding was more than seven times greater than fiscal year 1969—\$215 million compared to \$29 million. We would

be the first to admit that fiscal year 1969 funding, no matter how carefully distributed, was grossly inadequate when compared to the Nation's criminal justice needs.

It has been alleged that the vast bulk of LEAA's funds have gone for police, with corrections and juvenile programs being virtually ignored. But for fiscal 1970, nothing could be farther from the truth. Far from ignoring corrections, during fiscal 1970 LEAA made improvement in the corrections area its major priority. The result, we feel, was an outstanding success. The facts are:

In fiscal 1970 we doubled the percentage of State block action grants devoted to corrections programs, from 13.5 percent to over 27 percent.

In dollar terms that improvement was even more striking. We estimate that as a result of later reprogramming, States may have devoted only about \$2 million of fiscal 1969 funds to corrections programs. In fiscal 1970, if discretionary funding, technical assistance and corrections-related programs such as juvenile delinquency prevention are included, the total spending for corrections programs was more than \$68 million, more than 30 times the amount actually expended in fiscal 1969.

LEAA has a great concern about juvenile delinquency programs. We are proud of the fact that of the \$68 million total for corrections programs, some \$33 million went to fund various juvenile delinquency programs, substantially more than the total amount of money distributed to States in block action grants for all programs during the preceding fiscal year.

We are concerned over recidivism, for our corrections institutions simply do not correct. LEAA thus has put great emphasis on community-based programs to rehabilitate offenders, to get them back into the community as quickly as possible in a constructive manner. Of that \$68 million for corrections-related programs in fiscal 1970, some \$22 million went for these various types of community-based corrections programs.

Last November, President Nixon directed Attorney General Mitchell to move immediately to mobilize Federal resources to improve the national corrections situation. Corrections in the United States today is inhumane, it is a national disgrace and also many corrections institutions breed crime instead of rehabilitating prisoners. I am particularly proud of LEAA's record in corrections in fiscal 1970. Really, this is only a beginning. There is much work that remains to be done. But I think we have certainly met our obligations head on, and I believe the corrections improvement program funded by LEAA in fiscal 1970 represents an outstanding achievement in that year.

Total Federal, State, and local expenditures for the criminal justice system in the United States are estimated at roughly \$6.5 billion. Of this amount it has been estimated that roughly two-thirds, 67 percent, goes to the police. Against that 67 percent figure nationwide, I believe that the 51 percent and 31 percent police program expenditure levels for LEAA in fiscal 1970 substantially refute any charge that LEAA overemphasizes police programs. In fact, Mr. Chairman, we have recently been criticized because not enough of our money is going to police programs. So, we are sort of damned if we do and damned if we do not in this regard.

In our annual report we published a table showing that the 15 cities with the highest crime index in the United States had, on the average, only about 44 percent of the crime in their State and received, on the average, only about 28 percent of the State block action grants distributed by the State councils to the communities in their States. Those were fiscal 1969 figures, and we all agree were not good enough. Since the States have not distributed all of their fiscal 1970 money, comparable figures for this past year, based upon actual subgrant allocations, are not yet available.

I think it is important, however, to point out that a number of cities which did not receive adequate funding did not receive it because they did not ask for it. A great deal was heard last spring about the city in Indiana which received only a Polaroid camera and fingerprint kit. The simple fact is that at the time this charge was made public, that was all the city had asked for.

Further, city requests are often in the police area, since this is where they most frequently feel the pinch. Corrections programs are almost always operated at the State or county level. Therefore, if LEAA State block action grant money is spent on corrections, while the cities may receive the principal benefits, LEAA corrections money would generally not go directly to those cities.

LEAA considers adequate funds to the cities vitally important. Apart from urging State criminal justice councils to make this a matter of primary concern, LEAA set aside \$11 million—more than a third of its total discretionary funds for the last fiscal year—solely for programs to help the large cities. Even in cases where direct funds had been given to cities through LEAA discretionary grants, some projects were still not started at the local level after 6 months. LEAA technical assistance efforts are available to cities on request. Furthermore, we recently made an award of almost a quarter of a million dollars to the League of Cities and the Conference of Mayors to help find ways in which the Nation's largest cities can take advantage of the opportunities available to them under LEAA programs.

Recently, Mr. Chairman, we completed the last of three conferences in which representatives, in most cases either the Mayor or the Mayor's executive assistant and the chief of police, of the Nation's 30 largest cities have met in small groups with our staff to get them more involved in the program. The last of these meetings was held just last Friday in San Francisco where the 10 largest western cities participated in this program. These are really the first of a series of year-long conferences and meetings to get the larger cities more directly involved.

We have managed, in less than 2 years, to create and coordinate a nationwide criminal justice planning system, which has mounted a comprehensive attack on crime in every State and every major city in the United States. Certainly, it will be some time before the results can be seen, but we believe the promptness with which this program took hold, and the breadth of response, compares favorably with almost any other Federal grant program.

It has been alleged that LEAA has failed to exert proper leadership in the crime control area. But if anyone thinks that the share of action grants devoted to corrections was doubled without leadership from Washington they simply do not understand how State criminal

justice programs operate. Striking evidence of LEAA leadership can be seen by comparing the fiscal 1969 plans submitted by all the State agencies with the fiscal 1970 plans. It is not merely that the 1970 plans are more sophisticated. They are far more detailed, far more specific, far more comprehensive, far more integrated and show far more insight than in 1969. At the same time, there is room for increased LEAA leadership in the future, and we intended to provide it. It must be remembered that the overwhelming intent of Congress is that the Federal Government be a partner, not a dictator, in assisting States and local governments in improving law enforcement.

Critics often have completely ignored important parts of the LEAA program—including the discretionary grant program, the academic assistance program, and the research program carried out by LEAA's National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. During fiscal 1970, funds for those areas totaled some \$60 million—more than twice the amount of money spent in fiscal 1969 on the entire block action grant program.

Mr. Chairman, I have also made available for the committee's files copies of LEAA's second annual report, which covers our program in great detail.

Some of those who have examined the LEAA program seem to forget what the Congress said in creating the new national crime control program. Congress decided, first of all, that law enforcement is and must be primarily a local and State responsibility. Congress declared that the LEAA program is not one where the Federal Government implants its will on law enforcement throughout the country or begins development of a Federal police force. Rather, the LEAA program is designed to give financial and technical assistance to State and local governments. It is up to those State and local governments to not only contribute much of the money for improvement programs, but bear the overwhelming burden of work as well.

The LEAA program is basically a block grant program. State and local governments set their own priorities and develop their own programs. Then each State receives a block action grant to carry out its statewide improvement program, and, of course, by statute 75 percent of these funds must be made available to units of local government. This is truly a partnership program. We work cooperatively with State and local governments to develop programs and program directions, we feel, are important—as in the area of corrections, as I cited earlier. But we do not dictate to State and local governments, and anybody who thinks we should had better go back and read the legislative history of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Congress did not intend this to be a program of Federal dictation. And, as you know, Mr. Chairman, Congress recently, last week, as a matter of fact, in the Senate, reemphasized that this was the direction in which it wanted the LEAA program to go because attempts to modify the block grant concept were overwhelmingly rejected.

Concern also has been voiced that planning funds have been inadequate thus far in the program. All of the planning funds are given to the States in block grants, based upon population. However, as you know, there is a floor that assures that each State, no matter how small, gets a minimum of \$100,000 in planning funds each year. States use these funds, in cooperation with their units of local government, to

help draft and implement statewide law enforcement improvement programs and to help pay administrative costs of the State planning agencies. In the first year of the LEAA program, planning grants totaled \$19 million, compared to \$25 million for block action grants. In fiscal 1970, planning grants were \$21 million, compared to \$182 million in block action funds. Our budget for fiscal 1971 calls for \$26 million in planning funds and some \$350 million for block action grants. We feel that the planning funds are adequate so far. Planning is of great importance, but a good base already has been created and the funds proposed appear to be adequate to continue the work, as far as we are able to determine.

In many ways, police and courts and corrections all are still operating in the 19th century. We must bring them fully into the 20th century, and enable them to use the benefits of science and technology. Three basic elements are needed for intelligent research and development: First, there must be a solid, broad base of research projects that is built on a master plan of long-range goals, and in our case this is being done in cooperation with the States; second, there must be great emphasis on technology transfer, applying to criminal justice needs the techniques and equipment and know-how already developed by private industry, the space program, and the Department of Defense; and third, there must be impartial evaluations of the state of the criminal justice system today, its needs, and what is being done to meet them.

The Federal Government is a late starter in regard to criminal justice research, both in terms of money and years. To cite only one example, the Department of Agriculture has been conducting agricultural research since 1862—the year that agency was created. Even before that—as far back as 1828—the old Patent Office conducted agricultural research. This fiscal year the Agriculture Department's pending budget request contains \$255.2 million for research, and since 1862 it has spent \$4 billion on research activity. That research and development has been a key factor in this Nation's incredible productivity in foodstuffs. Research for criminal justice—properly funded and directed—could provide comparable results, and I believe it could be done in a fairly short time.

To develop sound improvement programs, we need sound planning programs. But to develop sound planning, we need comprehensive and reliable information and statistics on every part of the criminal justice system. Today, that information simply does not exist on a national scale. Recordkeeping is fragmented, at best, and not uniform. Some cities and States keep good records, but only on some portions of the system. Others collect and keep hardly any reliable data at all. We do not even know for sure how much crime there is, or how many ex-offenders commit new crimes after release from prison.

The uniform crime reports of the FBI represents the greatest advance to date in collecting information about crime. It is the best that exists. But its compilers are forced to rely on the reports submitted by cooperative police departments—and many departments do not report all the necessary information or do not participate in the program in any respect.

What is the cost of crime to victims? The cost of prevention and control? We must know in order to measure—in dollars—the value of various anticrime efforts.

How many offenders are repeaters and what is the frequency? What are the correlations between such factors as age, seriousness of crime, length of sentence? We must know so we may make sound decisions about rehabilitation programs.

Today, unfortunately, there is such a dearth of information that no one knows the aggregate expenditures for criminal justice activities in this country. Few State law enforcement officials can say positively how many jails are in their States. Courts do not have data on the amount of time required to process criminal cases, average sentences, or even on their own personnel.

To develop a sound, nationwide criminal justice data system we have created the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service in LEAA. LEAA is developing programs to create or improve information and statistics gathering. The agency has done this by earmarking substantial portions of its discretionary action funds for such programs, and by creating the Information and Statistics Service (NCJISS), which was established last year. This was a million dollar program in fiscal 1970, and this year its requested budget is \$4 million. NCJISS helps States and local communities develop statistical systems and it guides the States in using computer and information systems. In essence, it is providing the national leadership that has been critically needed in this area.

Mr. Chairman, I have attempted in this statement to discuss candidly many of the criticisms that have been raised about LEAA and to discuss a number of key parts of the program which often are overlooked. I would now be pleased to answer any questions.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Velde follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD W. VELDE

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee today to discuss the program of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

Since its beginning slightly more than two years ago, LEAA has been the object of intense interest and considerable scrutiny, by both the public and private sectors.

Such attention is not only proper, but in a sense it is mandatory. Part of the reason is that LEAA awards in grants and contracts large amounts of funds. They are public funds, and the public has a right to know whether they are judiciously used and whether maximum value is extracted from every dollar.

But there is another reason, and it may be even more important. LEAA was created by Congress to provide financial and technical assistance to help improve the nation's entire criminal justice system at the state and local level. The reduction of crime and the improvement of law enforcement comprise one of the nation's most urgent domestic priorities.

It is a demanding and complex task. It also is one of considerable sensitivity, because the rights of people are involved—the rights of our citizens to be free from crime and the fear of crime, the rights of the people to be properly served by their criminal justice system, the rights of those who are defendants or convicted offenders to be treated fairly and humanely.

The nation's criminal justice system has long been in a state of disrepair, in large measure because there has been deep apathy on the part of both the public and public officials for decades. That apathy is ending, as it should, for lasting improvements in crime control can be fashioned only if there is deep-rooted and broad commitment to the enormous task of making this society safe and just for all of its citizens.

During the past two years, there has been both interest in and study of the LEAA program by the general public, public service organizations, public officials and their organizations, criminal justice officials, and the Congress. We not only welcome all scrutiny and criticisms of the LEAA program, but we encourage it as well. In addition, we pay attention.

Your Subcommittee, in inviting me to testify today, indicated it had questions involving a number of the areas embraced by LEAA's operations. I am pleased to respond and to answer all of the questions—some in this prepared statement, others in the questions and answers you indicated would follow my formal remarks.

Because of your Subcommittee's interest in LEAA, we have given considerable thought on how to best relay to you the facts about the crime control program and how to convey our views on those areas which seem of greatest significance.

With your permission, I would like to deal, in part, with a number of criticisms that have been made of the LEAA program.

It has been alleged, for instance, that block grants to the states were being dissipated because LEAA had not assumed a leadership role in guiding expenditures; LEAA had allowed too much money to be spent on police programs; states involved the community to a very small extent in preparation and development of programs to reduce crime. While we welcome criticisms, we feel those conclusions are inaccurate.

To put the total LEAA program in perspective, I think it is important to note that the first year budget, for fiscal 1969, was only \$63 million—certainly not enough to meet the needs of all parts of the criminal justice system across the country, no matter how it was stretched. In addition, it should be remembered that this program began from scratch in fiscal 1969. Every state had to create a state planning agency, and then work in cooperation with its city and county governments to first draft statewide criminal justice improvement programs and then to implement them. When we consider this had to be done in every state, in a matter of months, it is clear it was a complex and demanding task. It also must be stressed that these things were accomplished and the nationwide crime control program became a reality in its first year of operations.

In addition, fiscal 1969 was the year in which several months passed before Administrators were appointed and LEAA actually went into operation. We have never denied that this late start caused problems. We have never denied that because the police were equipped to make immediate requests they often received a larger share of their state's grant money from the state planning council than might have been the case had the council been operating for longer, had more experience or had more time. We never denied that other areas such as corrections and courts posed more difficult problems for criminal justice planners and were slower in seeking funds. We never denied the fact that a number of large cities were very slow to request funds from their state councils and therefore received inadequate funding, even though they often got everything they asked for. We never denied those problems existed—but we set out vigorously to correct them at the end of fiscal 1969.

We believe we made substantial progress in fiscal 1970 in dealing with those problems. Fiscal 1970 was not only the first full year of operation for LEAA, but also was a year during which our funding level was more than four times as great as in that first difficult year—a total of \$268 million. In fact, as far as action grants are concerned, fiscal 1970 funding was nearly seven times as great as fiscal 1969—\$215 million compared to \$29 million. We would be the first to admit that fiscal 1969 funding, no matter how carefully distributed, was grossly inadequate when compared to the nation's criminal justice needs.

It has been alleged that the vast bulk of LEAA's funds have gone for police, corrections and juvenile programs being virtually ignored. But for fiscal 1970, nothing could be farther from the truth. Far from ignoring corrections, during fiscal 1970, LEAA made improvement in the corrections area its major priority. The result we feel was an outstanding success. The facts are:

In fiscal 1970 we doubled the percentage of state block action grants devoted to corrections programs, from 13.5 percent to 27 percent.

In dollar terms that improvement was even more striking. We estimate that as a result of later re-programming, states may have devoted only \$2 million of fiscal 1969 funds to corrections programs. In fiscal 1970, if discretionary funding, technical assistance and corrections-related programs such as juvenile delinquency prevention are included, the total spending for corrections programs was more than \$68 million, more than 30 times the amount in fiscal 1969.

LEAA has a great concern about juvenile delinquency programs. We're proud of the fact that of that \$68 million total, some \$33 million went to fund various delinquency programs, substantially more than the total amount of money distributed in block action grants to states during fiscal 1969.

We are concerned over recidivism, for our corrections institutions simply don't correct. LEAA thus has put great emphasis on community-based programs to

rehabilitate offenders, to get them back into the community as quickly as possible in a constructive way. Of that \$68 million for corrections-related programs in fiscal 1970, some \$22 million went for these various types of community-based corrections programs.

Last November, President Nixon directed Attorney General Mitchell to move immediately to mobilize federal resources to improve the national corrections situation. Corrections in the United States today is inhuman, it is a national disgrace and finally, I believe that many corrections institutions breed crime instead of rehabilitating prisoners. I am particularly proud of LEAA's record in corrections during fiscal 1970. There is much work that remains to be done. But I think that we have certainly met our obligations head on, and I believe that the corrections improvement program funded by LEAA in fiscal 1970 represents our outstanding achievement in that year.

Police programs occupied a large share of the money spent by states from their block action grants during fiscal 1969. This was the result of a number of factors including the very short time for preparation of grant requests, the fact that planning agencies were just getting organized and the fact that the police were probably better equipped than any other area to make specific requests. As a result some 75 percent of the state block action money in fiscal 1969 went for police programs.

However, it is very significant that during fiscal 1970 the percentage fell from 75 to 51 percent of state block action grant money devoted to police programs. That drop was directly the result of our emphasis on corrections as well as other factors. This year, fiscal 1971, we intend to emphasize court programs without letting up our pressure on corrections and so it's quite possible that the police share of state block action grant money might fall even lower.

Let me also stress that those figures do not include discretionary action grants—one of the best measures of LEAA leadership since LEAA itself determines how this money will be spent. In fiscal 1970, police programs accounted for only 31 percent of the \$32 million LEAA distributed in discretionary grants.

Total federal, state and local expenditures for the criminal justice system in the United States are estimated at roughly \$6.5 billion. Of this amount it has been estimated that roughly 67 percent goes to the police. Against that 67 percent figure nationwide, I believe that the 51 percent and 31 percent police program expenditure levels for LEAA in fiscal 1970 substantially refute any charge that LEAA overemphasizes police programs.

At the same time, LEAA certainly is not downgrading the importance of police, or ignoring their needs. We are well aware that police are the most important means of curbing crime, and as such have responsibility for performing a major service in the community. We are working with the police to develop programs which will provide real improvement and innovation. In the fiscal 1970 plans, for instance, less than 25 percent of the police program block action money was earmarked by the states for equipment purchases—and more than half of that was for communications equipment.

It has been alleged that LEAA has given inadequate attention to the needs of cities with urgent crime problems. This committee has received testimony earlier from a distinguished police chief in which an eloquent plea was made for more funds for police equipment and training. I can assure this committee that LEAA and the states will continue to be responsive to these basic needs.

There have been problems in the crime control program. No nationwide effort in a field as complex as criminal justice could escape having some difficulties. But we have been aware of them and have moved promptly to resolve them. We have shared the concern that large cities with urgent crime problems might not receive enough action funds from state block grants, for fighting crime in the cities is a priority. Preliminary results of the fiscal 1969 expenditures of block grants indicate that 60 percent of all action funds distributed by states to local government went to the nation's 411 cities of over 50,000 population. Those 411 cities contain less than 40 percent of the nation's population and about 62 percent of its serious crimes. Fund usage was running in nearly direct proportion to incidence of crime. It must be noted that the 60 percent figure includes only direct grants to cities and counties. The percentage would be larger if it included programs funded separately which are of substantial benefit to cities—for instance, programs to improve corrections and courts, which normally are operated by states but into which the cities send the bulk of offenders. There have been instances of inadequate participation by large cities. In some instances, states did not move quickly enough in sub-granting funds, but this is being resolved. In other instances, cities themselves did not take needed initia-

tives, but we are taking special efforts to help them become fully involved. Most of the criticism of large cities stemmed from the funds they received from the fiscal 1969 budget—which was only \$63 million and included only \$25 million in block action grants. That was not enough to satisfy the needs of anybody, no matter how it was stretched.

With the much larger budgets of last year and this year, we are confident the needs of the cities will be met adequately. Some responsibility for delay must also be borne by the federal government. No implementing agency was established by the prior administration until four months after the Safe Streets Act became law.

In our own Annual Report we published a table showing that the 15 cities with the highest crime index in the United States had, on the average, only about 44 percent of the crime in their state and received, on the average, only about 28 percent of the state block action grants distributed by the state councils to the communities in their states. Those were fiscal 1969 figures, and we all agree they are not good enough. Since the states have not distributed all their fiscal 1970 money, comparable figures for last year are not yet available.

I think it is important, however, to point out that a number of the cities which did not receive adequate funding did not receive it because they did not ask for it. A great deal was heard last Spring about the city in Indiana which received only a polaroid camera and a fingerprint kit. The simple fact is that at the time this was made public, that was all the city had asked for.

Furthermore, city requests are often in the police area, since this is where they most frequently feel the pinch. Corrections programs are almost always state or country run. Therefore, if LEAA state block action grant money is spent on corrections, while the cities may receive the principal benefits, LEAA corrections money would not go directly to those cities.

LEAA considers adequate funds to the cities very important. Apart from urging state criminal justice councils to make this a matter of primary concern, LEAA set aside \$11 million—more than a third of its total discretionary funds for fiscal 1970—solely for programs to help the large cities. Even in cases where direct funds had been given to cities through LEAA discretionary grants, some projects were still not started at the local level after six months. LEAA technical assistance efforts are available to cities on request. Furthermore, we recently made an award of almost a quarter of a million dollars to the League of Cities and the Conference of Mayors to find ways to help the nation's largest cities take advantage of the opportunities available to them under LEAA programs.

We have managed, in less than two years, to create and coordinate a nationwide criminal justice planning system, which has mounted a comprehensive attack on crime in every state and every major city in the United States. Certainly it will be some time before the results can be seen, but we believe the promptness with which this program took hold, and the breadth of response, compares favorably with almost any other federal grant program.

It has been alleged that LEAA has failed to exert proper leadership in the crime control program. But if anyone thinks that the share of action grants devoted to corrections was doubled without leadership from Washington they simply don't understand how state criminal justice programs operate. Striking evidence of LEAA leadership can be seen by comparing the fiscal 1969 plans submitted by all the state agencies with the fiscal 1970 plans. It isn't merely that the 1970 plans are more sophisticated. They are far more detailed, far more specific, far more insightful, far more comprehensive, far more integrated. At the same time, there is room for increased LEAA leadership in the future, and we intend to take advantage of it.

It must be remembered that the intent of Congress and overwhelmingly so is that the Federal government be a partner not a dictator in assisting states and local governments in improving law enforcement.

Critics often have completely ignored important parts of the LEAA program—including the discretionary grant program, the academic assistance program and the research program carried out by LEAA's National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. During fiscal 1970, funds for those areas totalled approximately \$60 million—more than twice the amount of money spent in fiscal 1969 on the entire block action grant program.

During fiscal 1970:

LEAA made 426 discretionary grants totalling \$32 million (compared to 29 discretionary grants totalling \$4.2 million in fiscal 1969.)

LEAA for the first time had appropriations of \$1.2 million for technical assistance, of which more than a third, about \$410,000, went for technical assistance

in the area of corrections. Examples of other technical assistance expenditures included \$228,000 for preparation and dissemination of technical assistance materials on bombs, bomb threats and related police procedures; and \$128,000 to support a study of campus disorders.

LEAA spent \$18 million for academic assistance to help finance college studies for some 50,000 persons—some 43,000 criminal justice personnel, and 7,000 students preparing for criminal justice careers.

The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice used its appropriation of \$7.5 million to support more than 100 research and development projects in the areas of crime prevention, police operations, courts, prosecution, and prisoner rehabilitation.

During fiscal 1970, LEAA established the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service with an appropriation from Congress of \$1 million. One of the projects undertaken by the Service was Project SEARCH: a System for Electronic Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal Histories. This project involves 15 states in a cooperative effort to pool information on criminal histories by establishing computerized information systems connected to a central coordinating point.

I also would like to submit, for the Committee's record, a copy of LEAA's Annual Report for Fiscal 1970, which covers our program in great detail.

From this summary, I hope a more accurate perspective has emerged regarding a number of key points in the LEAA program. Much already has been accomplished, thanks in large measure to the untiring efforts of state planning agencies and both criminal justice personnel and public officials at the local and state levels. However, much remains to be done. We cannot be content until the crime rates begin to drop. And not even then, for crime must be reduced to the absolute minimum, and we must greatly enhance the efficiency and fairness of the entire criminal justice system.

It is impossible to predict when crime rates might begin to decline nationally. But I believe that day will come, perhaps sooner than many of us suspect. Let me cite one example of what a dedicated, progressive police department can accomplish. Washington, D.C., recently reported a substantial reduction in its monthly crime rate—the first one in more than four years. Metropolitan Police Chief Wilson gave most of the credit for this reduction to two programs, increasing the number of police on the street and the use of methadone to control drug addiction. LEAA last year gave the District some \$2 million—more than twice its total block action grant—solely to help fund these two important programs.

Some who have examined LEAA have criticized the fact so much of LEAA's action funds have gone for police programs. I have tried to make it clear that the LEAA program is dealing with the comprehensive improvement of the entire criminal justice system, and is making every effort to make certain that this mandate of Congress is carried out so that police, courts, and corrections have their proper share of funds.

But I would like to take a moment to discuss those criticisms of aid to police. For the most part, the criticisms have been broad-gauge—too much money has gone for police, and there is always the implication that the bulk of police funds have gone for equipment.

The police comprise the overwhelming bulk of the criminal justice system. Their needs are enormous. In addition, they comprise the first line of efforts in crime prevention and crime reduction. It will do little lasting good to improve the fairness and efficiency of the courts and the rehabilitation efforts of corrections if we fail to give police the aid they need to prevent more crime and apprehend more suspects.

The critics often overlook the fact that aid for police involves a variety of vital programs. Equipment certainly is important—and an examination of equipment purchases shows heavy emphasis on communications equipment. This type of gear, as well as other kinds of equipment, is designed to permit police to respond faster and more efficiently to crime, and to protect the lives of policemen.

Studies have shown, for instance, that the faster police arrive at the scene of a crime, the greater chance they have of solving it. Heavy emphasis has been placed by police on training—from the rookie through the patrolman through the middle and upper-level command ranks. The training will not only make police more effective, it will make them fairer in their contacts with citizens. Emphasis has been placed on prevention and control of civil disorders—with prevention programs and training of personnel as priorities. Development of better relations with minority groups has also been given major attention, both through disorders

prevention campaigns and through enhanced police-community relations programs. Organized crime control is another area of prime concern. Organized crime is not only a law enforcement problem, but in ghetto areas is a civil rights problem as well—for organized crime preys on the poor and disadvantaged.

Some of those who have examined the LEAA program seem to forget what the Congress said in creating the new national crime control program. Congress decided, first of all, that law enforcement is and must be primarily a local and state responsibility. Congress decided that the LEAA program is not one where the federal government implants its will on law enforcement throughout the country or begins development of a federal police force. Rather, the LEAA program is designed to give financial and technical assistance to state and local governments. It is up to those state and local governments to not only contribute much of the money for improvement programs, but bear the overwhelming burden of work as well.

The LEAA program is basically a block grant program. State and local governments set their own priorities, develop their own programs. Then each state receives a block action grant to carry out its statewide improvement plan, and gives most of the block grant funds to its local units of government. This is a partnership program. We work cooperatively with state and local governments to develop programs and program directions we feel are important—as in the area of corrections, as I cited earlier. But we do not dictate to state and local governments, and anybody who thinks we should had better go back and read Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Congress did not intend this to be a program of Federal dictation.

Concern also has been voiced that planning funds have been inadequate thus far in the program. All of the planning funds are given to the states in block grants, based upon population. States use these funds, in cooperation with their units of local government, to help draft and implement statewide law enforcement improvement programs and to help pay administrative costs of the state planning agencies. In the first year of the LEAA program, planning grants totaled \$19 million, compared to \$25 million for block action grants. In fiscal 1970, planning grants were \$21 million, compared to \$182 million in block action funds. Our proposal for fiscal 1971 calls for \$26 million in planning funds, some \$350 million for block action grants. We feel the planning funds are adequate. Planning is of great importance, but a good base already has been created and the funds proposed are adequate to continue the work. I might add here that LEAA plans to request more funds for planning in fiscal 1972.

As I indicated earlier, we feel that plans submitted to LEAA so far have been generally of good quality. In the program's first year, it was something of a wonder that states were able to submit plans at all. Despite whatever other problems they may have had, the first-year plans were brutally candid in discussing shortcomings of the states' criminal justice systems. For fiscal 1970, we required the States to plan for more than one year—to begin development of long-range plans and goals. Generally, the long-range planning work was not as adequate as we felt it should have been. The third round of plans will be submitted to LEAA by next December 31. We have worked closely with the states to improve planning and we expect these next plans to be of uniformly high quality.

I would like to turn now to a discussion in some detail of two other important aspects of the LEAA program—The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, and the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service.

The National Institute is the research and development arm of LEAA. In fiscal 1970, the Institute had a budget of \$7.5 million, and Congress has appropriated the same amount for this year. We do not feel that is enough, but Congress has indicated that it will permit us to request re-programming of some funds if we feel they can be adequately utilized by the Institute this year.

In many ways, police and courts and corrections all are still operating in the 19th century. We must bring them fully into the 20th century, and enable them to use the benefits of science and technology. Three basic elements are needed for intelligent research and development: first, there must be a solid, broad base of research projects, being done in cooperation with the states, that are built on a master plan of long-range goals; second, there must be great emphasis on technology transfer, applying to criminal justice the techniques and equipment already developed by private industry, the space program, and the Department of Defense (it will do us no good to simply go on re-inventing the wheel); and third, there must be impartial evaluations of the state of the criminal justice system today, its needs, and what is being done to meet them.

The federal government is a late starter in regard to criminal justice research, both in terms of money and years. To cite only one example, the Department of Agriculture has been conducting agricultural research since 1862—the year the agency was created. Even before that—as far back as 1828—the old patent office conducted agricultural research. This fiscal year the Agriculture Department's pending budget request contains \$255.2 million for research, and since 1862 it has spent \$4 billion on research. That research and development has been a key factor in this nation's incredible productivity in foodstuffs. Research for criminal justice—properly funded and directed—could provide comparable results, and I believe it could be done in a fairly short time.

During the past fiscal year, the National Institute supported more than 100 research and development projects in the area of crime prevention, police operations, court procedures, and correctional methods.

One of the Institute's most promising efforts is the Pilot Cities Program, which emphasizes system-wide improvement of all criminal justice operations—police, courts, and corrections—in cities and metropolitan areas.

Pilot cities are being established throughout the country to test the impact of such across-the-board improvements. San Jose and Santa Clara County, California, and Dayton and Montgomery County, Ohio, are the first pilot sites selected for the program. Within the next two years, five additional municipalities will be selected. Eventually, one pilot program will be located in each of LEAA's seven regions.

There are several criteria for selecting pilot cities. One of the most important is size. The municipality must be large enough to have problems of street crime, drug addiction, drunkenness, and delinquency, yet small enough that a limited investment of LEAA funds can produce measurable improvement.

In each pilot city, a research team, in cooperation with law enforcement and community officials, studies criminal justice operations and identifies areas for improvement. A comprehensive group of action programs aimed at basic system-wide improvement is then designed and carried out. In this way, the pilot cities program will test the performance of the best criminal justice system that current knowledge and technology can offer.

LEAA's Office of Law Enforcement Programs is collaborating with the Institute on the program and is the principal source of funding for action programs. Nearly \$1 million in LEAA funds has gone to this program so far.

The Institute is sponsoring a number of projects to improve police capabilities. One priority is better police communications. We are well on our way to developing a small, reliable tranceiver radio which can provide communications for policemen away from the patrol car. The Institute has issued a request for proposals, and over 100 firms are competing for funding to build the best version, both technically and economically.

Other projects are developing robbery and burglary alarm systems linked directly to police communications centers.

Improvements in weapons systems have long been requested by many police officials. With Institute support, the International Association of Chiefs of Police has established a Police Weapons Center to conduct research and dissemination of information regarding police weapons—including non-lethal weapons. The Center will also provide information on bomb disposal equipment—one of a number of Institute projects designed to meet this growing threat to public safety. Other Institute efforts are being directed toward development of truly effective equipment and systems to locate, identify, neutralize and dispose of hidden explosive devices.

To help police control the wide-spread use of narcotics, the Institute is working on two projects to develop equipment capable of detecting hidden quantities of heroin.

The Institute's research efforts go beyond developing new equipment, however, crime prevention is a major focus of research supported by the Institute.

The University of California at Davis is using a \$148,121 grant to develop effective methods for preventing and controlling robbery, muggings, and other forms of attacks on the person. Other projects are studying ways to make residences and commercial establishments less susceptible to robbery, burglary, and vandalism. The theory behind these projects is that architectural and environmental design can enhance the security of homes and businesses.

In corrections and rehabilitation programs, the Institute has focused on such areas as prison architecture, work-release, and alternatives to incarceration.

Reducing court delay, which many experts view as a crucial element in controlling crime, is a primary aim of several Institute projects. Notre Dame Uni-

versity received \$200,000 for an operations research study of courts in Illinois and Indiana. To assist in the training of local prosecutors, the Institute granted \$290,000 to the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility to create special education programs in law schools and prosecutors' offices.

To develop sound improvement programs, we need sound planning programs. But to develop sound planning, we need comprehensive and reliable information and statistics on every part of the criminal justice system. Today, that information simply does not exist on a national scale. Record keeping is fragmented, at best, and not uniform. Some cities and states keep good records, but only on some portions of the system. Others keep hardly any reliable statistics. We don't even know for sure how much crime there is, or how many ex-offenders commit new crimes after release from prison.

The Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI represents the greatest advance to date in collecting information about crime. It is the best that exists. But it is forced to rely on the reports submitted to it by police departments—and some departments do not report all the necessary information, and many don't report at all.

What is the cost of crime to victims? The costs of prevention and control? We must know in order to measure—in dollars—the value of various anti-crime efforts.

How many offenders are repeaters and with what frequency? What are the correlations with such factors as age, seriousness of crime, length of sentence? We must know so we may make sound decisions about rehabilitation programs.

There is such a dearth of information that no one knows the aggregate expenditures for criminal justice activities in this country. Few state law enforcement officials can say positively how many jails are in their states. Courts do not have data about the amount of time required to process criminal cases, average sentences, or even on their own personnel.

To develop a sound, nation-wide criminal justice data system we have created the Information and Statistics Service in LEAA.

LEAA is spearheading programs to create or improve information and statistics gathering. The agency has done this by earmarking substantial portions of its discretionary action funds for such programs, and by creating the Information and Statistics Service (NCJISS), which was established last year. This was a million-dollar program in fiscal 1970, and its requested budget this year is \$4 million.

NCJISS helps states and local communities develop statistical systems and it guides the states in using computer and information systems. In essence, it is providing the national leadership that has been critically needed.

For example, NCJISS has begun pre-tests for a series of three surveys on crime victims. These surveys will examine the individual as a victim, businesses as victims, and governments as victims and will provide estimates on such matters as victims' characteristics, geographical distribution of crime, the number of crimes being committed.

As part of this effort, NCJISS is negotiating with the Census Bureau to include questions about victim experience in the Bureau's Quarterly Household Survey, conducted in January and July, 1971. If this is arranged, then this will be the first attempt to collect hard data on crime incidence at the national level. Then, in 1972, NCJISS expects to begin its extensive National Victimization Survey.

The important national survey of jails has just been completed and will soon be released. This survey report contains a wealth of information on jail facilities and prisoners.

Under another NCJISS project, the Census Bureau is preparing a directory of criminal justice agencies in the United States. The LEAA will publish this directory in March.

The LEAA has also arranged for the Census Bureau to expand its collection of statistics on criminal justice expenditures and employment. In December, when the Bureau publishes the annual compilation—*Employment and Expenditures in Criminal Justice for Fiscal 1969*—data on prosecution and indigent defense will be included for the first time.

The first step in LEAA's long range goal of developing national court statistics is a NCJISS survey of court organization. The initial phase will cover about 8,000 court systems in the nation—trial courts, courts of general jurisdiction, state appellate courts, courts of limited jurisdiction. An inter-agency agreement to conduct this survey is now pending; the LEAA expects to complete this agreement shortly so that it may begin the survey and finish it by the end of 1971.

The agency has already begun development of the first module of what will become a management information system for the LEAA itself. This is an important project for it will enable the LEAA to manage and monitor its rapidly growing grants-in-aid more effectively—not only improving the follow-through on individual grants but eliminating possible duplication or waste in the various grants.

The LEAA is establishing a criminal justice reference service. Among the information services now available there are wide gaps in coverage and in quality. LEAA's new service will be a service-oriented system filling the information needs of the entire law enforcement and criminal justice community—police, courts, corrections, prosecution, probation and parole. The National Institute has awarded a grant to George Washington University to define potential users and to assist in planning the new service. The University will complete this project in January.

NCJISS' statistical efforts figure importantly in the National Institute's pilot cities projects. The incidence of crime is being measured by NCJISS in these cities—a "before" and "after" project that will help determine the effectiveness of the demonstrations.

One of the most important LEAA efforts is encouraging the development of information systems which will serve the states' operational needs while providing—as a by-product—the required statistics. The LEAA surveyed the 50 states to assess the present status of existing systems, and will be guided by this data in further advising and assisting the states.

A number of prototype systems are being developed, for example, the public safety information sub-system in Long Beach, California, that is part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Municipal Information Systems Project.

The most significant of all such information system projects, of course, is Project SEARCH—System for the Electronic Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal Histories. SEARCH is designed to give criminal justice agencies needed information on offenders in a matter of seconds. It contains data on arrests, results of trials, prison sentences, etc. Using such a system, a state holding a suspect could query a central point, find out whether there is information on the person, and which state or states has it. The LEAA has thus far financed the project with some \$1.5 million. SEARCH is being demonstrated by the project states—a demonstration that will continue through December—and the preliminary evaluation indicates that every goal of the demonstration has either been met or exceeded. The 15 project states have made the decision to go operational. A system embracing all 50 states is essential.

In the SEARCH project, you see a cornerstone of information and statistics system for criminal justice. The development of this system is a landmark, auguring well for the future.

Mr. Chairman, I have attempted in this statement to discuss candidly many of the criticisms that have been raised about LEAA and to discuss a number of key parts of the program which often are overlooked. I would now be pleased to answer any questions.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Velde. We are concerned about this program for a number of reasons. You have detailed some of them in your statement. Another reason, of course, is because there is a rapidly expanding area of Federal expenditure, geometric in the way it has taken off. Maybe my figures are not quite correct because they just come off the top of my head from the debate we had last week, but it seems to me you said \$63 million in 1969, \$230 million in 1970—these are fiscal years—\$600 million in 1971, \$1.1 billion in 1972, \$1.7 billion in 1973. So, this is an increase from \$60 million to \$1.7 billion, a thirtyfold, 30 times as big a program in 5 years. Is that correct?

Mr. VELDE. Yes, sir. Let us discuss two areas. First, as far as authorizations are concerned—

Chairman PROXMIRE. Yes, I should say these are projections, these are authorizations and, of course, they are not always fully funded. I have some questions on what you are going to do about getting your funding a little later, but go ahead.

Mr. VELDE. As you know, the current authorization contained in title I carried us only through fiscal 1970 and that range of authorizations went from \$100 million for fiscal 1969 to \$300 million through fiscal 1970. There are amendments giving us spending authority for fiscal 1971 through fiscal 1973 pending in Congress. These have not yet been enacted into law, although both the Senate and the House have passed versions of the bill.

There is a discrepancy between the authorization amounts in the House and Senate versions, but, basically, it appears that we will have a minimum authorization of \$650 million for fiscal 1971, at least \$1 billion for fiscal 1972, although the Senate version is \$1.15 billion and for fiscal 1973 at least a billion and a half, although the Senate version is \$1.75 billion.

As for appropriations, fiscal 1969 was \$63 million. In fiscal 1970, this went up to \$268 million. And for fiscal 1971, Congress has already approved \$480 million and has sent this legislation to the President for signing into law. As you know, however, the program is not yet technically authorized.

So, whether you are looking at authorization numbers or appropriations figures, there is a dramatic and skyrocketing increase. But, of course, it must be pointed out, Mr. Chairman, that the needs of the criminal justice system are great, that there have been decades, in fact, centuries of neglect and apathy concerning these needs; so now we are paying the price for this apathy. I think the Federal Government somewhat belatedly is recognizing its responsibility in this area.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, I think that is true, but at the same time, you seem to concede in your statement, I think it is generally recognized, that the State and local governments expend the overwhelming amount of the funds and will continue to do so even under this big increase.

Mr. VELDE. That is correct.

Chairman PROXMIRE. And if there is one area of governmental responsibility which I think most people agree should be State and local, it is police protection. Almost everybody I know is against a national police force or a national police power or such national appropriations for law enforcement that the power would follow the dollars. It usually does. So, that the criticism that we got from previous witnesses seems to be very logical. What they were concerned about, they were very disturbed about the program. They think the program is working very badly because they feel the basic concept of the program had great promise but that it is not working out the way it was intended.

The general criticism is that the funds are not being used to provoke innovation and improvement but simply being used to ease the property tax burden in various States by providing funds from the Federal Government that can be used for law enforcement.

One witness said, and let me quote him:

I would encourage them (LEAA) to be sure that State planning agencies in awarding grants promote innovation, promote research, promote forward moves rather than support some past practices that are really horrible.

This, incidentally, was the chief of police in New Haven, Conn.

In fact, that is the way the money is being spent now, and it is being spent to reinforce the very worst things in the criminal justice system.

And as I say, he is a chief of police.

How do you see the purposes of the LEAA grant programs? Do you think they should encourage innovation? Should they serve as seed money or are they simply budget supplements for local agencies to spend anyway they see fit?

Mr. VELDE. Mr. Chairman, I think the answer is probably all three of those and more. Innovation and improvement are an important part of our program. But if you are operating with States, as we do, where there is no such thing as a minimum statewide standard for police recruit training, you have to attend to the basics first. If you are operating in a State, such as we are, where they let the judges in the State do their own typing, where they have no law books and no clerical support, then you have to attend to the basics first. If you are operating in a State where the main State institution is well over 100 years old and where there is no such thing as a statewide probation service at all, even on paper, to say nothing of actuality, then you have to attend to the basics first.

We support innovation to the extent that the States are able to try out the new. But for too many of the States the new is something that really should have been done 10, 20, 50, or even 100 years ago. You cannot move into the 21st century until you have first moved into the 20th century and, unfortunately, in too many cases there are basic and critical needs for such things as police equipment.

Let me give you an example: the State of Pennsylvania. The 1969 State plan for Pennsylvania identified 1,150 police departments in that State. The plan indicated that only 150 of those departments had any kind of communications capability other than the telephone. The 1970 comprehensive plan for Pennsylvania set forth a comprehensive program for statewide police communications. It also identified some 200 police departments that were not known to the State agency in 1969. In other words, it found 200 more police agencies.

So, sure, we encourage innovation and improvement. But we also are concerned with development of the basics as well. I certainly agree that we should move as far in the direction of innovation as we possibly can. But there is a long way to go, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman PROXMIER. Let me just ask one—try to tie this into one specific area that was perhaps the most disturbing thing that was disclosed, in my view. You talk about the great success or beginning success, at least, of the juvenile programs, concentration in this area. One of our witnesses told us of studies indicating that a 10-year-old boy now has about a 50-percent chance of being arrested sometime in his life for a nontraffic offense. For a black boy living in a city, his chance is believed to be greater than 90 percent. That is, the chances are almost 10 to 1 that he is going to have an arrest record to have to carry through life, and yet we have totally inadequate legal, social, psychiatric services to offer these young people we arrest. We mark them as deviants, give them a black mark which may stay with them all their lives, do nothing to help them, do nothing to increase their respect for law enforcement.

This seems to me a really shocking situation and a tremendous national program. Yet, I am having great difficulty finding out what, if any, Federal programs we have for youth development and delinquency prevention. The programs that were supposed to be established

in HEW, I gather, got very little funding and do not seem to exist in any significant sense. According to one of our earlier witnesses, the Department of Justice, "although it is trying to do a very good job in the delinquency field, is doing so with virtually no staff that has expertise in this area."

What do you see as the appropriate roles of the Department of Justice and HEW in this area? What kind and what amount of resources do you need and how should these resources be used? How do you go about coordinating your programs with those of HEW?

Mr. VELDE. I could almost give you a sermon in answer to that question, Mr. Chairman. It is a complex question with many facets. Let me see if I can identify briefly some of them for you.

There is a 1968 Juvenile Delinquency Act which was a companion piece of legislation to the Omnibus Crime Control Act, and, as you indicated, it is administered by HEW. It has been, I would say, frankly, grossly inadequately funded so far. I believe its appropriation this year is \$15 million. This is strictly a drop in the bucket in relation to the needs.

We have some appreciation of the need of improving the juvenile justice system because our comprehensive plans do have juvenile justice components in them. In fact, 42 of our State planning agencies also do planning under the 1968 Juvenile Delinquency Act, principally because there has not been funding under the Juvenile Delinquency Act to support separate planning activities. Also, we have encouraged joint activity, through a letter from the Attorney General and the Secretary of HEW, to improve coordination of the programs.

Now, as for LEAA's own juvenile program, I think the comment that we are inadequately staffed to deal with this program is an accurate one. It is sort of a side job of our Corrections Program Division. We do not presently have the staff to have a fully developed and comprehensive juvenile program. But having said that, I have indicated also that in 42 of the States our agencies do juvenile program planning.

Our best estimate for fiscal 1970 is that we will have about \$35 million in juvenile justice programs. This is roughly three times the size of the HEW funding level. About half of this money goes in the area of prevention programs, particularly in the drug field, at the junior high and elementary school level. There is some activity in the area of community-based programs, primarily for those juveniles who are court-acquainted already. And in many instances these are only the worst of the cases, those who have been court-acquainted 100, 200, or 300 times, and yet still are in their teens.

The needs are very great. We found in our State plan surveys that about one-fourth of those juveniles incarcerated in institutions in this country are in adult institutions. In other words, with respect to them there is no juvenile program at all. They are just physically housed in the worst imaginable conditions. And this is true in States all over the country.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You are painting a very, very black picture.

Mr. VELDE. That is right. It is a black picture.

Chairman PROXMIRE. And, of course, the grim part about it is these are the young people who, of course, are going to be problems for many, many years to come. You talk about how you agree you are

understaffed. You agree you need more funds to meet this problem, but what has the administration really done to get those funds? What have they done to fight for them? The proposals for increased assistance on the floor of the Senate in connection with these bills were proposals vigorously fought by the administration. The administration's spokesmen wanted to cut back the requests of Senator Hart and Senator Kennedy and others on the floor of the Senate to provide more money. Frankly, I did not support those Hart and Kennedy proposals myself because I thought in view of the terrific escalation in expenditure and the lack of effective evaluation or planning or staffing that I just could not see myself supporting just more money when the problem had been so ill defined and the success had been so limited. But it would seem to me where are getting a tremendous increase in funds, here is the area where you should concentrate your efforts and if you did that and dramatized this problem, then, I think, you would get support from most of us in the Senate and the House for it.

Mr. VELDE. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the package of amendments approved by the Senate last week includes the administration's so-called part E amendments, which would establish a comprehensive new program for improvement in the corrections area. The Senate authorized \$150 million for fiscal 1972 and \$250 million for fiscal 1973 to implement this program. Although the needs are just astronomical across the board in the corrections area, the emphasis in the early years will be on community-based programs, particularly those concerned with juveniles, because that is the greatest of all the needs. I need to go no further than the State of Wisconsin, which in its State plan identified a \$44 million construction program just to replace the institutions in that State, and to modernize them, without developing adequate community-based correctional programs.

In the juvenile prevention area, the current authorization for the HEW program expires next June. I understand the administration does have a comprehensive set of amendments now in preparation to expand and improve that program dramatically. In the meantime, of course, the LEAA program does have a substantial juvenile prevention program going and we will continue it at least until the funding level and the nature of the HEW program is expanded.

Chairman PROXMIRE. My time is up. I will be back.

Mr. Conable?

Representative CONABLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think Mr. Velde, it is a very interesting statement you have given us describing apparently insurmountable problems that are going to require a great deal of national attention.

Mr. VELDE. I would not say insurmountable, just extremely difficult.

Representative CONABLE. We are never going to have a crime rate of zero.

Mr. VELDE. I do not think so; no, sir.

Representative CONABLE. Let me ask what the difference is between your discretionary money and your nondiscretionary money. What do you use it for generally?

Mr. VELDE. By law, of our action funds available, 85 percent goes to the States in the form of block grants allocated by population. The remaining 15 percent is available to LEAA as a so-called discretionary

fund. Last year, fiscal 1970, we had about \$32 million available for this fund. This fiscal year, 1971, that fund will more than double.

Representative CONABLE. Have you made some analysis of how the discretionary funds are used?

Mr. VELDE. Yes.

Representative CONABLE. Are they used to supplement the other funds? Are they used for research primarily? Is that research carried out by the Federal Establishment itself or is it carried out through the State planning agencies that have been set up?

Mr. VELDE. Last year, fiscal 1970, we had a discretionary grant program with some 30 separate kinds of activity that we encouraged the States and local governments to submit to us. The largest single program was our big cities program where money was made available directly to the largest cities. The largest grants per city last year were about a quarter of a million dollars each. Some 100 cities participated in this project.

We had several programs in the organized crime area, and in the corrections area, particularly for the development of community programs, halfway houses, and the like. We funded some 20 halfway houses and community-based programs last year.

We can make available for the record a complete listing of those programs and how the funds were actually spent.

(The following information was subsequently supplied for the record by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration:)

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANTS AWARDED—JULY 7, 1970

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

DF program, grantee, and implementing agency	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF—
D(i) Large city special grants (street crime):		
Alabama SPA, Mobile, Ala.....	\$150,000	436
City of Birmingham.....	150,000	701
Arizona SPA, city of Phoenix Police Department.....	150,000	072
Arizona SPA, city of Tucson (model cities effort).....	20,000	417
California SPA, city of Sacramento.....	150,000	090
Connecticut SPA, city of Hartford.....	115,730	079
Connecticut SPA, city of Bridgeport.....	76,370	080
Delaware SPA, Wilmington Department of Public Safety.....	150,000	282
District of Columbia SPA, Washington Metropolitan Police Department.....	1,239,000	045
Florida SPA, city of Fort Lauderdale.....	150,000	198
Florida SPA, city of Tampa.....	150,000	170
Florida SPA, city of St. Petersburg.....	150,000	074
Indiana SPA, Indianapolis Police Department.....	90,948	254
Iowa SPA, city of Des Moines.....	40,000	437
California SPA, city of Los Angeles.....	15,000	084
Kentucky SPA, Bowling Green.....	91,200	430
Massachusetts SPA, city of Boston.....	150,390	073
Michigan SPA, Flint Police Department.....	150,000	179
Michigan SPA, Saginaw Police Department (city of Saginaw).....	3,352	416
Mississippi SPA, city of Jackson.....	150,000	221
Nebraska SPA, city of Omaha.....	150,000	131
New Jersey SPA, Newark Police Department.....	149,974	310
New York SPA, city of Buffalo.....	130,500	180
New York SPA, Poughkeepsie Police Department.....	27,589	405
New York SPA, Yonkers, N.Y.....	67,740	277
North Carolina SPA, city of Charlotte.....	150,000	428
North Dakota SPA, city of Fargo.....	73,155	157
Ohio SPA, city of Cleveland.....	141,146	147
Ohio SPA, Cincinnati Police Division.....	117,180	323
Oklahoma SPA, Oklahoma City Police Department.....	150,511	402
Rhode Island SPA, city of Providence.....	140,655	155
Pennsylvania SPA, City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police.....	146,984	224
South Dakota SPA, Sioux Falls Police Department.....	69,843	280
Tennessee SPA, Nashville Metro Police Department.....	150,000	305
Texas SPA, city of Austin.....	50,135	228
Texas SPA, city of Dallas.....	150,000	187
Vermont SPA, Winooski model cities program.....	6,600	053

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANTS AWARDED—JULY 7, 1970—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

DF program, grantee, and implementing agency	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF—
D(i) and D(ii) police/community cooperation:		
Georgia SPA, city of Gainesville.....	\$107,062	266
Nevada SPA, city of Las Vegas.....	150,000	144
D(ii) Large city special grants, police/community cooperation:		
California SPA, city of Fresno.....	78,759	133
California SPA, City of Oakland Police Department.....	150,000	118
Colorado SPA, city of Denver.....	150,000	273
Illinois SPA, Chicago Board of Education.....	232,886	274
Indiana SPA, city of Gary.....	150,000	413
Kentucky SPA, Louisville.....	149,910	411
Massachusetts SPA, city of Cambridge.....	21,295	105
Minnesota SPA, city of Minneapolis.....	129,455	412
New Jersey SPA, Atlantic City.....	131,389	181
North Carolina SPA, city of Winston-Salem.....	69,955	271
North Dakota SPA, Fargo Police Department.....	21,320	288
Ohio SPA, Dayton Police Department.....	149,506	418
Ohio SPA, city of Toledo.....	6,840	433
Oregon SPA, city of Portland.....	150,000	325
Wisconsin SPA, city of Milwaukee.....	53,299	317
D(iii) Large city special grants, police/community cooperation:		
Georgia SPA.....	84,080	220
Maryland SPA, city of Baltimore.....	150,000	184
D(iv) Large city special grants:		
Alabama SPA, city of Huntsville.....	83,280	318
Florida SPA, city of Jacksonville.....	150,000	139
D(iv) and D(ii) police/community cooperation and juvenile programs:		
Idaho SPA, city of Boise, Idaho.....	44,721	205
Massachusetts SPA, city of Cambridge.....	22,250	172
Missouri SPA, St. Louis Police Department.....	69,275	312
Montana SPA, Montal Legal Services Association, Helena.....	7,334	404
New Hampshire SPA, city of Manchester.....	146,250	77
New York SPA, Volunteer Opportunities, Inc.....	207,597	55
Ohio SPA, Toledo model cities crime and delinquency programs.....	12,000	281
Ohio SPA, city of Toledo.....	75,900	204
Puerto Rico SPA, city of San Juan.....	139,145	235
Tennessee SPA, city of Smithville De Kalb County Court.....	9,300	320
Texas SPA, city of Waco, McLennon County juvenile probation.....	47,180	301
D(v) Juvenile offender program:		
Arkansas SPA, city of Texarkana.....	68,587	403
Connecticut SPA, Hartford Police Department.....	34,845	107
District of Columbia SPA, District of Columbia Narcotics Treatment Agency.....	869,883	046
Idaho SPA, Boise Police Department.....	80,188	193
Massachusetts SPA, city of New Bedford.....	45,172	265
North Dakota SPA, city of Fargo.....	12,435	146
Pennsylvania SPA, Wilkes-Barre Police Department.....	17,986	190
South Carolina SPA, city of Columbia.....	101,721	166
Texas SPA, Fort Worth.....	121,416	237
Texas SPA, El Paso.....	101,854	286
Wisconsin SPA, city of Milwaukee.....	73,531	183
D(vi) Large city special grants organized crime: Florida SPA, city of Miami.....	150,000	129
D(vii) citywide coordinating:		
District of Columbia SPA, District of Columbia government, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Office of Crime Analysis.....	100,000	047
Ohio SPA, city of Akron.....	172,151	429
Pennsylvania SPA, Philadelphia.....	250,000	293
Pennsylvania SPA, city of Reading.....	147,711	240
E-1 Small State supplement:		
Alaska SPA.....	251,000	
American Samoa SPA.....	22,000	
Delaware SPA.....	48,000	
District of Columbia SPA.....	72,300	
Guam SPA.....	105,020	
Hawaii SPA.....	69,900	
Idaho SPA.....	63,900	
Maine SPA.....	88,200	
Montana SPA.....	62,700	
Nevada SPA.....	95,400	
New Hampshire SPA.....	63,400	
New Mexico SPA.....	89,000	
North Dakota SPA.....	56,200	
Rhode Island SPA.....	81,900	
South Dakota SPA.....	59,900	
Utah SPA.....	71,000	
Vermont SPA.....	113,000	
Virgin Islands SPA.....	150,000	
Wyoming SPA.....	210,000	

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANTS AWARDED—JULY 7, 1970—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

DF program, grantee, and implementing agency	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF—
F-1 Expanded laboratory services:		
California SPA, San Francisco Police Department.....	\$41,711	448
Indiana SPA, Indianapolis Police Department.....	58,370	439
Indiana SPA, State Police.....	88,780	453
Kentucky SPA, Kentucky State Police.....	119,900	442
Kentucky SPA, city of Louisville.....	33,100	441
Missouri SPA, St. Louis Police Department.....	59,500	449
Missouri SPA, University of Missouri, Columbus.....	54,506	451
New Hampshire SPA, State police division.....	26,500	443
New Jersey SPA, New Jersey State Police.....	120,000	446
North Carolina SPA, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation.....	60,000	445
Ohio SPA, Columbus Division of Police.....	24,505	440
Oregon SPA, Oregon State Police.....	27,934	447
Pennsylvania SPA, city of Philadelphia.....	120,000	444
Texas SPA, Texas Department of Public Safety.....	91,688	452
Virginia SPA, city of Portsmouth.....	59,050	450
Virgin Islands SPA, Department of Public Safety.....	25,000	454
F-2 Vertical policing services:		
Massachusetts SPA, Springfield Housing Authority.....	85,000	421
Michigan SPA, city of Detroit.....	175,000	423
Ohio SPA, Cuyahoga County (Cleveland).....	112,677	300
F-3 Executive development fellowship: Miscellaneous SPA's	252,764	326, 400
F-4 Police professional aides (legal):		
Arizona SPA.....	15,000	192
California SPA, San Jose Police Department.....	15,000	115
California SPA, Richmond Police Department.....	10,000	186
California SPA, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.....	10,000	091
California SPA, Oakland Police Department.....	15,000	108
California SPA, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.....	15,000	415
Connecticut SPA, Connecticut State Police.....	14,000	114
Connecticut SPA, New Haven Police Department.....	15,000	081
Connecticut SPA, Hartford Police Department.....	15,000	419
Do.....	10,000	278
California SPA, Ventura County.....	15,000	169
Florida SPA, Fort Lauderdale Police Department.....	15,000	227
Florida SPA, Miami Police Department.....	15,000	088
Florida SPA, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department.....	15,000	209
Illinois SPA, Peoria Police Department.....	15,000	409
Indiana SPA, Gary Police Department.....	15,000	165
Kansas SPA, Wichita Police Department.....	15,000	076
Kentucky SPA, city of Louisville.....	15,000	225
Louisiana SPA, Jefferson Parish Sheriff.....	15,000	123
Louisiana SPA, New Orleans Police Department.....	15,000	096
Michigan SPA, Oakland County, Mich.....	15,000	322
Michigan SPA, Grand Rapids Police Department.....	5,100	253
Michigan SPA, Oakland County Prosecutor (with County Sheriff and Pontiac Police Department).....	14,745	182
Michigan SPA, Warren Police Department.....	15,000	194
Michigan SPA, Detroit Police Department.....	15,000	324
Missouri SPA, Missouri Highway Patrol.....	15,000	252
Missouri SPA, St. Louis County Police Department.....	10,000	103
Nebraska SPA, Lincoln Police Department and Lancaster County Sheriff.....	15,000	086
Nevada SPA, Clark County.....	15,000	432
New York SPA, Syracuse Police Department.....	10,000	062
Do.....	15,000	196
New York SPA, Niagara Falls Police Department.....	15,000	078
North Carolina SPA, Winston-Salem Police Department.....	15,000	136
Ohio SPA, Dayton Police Department.....	14,866	149
Do.....	10,000	213
Oklahoma SPA, Oklahoma City Police Department.....	15,000	185
Puerto Rico SPA, Puerto Rico Police Department.....	10,000	082
Puerto Rico SPA, Puerto Rico Police Department.....	15,000	197
Tennessee SPA, Knoxville Police Department.....	11,500	128
Vermont SPA Windsor and Windham Counties.....	10,000	422
F-5 Police standards and training:		
Arizona SPA, Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council.....	30,000	226
Connecticut SPA, New Haven Municipal Police Training.....	30,000	247
Florida SPA, Florida Police Standards Safety.....	30,000	208
Idaho SPA, Idaho Peace Officer Standards Training Council.....	9,000	316
Michigan SPA, Michigan Law Enforcement Officers Training Council.....	30,000	232
Minnesota SPA, Minnesota Peace Officer Training Board.....	25,000	219
New Hampshire SPA, State Department of education.....	24,000	250
New Jersey SPA, New Jersey Police Training Commission.....	30,000	258
North Dakota SPA, North Dakota Highway Patrol.....	29,886	304
Rhode Island SPA, Municipal Police Training Council.....	30,000	217
South Carolina SPA.....	18,000	321
Utah SPA, Peace Officer Standards and Training Council.....	30,000	290
Virginia SPA, Virginia Training Standards Commission.....	26,335	152

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANTS AWARDED—JULY 7, 1970—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

DF program, grantee, and implementing agency	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF—
F—Police (miscellaneous) improvement programs:		
California SPA, city of San Clemente	\$99,792	042
Florida SPA, DeSoto County	127,612	036
Maine, SPA, New England Association of Chiefs of Police	59,800	029
F—Police (miscellaneous) evaluation of police/community cooperation: New Mexico		
SPA, city of Albuquerque	27,150	311
G-1 Community-based corrections:		
Arizona SPA, State department of corrections	85,645	143
Arizona SPA, Pima County Juvenile Court Center	140,625	109
California SPA, California Youth Authority	168,996	249
Colorado SPA, Colorado Department of Corrections	29,162	035
Colorado SPA, Boulder County Board of Commissioners	52,634	201
Colorado SPA, Denver Juvenile Court	82,500	039
Connecticut SPA of Connecticut Department of Corrections	199,049	296
Delaware SPA, State department of health and social services	74,730	238
Florida SPA, Florida Division of Youth Services	49,490	160
Georgia SPA, University of Georgia	73,039	178
Illinois Department of Corrections, Portland Cement Association	199,939	270
Illinois SPA, Chicago Department of Human Resources	103,289	272
Iowa SPA, Bureau of adult correction services	24,176	195
Kentucky SPA, Kentucky Department of Child Welfare	43,216	410
Kentucky SPA, Kenton County	53,113	132
Kentucky SPA, State department of corrections	127,340	102
Louisiana SPA, city of Baton Rouge	44,392	313
Louisiana SPA, Jefferson Parish School Board	155,558	067
Maryland SPA, Maryland Department of Juvenile Services	112,810	140
Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Department of Corrections	124,300	135
Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Department of Youth Services	200,000	438
Michigan SPA, National Conference on Volunteer Personnel (Volunteers in Probation, Inc.)	15,000	113
Michigan SPA, Michigan Department of Corrections	191,939	060
Minnesota SPA, Hennepin County Department of Court Services	24,472	069
Minnesota SPA, Ramsey County Juvenile Court	13,200	176
Missouri SPA, St. Louis Circuit Court	143,337	095
Montana SPA, Lewis and Clark County Welfare Departments	18,000	056
Nevada SPA, Nevada Youth Training Center	35,433	110
New Hampshire SPA, New Hampshire Probation Department	15,810	173
New Jersey SPA, State health department (division of narcotics and drug abuse)	100,000	092
New Jersey SPA, New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies	88,463	057
New York SPA, Christian Herald	190,030	223
New York SPA, Nassau County Crime Council	120,613	242
North Carolina SPA, Palmer Paulson Associates	184,984	231
North Carolina SPA, North Carolina Department of Juvenile Corrections (youth services center)	190,517	210
Ohio SPA, Dayton Health Division	200,000	309
Ohio SPA, Ohio Parole Authority—Ohio Department of Mental Hygiene and Correction	88,021	275
Oklahoma SPA, Oklahoma Department of Corrections	182,375	126
Oregon SPA, Oregon Corrections Division (Portland area)	51,734	120
Oregon SPA, State department of corrections	96,432	138
Oregon SPA, Oregon Corrections Division	53,312	218
South Carolina SPA, South Carolina Department of Corrections	114,433	058
South Carolina SPA, South Carolina Department of Corrections	200,000	054
South Carolina SPA, Marshall County	87,823	276
Tennessee SPA, city of Chattanooga	95,371	142
Texas SPA, Dallas County	27,000	161
Texas SPA, El Paso COG	113,480	289
Texas SPA, vocational guidance service, Houston	118,968	297
Texas SPA	35,000	033
Utah SPA, State juvenile court	28,342	162
Utah SPA, Utah State Division of Corrections	141,119	111
Vermont SPA, Vermont Department of Corrections	77,992	059
Virginia SPA, Virginia Probation and Parole Board	196,310	207
Washington SPA, State department of institutions	100,000	314
West Virginia SPA, Marshall County Court	49,000	241
Wisconsin SPA, State department of health and social services	67,332	083
Wyoming SPA, Wyoming Department of Health and Social Services	50,312	125
Wyoming SPA, Southeast Mental Health Board	26,580	215
G-2 Correctional centers—Jail and detention:		
Alaska SPA, Alaska Division of Corrections	79,387	084
Florida SPA, Broward County	49,763	153
Kentucky SPA, Logan County Logal Fiscal Court	12,494	148
Louisiana SPA, regional planning commission for Jefferson, Orleans, and St. Bernard Parishes	117,540	122
Michigan SPA, Wayne County Board of Commissioners	89,500	230
Michigan SPA, Kalamazoo County	100,000	066
Michigan SPA, Kent County (Lansing)	34,997	306
Michigan SPA, Berien County	100,000	068

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANTS AWARDED—JULY 7, 1970—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

DF program, grantee, and implementing agency	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF—
G-2 Correctional centers—Continued		
Missouri SPA, NW Missouri LEA Council	\$30,000	158
Minnesota SPA, Hennepin County	100,000	236
Minnesota SPA, State Department of corrections	125,000	040
Nebraska SPA, Omaha-Council Bluffs Regional Community Correction Center	59,796	048
North Carolina SPA, Cumberland County	92,970	177
Ohio SPA, District 8 planning office	65,100	263
Pennsylvania SPA, city of Philadelphia	100,000	268
Vermont SPA, Vermont Department of Corrections	6,000	234
Virgin Islands SPA, Virgin Islands Department of Public Safety	60,000	233
G-3 Multistate facilities for special offender types:		
Florida SPA, Florida State University	154,437	431
Kansas SPA, Sherman County Board of Commissioners	12,439	315
G-4 Correctional manager and trainer development:		
Georgia SPA, University of Georgia	100,000	285
Kentucky SPA, Eastern Kentucky University (3 States: Tennessee, West Virginia, and Kentucky)	100,068	150
Pennsylvania SPA, National Council on Crime and Delinquency	109,910	434
Ohio SPA, Ohio State University	93,750	284
Utah SPA, Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education	79,604	261
G-5 Executive development awards (police and corrections): Miscellaneous SPA's	190,500	326,400
G—Miscellaneous:		
Correctional programs: Arkansas SPA, Arkansas Department of Corrections	61,096	426
Corrections—Miscellaneous (R. O. discretionary): Connecticut SPA, New England Governor's Conference Boston, Mass	27,963	119
Corrections improvement program—all other: District of Columbia SPA, District of Columbia Department of Corrections	38,117	051
Corrections miscellaneous:		
Maryland SPA, American Correctional Association	107,885	407
Maryland SPA	16,650	175
R.O. optional referral—training conference: Pennsylvania SPA, Bucks County Department	1,006	424
H-1 Prosecutor training course:		
Michigan SPA, Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan	25,625	319
Michigan SPA, Wayne County prosecutor's office	24,120	064
Minnesota SPA, National District Attorneys Association	182,590	257
New Jersey SPA, department of law and public safety	31,570	106
H-1 and H-2 Prosecutor technical assistance (combined):		
South Carolina SPA, State attorney general	32,186	244
Texas SPA, National College of District Attorneys	10,500	302
H-2 Protective technical:		
Arizona SPA, attorney general's office	75,258	414
Maryland SPA, Maryland State Attorneys Association	29,456	199
New York SPA, State office of crime control planning	34,610	203
Texas SPA, attorney general	54,846	427
H-3 Court management studies:		
Alaska SPA, administrative office, Alaska court system	29,192	099
Colorado SPA, institute for court management	357,000	269
Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Superior Court	75,000	145
Ohio SPA, Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, Cuyahoga County	82,840	052
H—Miscellaneous:		
Court Programs: Alabama SPA, University of Alabama (with North American Judges Association)	51,295	168
Training for juvenile court judges: Georgia SPA, National Council for Juvenile Court Judges	30,915	283
I-1 Interstate intelligence analysis and dissemination centers:		
Massachusetts SPA	598,430	044
New Jersey SPA, Waterfront commission (New Jersey/New York)	251,554	156
New York SPA	168,432	043
I-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units:		
Colorado SPA, 2d judicial district	84,663	191
Connecticut SPA, Connecticut State Police	52,980	159
Florida SPA, State department of law enforcement	290,626	435
Florida SPA, Dade County Public Safety Department	77,950	104
Idaho SPA, Idaho Department of Law Enforcement	48,017	183
Indiana SPA, Indiana State Police	150,000	101
Louisiana SPA, department of public safety	183,103	408
Michigan SPA, Michigan State Police	67,300	038
New Jersey SPA, division of State police	58,846	117
New York SPA, New York State Identification and Intelligence Units	57,000	070
Oklahoma SPA	21,895	037
Texas SPA, Texas Department of Public Safety	213,669	141
Washington SPA, office of the State attorney general	49,965	124
West Virginia SPA, P.P. and P. commission	193,739	167
I-3 Statewide organized crime investigatory and prosecutorial unit:		
California SPA, California Department of Justice	250,000	308
Michigan SPA, dept. of attorney general	63,500	065
State of Illinois, office of attorney general	250,540	274
New Jersey SPA, department of law and public safety	176,492	116

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANTS AWARDED—JULY 7, 1970—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

DF program, grantee, and implementing agency	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF—
I-3 Statewide organized crime investigatory and prosecutorial unit—Continued		
New York SPA, New York State Department of Law	\$250,000	112
Rhode Island SPA, office of the attorney general	48,200	085
Wisconsin SPA, Wisconsin Department of Justice	138,880	098
I—Miscellaneous:		
Statewide organized crime intelligence units—all other:		
Georgia SPA	16,400	030
Selected State and local units (continuation of LEAA State and local traineeships in IRS Special Agent Basic School)	59,500	164
Various units of State and local governments	49,100	034
J-1 Civil disorders T.A. units:		
Connecticut SPA, Connecticut State Police	40,000	151
Florida SPA, law enforcement planning council	38,758	121
Georgia SPA, department of public safety	31,260	087
Idaho SPA	25,000	089
Indiana SPA, Indiana State Police	38,985	097
Kentucky SPA	40,000	100
Michigan SPA, Michigan State Police	32,416	255
New Jersey SPA, New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety	54,025	248
Oklahoma SPA, office of interagency coordination	18,347	211
Ohio SPA	60,000	425
Puerto Rico SPA	40,000	075
South Carolina SPA	24,000	093
Virginia SPA	31,318	216
West Virginia SPA, West Virginia Department of Public Safety	26,291	174
J-2 Mutual aid compacts and programs re disorders:		
Kentucky SPA	30,000	259
Michigan SPA, Downriver Mutual Aid Task Force	25,000	243
J-3 Civil disorders prevention and coordination programs:		
Louisiana SPA, Baton Rouge Police Department	48,708	267
Maine SPA, State police	27,880	245
Maryland SPA	153,470	049
Minnesota SPA, Minnesota Highway Patrol	20,325	303
New Hampshire SPA	20,893	212
New Jersey SPA, department of law and public safety	100,000	171
Oklahoma SPA, office of interagency coordination	11,606	222
Ohio SPA, Dayton Police Department	98,595	292
K-1 State narcotics and drug abuse bureaus:		
Iowa SPA, Iowa Department of Public Safety	94,100	287
Minnesota SPA, State bureau of criminal administration	76,281	229
Virginia SPA, Governor's Council on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Control	74,029	206
K-2 Metropolitan narcotics and drug enforcement groups:		
Michigan SPA, city of East Lansing	53,551	406
Ohio SPA, Stark County	85,136	189
K—Miscellaneous:		
Special narcotics control programs:		
District of Columbia SPA	82,500	032
Texas SPA, Texas Education Agency	115,000	298
L-1 Indian programs—training grants:		
Arizona SPA, San Carlos Apache Tribe	12,660	163
Arizona SPA, Navajo Tribe	32,604	127
Arizona SPA	29,994	061
Arizona SPA	22,559	130
Arizona SPA, Navajo Tribe	44,730	154
Arizona SPA, Navajo Tribe		
Colorado SPA, Southern Ute Tribe (Colorado), Turtle Mountain Chipewa (North Dakota)	60,000	214
Minnesota SPA, Minnesota Indian Affairs Commission	50,844	251
Mississippi SP, Mississippi Choctaw Indians	3,500	239
Montana SPA, Fort Peck Tribes	17,993	134
Montana SPA, Blackfeet Indian Tribe	28,387	289
Utah SPA, Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation	5,938	063
M-1 Law enforcement information and statistics program:		
City of Long Beach	198,508	200
Florida SPA, Florida Department of Law Enforcement	40,000	420
Kentucky SPA, Kentucky State Police	29,940	291
Maryland SPA	30,000	307
Michigan SPA, Michigan State Police	28,493	262
Nebraska SPA	28,556	202
New Jersey SPA, New Jersey State Police	30,000	279
Rhode Island SPA, Rhode Island State Police	26,451	295
Texas SPA	30,000	260
Vermont SPA, Vermont Department of Public Safety	30,000	246
Wisconsin SPA, State department of justice	30,000	256

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANTS AWARDED—JULY 7, 1970—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

DF program, grantee, and implementing agency	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF--
M--Miscellaneous:		
R.O. discretionary option: Kentucky SPA (for 8 Southeastern States).....	\$150,000	137
Information and statistics program:		
Colorado SPA.....	6,000	050
Illinois SPA.....	6,000	050
New Jersey SPA.....	6,000	050
Ohio SPA.....	6,000	050
Pennsylvania SPA.....	6,000	050
Various States (10 State project) (California, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Texas, Washington, and Arizona).....	747,940	041
Miscellaneous:		
Delinquency prevention programs: District of Columbia SPA.....	61,000	028
Training materials: Georgia SPA, with Institute of Government, University of Georgia.....	30,000	027
Workshops and conferences: West Virginia SPA.....	2,700	031
Special D.F. grant: Wisconsin SPA, National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors.....	240,575	264

DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—FISCAL YEAR 1970

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

Grantee and implementing subgrantee (if applicable)	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF--
Georgia SPA, University of Georgia Institute of Government.....	\$50,000	027
District of Columbia SPA.....	61,000	028
Maine SPA, New England Association of Chiefs of Police.....	59,800	029
Georgia SPA.....	16,400	030
West Virginia SPA.....	2,700	031
District of Columbia SPA.....	82,500	032
Texas SPA.....	35,000	033
Units of State and local government to be subsequently designated based upon acceptance of applicants.....	49,100	034
Colorado SPA—Colorado Department of Corrections.....	29,162	035
Florida SPA, Dade County, Fla.....	127,612	036
Oklahoma SPA.....	21,895	037
Michigan SPA, Michigan State Police.....	67,300	038
Colorado SPA, Denver Juvenile Court.....	82,500	039
Minnesota SPA, Minnesota Department of Corrections.....	125,000	040
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Texas, Washington SPA.....	747,940	041
California SPA, city of San Clemente.....	99,792	042
New York SPA.....	168,432	043
Massachusetts SPA.....	598,430	044
District of Columbia SPA.....	1,239,000	045
Do.....	869,883	046
Do.....	100,000	047
Nebraska SPA, Omaha-Council Bluffs Metropolitan Area Planning Agency.....	59,796	048
Maryland SPA.....	153,470	049
Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania SPA.....	30,000	050
District of Columbia SPA.....	38,117	051
Ohio SPA, Criminal Justice Coordinating Council of Cuyahoga County.....	82,840	052
Vermont SPA, city of Winooski.....	6,600	053
South Carolina SPA, South Carolina Department of Juvenile Corrections.....	200,000	054
New York SPA, Volunteer Opportunities, Inc.....	207,597	055
Montana SPA, Lewis and Clark County Welfare Department.....	18,000	056
New Jersey SPA, New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies.....	88,463	057
South Carolina SPA, South Carolina Department of Corrections.....	114,433	058
Vermont SPA, Vermont Department of Corrections.....	77,992	059
Michigan SPA, Michigan Department of Corrections.....	191,939	060
Arizona SPA, White Mountain Apache Indian Tribe.....	29,994	061
New York SPA, city of Syracuse.....	10,000	062
Utah SPA, Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.....	5,938	063
Michigan SPA, Wayne County Prosecutor's Office.....	24,120	064
Michigan SPA, Department of Attorney General.....	63,500	065
Michigan SPA, Board of Commissioners, County of Kalamazoo, Mich.....	100,000	066
Louisiana SPA, Jefferson Parish School Board.....	155,558	067
Michigan SPA, Berrien County School Board.....	100,000	068
Minnesota SPA, county of Hennepin.....	24,472	069
New York SPA, New York State Identification and Intelligence System.....	57,000	070
Alabama SPA, city of Birmingham, Ala.....	150,000	071
Arizona SPA, city of Phoenix (Police Department).....	150,000	072
Massachusetts SPA, city of Boston.....	150,390	073

DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—FISCAL YEAR 1970—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

Grantee and implementing subgrantee (if applicable)	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF—
Florida SPA, city of St. Petersburg.....	\$150,000	074
Puerto Rico SPA.....	40,000	075
Kansas SPA, city of Wichita, Kans.....	15,000	076
New Hampshire SPA, city of Manchester.....	146,250	077
New York SPA, city of Niagara Falls.....	15,000	078
Connecticut SPA, city of Hartford.....	115,730	079
Connecticut SPA, city of Bridgeport.....	76,370	080
Connecticut SPA, city of New Haven.....	15,000	081
Puerto Rico SPA, territory of Puerto Rico, Police Department, Puerto Rico.....	10,000	082
Wisconsin SPA, Wisconsin State Department of Health and Social Services.....	67,332	083
Alaska SPA, Division of Corrections, Alaska Department of Health and Welfare.....	79,387	084
Rhode Island SPA, Office of the Attorney General.....	48,200	085
Nebraska SPA, city of Lincoln and county of Lancaster.....	15,000	086
Georgia SPA, Georgia Department of Public Safety.....	31,260	087
Florida SPA, city of Miami.....	15,000	088
Idaho SPA.....	25,000	089
California SPA, city of Sacramento, Police Department.....	150,000	090
California SPA, county of Los Angeles.....	10,000	091
New Jersey SPA, New Jersey Department of Health.....	100,000	092
South Carolina SPA.....	24,000	093
California SPA, city of Los Angeles.....	15,000	094
Missouri SPA, St. Louis Circuit Court, Juvenile Division.....	143,377	095
Louisiana SPA, New Orleans Police Department.....	15,000	096
Indiana SPA, Indiana State Police.....	38,985	097
Wisconsin SPA, State of Wisconsin Department of Justice.....	138,880	098
Alaska SPA, Administrative Office, Alaska Court System.....	29,192	099
Kentucky Commission on Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention.....	40,000	100
Indiana SPA, Indiana State Police.....	150,000	101
Kentucky Commission on Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention.....	217,340	102
Missouri SPA, county of St. Louis.....	10,000	103
Florida SPA, Dade County Public Safety Department.....	77,950	104
Massachusetts SPA, city of Cambridge.....	21,295	105
New Jersey SPA, Department of Public Law and Safety.....	31,570	106
Connecticut SPA, city of Hartford.....	34,845	107
California SPA, city of Oakland.....	15,000	108
Arizona SPA, Pima County Juvenile Court Center.....	140,625	109
Nevada SPA, Nevada Youth Training Center.....	35,453	110
Utah Law Enforcement Planning Council.....	141,119	111
New York SPA, New York State Department of Law.....	250,000	112
Michigan SPA, Volunteers in Probation, Inc.....	15,000	113
Connecticut SPA, Connecticut State Police.....	14,000	114
California SPA, city of San Jose.....	15,000	115
New Jersey SPA, Department of Public Law and Safety.....	196,492	116
New Jersey SPA, Department of Public Law and Safety.....	58,846	117
California SPA, city of Oakland.....	150,000	118
Connecticut SPA, New England Governor's Conference.....	27,963	119
Oregon SPA, Oregon Corrections Division.....	51,734	120
Florida Interagency Law Enforcement Planning Council.....	38,758	121
Louisiana SPA, Regional Planning Commission for Jefferson, Orleans, and St. Bernard Parishes.....	117,540	122
Louisiana SPA, Parish of Jefferson.....	15,000	123
Washington SPA, Office of the Attorney General.....	49,965	124
Wyoming SPA, Family and Childrens Services; Division of Public Assistance and Social Services.....	50,312	125
Oklahoma SPA, Oklahoma Department of Corrections.....	182,375	126
Arizona SPA, the Navajo Tribe.....	32,604	127
Tennessee SPA, city of Knoxville.....	11,500	128
Florida SPA, city of Miami.....	150,000	129
Arizona SPA, Navajo Tribe Police Department.....	22,559	130
Nebraska SPA, city of Omaha.....	150,000	131
Kentucky SPA, Kenton County Jail.....	53,113	132
California SPA, city of Fresno.....	78,759	133
Montana SPA, Fort Peck Tribes.....	17,993	134
Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Department of Corrections.....	124,300	135
North Carolina SPA, city of Winston-Salem.....	15,000	136
Kentucky Commission on Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention.....	150,000	137
Oregon SPA, Oregon State Division of Corrections.....	96,432	138
Florida SPA, city of Jacksonville.....	150,000	139
Maryland SPA, Maryland Department of Juvenile Services.....	112,810	140
Texas SPA, Texas Department of Public Safety.....	213,669	141
Tennessee SPA, city of Chattanooga.....	95,371	142
Arizona SPA, Arizona State Department of Corrections.....	85,645	143
Nevada SPA, city of Las Vegas.....	150,000	144
Massachusetts SPA, State of Massachusetts Superior Court.....	75,000	145
North Dakota SPA, city of Fargo.....	12,435	146
Ohio SPA, city of Cleveland.....	141,146	147
Kentucky SPA, Logan Fiscal Court, Logan County.....	12,494	148
Ohio SPA, city of Dayton.....	14,866	149

DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—FISCAL YEAR 1970—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

Grantee and implementing subgrantee (if applicable)	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF--
Kentucky SPA, Eastern Kentucky University.....	\$100,068	150
Connecticut SPA, Connecticut State Police.....	40,000	151
Virginia SPA, Law Enforcement Officers Training Standards Commission.....	26,335	152
Florida SPA, Broward County Board of Commissioners.....	49,763	153
Arizona SPA, the Navajo Tribe.....	44,730	154
Rhode Island SPA, city of Providence.....	140,655	155
New Jersey SPA, Waterfront Commissio of New York Harbor.....	251,554	156
North Dakota SPA, city of Fargo.....	73,155	157
Missouri SPA, Northwest Missouri Law Enforcement Assistance Council.....	30,000	158
Connecticut SPA, Connecticut State Police.....	52,980	159
Florida SPA, Florida Division of Youth Services.....	49,490	160
Texas SPA, Dallas County Juvenile Department.....	27,000	161
Utah SPA, Utah State Juvenile Court, Board of Juvenile Court Judges.....	28,342	162
Arizona SPA, San Carlos Apache Tribe.....	12,660	163
Units of State and local government will be designated.....	59,500	164
Indiana SPA, Gary Police Department.....	15,000	165
South Carolina SPA, Columbia.....	101,721	166
West Virginia SPA, Charleston.....	193,739	167
Alabama SPA, University of Alabama.....	51,295	168
California SPA, Ventura County.....	15,000	169
Florida SPA, Tampa.....	150,000	170
New Jersey SPA, Department of Law and Public Safety.....	100,000	171
Massachusetts SPA, Cambridge.....	22,250	172
New Hampshire SPA, New Hampshire Probation Department.....	15,810	173
West Virginia SPA, Department of Public Safety.....	26,291	174
Maryland SPA.....	16,650	175
Minnesota SPA, Ramsey County Juvenile Court.....	13,200	176
North Carolina SPA, Cumberland County.....	92,970	177
Georgia SPA, University of Georgia.....	73,039	178
Michigan SPA, Flint Police Division.....	150,000	179
New York SPA, Buffalo, N.Y.....	130,500	180
New Jersey SPA, Atlantic City.....	131,389	181
Michigan SPA, Oakland County Prosecutor.....	14,745	182
Wisconsin SPA, Milwaukee.....	73,531	183
Maryland SPA, Baltimore City.....	150,000	184
Oklahoma SPA, Oklahoma City Police Department.....	15,000	185
California SPA, Richmond Police Department.....	10,000	186
Texas SPA, city of Dallas.....	150,000	187
Idaho SPA, Department of Law Enforcement.....	48,017	188
Ohio SPA, Stark County.....	85,136	189
Pennsylvania SPA, Wilkes-Barre Police.....	17,986	190
Colorado SPA, 2d Judicial District.....	84,663	191
Arizona SPA, Department of Public Safety.....	15,000	192
Idaho SPA, Boise Police Department.....	80,188	193
Michigan SPA, Warren Police Department.....	15,000	194
Iowa SPA, Bureau of Adult Correction Services.....	24,176	195
New York SPA, Syracuse Police Department.....	15,000	196
Puerto Rico SPA, Puerto Rico Police Department.....	15,000	197
Florida SPA, city of Fort Lauderdale.....	150,000	198
Maryland SPA, Maryland State's Attorney's Association.....	29,456	199
California SPA, city of Long Beach.....	198,508	200
Colorado SPA, Boulder County Board of Commissioners.....	52,634	201
Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.....	28,556	202
New York SPA, New York State Office of Crime Control Planning.....	34,610	203
Ohio SPA, city of Toledo.....	75,900	204
Idaho SPA, city of Boise, Idaho.....	44,721	205
Virginia SPA, Virginia Governors Council on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Control.....	74,029	206
Virginia SPA, Virginia Probation and Parole Board.....	196,310	207
Florida SPA, Florida Police Standards Board.....	30,000	208
Florida SPA, county of Palm Beach.....	15,000	209
North Carolina SPA, Youth Services Center, Raleigh.....	190,517	210
Oklahoma SPA, Office of Interagency Cooperation.....	18,347	211
New Hampshire Crime Commission.....	20,893	212
Ohio SPA, city of Dayton.....	10,000	213
Colorado SPA, Southern Ute Tribe.....	60,000	214
Wyoming SPA, Southeast Mental Health Board.....	26,580	215
Virginia Law Enforcement Administration.....	31,318	216
Rhode Island SPA, Municipal Police Training Council.....	30,000	217
Oregon SPA, Corrections Division, State of Oregon.....	53,912	218
Minnesota SPA, Minnesota Peace Officer Training Board.....	25,000	219
Georgia SPA, city of Athens, Ga.....	84,080	220
Mississippi SPA, city of Jackson.....	150,000	221
Oklahoma SPA, Office of Interagency Coordination.....	11,606	222
New York SPA, Christian Hearld, New York.....	190,030	223
Pennsylvania SPA, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police.....	146,984	224
Kentucky SPA, city of Louisville.....	15,000	225
Arizona SPA, Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council.....	30,000	226
Florida SPA, city of Fort Lauderdale.....	15,000	227

DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—FISCAL YEAR 1970—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

Grantee and implementing subgrantee (if applicable)	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF—
Texas SPA, city of Austin.....	\$50,135	228
Minnesota SPA, Bureau of Criminal Administration.....	76,281	229
Michigan SPA, Wayne County Board of Commissioners.....	89,500	230
North Carolina SPA, Palmer/Paulson Association, Inc.....	184,984	231
Michigan SPA, Michigan Law Enforcement Officers Training Council.....	30,000	232
Virgin Islands SPA.....	60,000	233
Vermont SPA, Vermont Department of Corrections.....	6,000	234
Puerto Rico SPA, city of San Juan.....	139,145	235
Minnesota SPA, Hennepin County, Minn.....	100,000	236
Texas SPA, Austin.....	121,416	237
Delaware SPA, Wilmington Division of Juvenile Corrections.....	74,730	238
Mississippi SPA, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians.....	3,500	239
Pennsylvania SPA, city of Reading, Office of the Mayor.....	147,711	240
West Virginia SPA, Marshall County Court.....	49,000	241
New York SPA, Nassau County Crime Council.....	120,613	242
Michigan SPA, Downriver Mutual Aid Task Force.....	25,000	243
South Carolina SPA, Office of Attorney General of South Carolina.....	32,186	244
Maine SPA, Maine State Police.....	27,880	245
Vermont SPA, Vermont Department of Public Safety.....	30,000	246
Connecticut SPA, New Haven, Municipal Police Training Council.....	30,000	247
New Jersey SPA, New Jersey Department of law and Public Safety.....	54,025	248
California SPA, California Youth Authority.....	168,996	249
New Hampshire SPA, Division of Vocational-Technical Education.....	24,000	250
Minnesota SPA, Minnesota Indian Affairs Commission.....	50,844	251
Missouri SPA, Missouri State Highway Patrol.....	15,000	252
Michigan SPA, city of Grand Rapids.....	5,100	253
Indiana SPA, Indianapolis Police Department.....	90,948	254
Michigan SPA, Michigan State Police.....	32,416	255
Wisconsin SPA, Division of Law Enforcement.....	30,000	256
Minnesota SPA, National District Attorneys Association.....	182,590	257
New Jersey SPA, New Jersey Police Training Commission.....	30,000	258
Kentucky Crime Commission.....	30,000	259
Texas Criminal Justice Council.....	30,000	260
Utah SPA, Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education.....	79,604	261
Michigan SPA, Michigan State Police.....	28,493	262
Ohio SPA, Law Enforcement Planning Office, district 8.....	65,100	263
Wisconsin SPA, National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors.....	240,575	264
Massachusetts SPA, city of New Bedford.....	45,172	265
Georgia SPA, city of Gainsville.....	107,062	266
Louisiana SPA, city of Baton Rouge.....	48,708	267
Pennsylvania SPA, Philadelphia Department of Public Property.....	100,000	268
Colorado SPA, Institute for Court Management and National College of State Trial Lawyers.....	357,000	269
Illinois Department of Corrections, Portland Cement Association.....	199,939	270
North Carolina SPA, city of Winston-Salem.....	69,955	271
Illinois SPA, Correctional Services, Human Resources Chicago.....	103,289	272
Colorado SPA, city of Denver.....	150,000	273
Illinois SPA, Chicago Board of Education.....	232,886	274
Ohio Department of Urban Affairs, Ohio Department of Mental Hygiene.....	88,021	275
South Carolina SPA, South Carolina Department of Corrections.....	87,923	276
New York SPA, Yonkers Department of Public Safety.....	67,740	277
Connecticut SPA, city of Hartford.....	10,000	278
New Jersey SPA, Department of Law and Public Safety.....	30,000	279
South Dakota SPA, Sioux Falls Police Department.....	69,843	280
Ohio SPA, Model cities crime and delinquency programs.....	12,000	281
Delaware SPA, Delaware Department of Public Safety.....	150,000	282
Georgia SPA, National Council of Juvenile Court Judges.....	30,915	283
Ohio SPA, Ohio State University, Continuing Education Division.....	93,750	284
Georgia SPA, University of Georgia.....	100,000	285
Texas SPA, city of El Paso.....	101,854	286
Iowa SPA, Iowa Department of Public Safety.....	94,100	287
North Dakota SPA, city of Fargo.....	21,320	288
Montana SPA, Blackfeet Indian Tribe.....	28,387	289
Utah SPA, Utah Peace Officer Standards and Training.....	30,000	290
Kentucky SPA, Kentucky State Police.....	29,940	291
Ohio SPA, Dayton Police Department.....	98,595	292
Pennsylvania SPA, city of Philadelphia.....	250,000	293
Attorney General of Illinois.....	250,540	294
Rhode Island SPA, Rhode Island State Police.....	26,451	295
Connecticut SPA, Connecticut Department of Corrections.....	199,049	296
Texas SPA, Vocational Guidance Service.....	118,968	297
Texas SPA, Texas Education Agency.....	115,000	298
Texas SPA, El Paso Council of Governments.....	113,480	299
Ohio SPA, Cuyahoga County.....	112,677	300
Texas SPA, McLennan County Juvenile Probation.....	47,180	301
Texas SPA, National College of District Attorneys.....	10,500	302
Minnesota SPA, Minnesota Highway Patrol.....	20,325	303
North Dakota SPA, North Dakota Highway Patrol.....	29,886	304

DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—FISCAL YEAR 1970—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

Grantee and implementing subgrantee (if applicable)	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF—
Tennessee SPA, city of Nashville	\$150,000	305
Michigan SPA, county of Kent	34,997	306
Maryland SPA, none	30,000	307
California SPA, Organized Crime Unit, Justice Department	250,000	308
Ohio SPA, Dayton Division of Health	200,000	309
New Jersey SPA, Newark Police Department	149,974	310
New Mexico SPA, City of Albuquerque	27,150	311
Missouri SPA, St. Louis Police Department	69,275	312
Louisiana SPA, city of Baton Rouge	44,392	313
Washington SPA, Washington Department of Institutions	100,000	314
Kansas SPA, Sherman County Board of Commissioners	12,439	315
Idaho SPA, Idaho Peace Officer Standards and Training Advisory Council	9,000	316
Wisconsin SPA, city of Milwaukee	53,299	317
Alabama SPA, city of Huntsville	83,280	318
Michigan SPA, Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan	25,625	319
Tennessee SPA, DeKalb County Court	9,300	320
South Carolina SPA, none	18,000	321
Michigan SPA, county of Oakland	15,000	322
Ohio SPA, city of Cincinnati	117,180	323
Michigan SPA, city of Detroit	15,000	324
City of Portland, Oreg., none	150,000	325
Alaska SPA, Alaska Department of Health and Welfare, Division of Corrections—Stanley J. Zaborac, Jr.	8,000	326
Arizona SPA, Arizona Department of Public Safety—Gregory L. Goodson	1,320	327
Colorado SPA, Tri-District Probation Department—Frank S. Jacobucci	6,500	328
Connecticut SPA, Connecticut State Police Department—Raymond Andrews	3,500	329
Florida SPA, Office of the Sheriff, Duval County, Fla.—Dale T. Beerbower	8,000	330
Florida SPA, Florida Division of Adult Corrections—Larry C. McAllister	8,000	331
Florida SPA, Florida Division of Adult Corrections—Norma Jean Fugate	6,500	332
Idaho SPA, Idaho Department of Health—Orville L. Tallman	8,000	333
Iowa SPA, Iowa Bureau of Adult Correction Services—Donald F. Rhode	7,500	334
Kansas SPA, Johnson County Juvenile Court, Olathe, Kans.—Jerome H. Jacobson	8,000	335
Kentucky SPA, Kentucky Department of Public Safety—Robert C. McKinney	4,809	336
Kentucky SPA, Kentucky Department of Public Safety—Edwin E. Miller	5,309	337
Maine SPA, City of Portland, Maine—Richard L. Thayer, Jr.	4,500	338
Maryland SPA, Maryland Department of Correctional Services—Robert W. McColley	4,500	339
Maryland SPA, Maryland Department of Parole and Probation—Daniel Lipstein	6,500	340
Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Department of Public Safety—Allan Zukowsky	8,000	341
Missouri SPA, Police Department, Kansas City, Mo.—James Reynolds	4,500	342
New York SPA, New York State Police—Socrates Lecakes	6,500	343
New York SPA, New York State Police—Edmond S. Culhane, Jr.	6,500	344
New York SPA, New York State Police—Thomas A. Constantine	8,000	345
New York SPA, New York State Police—Francis A. DeFrancesco	4,500	346
New York SPA, New York State Police—Jerome O'Grady	8,000	347
New York SPA, New York State Municipal Police Training Council—William G. McMahon	8,000	348
New York SPA, New York City Police Department—Philip J. Romano	3,500	349
New York SPA, Office of Probation for the courts of New York City—Stephen E. Morris	8,000	350
New York SPA, New York State Department of Corrections, Rodger B. Doren	8,000	351
New York SPA, New York State Department of Corrections—Karl H. Gohlke	8,000	352
New York SPA, New York State Division of Parole—Jack Bernstein	8,000	353
New York SPA, New York State Division of Parole—Mark Ross	6,500	354
North Carolina SPA, North Carolina Department of Corrections—Frank O. Gunter	8,000	355
North Carolina SPA, North Carolina Department of Corrections—Robert J. Fleming, Jr.	3,500	356
North Dakota SPA, North Dakota Highway Patrol—Richard E. Stephens	4,446	357
Puerto Rico SPA, Police of Puerto Rico—Juan del Valle Lopez	3,500	358
Puerto Rico SPA, Police of Puerto Rico—Samuel Lopez Torres	3,500	359
Texas SPA, city of Dallas, Tex.—Donald H. Milliken	5,690	360
Texas SPA, city of Dallas, Tex.—William R. Fulghum	6,000	361
Texas SPA, city of San Antonio, Tex.—Harold L. Fiske	8,000	362
Utah SPA, Utah State Juvenile Court—Vernon Fehlberg	6,500	363
Vermont SPA, Vermont Department of Corrections—Larry Simino	6,500	364
Alabama SPA, city of Birmingham, Ala.—Tommy E. Rouse	8,000	365
California SPA, Department of California Highway Patrol—Harold D. Fargo	6,500	366
California SPA, Department of California Highway Patrol—Gerald W. Clemons	6,500	367
California SPA, Department of California Highway Patrol—Eriks M. Svede	8,000	368
California SPA, Los Angeles Police Department, city of Los Angeles, Calif.—Robert Loomis	8,000	369
California SPA, Los Angeles Police Department, city of Los Angeles, Calif.—Edwin Henderson	8,000	370
California SPA, California Youth Authority—Takashi Watanabe	7,500	371
District of Columbia SPA, Metropolitan Police Department—Gary L. Steedman	3,500	372
District of Columbia SPA, Metropolitan Police Department—Martin J. Hannon	3,500	373
District of Columbia SPA, Metropolitan Police Department—James K. Kelly	3,075	374
District of Columbia SPA, Metropolitan Police Department—Edward Kreilis	3,075	375
District of Columbia SPA, Metropolitan Police Department—Ronald D. Cox	3,075	376
Georgia SPA, Edgar F. Williams, Jr.	6,500	377
Indiana SPA, Indianapolis Police Department—Paul E. Harmon	4,660	378
Louisiana SPA, Louisiana Department of Corrections—Benny Harris	3,500	379
Louisiana SPA, Louisiana Department of Corrections—Gaines Colbert	3,500	380
Louisiana SPA, Jefferson Parish Juvenile Probation—Milo R. Faustermann	6,500	381

DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—FISCAL YEAR 1970—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

Grantee and implementing subgrantee (if applicable)	Amount	Grant No. 70-DF—
Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Department of Public Safety—Edward J. Higgins, Jr.	\$4,500	382
Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Department of Public Safety—Richard H. O'Shea, Jr.	3,500	383
Michigan SPA, Police Department, Detroit, Mich.—William B. Brandimore, Jr.	3,500	384
Michigan SPA, Police Department, Detroit, Mich.—Rufus S. Anderson	3,500	385
Michigan SPA, Police Department, Detroit, Mich.—Thomas S. Ireland	6,500	386
North Carolina SPA, North Carolina Department of Corrections—Donald B. Street	3,500	387
New Jersey SPA, Newark Police Department, Newark, N.J.—Hubert Williams	8,000	388
New York SPA, city of Schenectady, N.Y.—Patricia Carter	6,500	389
New York SPA, Police Department, Buffalo, N.Y.—Richard A. Hoffman	8,000	390
New York SPA, Police Department, Buffalo, N.Y.—Alfred W. Stanton	3,500	391
North Dakota SPA, North Dakota State Penitentiary—Charles F. Enders	8,000	392
Pennsylvania SPA, Philadelphia Prisons, Department of Public Welfare—Louis Aytch	3,500	393
Puerto Rico SPA, Division of Corrections, Department of Justice—Luciano Mendez	8,000	394
Ohio SPA, Cincinnati Police Division—Roosevelt E. Sheperd	8,000	395
Texas SPA, Texas Department of Public Safety—James Gilstrap	6,364	396
Texas SPA, Texas Department of Public Safety—Ben A. Neal	4,176	397
Virginia SPA, Virginia Department of Welfare and Institutions—Jerry G. Parrish	6,500	398
Virginia SPA, Virginia Department of Welfare and Institutions—Garnett F. Taylor	7,000	399
Florida SPA, city of Titusville, Fla.—Clarence N. Kirland, Jr.	4,765	400
Deferred to fiscal year 1971		401
Oklahoma SPA, Oklahoma City Police Department	150,511	402
Arkansas SPA, city of Texarkana	68,587	403
Montana SPA, Montana Legal Services Association	7,334	404
New York SPA, Poughkeepsie Police Department	27,589	405
Michigan SPA, city of East Lansing	53,551	406
Maryland SPA, American Correctional Association	107,885	407
Louisiana SPA, Louisiana Department of Public Safety	183,103	408
Illinois SPA, city of Peoria Ill.	15,000	409
Kentucky SPA, Kentucky Department of Children Welfare	43,216	410
Kentucky SPA, city of Louisville	149,910	411
Minnesota SPA, Minneapolis Police Department	129,455	412
Indiana SPA, city of Gary	150,000	413
Arizona SPA, Attorney General of Arizona	75,258	414
California SPA, county of Los Angeles	15,000	415
Michigan SPA, city of Saginaw	3,352	416
Arizona SPA, city of Tucson	20,000	417
Ohio SPA, Dayton Department of Police	149,506	418
Connecticut SPA, city of Hartford	15,000	419
Florida SPA, Florida Department of Law Enforcement	40,000	420
Massachusetts SPA, city of Springfield	85,000	421
Vermont SPA, Windsor and Windham Counties	10,000	422
Michigan SPA, Detroit Housing Commission	175,000	423
Pennsylvania SPA, Bucks County Department of Corrections	1,006	424
Ohio SPA, none	60,000	425
Arkansas SPA, none	61,096	426
Texas SPA, Attorney General of Texas	54,846	427
North Carolina SPA, city of Charlotte	150,000	428
Ohio SPA, city of Akron	127,151	429
Kentucky SPA, city of Bowling Green	91,200	430
Florida SPA, Florida State University	154,437	431
Nevada SPA, Clark County	15,000	432
Ohio SPA, city of Toledo	6,840	433
Pennsylvania SPA, National Council on Crime and Delinquency	109,910	434
Florida SPA, Florida Department of Law Enforcement	290,626	435
Alabama SPA, city of Mobile	150,000	436
Iowa SPA, city of Des Moines	40,000	437
Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Department of Youth Services	200,000	438
Indiana SPA, city of Indianapolis	58,370	439
Ohio SPA, city of Columbus	24,505	440
Kentucky SPA, city of Louisville	33,100	441
Kentucky SPA, Kentucky State Police	119,900	442
New Hampshire SPA, New Hampshire State Police	26,500	443
Pennsylvania SPA, city of Philadelphia	120,000	444
North Carolina SPA, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation	60,000	445
New Jersey SPA, New Jersey State Police	120,000	446
Oregon SPA, Oregon State Police	27,934	447
California SPA, city of San Francisco	41,711	448
Missouri SPA, city of St. Louis	59,500	449
Virginia SPA, city of Portsmouth	59,050	450
Missouri SPA, University of Missouri	54,506	451
Texas SPA, Public Safety Department of Texas	91,688	452
Indiana SPA, Indiana State Police	88,780	453
Virgin Islands SPA, Department of Public Safety	25,000	454
Total	130,227,340	

1 With the addition of \$1,772,420 in small State supplementary allocations, a grand total of \$31,999,760 has been awarded

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF—	Amount
ALABAMA			
D(i) Large city special grants.....	City of Birmingham.....	071	\$150,000
H Court programs—Miscellaneous.....	Alabama SPA, University of Alabama (with North American Judges Association).	168	51,295
D(i) Large city special grants (street crime).....	Alabama SPA, Mobile, Ala.....	436	150,000
D(iv) Large city special grants (juvenile offender programs).....	Alabama SPA, city of Huntsville.....	318	83,280
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.....	Alabama SPA, city of Birmingham, Ala.....	365	8,000
Total.....			442,575
ALASKA			
G-2 Correctional centers—jail and deten- tion.....	Alaska SPA, Alaska Division of Correc- tions.....	084	79,387
H-3 Court management studies.....	Alaska SPA, Administrative Office, Alaska Court System.....	099	29,192
Small State supplement.....	Alaska SPA.....		251,000
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.....	Alaska SPA, Department of Health and Welfare, Division of Corrections.....	326	8,000
Total.....			367,579
ARIZONA			
L-1 Indian law-enforcement programs.....	Arizona SPA.....	061	29,994
D-1 Large-city special grants.....	Arizona SPA, City of Phoenix Police De- partment.....	072	150,000
G-1 Community-based corrections.....	Arizona SPA, Pima County Juvenile Court Center.....	109	140,625
L-1 Indian law-enforcement programs.....	Arizona SPA, Navajo Tribe.....	130	22,559
Do.....	do.....	127	32,604
G-1 Community-based corrections.....	Arizona SPA, State Department of Correc- tions.....	143	85,645
L-1 Indian programs—Training grants.....	Arizona SPA, Navajo Tribe.....	154	44,730
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Arizona SPA, State Department of Public Safety.....	192	15,000
L-1 Indian programs—Training grants.....	Arizona SPA, San Carlos Apache Tribe.....	163	12,660
F-5 Police standards and training.....	Arizona SPA, Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council.....	226	30,000
D(i) Large-city special grants (street and violent crime programs, etc.).....	Arizona SPA, city of Tucson (model cities effort).....	417	20,000
H-2 Prosecutive technical.....	Arizona SPA, Attorney General's Office.....	414	75,258
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.....	Arizona SPA, Department of Public Safety..	327	1,320
Total.....			660,395
ARKANSAS			
D(v) Large city special grants (juvenile offender programs).....	Arkansas SPA, city of Texarkana.....	403	68,587
G Miscellaneous correctional programs.....	Arkansas SPA, Arkansas Department of Corrections.....	426	61,096
Total.....			129,483
CALIFORNIA			
Police improvements program—all others..	California SPA.....	042	99,792
D(i) Large city special grants.....	California SPA, city of Sacramento.....	090	150,000
D(ii) Large city special grants.....	California SPA, Oakland Police Department..	118	150,000
D(i) Large city (R.O. miscellaneous).....	California SPA, Los Angeles Police Depart- ment.....	415	15,000
F-4 Police professional aides (pschiatric)...	California SPA, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.....	091	10,000
F-4 Police professional aides (legal adviser). Do.....	California SPA, San Jose Police Department.. California SPA, Oakland Police Department..	115 108	15,000 15,000
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/com- munity cooperation).....	California SPA, city of Fresno.....	133	78,759
F-4 Police professional aides (psychiatric)...	California SPA, Richmond Police Depart- ment.....	186	10,000
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	California SPA, Ventura County.....	169	15,000
M Law enforcement information and statis- tics program (miscellaneous.).....	California SPA, city of long Beach.....	200	198,508
G-1 Community based correctional pro- grams.....	California SPA, California Youth Authority..	249	68,996
F-1 Expanded laboratory services.....	California SPA, San Francisco Police De- partment.....	448	41,711

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

(SPA=State Planning Agency)

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF—	Amount
CALIFORNIA—Continued			
I-3 Statewide organized crime investigatory and prosecutorial unit.	California SPA, California Department of Justice.	308	\$250, 000
F-4 Police legal adviser.....	California SPA, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.	415	15, 000
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	California SPA Department of California Highway Patrol.	366	6, 500
Do.....	do.....	367	6, 500
Do.....	do.....	368	8, 000
Do.....	California SPA Los Angeles Police Department.	369	8, 000
Do.....	do.....	370	8, 000
Do.....	California SPA.....	371	7, 500
Total.....			<u>1, 277, 266</u>
COLORADO			
G-1 Community based corrections programs.	Colorado SPA Colorado Department of Corrections.	035	29, 162
Community based corrections program.....	Colorado SPA, Denver Juvenile Court.....	039	82, 500
Miscellaneous—information and statistics program.	Colorado SPA.....	050	6, 000
I-3 Investigatory and prosecutorial.....	Colorado SPA, 2d judicial district.....	191	84, 663
G-1 Community based corrections.....	Colorado SPA, Boulder County.....	201	52, 634
L-1 Indian law enforcement programs—Training.	Colorado SPA, Southern Ute Tribe (Colorado) Turtle Mountain Chipewa (North Dakota).	214	60, 000
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/community cooperation).	Colorado SPA, city of Denver.....	273	150, 000
F-3 Command and executive development G-5 Executive development.	Colorado SPA, tridistrict probation.....	328	6, 500
Total.....			<u>471, 459</u>
CONNECTICUT			
D(i) Large city special grants.....	Connecticut SPA, city of Hartford.....	079	115, 730
Do.....	Connecticut SPA, city of Bridgeport.....	080	76, 370
F-4 Professional aides for police.....	Connecticut SPA, New Haven Police Department.	081	15, 000
D(v) Large city special grants.....	Connecticut SPA, Hartford Police Department.	107	34, 845
G Corrections—miscellaneous (R.O. discretionary).	Connecticut SPA.....	119	27, 963
F-4 Police professional aides (legal adviser).	Connecticut SPA, Connecticut State Police..	114	14, 000
J-1 Civil disorders T.A. units.....	Connecticut SPA.....	151	40, 000
I-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units.	Connecticut SPA, Connecticut State Police..	159	52, 980
F-5 Police training and standards.....	Connecticut SPA, Municipal Police training.	247	30, 000
F-4 Professional aides for police (legal).....	Connecticut SPA, Hartford Police Department.	419	15, 000
G-1 Community based corrections programs.	Connecticut SPA, Connecticut Department of Corrections.	296	199, 049
F-4 Police professional aides (psychiatric).	Connecticut SPA, Hartford Police Department.	278	10, 000
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Connecticut SPA, Connecticut State Police Department.	329	3, 500
Total.....			<u>634, 437</u>
DELAWARE			
G-1 Community based corrections program.	Delaware SPA, State Department of Health and Social Services.	238	74, 730
D(i) Large city special grants (streets, violent crime, etc., programs).	Delaware SPA, Wilmington Department of Public Safety.	282	150, 000
Small State supplement.....	Delaware SPA.....		48, 000
Total.....			<u>272, 730</u>
FLORIDA			
Police improvement programs—All others..	Florida SPA, Dade County.....	036	127, 612
D(i) Large city special grants.....	Florida SPA, city of St. Petersburg.....	074	150, 000
E-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence (training component).	Florida SPA, Dade County Public Safety Department.	104	77, 950
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Florida SPA, Miami Police Department.....	088	15, 000
J-1 Civil disorders T.A. units.....	Florida SPA.....	121	38, 758

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF--	Amount
FLORIDA—Continued			
D(vi) Large city special grants (organized crime).	Florida SPA, city of Miami.....	129	\$150,000
D(j) Street and violent crime reduction.	Florida SPA, city of Tampa.....	170	150,000
D(iv) Large city special grants.	Florida SPA, city of Jacksonville.....	139	150,000
G-2 Correctional center development—jail and juvenile.	Florida SPA, Groward County.....	153	49,763
G-1 Community based corrections.	Florida SPA, Florida Division of Youth Services.....	160	49,490
F-5 Statewide POST systems.	Florida SPA, Florida Police Standards Safety.....	208	30,000
D(i) Large city special grants (street and violent crime programs, etc.).	Florida SPA, city of Fort Lauderdale.....	198	150,000
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).	Florida SPA, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department.....	209	15,000
Do.....	Florida SPA, Fort Lauderdale Police Department.....	227	15,000
G-3 Multistate facilities for special offender types.	Florida SPA, Florida State University.....	431	154,437
I-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units.	Florida SPA, State department of law enforcement.....	435	290,626
M-1 Statewide criminal justice statistics programs.	do.....	420	40,000
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Florida SPA, city of Titusville.....	400	4,765
Do.....	Florida SPA, office of the sheriff, Duval County.....	330	8,000
Do.....	Florida SPA, Division of Adult Corrections..	331	8,000
Do.....	do.....	332	6,500
Total.....			<u>1,630,901</u>
GEORGIA			
Miscellaneous—training materials.	Georgia SPA, with institute of government, University of Georgia.....	027	50,000
Statewide organized crime intelligence units—all other.	Georgia SPA.....	030	16,400
J-1 Disorders T.A. unit.	Georgia SPA, Department of public safety ..	087	31,260
G-1 Community correctional programs.	Georgia SPA, University of Georgia.....	178	73,039
D(iii) Large city special grants (police/community cooperation).	Georgia SPA.....	220	84,080
D(i) and D(ii) Large city special grants (streets and violent crime programs, etc.) and police/community cooperation.	Georgia SPA, city of Gainesville.....	266	107,062
H—Miscellaneous—training for juvenile court judges.	Georgia SPA, national council of juvenile court judges.....	283	30,915
G-4 Correctional manager and trainer development.	Georgia SPA, University of Georgia.....	285	100,000
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Georgia SPA.....	377	6,500
Total.....			<u>499,256</u>
HAWAII			
E Small State allocation supplement.	Hawaii SPA.....		69,000
Total.....			<u>69,000</u>
IDAHO			
J-1 Disorders T.A. unit.	Idaho SPA.....	089	25,000
D(v) Large city special grants (narcotics and drug control program).	Idaho SPA, Boise Police Department.....	193	80,188
J-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units.	Idaho SPA, Idaho Department of Law Enforcement.....	183	48,017
D(iv) and D(ii) Large city special grants (police/community cooperation and juvenile programs).	Idaho SPA, city of Boise.....	205	44,721
Small State supplement.	Idaho SPA.....		63,900
F-5 Statewide police officer standards and training.	do.....	316	9,000
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Idaho SPA, Idaho Department of Health....	333	8,000
Total.....			<u>278,826</u>

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF--	Amount
ILLINOIS			
Miscellaneous—Information and statistics program.	Illinois SPA	050	\$6, 000
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/community cooperation).	Illinois SPA, Chicago Board of Education	274	232, 886
G-1 Community based corrections	Illinois SPA, Chicago Department of Human Resources.	272	103, 289
Do	Illinois Department of Corrections, Portland Cement Association.	270	199, 939
F-4 Police legal adviser	Illinois SPA, Peoria Police Department	409	15, 000
I-3 Organized crime investigatory and prosecutorial units.	State of Illinois, Office of Attorney General	274	250, 540
Total			807, 654
INDIANA			
I-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units.	Indiana SPA, Indiana State Police	101	150, 000
J-1 Civil disorder prevention units.	do	097	38, 985
F-4 Police professional aides (legal advisor).	Indiana SPA, Gary Police Department	165	15, 000
F-1 Police—Expanded laboratory services.	Indiana SPA, State Police	453	88, 780
D(i) Large city special grants (street and violent crime prog).	Indiana SPA, Indianapolis Police Department.	254	90, 948
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/community cooperation).	Indiana SPA, city of Gary	413	150, 000
F-1 Expanded laboratory services.	Indiana SPA, Indianapolis Police Department.	439	58, 370
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	do	378	4, 660
Total			596, 743
IOWA			
G-1 Community based	Iowa SPA, Bureau of Adult Correction Service.	195	24, 176
D(i) Large city special grants (street crime).	Iowa SPA, city of Des Moines	437	40, 000
K-1 State narcotics and drug abuse bureaus.	Iowa SPA, Iowa Department of Public Safety.	287	94, 100
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Iowa SPA, Iowa Bureau of Adult Correction Services.	334	7, 500
Total			165, 776
KANSAS			
F-4 Professional aides for police.	Kansas SPA, Wichita Police Department	076	15, 000
G-3 Multistate facilities for special offenders.	Kansas SPA, Sherman County	315	12, 439
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Kansas SPA, John County Juvenile Court, Olathe, Kans.	335	8, 000
Total			35, 439
KENTUCKY			
G-1 Community based corrections.	Kentucky SPA, State Department of Corrections.	102	127, 340
J-1 Civil disorders T.A. units	Kentucky SPA	100	40, 000
G-1 Community-based corrections.	Kentucky SPA, Kenton County Jail	132	53, 113
Miscellaneous RO discretionary option	Kentucky SPA, (for 8 Southeastern States)	137	15, 000
G-4 Correctional manager training	Kentucky SPA, Eastern Kentucky University (3-States: Tennessee, West Virginia, and Kentucky.	150	100, 068
G-2 Correctional center development—Jail and juvenile.	Kentucky SPA, Logan County	148	12, 494
J-2 Mutual aid compacts and programs re disorders.	Kentucky SPA	259	30, 000
G-1 Community based correctional programs.	Kentucky SPA, Kentucky Department of Child Welfare.	410	43, 216
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).	Kentucky SPA	225	15, 000
F-1 Expanded laboratory services.	Kentucky SPA, Kentucky State Police	442	119, 900
D(ii) Large city special grants (improving police community relations).	Kentucky SPA, Louisville, Ky	411	149, 910
F-1 Expanded laboratory programs	Kentucky SPA, city of Louisville	441	33, 100

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA = State Planning Agency]

D:F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF—	Amount
KENTUCKY—Continued			
M-1 Statewide statistics programs.....	Kentucky SPA, Kentucky State Police.....	291	\$29,940
D(i) Large city.....	Kentucky SPA, Bowling Green.....	430	91,200
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Kentucky SPA, Kentucky Department of Public Safety.	336	4,809
Do.....	337	5,309
Total.....	1,005,399
LOUISIANA			
G-1 Community-based corrections.....	Louisiana SPA, Jefferson Parish School Board.	067	155,558
G-2 Correctional centers, jail and juvenile detention.	Louisiana SPA, Regional Planning Commis- sion for Jefferson, Orleans, and St. Bernard Parishes.	122	117,540
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Louisiana SPA, New Orleans Police Depart- ment.	096	15,000
Do.....	Louisiana SPA, Jefferson Parish sheriff.....	123	15,000
J-3 Civil disorders prevention and coordi- nation programs.	Louisiana SPA, Baton Rouge Police Depart- ment.	267	48,708
G-1 Community based corrections.....	Louisiana SPA, city of Baton Rouge.....	133	44,392
I-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units.	Louisiana SPA, department of public safety.	408	183,10
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Louisiana SPA, Louisiana Department of Corrections.	379	3,500
Do.....	do.....	380	3,500
Do.....	Louisiana SPA, Jefferson Parish juvenile probation.	381	6,500
Total.....	592,801
MAINE			
Police improvement programs—all other.....	Maine SPA.....	029	59,800
J-3 Disorders prevention and coordination Small State supplement.....	do.....	245	27,880
F-3 Command and executive develop- ment; G-5 Executive development.	Maine SPA, city of Portland.....	338	4,500
Total.....	180,380
MARYLAND			
J-3 Disorder prevention units and coordi- nation programs.	Maryland SPA.....	049	153,470
G-1 Community-based corrections.....	Maryland SPA, Maryland Department of Juvenile Services.	140	112,810
G Corrections—Miscellaneous.....	Maryland SPA.....	175	16,650
Do.....	Maryland SPA, American Correctional As- sociation.	407	107,885
D(iii) Large city special grants (misdemeanor courts—delay reduction).	Maryland SPA, city of Baltimore.....	184	150,000
H-2 Prosecutive technical assistance and coordination.	Maryland SPA, Maryland State Attorneys Association.	199	29,456
M-1 Criminal Justice statistics programs.....	Maryland SPA.....	307	30,000
F-5 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Maryland SPA, Maryland Department of Correctional Services.	359	4,500
Do.....	Maryland SPA, Maryland Department of Parole and Probation.	340	6,500
Total.....	611,271
MASSACHUSETTS			
D Large-city special grants.....	Massachusetts SPA, city of Boston.....	073	150,390
G-1 Community-based corrections.....	Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Depart- ment of Corrections.	135	124,300
D(ii) Large-city special grants (police/com- munity cooperation).	Massachusetts SPA, city of Cambridge.....	105	21,295
D(iv) Large-city special grants (new juve- nile offender programs).	do.....	172	22,250
H-3 Court management studies.....	Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Superior Court.	145	75,000
G-1 Community based.....	Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Depart- ment of Youth Services.	438	200,000
D(v) Large-city special grants (narcotics and drug programs).	Massachusetts SPA, city of New Bedford....	265	45,172
F-2 Vertical policing services.....	Massachusetts SPA, Springfield Housing Authority.	421	85,000

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA = State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF—	Amount
MASSACHUSETTS—Continued			
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Massachusetts SPA, Massachusetts Department of Public Safety.	382	\$4,500
Do.....do.....	do.....do.....	383	3,500
Do.....do.....	do.....do.....	341	8,000
Total.....			739,407
MICHIGAN			
I-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units.	Michigan SPA, Michigan State Police.....	038	67,300
G-1 Community based corrections.....	Michigan SPA, Michigan Department of Corrections.	060	191,939
G-2 Correctional centers—Jail and juvenile detention.	Michigan SPA, Berien County, Mich.....	068	100,000
H-1 Prosecutor training courses.....	Michigan SPA, Wayne County Prosecutor's Office.	064	24,120
G-2 Correctional centers—Jail and juvenile detention.	Michigan SPA, Kalamazoo County.....	066	100,000
I-3 Organized crime—Statewide prosecutorial units.	Michigan SPA.....	065	63,500
G-1 Community based corrections.....	Michigan SPA (National conference on volunteer personnel).	113	15,000
D(i) Large city special grants (reduction of street and violent crime).	Michigan SPA, Flint Police division.....	179	150,000
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Michigan SPA, Oakland county prosecutor (with county sheriff and Pontiac Police Department).	182	14,745
G-2 Correctional centers—Jail and detention.	Michigan SPA, Wayne County Board of Commissioners.	230	89,500
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Michigan SPA, Warren Police Department...	194	15,000
F-2 Police professional aides (psychiatric).	Michigan SPA, Grand Rapids Police Department.	253	5,100
J-2 Disorders—Mutual aid compact and program development.	Michigan SPA, Downriver Mutual Aid Task Force.	243	25,000
M-1 Law enforcement information and statistics systems.	Michigan SPA, Michigan State Police.....	262	28,493
F-5 Police training and standards.....	Michigan SPA, Michigan Law Enforcement Officers Training Council.	232	30,000
D-1 State disorders technical assistance units.	Michigan SPA, Michigan State Police.....	255	32,416
G-2 Correction centers—jail and detention.	Michigan SPA, Kent County (Lansing).....	306	34,997
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Michigan SPA, Oakland County, Mich.....	322	15,000
F-2 Vertical policing services.....	Michigan SPA, city of Detroit.....	423	175,000
K-2 Metropolitan narcotics and drug enforcement groups.	Michigan SPA, city of East Lansing.....	406	53,551
H-1 Prosecutor training courses.....	Michigan SPA, Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.	319	25,625
D(i) Large city special grants (street and violent crime efforts).	Michigan SPA, Saginaw Police Department ..	416	3,352
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Michigan SPA, Detroit Police Department...	324	15,000
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	do.....do.....	384	3,500
Do.....do.....	do.....do.....	385	3,500
Do.....do.....	do.....do.....	386	6,500
Total.....			1,288,138
MINNESOTA			
G-2 Correctional centers—jail and juvenile detention.	Minnesota SPA, State Department of Corrections.	040	125,000
G-1 Community based.....	Minnesota SPA, Hennepin County Department of Court Services.	069	24,472
G-1 Community based corrections.....	Minnesota SPA, Ramsey County Juvenile Court.	176	13,200
G-2 Correction center—jail and detention.	Minnesota SPA, Hennepin County.....	236	100,000
F-5 Police standard and training programs.	Minnesota SPA, Minnesota Peace Officer Training Board.	219	25,000
K-1 State Narcotics and Drug Enforcement Bureaus.	Minnesota SPA, State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.	229	76,281
L-1 Indian law enforcement programs—Training.	Minnesota SPA, Minnesota Indian Affairs Commission.	251	50,844
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/community cooperation).	Minnesota SPA, city of Minneapolis.....	412	129,455
J-3 Disorders prevention and coordination.	Minnesota SPA, Minnesota Highway Patrol...	303	20,325
Total.....			564,577

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF—	Amount
MISSISSIPPI			
L-1 Indian law enforcement training programs.	Mississippi SPA, Mississippi Choctaw Indians.	239	\$3, 500
D(j) Large city special grants (reduction of street and violent crime, etc.).	Mississippi SPA, city of Jackson.....	221	150, 000
Total.....			<u>153, 500</u>
MISSOURI			
F-4 Police professional aides (psychiatric).	Missouri SPA, St. Louis County Police Department.	103	10, 000
G-1 Community based corrections.....	Missouri SPA, St. Louis Circuit Court.....	095	143, 577
G-2 Correctional center development—jail and juvenile.	Missouri SPA, Northwest Missouri LEA Council.	158	30, 000
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Missouri SPA, Missouri Highway Patrol.....	252	15, 000
F-1 Expanded laboratory services.....	Missouri SPA, University of Missouri Columbia.	461	54, 506
D(iv) Large city special grants (juvenile offender programs).	Missouri SPA, St. Louis Police Department..	312	69, 275
F-1 Expanded laboratory programs.....	Missouri SPA, St. Louis Police Department..	449	59, 500
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive Development.	Missouri SPA, police department, Kansas City.	342	4, 500
Total.....			<u>586, 158</u>
MONTANA			
G-1 Community based corrections.....	Montana SPA, Lewis and Clark County Welfare Department.	056	18, 000
L-1 Indian law enforcement programing... Small State supplement.....	Montana SPA, Fort Peck Tribes.....	134	17, 993
D(iv) Large city special grants (juvenile offender programs).	Montana SPA, Montana Legal Services Association Helena.	404	7, 334
L-1 Indian criminal justice training grants..	Montana SPA, Blackfeet Indian Tribe.....	289	28, 387
Total.....			<u>134, 414</u>
NEBRASKA			
G-2 Community based corrections.....	Nebraska SPA, Omaha-Council Bluffs Regional Community Correction Center.	048	59, 796
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Nebraska SPA, Lincoln Police Department and Lancaster County Sheriff.	086	15, 000
D(i) Street and violent crime reduction.....	Nebraska SPA, city of Omaha.....	131	150, 000
M-1 Law enforcement information and statistics systems.	Nebraska SPA.....	202	28, 556
Total.....			<u>253, 352</u>
NEVADA			
G-1 Community based corrections.....	Nevada SPA, Nevada Youth Training Center..	110	35, 453
D(i)(ii) Large city special grants.....	Nevada SPA, city of Las Vegas.....	144	150, 000
Small State supplement.....	Nevada SPA.....		95, 000
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Nevada SPA, Clark County.....	432	15, 000
Total.....			<u>295, 453</u>
NEW HAMPSHIRE			
D-4 Large city special grants.....	New Hampshire SPA, city of Manchester....	077	146, 250
G-1 Community based corrections.....	New Hampshire SPA, New Hampshire Probation Department.	173	15, 810
F-5 Police standards and training programs.	New Hampshire SPA, State department of education.	250	24, 000
J-3 Civil disorders prevention and coordination.	New Hampshire SPA.....	212	20, 893
F-1 Expanded police laboratory services....	New Hampshire SPA, State police division..	443	26, 500
E Small State allocation supplement.....	New Hampshire SPA.....	63, 400	
Total.....			<u>296, 853</u>
NEW JERSEY			
M-1 Statewide Statistics programs.....	New Jersey SPA, New Jersey State Police..	279	30, 000
F-1 Expanded Laboratory Services.....	do.....	446	120, 000
Miscellaneous—Information and statistics program.*	New Jersey SPA.....	050	6, 000

1970. DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF—	Amount
NEW JERSEY—Continued			
G-1 Community based corrections.....	New Jersey SPA, New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies.	057	\$88,463
I-3 Statewide investigatory and prosecu- torial units.	New Jersey SPA, Department of Law and Public Safety.	116	196,492
I-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units.	New Jersey SPA, Division of State Police...	117	58,846
G-1 Community based corrections.....	New Jersey SPA, State Health Department (Division of Narcotics and Drug Abuse).	092	100,000
H-1 Prosecutor training courses.....	New Jersey SPA, Department of Law and Public Safety.	106	31,570
I-1 Interstate intelligence analysis centers.	New Jersey SPA, Waterfront Commission (N.J./N.Y.).	156	251,554
J-3 Disorder prevention and coordination programs.	New Jersey SPA, Department of Law and Public Safety.	171	100,000
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/ community cooperation).	New Jersey SPA, Atlantic City.....	181	131,389
F-5 Police standards and training pro- grams.	New Jersey SPA, New Jersey Police Training Commission.	258	30,000
J-1 Disorders, statewide technical assist- ance units.	New Jersey SPA, New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety.	248	54,025
D(i) Large city special grants (street, violent crime, etc. programs).	New Jersey SPA, Newark Police Depart- ment.	310	149,974
F-3 Command and executive development; G-5 Executive development.do.....	388	8,000
Total.....			1,356,313
NEW MEXICO			
Small State supplement.....	New Mexico SPA.....		89,000
F (miscellaneous) evaluation of police/ community cooperation.	New Mexico SPA, city of Albuquerque.....	311	27,150
Total.....			116,150
NEW YORK			
I-1 Interstate intelligence analysis and dissemination centers.	New York SPA.....	043	168,432
D-4 Large city special grants.....	New York SPA, Volunteer Opportunities, Inc.	055	207,597
F-4 Police professional aides (psychiatric).	New York SPA, Syracuse Police Department.	062	10,000
I-2 Organized crime-statewide intelligence systems.	New York SPA, New York State identifica- tion and intelligence units.	070	57,000
I-3 Statewide organized crime investigatory and prosecutorial units.	New York SPA, New York State Department of Law.	112	250,000
F-4 Professional aides for police.....	New York SPA, Niagara Falls Police Depart- ment.	078	15,000
D-1 Large city DF grant.....	New York SPA, city of Buffalo, N.Y.....	180	130,500
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	New York SPA, Syracuse Police Department.	196	15,000
G-1 Community based corrections.....	New York SPA, Nassau County Crime Coun- cil.	242	120,613
H-1 Prosecutive technical assistance and coordination.	New York SPA.....	203	34,610
G-1 Community based corrections pro- grams.	New York SPA, Christian Herald.....	223	190,030
D(i) Large city special grants (street, vio- lent crime, etc. programs).	New York SPA, Yonkers, N.Y.....	277	67,740
D(i) Large city special grants (street and violent crime efforts).	New York SPA, Poughkeepsie Police Depart- ment.	405	27,589
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	New York SPA, Office of Probation for the Courts of New York City.	350	8,000
Do.....	New York SPA, State Department of correc- tions.	351	8,000
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive Development.....	New York SPA, State department of cor- rections.	352	8,600
Do.....	New York SPA, State division of parole.....	353	8,000
Do.....	do.....	354	6,500
Do.....	New York SPA, State police.....	343	6,500
Do.....	do.....	344	6,500
Do.....	do.....	345	8,000
Do.....	do.....	346	4,500
Do.....	do.....	347	8,000
Do.....	New York SPA, State municipal police train- ing council.	348	8,000
Do.....	New York SPA, police department, New York City.	349	3,500

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF—	Amount
NEW YORK—Continued			
F-3 Command and executive development; G-5 Executive development.	New York SPA, Schenectady.....	389	\$6,500
Do.....	New York SPA, Buffalo Police Department..	390	8,000
Do.....	do.....	391	3,500
Total.....			<u>1,395,611</u>
NORTH CAROLINA			
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	North Carolina SPA, Winston-Salem Police Department.	136	15,000
G-2 Correctional centers—Jail and deten- tion.	North Carolina SPA, Cumberland County..	177	92,970
G-1 Community based corrections.....	North Carolina SPA.....	231	184,984
G-1 Community based corrections pro- grams.	North Carolina SPA, North Carolina De- partment of Juvenile Corrections.	210	190,517
D(i) Large city special grants (street and violent crime programs, etc.).	North Carolina SPA, city of Charlotte.....	428	150,000
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/com- munity cooperations).	North Carolina SPA, city of Winston-Salem..	271	69,955
F-1 Expanded police laboratory services...	North Carolina SPA, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation.	445	60,000
F-3 Command and executive development; G-5 Executive development.	North Carolina SPA, North Carolina De- partment of Corrections.	387	3,500
Do.....	do.....	355	8,000
Do.....	do.....	356	3,500
Total.....			<u>778,426</u>
NORTH DAKOTA			
D(v) Large city special grants (narcotics and dangerous drugs programs).	North Dakota SPA, city of Fargo.....	146	12,435
D(i) Large city special grants (reduction of street and violent crime).	do.....	157	73,155
Small State supplement.....	North Dakota SPA.....		56,200
F-5 Police standards and training programs.	North Dakota SPA, North Dakota Highway Patrol.	304	29,886
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/com- munity cooperation).	North Dakota SPA, Fargo Police Department..	288	21,320
F-3 Command and executive development; G-5 Executive development.	North Dakota SPA, North Dakota Highway Patrol.	357	4,446
Do.....	North Dakota SPA, North Dakota State Penitentiary.	392	8,000
Total.....			<u>205,442</u>
OHIO			
Miscellaneous—Information and statistics program.	Ohio SPA.....	050	6,000
H-3 Individual court management studies...	Ohio SPA.....	052	82,840
D(i) Large city special grants.....	Ohio SPA, city of Cleveland.....	147	141,146
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Ohio SPA, Dayton Police Department.....	149	14,866
K-2 Metropolitan narcotics and drug en- forcement units.	Ohio SPA, Stark Council of Governments...	189	85,156
G-2 Correctional centers—jail and deten- tion.	Ohio SPA, district 8 planning office.....	263	65,100
F-4 Police professional aides (psychiatric)...	Ohio SPA, Dayton Police Department.....	213	10,000
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/com- munity cooperation).	Ohio SPA, Dayton Police Department.....	418	149,506
D(iv) Large city special grants (juvenile defender programs).	Ohio SPA, city of Toledo.....	204	75,900
G-1 Community based correctional pro- grams.	Ohio SPA, Dayton Health Division.....	309	200,000
D(iv) Large city special grants (juvenile offender programs).	Ohio SPA, Toledo Model Cities.....	281	12,000
G-1 Community based programs.....	Ohio SPA, Ohio Parole Authority.....	275	88,021
F-2 Vertical policing services.....	Ohio SPA, Cuyahoga County (Cleveland)...	300	112,677
D(vii) Large city special grants.....	Ohio SPA, city of Akron.....	429	127,151
G-4 Corrections training (manager and trainer development).	Ohio SPA, Ohio State University.....	284	93,750
J-5 Disorders prevention and coordination programs.	Ohio SPA, Dayton Police Department.....	292	98,595
F-1 Expanded police laboratory services...	Ohio SPA, Columbus Division of Police.....	440	24,505
J-1 Statewide disorders technical assist- ance units.	Ohio SPA.....	425	60,000

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF—	Amount
OHIO—Continued			
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/community cooperation).	Ohio SPA, city of Toledo	433	\$6,840
D(i) Large city special grants (street and violent crime efforts).	Ohio SPA, Cincinnati Police Division	323	117,180
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	do	395	8,000
Total			1,579,215
OKLAHOMA			
1-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units—all other	Oklahoma SPA	037	21,895
G-1 Community based corrections	do	126	182,375
F-4 Police professional aides (legal)	Oklahoma SPA, Oklahoma City Police Department	185	15,000
J-1 State disorders technical assistance units.	Oklahoma SPA, Office of Interagency Coordination.	211	18,347
J-3 Disorders prevention and coordination	do	222	11,606
D(ii) Police/community relations	Oklahoma SPA, Oklahoma City Police Department.	402	150,511
Total			399,734
OREGON			
G-1 Community based corrections	Oregon SPA, Oregon Corrections Division (Portland area).	120	51,734
Do	Oregon SPA, State Department of Corrections.	138	96,432
G-1 Community based correctional programs.	Oregon SPA, Oregon Corrections Division	218	53,912
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/community cooperation).	Oregon SPA, city of Portland	325	150,000
F-1 Expanded police laboratory services	Oregon SPA, Oregon State Police	477	27,934
Total			380,012
PENNSYLVANIA			
Miscellaneous—Information and statistics program.	Pennsylvania SPA	050	6,000
D(v) Large city special grants (narcotics and drug control program).	Pennsylvania SPA, Wilkes-Barre Police Department.	190	17,986
D(vii) Large city special grants (citywide coordinating councils).	Pennsylvania SPA, city of Reading	240	147,711
D(i) Large city special grants (street and violent crime programs, etc.).	Pennsylvania SPA, city of Pittsburgh	224	146,984
G-2 Correctional centers—Jail and juvenile	Pennsylvania SPA, city of Philadelphia	268	100,000
F-1 Expanded laboratory services	Pennsylvania SPA	444	120,000
G Miscellaneous (RO operational referral—training conference).	Pennsylvania SPA, Bucks County Department.	424	1,006
D(vii) Large city special grants (citywide coordinating councils).	Pennsylvania SPA, Philadelphia, Pa	293	250,000
G-4 Correctional manager/trainer development.	Pennsylvania SPA, National Council on Crime and Delinquency.	434	109,910
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Pennsylvania SPA, Philadelphia Prisons Department of Public Welfare.	393	3,500
Total			903,097
RHODE ISLAND			
I-3 Organized crime investigatory and prosecutorial unit.	Rhode Island SPA, Office of the Attorney General.	085	48,200
D(i) Large city special grants (efforts to reduce street and violent crime).	Rhode Island SPA, city of Providence	155	140,655
F-5 Police standards and training	Rhode Island SPA, Municipal Police Training Council.	217	30,000
M-1 Statewide statistics programs	Rhode Island SPA, Rhode Island State Police.	295	26,451
Small State supplement	Rhode Island SPA		81,900
Total			327,206

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF—	Amount
SOUTH CAROLINA			
G-1 Community based corrections.....	South Carolina SPA, South Carolina Department of Corrections.	054	\$200,000
G-1 Community based corrections.....	South Carolina SPA, South Carolina Department of Corrections.	058	114,433
J-1 Civil disorder prevention units.....	South Carolina SPA.....	093	24,000
D(v) Large cities special grants (narcotics and drug programs).	South Carolina SPA, city of Columbia.....	166	101,721
H-1 and H-2 Prosecutor training courses and prosecutor T.A. (combined).	South Carolina SPA, State attorney General.	244	32,186
G-1 Community based correctional programs.	South Carolina SPA, South Carolina Department of Corrections.	276	87,923
F-5 Statewide police officer standards and training.	South Carolina SPA.....	321	18,000
Total.....			<u>578,263</u>
SOUTH DAKOTA			
D(i) Large city special grants (street and violent crime programs, etc.).	South Dakota SPA, Sioux Falls Police Department.	280	69,843
Small State supplement.....	South Dakota SPA.....		59,900
Total.....			<u>129,743</u>
TENNESSEE			
F-4 Police professional aides (legal).....	Tennessee SPA, Knoxville Police Department.	128	11,500
G-1 Community based corrections programs.	Tennessee SPA, city of Chattanooga.....	142	95,371
D(iv) Large city special grants (juvenile offender programs).	Tennessee SPA, city of Smithville.....	320	9,300
D(i) Large city special grants (street, violent crime, etc. programs).	Tennessee SPA, Nashville Metro Police Department.	305	150,000
Total.....			<u>266,171</u>
TEXAS			
G-1 Community based corrections.....	Texas SPA.....	033	35,000
I-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units.	Texas SPA, Texas Department of Public Safety.	141	213,669
G-1 Community based corrections.....	Texas SPA, Dallas County.....	161	27,000
D(i) Large city special grants (special efforts in reduction of street and violent crime, etc.).	Texas SPA, city of Dallas.....	187	150,000
D-1 Large city special grants (special efforts in reduction of street and violent crime, etc.).	Texas SPA, city of Austin.....	228	50,135
H-1 Prosecutor training courses.....	Texas SPA, National College of District Attorneys.	302	10,500
M-1 Law enforcement information and statistics systems.	Texas SPA.....	260	30,000
K (Miscellaneous) special narcotics control program.	Texas SPA, Texas Education Agency.....	298	115,000
F-1 Expanded laboratory services.....	Texas SPA, Texas Department of Public Safety.	452	91,688
D(v) Large city special grants (narcotics and drug programs).	Texas SPA, Fort Worth.....	237	121,416
D(v) Large city special grants (narcotics and drug programs).	Texas SPA, El Paso.....	286	101,854
G-1 Community based programs (juvenile delinquency).	Texas SPA, Vocational Guidance Service Houston.	297	118,968
G-1 Community based programs.....	Texas SPA, El Paso COG.....	299	113,480
D(iv) Large city special grants (juvenile offender programs).	Texas SPA, city of Waco.....	301	47,180
H-2 Prosecutive technical assistance units.	Texas SPA, attorney general.....	427	54,846
F-3 Command and executive development G-5 Executive development.	Texas SPA, city of Dallas.....	360	5,690
F-3 Command and executive development G-5 Executive development.do.....	361	7,000
F-3 Command and executive development G-5 Executive development.	Texas SPA, city of San Antonio.....	362	8,000
F-3 Command and executive development G-5 Executive development.	Texas SPA, Department of Public Safety...	396	6,364
F-3 Command and executive development G-5 Executive development.do.....	397	4,176
Total.....			<u>1,311,966</u>

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA = State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF—	Amount
UTAH			
E Small State allocation supplement (combined with 70-A-144)	Utah SPA		\$71,000
L-1 Indian law enforcement programs	Utah SPA, Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation	063	5,938
G-1 Community based corrections	Utah SPA, Utah State Division of Corrections	111	141,119
Do	Utah SPA, State Juvenile Court	162	28,342
G-4 Correctional manager and trainee development	Utah SPA, Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education	261	79,604
F-5 Police standards and training programs	Utah SPA, Peace Officer Standards and Training Council	290	30,000
F-3 Command and executive development; G-5 executive development	Utah SPA, Utah State Juvenile Court	363	6,500
Total			362,503
VERMONT			
D-1 Large city special grants	Vermont SPA, Winooski model cities program	053	6,600
G-1 Community based correctional programs	Vermont SPA, Vermont Department of Corrections	059	77,992
F-4 Police professional aides (psychiatric)	Vermont SPA	422	10,000
G-2 Correction center—jail and detention	Vermont SPA, Vermont Department of Corrections	234	6,000
M-1 Law enforcement information and statistics systems	Vermont SPA, Vermont Department of Public Safety	246	30,000
Small State supplement	Vermont SPA		113,000
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 executive development	Vermont SPA, department of corrections	364	6,500
Total			250,092
VIRGINIA			
F-5 Statewide police standards and training systems	Virginia SPA, Virginia Training Standards Commission	152	26,335
G-1 Community based corrections	Virginia SPA, Virginia Probation and Parole Board	207	196,310
K-1 State narcotics and drug enforcement bureaus	Virginia SPA, Governor's Council on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Control	206	74,029
J-1 State disorders technical assistance units	Virginia SPA	216	31,318
F-1 Expanded laboratory programs	Virginia SPA, city of Portsmouth	450	59,050
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 executive development	Virginia SPA, Department of Welfare and Institutions	398	6,500
Do	do	399	7,000
Total			400,542
WASHINGTON			
I-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units	Washington SPA, Office of the State AG	124	49,965
G-1 Community based correctional programs	Washington SPA, State department of institutions	314	100,000
Total			149,965
WEST VIRGINIA			
Miscellaneous—workshops and conferences	West Virginia SPA	031	2,700
I-2 Statewide organized crime intelligence units	West Virginia SPA, P.P. & P. commission	167	193,739
J-1 Civil disorders T.A. units	West Virginia SPA, West Virginia Department of Public Safety	274	26,291
G-1 Community based corrections programs	West Virginia SPA, Marshall County Court	241	49,000
Total			271,730
WISCONSIN			
Special D.F. grant	Wisconsin SPA, National League of Cities/ U.S. Conference of Mayors	264	240,575
G-1 Community based corrections	Wisconsin SPA, State department of health and social services	083	67,332

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 70-DF—	Amount
WISCONSIN—Continued			
I-3 Organized crime investigatory and prosecutorial units.	Wisconsin SPA, Wisconsin Department of Justice.	098	\$138,880
D(v) Large city special grants (narcotics and drug programs).	Wisconsin SPA, city of Milwaukee	183	73,531
M-1 Statewide criminal justice statistics.	Wisconsin SPA, State department of justice.	256	30,000
D(ii) Large city special grants (police/community co-op).	Wisconsin SPA, city of Milwaukee	317	53,299
Total			603,617
WYOMING			
G-1 Community based corrections.	Wyoming SPA, Wyoming Department of Health and Social Services.	125	50,312
Small State supplement.	Wyoming SPA		210,000
G-1 Community based corrections.	Wyoming SPA, Southeast Mental Health Board.	215	26,580
Total			286,892
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA			
Miscellaneous—Delinquency prevention programs.	District of Columbia SPA	028	61,000
Miscellaneous—Special narcotics control programs.	do	032	82,500
Large-city special grants.	District of Columbia SPA, Washington Metropolitan Police Department.	045	1,239,000
Do	District of Columbia SPA, District of Columbia Narcotics Treatment Agency.	046	869,883
Do	District of Columbia SPA, District of Columbia government, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Office of Crime Analysis.	047	100,000
Corrections improvement program—all other.	District of Columbia SPA, District of Columbia Department of Corrections.	051	38,117
Small-State supplement.	District of Columbia SPA		72,300
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	District of Columbia SPA, Metropolitan Police Department.	374	3,075
Do	do	375	3,075
Do	do	372	3,500
Do	do	373	3,500
Do	do	376	3,075
Total			2,479,025
AMERICAN SAMOA			
E—Small State allocation supplement (combined with 70-A-153).	American Samoa SPA		22,000
GUAM			
E—Small State allocation supplement.	Guam SPA		105,020
PUERTO RICO			
C-4 Civil disorders technical assistance units.	Puerto Rico SPA	075	40,000
F-4 Professional aides for police.	Puerto Rico SPA, Puerto Rico Police Department.	082	10,000
F-4 Police professional aides (legal)	do	197	15,000
D(iv) Large city special grants (juvenile offenders programs).	Puerto Rico SPA, city of San Juan	235	139,145
F-3 Command and executive development, G-5 Executive development.	Puerto Rico SPA, police of Puerto Rico	358	3,500
Do	do	359	3,500
Do	Puerto Rico SPA, Division of Corrections, Department of Justice.	394	8,000
Total			219,145

1970 DISCRETIONARY GRANT AWARDS—STATE BY STATE—Continued

[SPA=State Planning Agency]

D.F. program	Grantee and implementing agency	Grant No. 78-DF—	Amount
VIRGIN ISLANDS			
G-2 Correctional Centers—Jail and detention.	Virgin Islands SPA, Virgin Islands Department of Public Safety.	233	\$60,000
F-1 Expanded laboratory services.....	Virgin Islands SPA, Department of Public Safety	454	25,000
Small State supplement.....	Virgin Islands SPA.....		150,000
Total.....			235,000
MULTISTATE			
Statewide organized crime intelligence units—All other.	Various units of State and local governments.	034	49,100
Information and statistics program.....	Various States (10 State projects) (California, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Texas, Washington, and Arizona).	041	747,740
Miscellaneous—Organized crime training...	Selected State and local units (Continuation of LEAA State and local traineeships in IRS Special Agent Basic School).	164	59,500
I-1 Interstate intelligence analysis and dissemination centers.	Massachusetts SPA.....	044	598,430
H-1 Prosecutor training courses.....	Minnesota SPA, National District Attorneys Association.	257	182,590
H-3 Individual court management studies	Colorado SPA, institute for court management.	269	357,000
Total.....			1,994,560

Representative CONABLE. How many Federal employees are involved in this program?

Mr. VELDE. Currently we have 300.

Representative CONABLE. Is that going to be expanded, I assume, as your budget goes up?

Mr. VELDE. Yes. By the end of next June we are authorized to hire an additional 85 employees.

Representative CONABLE. What is the size of our total Federal police force at the present time?

Mr. VELDE. The total Federal police force is about 24,000 of which 17,000 are in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Representative CONABLE. Are these all agents?

Mr. VELDE. No. Total employees.

Representative CONABLE. The number of agents would be very much less than that?

Mr. VELDE. The number of agents would be about 8,000.

Representative CONABLE. And that is the core of the Federal police force; is that correct?

Mr. VELDE. That is correct.

Representative CONABLE. I am concerned about the number of Federal crimes we are creating nowadays and how we are going to handle them, how we are going to handle the administration of justice in the Federal courts with all these new Federal criminal obligations being created by Congress. I realize that people are expecting the Federal Government to take a much more active interest but I wonder how the creation of all these Federal crimes squares with the manner of administration of the LEAA. Are we going in two different courses that are likely to put us in a contradictory kind of a developmental path here in the administration of justice?

Mr. VELDE. Well, as you know, Congressman, the Federal criminal jurisdiction is an extremely limited one. Our estimates are that only about 4 percent of the total crime committed in this country represents violations of Federal criminal laws. The Federal police force includes only about 10,000 enforcement agents out of approximately 450,000 full-time police throughout the country. Only about 10 percent of the inmates are incarcerated in Federal institutions.

The LEAA program is one which by our enabling legislation, is limited to assisting State and local governments. The one exception is in the research field where our National Institute does engage in research that is of interest to Federal law enforcement as well. But, basically, our program is one to assist State and local governments.

Representative CONABLE. With the distribution formula you have, do you wind up with a good deal of money unexpended at the present time or have you been able to improve on the problems of fiscal 1969 in that respect?

Mr. VELDE. Yes. There is a timelag or a "pipeline" that has built up and that affects the expenditure level of the funds. So far we have had no difficulty obligating the money—that is, actually technically transferring it to the States so it will not revert to the U.S. Treasury.

There is a "pipeline" not only from the standpoint of the delivery system making the money available to the ultimate user, whether it be a local government, a county or State agency, but, of course, when a project is approved and the money made available to the local government, in relatively few instances does all of the money actually flow to the city on the initial date, the startup date of the project. The money is made available in installments over the life of the project. This is the case in construction and most other programs. So, there is a substantial "pipeline" on the expenditure side.

Representative CONABLE. The "pipeline" problems apparently are accentuated by the uneven development of State systems for the administration of justice. Do you find that there are any States that are resisting the cooperation implicit in the LEAA?

Mr. VELDE. There is an uneven picture so far.

Representative CONABLE. Well, you have described the shocking condition in Pennsylvania. They do not even know how many police forces they have, how many police establishments?

Mr. VELDE. Well, you know, you have to realize it was 1969 with their initial efforts done on very short notice.

Representative CONABLE. Apparently there cannot have been any very substantial State plan there at all. Perhaps that is one of the major impacts the LEAA will have. It will force the States to have plans.

Mr. VELDE. That is correct.

Representative CONABLE. But do you find any resistance to the idea? Are there some States who are leary of Federal assistance in this area because of the possibility of Federal control following it? Do you find this concern expressed in your relationship with the States?

Mr. VELDE. Yes. This is a concern. In fact, in one State, North Dakota, there will be a statewide referendum this fall in which I believe there will be an attempt to have our State planning agency abolished. I think there is a fear, at least by those who signed the petitions for the referendum that our program could lead to Federal domination and control.

Representative CONABLE. Is there any particular agency in a State opposing this like, for instance, the sheriffs?

Mr. VELDE. No.

Representative CONABLE. County sheriffs?

Mr. VELDE. No.

Representative CONABLE. Is there some particular type of State law enforcement that is resisting in particular?

Mr. VELDE. No. Not that I know of. There is no formal group, professional or State or local, opposing the program, to the best of my knowledge.

Representative CONABLE. The reason I asked that is that we have had a high degree of pluralism in law enforcement and it has generally been considered desirable, for instance, that the typical citizen can turn to the local constabulary or he can turn to the sheriff or he can turn to the State trooper, and all these three elements are being bound into the process, are they not? In the LEAA there is no particular reason for one or another to feel that its role is being downgraded in relation to the pluralism the citizens have generally considered desirable in being able to turn to a number of different sources for law enforcement protection.

Mr. VELDE. There certainly are vested interests in the criminal justice community as there are in any other aspect of government. For example, when we attempt to establish regional correctional facilities to replace outmoded county jails we find a great deal of resistance on the part of county sheriffs, who in some States still operate under the fee system. They have relatives on the payrolls of these institutions. They stand to lose financially by the replacement of those county institutions?

That is just one example of many that could be cited.

There is this vestige, I hope merely a vestige, of separateness, of vested interest. I think it is crumbling away, but in some cases, I must tell you very frankly, the only way it will be removed is if the principals involved either retire or find some other employment.

Representative CONABLE. One last question. Is your research in this area, in the area of law enforcement, seriously inhibited by the lack of trained personnel? You obviously have a comparatively small Federal establishment administering the LEAA. Are the States themselves feeling the pinch in terms of training of researchers and planners and is this a major factor that is being addressed by the allocation of discretionary funds?

Mr. VELDE. I think there is a serious shortage. There has been a serious shortage of trained planners who are knowledgeable about the criminal justice system. When our program was initiated 2 years ago, the State agencies had great difficulty in staffing with professionals who knew planning and who also knew something about the criminal justice system. You did not have enough people with experience with both. We have now had 2 years in which, I would say, substantial gains have been made in establishing a new profession which never existed before.

Now, in the area of research, there are similar problems, although I do not think they are really as pronounced. A person trained in scientific skills and disciplines can apply those talents to new areas.

When you look at a problem in the criminal justice area you use the same techniques, the same approach as in tackling any other scientific or research problem. The question is identifying the problems of the criminal justice community, communicating them to those who have the experience and know-how and the resources to tackle them.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I was talking, Mr. Velde, with you about the appalling situation of young people getting in trouble and what an overwhelming proportion of them do. Fifty percent according to statistics that we had, a very much higher percentage for minority groups, and you indicated increased emphasis on correctional programs for juveniles, especially correctional institutions, et cetera.

I think that is fine. But what about the programs for keeping these young people from going to the correctional institutions in the first place? Not only prevention of crime but also improved juvenile courts and psychiatric and social services, et cetera.

What I have in mind is this. We asked Chief Ahern about the young man who snatches a purse and gets pulled in and he said well, we have no time for them. We have to be concerned about big crime, the big criminals. They will fine him or send a letter to his mother or something like that but they do not sit down with him and have an opportunity to talk and find out what is wrong and see if there is something that can be done to straighten him out, give him encouragement, to give him an opportunity to do something that would help get him away from crime. And obviously, what they are doing is not working. It is failing. It is getting worse.

In what department do responsibilities for this lie, in your Department or in the HEW area?

Mr. VELDE. Mr. Chairman, our program is basically one to improve the institutions and programs of the criminal justice system. Our objectives, as defined by Congress, are somewhat narrow. The emphasis is to improve the system, the establishment of criminal justice. I mentioned that we do have a substantial effort in the juvenile area, particularly in corrections, and, as I outlined, in the drug area we have education programs.

Chairman PROXMIRE. You see, what concerns me is that we have to wait until June, as I understand, before HEW is going to come forward with some proposals for improving that program.

Mr. VELDE. No. The current authority expires on June 30. I think the administration will be sending its amendments to Congress shortly. There have been a number of bills already introduced individually to modify—

Chairman PROXMIRE. We can expect that shortly and do not have to wait until next summer.

Mr. VELDE. That is correct. Of course, these bills are processed by the Labor and Education Committee. So, it is within their jurisdiction. But the criminal justice system, Mr. Chairman, with relationship to juveniles, in a literal sense, is at the end of the line. We get involved with the juvenile only when the other institutions of society have essentially failed—the church, the home, the school. Of course, our program is not and was not designed by Congress to deal with these other institutions. So often when you get into the prevention area, you are right back to why the school is not doing a better job or why the family unit is breaking down—the so-called causes of crime by juveniles and delinquent behavior.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I think that is all correct.

Mr. VELDE. And there are other Federal programs and State programs designed to work in these areas.

Chairman PROXMIRE. But there are things that the police can do to help constructively.

Mr. VELDE. Absolutely.

Chairman PROXMIRE. One of the criticisms we got from Chief Ahern was we have a situation now where in Connecticut, which is the most prosperous State in the Union, highest income, and an enlightened State, they have a training program that is a disgrace. For a policeman, 5 weeks, hair dressers, 12 weeks. Police are required to be trained for only 5 weeks.

It would seem that part of the Federal effort should be to encourage higher standards and to do what is possible to assist in achieving those. In fact, it would seem to me that this money which is always going to be limited, and it is going to be substantially less than the amount that State and local government will pay, should be concentrated in setting criteria, in providing for planning, and in doing what can be done to help the local law enforcement agencies develop qualified personnel.

It was pointed out that in 1969, 40 percent of the LEAA money was spent for planning. In 1970, 9 percent, 1971, 4 percent. So that the amount of planning money just remains constant.

What is happening is that this money just goes into substantive programs but without the kind of particular assistance and peculiar assistance the Federal Government should provide by insisting on having the money devoted to improving what they are doing and finding out what they are doing wrong and correcting it.

Mr. VELDE. Well, as you know, Mr. Chairman, the appropriations committees are somewhat concerned with what they call the administrative overhead of any Federal aid program. This is not peculiar to the LEAA program at all. In every categorical grant-in-aid program there is yearly concern that the administrative expenses, the overhead, does not substantially eat into the action funds available to serve the purposes of the program. And that is a concern in our program as well as others.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do you think that concern is misplaced? Are you satisfied with the current planning and evaluation procedures?

Mr. VELDE. So far, Mr. Chairman, we have not had any substantial indication from the States that the planning funds made available are inadequate. There are a few exception to this.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I think that is right but we all know on the basis of testimony we have had, that the States need to be prodded on this and that the States simply are not asking for the kind of things they should. You gave a dramatic example in your testimony of the city that had gotten two little items of equipment because they had not asked for more. So, I think if we use that as a basis for not providing adequate planning it is not very satisfactory.

Mr. VELDE. I think there is a substantial need for more planning funds to be made available to local governments. As you know, the pending amendments, well, the Senate and House versions are different, but both versions do authorize more funds, either action or planning, to be made available to local government. I think there is a defi-

nite need in this area. And to the extent that Congress is willing to appropriate these funds, I think there will be an interest on the part of the administration to see that they are provided.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do State agencies have the skilled personnel they need to do planning and evaluation?

Mr. VELDE. They are developing them, Mr. Chairman. As I indicated earlier, 2 years ago there was no such thing as a profession of criminal justice planning. You had some people who had planning backgrounds and others who had experience as police or in courts or corrections, whatever the case may be, but you had few people with both. We are now building this profession and I think great progress has been made.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do they employ outside consultants?

Mr. VELDE. Yes; they do.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Are they qualified; do you think?

Mr. VELDE. Yes and no. I think in some cases there is very good technical assistance available, particularly in the corrections area, not only through LEAA but through professional organizations, and other Federal agencies as well, such as the Bureau of Prisons.

In the police area, of course, you have the IACP, which has a substantial number of requests, technical assistance requests, that it is responding to. But by and large in the management and information systems area, there has not been technical assistance available that is directly related to criminal justice.

Chairman PROXMIRE. In view of this need that you describe, the fact that you do not have these people, you have some, they have part of the training but not all of it, what role should the Federal Government be playing in trying to develop qualified personnel?

Mr. VELDE. The Federal Government should play an important role in two areas. And I think LEAA is presently engaged rather substantially in both areas. First, in providing technical assistance itself. Last year, fiscal 1970, we had \$1.2 million available for technical assistance and this just buys services of experts to go to the field upon request in whatever area it is required. We responded to well over 300 requests last year. This year we will have \$4 million available for these consulting services. That is one area where the Federal Government should play and is playing an important role.

Now, a second area is in providing support and assistance at the university level to build up programs, and we have programs in some—

Chairman PROXMIRE. That was criticized on the ground that the police university study tended to be segregated, that the people who were involved in the criminal justice work were often on one side of the campus, one school, and were not given an opportunity to get the influence that they would have if they were exposed to a broader curriculum. I do not know if this is justified or not but it was criticized on those grounds.

Mr. VELDE. We are treading on a very delicate area here, Mr. Chairman. We have 900 active programs going right now and many of these programs are in the narrow area of police science. But also many more of them are broader programs in the criminal justice area, in planning and research, in information sciences, in the liberal arts, just about the entire gamut of higher educational pursuits. We have, in our pending

amendments, requested authority to work more in the area of curriculum development.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, certainly a vigorous informational program and maybe with some examples of success in areas—Sauselito, Calif., it seems to me, had an example—it just comes back to me—of having used a psychiatrist very effectively with their police people and the police people liked it and it was successful in the community. At first, of course, it was greeted with a lot of ridicule but it worked out to the satisfaction of both the community and the police force. This kind of thing, it seems to me, if done imaginatively, at the initiative of the Federal Government, can change some of these attitudes.

Mr. VELDE. We did have a discretionary grant program last year and this fiscal year in that area you mentioned, police psychiatrists in legal services. This year it has been broadened to include consultants in other fields if the police department has a specific need.

Chairman PROXMIRE. One of the most successful programs in terms of improving efficiency, productivity, has been the county agent in the agricultural program, fantastically successful. The county agent system simply works by providing a system of explaining innovations, productive techniques. Of course, there is a different kind of motivation for a farmer than a police department, but nevertheless, the concept is there. It has worked well. Why can't something like that be used to stimulate innovation and to help police understand how things can be done better and to have wiser and more efficient practices brought to their attention?

Mr. VELDE. We do have regional field offices, although they are very modestly staffed now. And we do have people available to go around to the States to provide technical assistance in that regard. But, as you know, Mr. Chairman, the Department of Agriculture has been in this business a long while, and the State land-grant college system, all these programs in agriculture have been long established and over the long run you are seeing these dramatic results. But it does take time.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I would like you to describe briefly how various programs you fund are evaluated. It seems to me, in a program like this that is expanding so rapidly and in view of the resistance out in the field and the fact that many departments do not seem to have the kind of training or the kind of imagination which others have, evaluation of what is being done is very, very vital and important.

One of our earlier witnesses described the quality of existing evaluation by giving an example of a local official who writes back and says, "Thanks so much for those helicopters. We really enjoy riding up and down." And that was the evaluation of the program.

I know that is an exaggeration, a parody, but I do think evaluation is very, very important if you are going to develop effective programs and I am concerned that not enough effort has gone into it.

Mr. VELDE. Let me respond by first giving you an example of helicopters and what we are doing in the evaluation area there, and I will then generalize as to our evaluation efforts beyond that. Helicopters are a current fad among many large police departments, and we have been quite concerned because of the potential of spending a great deal of our funds for something that could be nothing more than a very expensive and potentially very dangerous toy. We have funded grants with, I believe, six police departments now to set up test beds, first

of all, to evaluate the potential missions for police aviation, whether it be a helicopter or light plane, and to bring to bear the discipline of operations research. We have a National Institute of Law Enforcement contract with the Cornell Aeronautics Lab that has gone into three of these test beds to assemble data on the evaluation project as it goes along and make detailed evaluation reports available to the Institute. These reports are being disseminated. In fact, last month's issue of "The Police Chief" carried the first preliminary results of this evaluation effort. We have, I would say, about \$800,000 invested in this one series of evaluation projects alone. We have discretionary funds and Institute funds. The test bed at Miami, Dade County, is a very elaborate effort. We have light aircraft, we have helicopters—

Chairman PROXMIRE. Why do you call them a test bed?

Mr. VELDE. Well, to define the role.

Chairman PROXMIRE. What does the term "bed" mean?

Mr. VELDE. "Test bed" is a technical term referring to an area or facility where you put in a variety of equipment to actually test it out, to measure its performance and to evaluate it. The Dade County Sheriff's Department is, in effect, a test bed for which we have purchased two light aircraft and three helicopters.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Now, when you get that evaluative information, and process it and analyze it and come to your own conclusions, when there is an application for a helicopter, you try to evaluate it in terms of whether or not it has been cost effective?

Mr. VELDE. That is right. We also make those evaluations available to the States, State planning agencies, and police departments through a variety of dissemination means, so that when they are considering such a project, they will have the available information. We are currently establishing a technical reference service to disseminate these evaluation efforts, research efforts, to the users and to the planners and to the legislators, those involved in implementation of the program.

Our evaluation efforts in general consist of several levels of activity. I gave you an example of one of the most sophisticated evaluation efforts. The States themselves engage in evaluations. Each State plan has a built-in evaluation component which must measure the progress yearly in implementation of its comprehensive plan. Each State must resubmit to LEAA once each year an updating of its comprehensive plan with the evaluation components.

Many of the States require, as a condition precedent to the actual award of a subgrant, a formal evaluation component in the application. Now, many of these are not very sophisticated, frankly, because the techniques and the skills of evaluation are just not all that advanced. I think the experience with the OEO programs is a case in point. There a lot of money was spent on Federal programs and the evaluation techniques were developed subsequent to the early efforts in the program.

We are attempting to see if there can be a transfer of evaluation activities from other Federal programs. We have a lot to learn. And, I think, there will be mistakes and there will be money misused. No question about that.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Congressman Conable?

Representative CONABLE. Mr. Velde, how long has the LEAA been without an Administrator?

Mr. VELDE. The last Administrator resigned effective June first.

Representative CONABLE. How many Administrators have there been?

Mr. VELDE. Well, as you know, there is an Administrator and two Associate Administrators under the existing law, all of whom have equal responsibility for the administration of the program. We currently have two Associate Administrators and the Administrator position is vacant. Actually, the Congress enacted the law in June of 1968, under the Johnson administration. There was a recess appointment of Mr. Patrick Murphy in October of 1968. He was never confirmed by the Senate. So, in effect, he was not technically an Administrator, Mr. Rogovin was confirmed in March of 1969 and he served until June of 1970.

As you know, the status of the so-called troika has been in some dispute. The House version of the amendments has abolished the troika. The Senate version has retained it with some modifications.

Representative CONABLE. And is this the reason why there has not been an appointment, do you think?

Mr. VELDE. The Attorney General so indicated at a press conference just last week.

Representative CONABLE. Where does the IEAA fit into the structure of the Justice Department?

Mr. VELDE. IEAA by statute is within the Justice Department under the general authority of the Attorney General. We have Bureau status equal to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Prisons, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Representative CONABLE. What is your own background?

Mr. VELDE. I am an attorney. I spent 4 years on the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee as Minority Counsel on the Senate Criminal Laws Subcommittee. I spent a year and a half as a legislative assistant to a member of the House, 4 years in private practice, civil and criminal, in Washington, D.C., 5 years in the Air Force and the rest of the time I was in school. I have a law degree, a master's degree in speech, and I am a Ph. D. candidate in public administration.

Representative CONABLE. I do not want to put you on the spot, but can you tell me in your view, what is most needed to make the IEAA a more effective bureau?

Mr. VELDE. As far as involvement of the States and local governments or as far as our own internal administration?

Representative CONABLE. Well, in both respects.

Mr. VELDE. Well, of course, I feel there is always room for improvement in any Federal program, and our agency is no exception.

Representative CONABLE. There might even be some room for improvement in Congress.

Mr. VELDE. Yes. First, with respect to the State and local governments, I think there is a need for getting the word out, so to speak. With any new Federal program there is always great difficulty in getting the word out to the potential users as to what is available and what they should be doing, what the limitations are, and so on. This is true in our program. There needs to be a lot more work done in this area.

There needs to be more professionalism. I think great strides have been made in this regard but we still have a long way to go. We are at the mercy of the State and local civil service and other employment practices whatever they are. This has caused us some difficulties. There has been a certain amount of turnover and, as you know, State governments come and go. Governors come and go. We would encourage more stability in the professional staffing of these agencies, not only at the State level, but at the regional level as well. I think that is an important thing.

And, of course, we are vitally interested in streamlining the efficiency of the delivery system, of making the subgrant awards. I think our delivery system compares very favorably with that of other Federal aid programs, particularly our record in the larger States. At the Federal level, of course, I think any bureaucrat would say he needs more personnel and more money.

I personally feel that the troika is an important and a vital part of the administration of our program. The potential power of LEAA is very great. We are dealing in one of the most sensitive areas of government. I was particularly impressed this past summer when I had the opportunity to attend a United Nations Conference on Crime and Delinquency and talk with my counterparts from other nations of the world. One country in particular impressed me. They have established a similar program but for an entirely different reason. Several of the states of that nation tend to be rather independent or, in fact, secessionist, and they are providing Federal aid to state police to keep the police in line and keep them operating consistently with the Federal political programs. That is a danger that I hope we will never face in this country. But the troika, in effect, is another set of checks and balances to prevent this kind of thing from occurring. It has prevented us, I think, from going off the deep end in some cases, either to the left or to the right with some of our programs. It is an important thing.

Representative CONABLE. Well, Mr. Velde, I would like to say I think you have made a very impressive presentation here today and I am grateful for the balance you have shown and for the very clear grasp of your subject.

Mr. VELDE. Thank you, sir.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Mr. Velde, as you know, one of the most important elements in making progress in any field is knowing what the situation is, what the facts are and having them accurate. This is certainly true in business; it is true in government; it is true in military operations. Unless you have an effective intelligence system that tells you what you are up against, what your opposition has, what you have to cope with, it is hard to know how to use your resources let alone how much of your resources to put into the battle.

Our crime statistics, it seems, as you have indicated, are just appalling. They are so appalling that it is very, very hard to accept them one way or the other and yet as we know, they are not only used without any apparent qualification by the press but they are used to create an atmosphere in our country. I think many people on the basis of crime statistics have been persuaded that American crime represents a situation that may be worse than it actually is. We do not know because we do not know how valid those crime statistics are.

This is what one of our witnesses had to say about our statistics on the incidence of crime: "It is a voluntary method of reporting. Very honestly, crime rates go up and down according to political pressures."

He pointed out that you tell a precinct captain we have to cut the crime rate and he gets the message, he just does not report crimes, and these are very hard under any circumstances always to determine precisely when a burglary occurs. Even with something like murder it is not always sure that the dead man is a murder victim.

Representative CONABLE. *Corpus delecti*.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I will say that again. We are not always sure that a person has been killed. It may have been a matter of suicide. It may not have been foul play. It may have been some other way in which he met his end.

At any rate, I think we do have to go a long way to improve our statistics.

The same witness pointed out that existing statistics do not enable us to determine how much crime is committed by people using drugs. This is a most serious gap.

In view of the testimony by Police Chief Jerry Wilson of the District of Columbia, he thinks much of the increase in crime is because of the increase in drug abuse and requirement to feed the habit, and we do not have any substantial statistics in this area at all and they indicate how hard it is to get the statistics. Your statement describes a number of statistical efforts your agency is making and certainly we are very glad to see these efforts getting underway but do you think you are on the way to developing statistics on the incidence of crime that will be free of political pressures, that is, of temptations by local officials to shade statistics a bit when they get the word from the chief to, "Reduce crime this month?"

What about the connection between crime and drug abuse? Are you working on that?

Mr. VELDE. First of all, with regard to our statistical programs, we have a number of efforts, as I described in my statement, by our newly created National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service. We have several statistical series being developed for us by the Census Bureau. A year or two from now we hope we will be able to measure, on a rather comprehensive basis, the amount of victimization of crime by using survey techniques.

As you know, whenever statistics are collected, there is always the possibility of inaccurate, biased reporting, or inaccurate or biased interpretation of that data. This has been true in other fields. I am sure the chairman will recall the problem with the livestock and the feed reports some years ago. Here is a quite well-established and universally accepted set of data that has been reported over a long period of time, and yet I think one year there was more than a 5-percent variance. And, certainly, political careers have arisen and fallen on the basis of data in many fields—the agricultural field, the unemployment figures, the cost of living index.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, that data now is reasonably reliable. Our unemployment statistics, for example, are the best in the world, in this committee's determination. I would agree that economic statistics are just the heart of any kind of effective economic policy or program but I think most people recognize that there is the uniformity now and

there is not the same kind of political power because of the way those statistics are derived to alter them or distort them.

I do not think any President has done that—Republican or Democrat—or tried to. I do not know anybody who has even alleged or suggested that they have tried to do that, but on crime statistics it is a common understanding that these are very hard to evaluate. It depends on how good your reporting system has been in the past, how good it is now, a pressure to report that New York or Chicago or Washington is not a crime-ridden city.

Mr. VELDE. We aspire to the same standards in the criminal justice area. We had a discretionary grant program last year, and we are carrying it forward this year, to encourage the States to adopt mandatory reporting legislation. About 13 States now have enacted laws—Wisconsin just last summer—requiring local governments to report to the States on a systematic basis a whole variety of criminal justice data, including reports of arrests and other kinds of things.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Have the big city States been among those 13—New York, California, Texas, Ohio, and so forth?

Mr. VELDE. Pennsylvania passed a statute last summer and I believe with the addition of Pennsylvania, all the other large States now do. California was a pioneer in this area. It has had mandatory reporting for at least 10 years. So, we are encouraging this.

We have a project, which I referred to in my statement, called "Project Search," which for the first time is attempting to develop offender based transaction statistics that will be, if not on line, close to a real time computer system.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Now, even with that system, let me ask you, the trouble is that existing crime statistics have to, of course, be confined to reported crime and not all crime is reported. The percent reported could vary. Some people argue that part of the recent increase in crime as shown by existing statistics could be simply an increase in the percent reported.

Mr. VELDE. That is right.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do you think that is true?

Mr. VELDE. That is correct.

Chairman PROXMIRE. In fact, a Small Business Administration study which surveyed victims of crime, indicated total crime was much greater than reported crime.

Mr. VELDE. Yes; as I indicated, we now have a pilot project well underway to develop measures, survey techniques, for measuring the amount of crime actually committed as opposed to that reported.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Does this sort of go into just examining, discussing with the victims so that you would have enough of a survey without relying at all on the police so you could make independent estimates which could be used to correct the police statistics you get?

Mr. VELDE. Right, and we have conducted pilot surveys in the District of Columbia.

Chairman PROXMIRE. How widespread are those pilot surveys?

Mr. VELDE. Well, we have the surveys now in the District of Columbia, Philadelphia, and two or three other cities. I think San Jose, Calif.; perhaps Dayton, Ohio, are other cities. We are now evaluating the results of those pilot surveys and I have on my desk this week a proposal to make our so-called victimization survey a permanent pro-

ject with the first data to be available hopefully by, I think, the third quarter of calendar 1971. So, we are moving ahead in this area. There are some real problems to overcome in this area because a victim of crime is not necessarily an expert in classifying that crime. He may report that his car was stolen, a felony, when in fact some kid took it for a joyride, which is usually a misdemeanor.

Chairman PROXMIRE. It might be his own child who took it.

Mr. VELDE. That is right, or it might have been the finance company repossessing the car, which is often the case. And, of course assault has varying degrees, from the misdemeanor to the serious felony. A victim who is hit over the head is hardly in a position to say how the police would classify it. So, there are some real problems here. But we think we can overcome them.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Earlier witnesses seemed to agree that our courts are the most antiquated and inefficient part of the criminal justice system. I would like to find out more about what the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration is doing or plans to do to achieve improvements in the court system.

According to your recent annual report, 6 cents out of each action grant dollar went into court and law reform efforts and 20 cents out of each research dollar. This was in fiscal 1970. Do you know if the proportions will be similar in 1971? Do you feel a large enough share of your resources is going into this area in view of the problem?

Mr. VELDE. The comprehensive State plans for fiscal 1971 are not due into our agency until the end of December, so we have no estimates as yet as to what the fiscal 1971 allocations will be. But we are encouraging the States to devote more of their resources to courts. This is a badly neglected area. The assessment you indicated is a very accurate one. Perhaps this system is more in need of improvement than any of the criminal justice systems, although I must say in both the police and the corrections area there is a long way to go also.

Chairman PROXMIRE. One suggestion made by our witnesses was that LEAA sponsor the introduction of administrative officers in courts throughout the country. Are you doing anything of that sort and on how large a scale if you are?

Mr. VELDE. We have several discretionary grant programs in the courts area designed primarily to improve prosecutor educational and training skills at management, particularly information systems in courts.

Chairman PROXMIRE. One witness said that we report more crime, we arrest more people, more people are brought in but about the same proportion of the population now is being sent to jail, fined, as we have had over the years. There is not much change in his view. And he seemed to indicate that this is just a matter of our feeling a little bit better if we go through this arrest process but at the same time with such a large number not penalized, there is a growing disrespect for the legal system on the part of those who are arrested because they find that they can get away with it. Very often the case is dismissed because the courts are crowded.

What studies have you made of the prevalence of various practices which prevent cases being brought for jury trial, such as dropping of the charges without a trial, plea bargaining, and that kind of thing?

Mr. VELDE. First of all, let me take exception to the statement

made. I think there has been a dramatic increase in the incidence of crime, far out of proportion to the population increase, particularly in drug-related offenses and juvenile crimes.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, that may well be. I do not think I would necessarily contradict—maybe I misspoke but what I tried to convey was that we were actually sentencing one way or another about the same proportion of the population, arresting more, and perhaps you are right, perhaps there is more crime. There certainly are a lot of indications that there is.

Mr. VELDE. At least, in those areas specifically.

Chairman PROXMIRE. But there does seem to be no increase in view of the increase in crime, no corresponding increase in actual penalties for those committing crimes.

Mr. VELDE. I would agree that by and large the courts have not significantly increased the processing rate of offenses brought within their jurisdiction in the last decade. In fact, the conviction rate is down in absolute numbers, let alone percentages.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, have you made studies to determine why this is being done and what can be done to overcome them?

Mr. VELDE. Yes; we have a number of studies going now on the effect of court decisions. We have a major study going on by the University of Chicago to examine the so-called exclusionary rules, which, of course, account for a considerable time delay in the actual processing, court time, of a criminal case. So often the court's time is devoted to these questions of admissibility or exclusion of evidence and the evidence-gathering system is more on trial than the defendant. So, we have a major study going on in this area.

We realize that involvement of the courts in our program is perhaps the most sensitive and critical and most needed in our whole program at this time, but it is a very difficult objective to achieve. First of all, there is the traditional independence and aloofness of the judiciary from other parts of the criminal-justice system. I think many of the State and local systems are quite, shall we say, embedded in the status quo and there is a reluctance to change or improve. And there has been a traditional indifference and apathy toward the needs of the judicial systems by the legislatures. As a result, they are in many cases just criminally understaffed and with very inadequate resources.

But how do you get effective involvement of the judiciary in our program? Next spring we are having a conference cosponsored by the American Bar Association, the American Judicature Society, and the Conference of State Chief Justices, which we hope all of the chief justices will attend, to expose them to our program and to get them involved so that there will be meaningful participation. But there is this traditional aloofness and this independence. I think there also is a fear of Federal or State domination of the judiciary. It is probably the most difficult and sensitive question we face.

Chairman PROXMIRE. It is a legitimate fear. I think we agree we have to be very careful about that but at the same time, we certainly as you so well said, need to vastly improve our court system.

I would like to ask just one more question. Your authorization for this year is apparently going to be \$170 million more than the appropriation, as you indicated. Do you anticipate there will be a supplemental budget request, and, if so, would you request reallocation of some funds to research, planning, and/or evaluation?

Mr. VELDE. Well, there are two questions here. First, as far as the supplemental budget is concerned, I believe there will be an administration supplemental request. I think the range would probably be somewhere between \$50 and \$100 million. It will be basically to implement the new authority in our pending amendments, the so-called part E amendments, and our training amendments. Although the Office of Management and Budget and the President have not finally decided on our request, we are certainly actively pursuing a supplemental request, and, of course, from our own standpoint, we would hope it would be closer to the higher mark than the lower one.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Would you reallocate those funds to research, planning, and evaluation?

Mr. VELDE. As far as reallocation is concerned, for this current fiscal year LEAA requested a \$11.5 million increase in research funds over our \$7.5 million base in fiscal year 1970. The appropriations committees did not allow this increase, but they did not cut the funds from LEAA. Instead, they directed, through the report language that the additional funds be transferred to an action account. Now, this was done with the understanding and express legislative history on the House floor that if LEAA could develop research programs that were, first of all, oriented toward the development of practical hardware and were more responsive to the needs of the committees, they would allow us to request a reprogramming of those funds, and using just the regular—the usual letter to the committee—procedure—

Chairman PROXMIRE. You do not mean the committee needs hardware?

Representative CONABLE. You said responsive to the “needs” of the committee.

Chairman PROXMIRE. The only other kind of needs I can think of are the political.

Mr. VELDE. The “wishes” of the Committee are correct. I think it is fair to say that we will request a reprogramming of a substantial amount of these funds.

Now, it is also true that the account into which these funds were transferred can be used in its own right for research activities and we do intend to use a portion of those funds to establish a cooperative Federal-State research program. So there will be a reprogramming, but I would suspect not of the entire \$11.5 million that was transferred out of the Institute.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I do not know how the other members of the subcommittee will decide on this but it seems to me, the overwhelming weight of the witnesses, Department of Justice, the police witness we had, the people who have had experience before in States and in the justice system, all agree that we should concentrate more funds than we have before in these areas of planning, research, and evaluation. This is the peculiar function that if not performed by the Federal Government, is unlikely to be performed well anywhere in the Nation and I commend you for your attitude that you are going to ask for more, and it seems that perhaps this subcommittee can have some influence on our colleagues in the appropriations committees to take another look at this and recognize the particular contribution the Federal Government can make to be most useful.

I want to thank you very, very much for a good statement and for your most responsive replies.

The subcommittee will adjourn and the record will be kept open for 1 week.

Mr. VELDE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

APPENDIX

(The following recommendations were subsequently supplied for the record by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations:)

RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AT ITS SEPTEMBER 11, 1970, MEETING DEALING WITH THE COURT AND PROSECUTION FUNCTIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

The Commission recommends that each State establish a simplified and unified court system, consisting of a supreme court, an intermediate court of appeals if necessary, a general trial court and special subdivision of the general trial court performing the duties of courts of limited jurisdiction. The Commission also recommends that the States abolish justice of the peace courts, or overhaul them by placing them under State supervision, direction and administration; by compensating justices by salary rather than by fees; and by requiring them to be licensed to practice law in the State or pass an appropriate qualifying examination. The Commission further recommends that all courts be subject to administrative supervision and direction by the supreme court or the chief justice; to uniform rules of practice and procedure promulgated by the supreme court subject to change by the legislature; and to the flexible assignment by the supreme court or chief justice of judges from court to court within and between levels.

RECOMMENDATION 2. STATE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE

The Commission recommends that all States provide an administrative office of the State courts, headed by a professional administrator, to assist in the administrative supervision and direction of the State court system.

RECOMMENDATION 3. TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES

The Commission recommends that States authorize and encourage establishment of administrative offices for the general trial courts of large urban areas. The Commission further recommends that such offices be headed by professional administrators and be under the general supervision of the State court administrator where one exists.

RECOMMENDATION 4. METHODS OF SELECTING JUDGES—THE "MERIT PLAN"

The Commission recommends that State and local governments, where needed, adopt the "Merit Plan" of selecting judges, whereby commissions consisting of representatives of the bar, the judiciary, and the public screen and nominate qualified candidates for appointment by the chief executive. The Commission further recommends that judges so appointed be required to submit themselves to voter approval or disapproval at an election at the end of each term.

RECOMMENDATION 5. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL: THE CALIFORNIA-TYPE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS

The Commission recommends that, where lacking, States establish machinery for the discipline and removal of incapacitated or unfit judges, patterned after California's Commission on Judicial Qualifications.

RECOMMENDATION 6. JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS

The Commission recommends that States require all judges to be licensed to practice law in the State.

RECOMMENDATION 7. MANDATORY RETIREMENT

The Commission recommends that, where lacking, State laws require mandatory retirement of State and local judges upon reaching age seventy.

RECOMMENDATION 8. FULL-TIME JUDGES

The Commission recommends that States require all judges to devote full-time to their judicial duties.

RECOMMENDATION 9. STATE-LOCAL SHARING OF COURT FINANCING: FULL STATE ASSUMPTION OF COSTS

The Commission recommends that States assume full responsibility for financing State and local courts.

RECOMMENDATION 10. STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION

To be considered at January 22, 1971 meeting.

RECOMMENDATION 11. CONSOLIDATION OF LOCAL PROSECUTION FUNCTIONS IN CERTAIN AREAS

To achieve more efficient use of manpower and a higher level of prosecution, the Commission recommends that States, where necessary, centralize the local prosecution function in a single office, responsible for all criminal prosecutions.

RECOMMENDATION 12. PROSECUTORIAL DISTRICTS AND THE PART-TIME PROSECUTOR

The Commission recommends that States require prosecuting attorneys to be full-time officials and that their jurisdictions be redrawn so that each is large enough to require the full-time attention of such an official and to provide the financial resources to support his office.

RECOMMENDATION 13. FINANCING PROSECUTION

The Commission recommends that States pay at least 50 percent of the costs of local prosecuting attorneys' offices.

RECOMMENDATION 14. STATE-LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR THE INDIGENT-DIRECT ADMINISTRATION BY THE STATE

The Commission recommends that each State establish and finance a state-wide system for defense of the indigent, making either a public defender or coordinated assigned counsel service readily available to every area of the State.

RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN ITS REPORT ON "MAKING THE SAFE STREETS ACT WORK—AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CHALLENGE," JUNE 12, 1970

MODIFYING LEAA'S ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

Recommendation 1.—The Commission recommends that Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 be amended to create the position of Director of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance who, acting under the general authority of the Attorney General, would be responsible for administering the Act. He shall be one of the three-man Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The Commission further recommends that the Director be appointed by the President with due regard to his fitness, knowledge, and experience to perform the duties of the chief administrator of the LEAA.

DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS BY THE STATES : RETAINING THE BLOCK GRANT

Recommendation 2.—The Commission strongly believes that, although there are presently some gaps in State performance under Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 in responding to the special needs of high crime urban and suburban areas, the block grant represents a significant device for achieving greater cooperation and coordination of criminal justice efforts between the States and their political subdivisions. The Commission therefore recommends that the block grant approach embodied in the Act be retained and that States make further improvements in their operations under it.

MAINTAINING THE PRESENT SUBGRANT SYSTEM

Recommendation 3.—The Commission recommends that no changes be made in Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to funnel additional Federal funds into high crime urban and suburban areas, except for an amendment providing that no State comprehensive law enforcement plan shall be approved unless the LEAA finds that the plan provides for the allocation of an adequate share of assistance to deal with law enforcement problems in areas of high crime incidence.

STRENGTHENING ALL COMPONENTS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Recommendation 4.—The Commission recommends that no changes be made in Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to require or encourage a greater channeling of Federal funds to court and corrections related projects, since modifications of this type would constitute an infringement on State and local discretion under the block grant approach contained in the Act. At the same time, the Commission urges that State comprehensive law enforcement plans should give greater attention to improving all components of the criminal justice system.

RETAINING REGIONAL DISTRICTS

Recommendation 5.—The Commission recommends that States retain and strengthen their regional law enforcement planning districts.

AUTHORIZING WAIVER OF THE PERSONNEL COMPENSATION LIMIT

Recommendation 6.—The Commission recommends that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration be authorized to waive the ceiling on grants for personnel compensation contained in Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.¹

MAINTAINING PRESENT REPRESENTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR SPA

Recommendation 7.—The Commission recommends retention of the present provisions of Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, and of related program guidelines, providing for balanced representation of interests on the supervisory boards of State law enforcement planning agencies.

(The following statement, with appendixes, was subsequently supplied for the record by the National League of Cities and the United States Conference of Mayors:)

STATEMENT ON OPERATION OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968 BY THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES AND THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, OCTOBER 12, 1970

Crime is a matter of deep concern to the mayors of the nation's cities for crime, particularly violent crime, is concentrated to a high degree within cities. Eighty-five per cent of all reported crime is committed within city limits, and most of this occurs in the larger and more densely populated areas. A task force report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence notes that one-half of the total reported major violent crimes occur within the

¹ Congressman Fountain, Budget Director Mayo, and Supervisor Roos dissented on Recommendation 6.

26 cities of more than 500,000 population. Fifty-three per cent of all FBI index crimes and 80 per cent of all robberies occur within the nation's 154 cities over 100,000 population which contain only 28 per cent of our total population.

The control of crime is considered primarily a local responsibility and should remain so. City officials—mayors, managers, police chiefs—must deal with crime on the streets every day. They have the greatest experience in crime control and the greatest desire to seek solutions to crime problems. Cities are making a major financial commitment to crime control. The Bureau of the Census reports that in 1969, the nation's 43 largest cities spent \$1,496,195,000 for police and correctional activity, while all 50 states spent only slightly more, \$1,580,000,000. Further, these commitments are increasing at a rapid rate. The City of Detroit, for example, increased its criminal justice budget from \$64,000,000 for fiscal 1969 to \$83,000,000 for fiscal 1970. Public demand for better crime control combined with substantial increases in personnel costs have resulted in similar rapid increases in resource commitments by other cities.

These increased commitments have come at a time of severe budgetary strains for local governments. Cities across the nation are caught in a severe financial crisis between state imposed restrictions preventing broadening of the local revenue base and increasing demands for service by local citizens. Even a city completely committed to action to control crime may not be a free agent to collect and dedicate the necessary resources to achieve this purpose. Local revenue raising capability, and to some extent, local spending choices are severely restricted by state law:

States tell cities what taxes they may raise, and in some cases how high they may raise them.

States designate who may and who may not be taxed.

States set limits on how much debt may be incurred and what interest rates may be paid, and

States sometimes mandate services which must be performed and what people must be paid to perform them.

From limited local revenue bases—primarily the property tax—demands for the full variety of municipal services must be filled, and demands for increased commitments of local resources have been greater. Local government is the government closest to the people, and it is local government towards which people turn first when they need help.

Because of the severe financial strain, local governments of the nation greatly appreciate the commitment to aid local governments which the Congress made in enacting and funding the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. However, the manner in which many of the states are administering the program gives local officials great concern that the purpose of Congress which was to provide meaningful assistance in fighting crime is not being met. Early this year, the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors conducted a comprehensive review of activities under the Safe Streets Act at a time when distribution of fiscal 1969 action funds had been substantially completed. That study, a copy of which is attached as Appendix A, noted a number of major inadequacies in state administration of the program. Our discussions with many city officials since publication of that study indicate that the problems identified in that study are wide spread throughout the nation and apply to the Safe Streets program as it is being administered today. These are:

1. In too many instances funds are being dissipated shotgun style across the states in many small grants that are not likely to have any significant impact on the crime problem and result in dollar allocation patterns that favor rural and suburban low crime areas. This distribution deprives high crime areas, such as core cities, of urgently needed assistance. A study by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations published in June of 1970 noted that in 33 states the five largest cities received shares of assistance significantly below their proportion of the crime rate. Detroit which has 40 percent of the state's crime, makes 30 per cent of the total police expenditures in the state and contains 19 per cent of the state's population received only 18 per cent of the action funds plus 6 per cent of the planning funds.

Obviously, expenditures do not need to follow crime rates in a one-to-one ratio to be effective. Money spent at the state level can also aid in solving the problem of high crime areas if the state level programs which the money supports are geared to high crime area needs. However, we have seen no evidence that funds not allocated directly to high crime jurisdictions have been concentrated on their needs. Rather, it appears that a disproportionate share of the money spent by the state or allocated from the state to local units has been

scattered in grants to purchase basic equipment and support basic law enforcement training for low crime areas including many jurisdictions which up to now have shown little interest in making any significant financial commitments to the criminal justice system.

Livonia, Michigan, a city of 102,000 population, received nothing in the first year plan. However, rural Isabella County received \$18,000 for a basic radio system and Delta County with a widely spread population of 34,000 received \$15,000 to train volunteer probation aides. Further, the regular action allocations in Michigan included 11 grants of less than \$1,000 including one of only \$135 to Midland County for the purchase of radio equipment.

These patterns have been repeated all across the country. In Pennsylvania, the City of Scranton with 115,000 population and annual police expenditures of approximately \$1 million received \$5,000 while a rural county with 16,400 population and annual police expenditures of a mere \$12,000 received \$22,236 for basic communications equipment. The May 1970 issue of the *Nebraska Municipal Review* contains a listing of Safe Street grants in that state which includes one grant of only \$60, 16 grants of under \$500 and 59 grants of under \$1,000. A copy of that listing is attached as Appendix B.

2. In many instances, state plans overlooked individual needs of high crime areas, particularly major cities, in favor of a generalized approach to problem solving. These approaches have emphasized improvements in basic law enforcement equipment and training techniques for areas with low crime problems that have not, up to now, felt the need to use their own funds to upgrade the competence and sophistication of their crime fighting apparatus. For example, Michigan placed 23 grants in 22 communities to provide basic radio equipment. One of the major goals of the Kentucky plan was to place radios in many police and sheriffs' vehicles in low crime communities which, up to now, had not thought it necessary to reach into their own pockets to provide this basic equipment.

3. Instead of directing their efforts toward aiding cities and fighting crime in the streets, most states have concerned themselves with establishing and maintaining substantial, unwieldy and unnecessary bureaucracies to distribute Safe Streets dollars. In addition to the state agencies which have been established to maintain the program in all 50 states and which, by themselves, are not overly large, 45 states have established a total of 452 administrative districts to aid in planning, dollar distribution, and program administration. Most of these administrative districts are supported from the 40 percent of planning funds which is supposed to be used in development of local plans. Because this money has been used to support regions in many states no funds have been available for planning on the local level. Presently cities are excluded from eligibility to receive the local share of planning funds in 29 states. Generally, these regional planning efforts do not adequately recognize the individual criminal justice planning problems of their various local units. They only identify and support solutions for problems common to all. They are established in the name of coordination but often perform no greater function than to assure that every body gets something, effectively frustrating any efforts to pinpoint funds on solution of particular problems in individual communities within the region. In Illinois there are 35 of these regions, in Nebraska, North Carolina and Texas 22, in Georgia 18. Many are set up without regard to particular concentrations of crime or population. California has subdivided several of its nine regions into subregions, further deepening the mass of red tape.

4. The values of the block grant approach have generally not been realized in the application of the Safe Streets Act:

(a) Instead of avoiding a proliferation of paperwork and bureaucracy, the state channelled block grant approach has interposed two new and costly layers of bureaucracy between the source of funds (the federal government) and the location of most criminal activity (the cities). Further, the state dollar distribution patterns supporting small low crime jurisdictions have given these jurisdictions a subsidy to reduce the financial pressures to consolidate which they might otherwise face.

(b) The block grant approach has increased the delay in getting funds to local projects. In January and February of 1970, a year and a half after the fiscal 1969 appropriation was approved, many states were still in the process of, or had just completed, allocation of fiscal 1969 action funds. Regional and state approval must precede federal program approvals, and regional and state decisions to release funds must follow federal decisions to release funds—compounding delay local governments face in

filing applications and receiving determination of the funds they will receive.

The Second Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration is able to present a detailed picture of the uses to which fiscal 1970 discretionary funds—those funds allocated directly from the federal government to localities—have been put. However, the same report can speak in only generalities about uses of the state channeled block grants because many of the states are still in the process of allocating their fiscal 1970 funds.

(c) Though distribution of program responsibility down through the levels of government was a stated goal of the block grant approach, the direction of the program has been toward increased centralization of power at the state level at the expense of cities and counties—the levels of government closest to the people and to the problem. The local say in state planning for local programs can often be best described as tokenism. Many mayors have reported to NLC and USCM their frustration at the state's failure to consult them or their staffs in development of these Safe Street plans which they consider vital to their local interests.

5. Finally, as the level of program funding is increasing, many cities will be experiencing great difficulty in raising the required local share in order to participate in this federal program. This difficulty is occurring because of the severe constraints on local financial capacity imposed by state revenue raising and spending restrictions, and the rapidly increasing demands for local expenditures which were noted earlier.

The block grants-to-states approach to providing federal aid for solving local crime problems is not working. Too many states have too little expertise and interest in dealing with the problems of major urban areas where the great bulk of crime occurs. Alternative approaches must be found if federal dollars are to be spent effectively to solve the crime crisis which faces many cities today.

To improve the federal role in providing resources to aid solution of local crime problems, we suggest the following as alternatives to or improvements in aid provided under the Safe Streets Act:

1. Major cities and counties should receive adequate automatic allocations of funds directly from the federal government to be used for improving their criminal justice systems. Such allocations would provide localities urgently needed resource support and stimulate new approaches in improving local criminal justice services. Legislation to implement this proposal has been introduced in different forms by Congressman William O. Cowger and Senator Edward M. Kennedy and is included as Appendix C.

2. The federal government should substantially increase its efforts to control organized crime and the distribution of dangerous drugs. The national and even international nature of this criminal activity makes it impossible for local governments and states to control it. Control of organized crime and dangerous drug distribution is important as it leads to many other criminal acts at the local level.

3. The federal government should support a greatly increased research effort to identify and analyze ways to improve the criminal justice system. All agree that this system is one which urgently needs new approaches, but the federal commitment to date has been minimal. For fiscal 1970, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the research arm of LEAA received only \$7.5 million, an amount approximately equal to the federal support payments made to just two large farmers in California not to grow food. At the same time nearly \$250 million was committed to research programs in the Department of Agriculture to study how to grow food more effectively.

4. If the block grant approach is to be maintained states should be required to contribute 50 per cent of the non-federal costs of local programs supported under the Safe Streets Act, as long as the states are to maintain control of the federal dollar distributions. As noted before, local governments face severe difficulty in providing their required matching share of costs under this program in large part because of state imposed revenue raising limitations. The requirement that states contribute 50 per cent of the non-federal share of local programs costs would ease this substantial burden on local government and by assuring a state resource commitment result in a substantially higher degree of state interest and involvement in local law enforcement programs. This requirement would also make states assume some responsibilities commensurate with the complete rule over local programs which the block grant approach gives them.

5. The discretionary fund available for direct grants to the cities under the Act should be substantially increased from its present 15 per cent limit. Such an increase is necessary to allow immediate federal action to support generally recognized needs for improvements at the local level without the delays incident to passing local applications for funds through state and regional grant approval structures. Many vital local problems are being overlooked by a generalized state planning process. The discretionary fund must be broadened to support these vital local needs, particularly central city needs for improvements to highly sophisticated criminal justice systems, which are generally being ranked lower in state and regional planning structures than support for basic improvements to criminal justice systems in lower crime suburban and rural areas.

6. The Safe Streets Act should also be amended to require LEAA, before it approves any state plan, to certify that streets, in using federal funds, will allocate an adequate amount of these funds to deal with the problems in the high crime areas. Such an amendment is necessary to avoid the present problems under which substantial amounts of funds are being dissipated in small grants to low crime areas. It will give LEAA a statutory mandate to assure concentration of funds on most urgent crime control needs. Only through such an amendment will federal funds be concentrated in sufficiently large amounts and in sufficiently needed areas to have a significant impact on improving the criminal justice system.

We believe that these programs could create a positive federal-state-local action partnership to control crime.

APPENDIX A

STREET CRIME AND THE SAFE STREETS ACT—WHAT IS THE IMPACT? AN EXAMINATION OF STATE PLANNING AND DOLLAR DISTRIBUTION PRACTICES UNDER THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968 BY THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES AND THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, FEBRUARY 1970

Crime has always been a subject of public concern, but in recent years this concern has risen in some areas to a state of alarm with demands for action by all levels of government to restore a general feeling of safety to America's streets. In the past three years three separate Presidential Commissions have studied problems relating to crime and issued reports recommending substantial, and costly, courses of action to deal with crime and the social conditions which create it. Such close and continued coverage of a subject by Presidential Commissions is unprecedented in the history of America.

The most recent of these Presidential Commissions, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, reported in December of 1969:

Violence in the United States has risen to alarmingly high levels. Whether one considers assassination, group violence or individual acts of violence, the decade of the 1960's was considerably more violent than the several decades preceding it and ranked among the most violent in our history.

Crime is primarily an urban problem. In 1968 approximately 3.8 million index crimes—85% of the national total—were committed within the nation's metropolitan area. There are over 2,800 crimes per hundred thousand population in metropolitan areas compared to less than 800 per hundred thousand population in rural areas. City officials are particularly concerned about crime problems, for it is upon them that prime responsibility for crime prevention and control rests and it is they from whom the people are demanding most immediate action to improve safety on the streets.

Enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 signalled the beginning of a major new federal grant effort to aid in solution of the urban crime problem. Local officials particularly welcomed this development as a valuable source of support for improvement in their law enforcement systems above the improvements already being supported from heavily strained local revenue bases. Local officials were concerned at the time of the enactment of this legislation, however, with amendments to channel all funds through state agencies. While they were encouraged by assurances that states would use funds responsibly to deal with the most urgent crime problems, they were concerned that traditional state dollar distribution patterns would reappear in this program with the result that substantial portions of funds would be channelled away from the most urgent crime problems in the urban areas.

The Safe Streets Act establishes a program of planning and action grants to state and local governments for improvement of their criminal justice systems. All of the planning grants and 85% of the action grants must be channelled through states according to a formula established in the Act. Fifteen percent of the action grants may be allocated directly to state or local governments as determined by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

Several provisions of the Act seek to assure that local government will have a definitive role in planning and funding of the programs. Most important of these protections are sections which require that 40% of each state's planning funds and 75% of the state block grant of action funds be "available to units of general local government or combinations of such units" for local planning and action programs. The percentage for allocations of action funds between state and local governments was drawn from the breakdown of expenditures for the criminal justice system cited in the 1967 report of the President's Crime Commission. The Act also requires that local officials be represented on the state planning agencies and specifically directs the states to take into account "the needs and requests of the units of general local government" and to "encourage local initiative . . ."

Because of the great needs of urban governments for assistance in upgrading their criminal justice systems and the concern of many city officials that funds appropriated under the Safe Streets Act be spent effectively, the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors have followed closely the progress of this program.

In March of 1969 the National League of Cities completed a preliminary examination of the program and issued a report which raised some very serious questions about the early directions the program appeared to be taking. In the fall of 1969, as the state allocations of action funds to local governments are getting under way, Patrick Healy, Executive Vice President of the National League of Cities and John Gunther, Executive Director of the U.S. Conference of Mayors directed three staff members of NLC and USCM to undertake a substantial review of the first year fund allocation processes developed by the states. This report is the product of that study. The findings are a matter of concern because, essentially, they confirm the patterns identified as developing a year ago.

The program, as presently administered by most states, will not have the necessary impact vitally needed to secure improvements in the criminal justice system. The states in distributing funds entrusted to them under the block grant formula of the Safe Streets Act have failed to focus these vital resources on the most critical urban crime problems. Instead, funds are being dissipated broadly across the states in many grants too small to have any significant impact to improve the criminal justice system and are being used in disproportionate amounts to support marginal improvements in low crime areas.

A few states are operating programs which give promise of success, among these are Arizona, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Washington and Wisconsin. But generally despite the great urgency of the crime problem, states are not acting responsibly to allocate Federal resources, or their own, in a manner which will be most productive in preventing and controlling the urban crime which was the target of the Act. In light of the findings, the Safe Streets Act must be amended to insure effective use of funds in areas of greatest need by giving its dollar distribution pattern greater flexibility, permitting full support of state programs where state and local governments have formed a cooperative and effective partnership to fight crime, but preserving the option of dealing directly with the Federal government to those cities within states which have neither demonstrated a clear commitment to improve the criminal justice system nor used Federal funds entrusted to them most productively.

Specially, the intensive analysis of state programs under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act concludes:

1. The planning process has not been effective in creating real, substantive state plans. Generally the state plans have focused on individual problems and solutions of varied and often unrelated impact without providing the guidance for coordinated improvement to the criminal justice system which is the most appropriate role of a state planning operation. Further, in many states there appears little relation between plans and actual distribution of funds for projects. The final result is that local governments are presented with generalized statements of problems and solutions which create only confusion among localities as to their immediate role in the program and give no indication of the future impact of system improvements at the local level. In addition to confusing state-

ments of generalized goals, many state plans produced shopping lists of specific projects which frustrated any local attempts at comprehensive criminal justice improvements. Localities in such states were forced to split their programs into separate project categories fixed by the state and hope for funding of those parts of their program which related to the state lists on a hit-or-miss, project by project basis.

This conclusion of confusion in state planning processes is not held by NLC and USCM alone. Mr. James A. Spady, Executive Director of the New Jersey State Law Enforcement Planning Agency and President of the American Society of Criminal Justice Planners, in explaining the need for a good state plan, told a meeting of the New Jersey State League of Municipalities about some of the other state action plans:

If you had seen some of the confused, contradictory, and unimaginative plans of some other states that I have seen you would know what I mean. You would know how difficult it must be for local officials in those states to decide just what is available under the plan, just what has to be done to get it, and just where is the whole thing headed.

2. The states in their planning processes, have generally failed to take into account the specialized and critical crime problems of their major urban areas. This failure goes to the very heart of the state programs—a crime planning process which neglects to take special notice of problems in those areas where 85% of the crime is committed can be judged by no other mark than failure. Significantly, that is a general defect in the plans recognized by LEAA itself whose Police Operations Division, after reviewing the state plans, noted with concern: . . . “the failure of those states have large metropolitan areas where from 25% to 60% of the state’s crime is committed, to give separate treatment to the law enforcement situation in those areas.”

3. Despite general statements in plans advocating improvements, most states in the allocation of action dollars have neither demonstrated any real commitment to improve the criminal justice system, nor have they concentrated funds on programs in most critical need areas. Instead of need and seriousness of crime problems, emphasis in dollar allocation appears to have been placed on broad geographic distribution of funds. Some states have established formulas for distribution of planning and action funds among local units or through regional units established for fund distribution purposes. Others have simply allocated funds in many small grants to local units. Few, if any, states have attempted to make difficult decisions which would enable them to allocate sufficient amounts of dollars to have any impact on the most urgent problems. Though LEAA guidelines are reasonably explicit in urging concentration of funds on crime problem areas and in requiring local consent if the local share of funds allocated under the Act is to be used by other than local governments, LEAA has not been very active in enforcing these requirements. Nor does it appear that LEAA has been very demanding in requiring a certain level of quality in state plans.

4. Though better coordination and program comprehensiveness is a stated goal in most plans, and was a goal of Congress in enactment of the legislation, in practice state dollar distributions have frustrated chances for coordination. The many grants to low crime areas, often served by small departments may preserve the fragmentation of the criminal justice system and frustrate efforts to improve coordination. Some small departments which would otherwise be forced to consider coordination or even consolidation because of local financing constraints are now able to continue maintaining an independence existence because of the subsidy provided from Safe Streets funds. Also state programs often support separate regional training academies and development of new independent communications systems when these facilities could be operated more economically and improve coordination if they were tied into the existing training or communications facilities of major cities in the area. In some states which allocate dollars to regional units, coordination is also frustrated because jurisdictional lines for law enforcement planning regions have been drawn differently from jurisdictional lines for other existing multi-jurisdictional planning efforts.

5. Assignment of planning responsibility to regional planning units has often frustrated the capacity of individual cities and counties to gain expression of critical needs in the state plan and action program. These regions have been established, in most cases, at the direction of the state planning agency, often without the consent of and sometimes with the actual opposition of the local units assigned to the regions. In most cases these state established regions are supported from the 40% local share of planning funds. Allocations to such regions

have resulted in no Federal aid being available for necessary planning in individual localities. The regions impair the ability of LEAA to oversee the fairness of dollar distribution at the local level. In addition they increase administrative costs and often times result in several duplicative studies of similar problems in different areas of the state. Regional units also restrict the ability of local governments to gain expression in the state level plans of their particular local needs and ideas for improvement of the criminal justice system, thus restricting local control over local programs. In many cases representation on the governing boards of regional planning units is not fairly apportioned among participating local units.

6. Finally, the values of the block grant approach stated at the time of enactment of the Safe Streets Act have generally not been realized in application.

(a) Instead of avoiding a proliferation of paperwork and bureaucracy the block grant approach has interposed two new and costly layers of bureaucracy between federal crime funds and their local application in most states, with a resulting confusion of planning boards, staffs, application timetables, guidelines, plan priorities, etc.

(b) The states have not filled their proposed role as agencies to coordinate programs and assure that funds are spent most effectively, rather state program directions have created much confusion for localities trying to define a role for themselves in the program and state dollar allocations have spread funds broadly across the state without regard to need.

(c) Delay in getting funds to local projects has increased, not reduced. A year and a half after the fiscal 1969 appropriation was approved, many states are still in the process of, or have just completed, allocation of fiscal 1969 action funds to their local governments. Regional and state approval must precede Federal program approvals and regional and state decisions to release funds must follow Federal decisions to release funds—compounding delay local governments face in filing applications and receiving determination on the funds they will receive.

(d) Though dispersal of program responsibility down through the levels of government was a stated goal of the block grant approach, the direction of the program has been toward increased concentration of power at the state level at the expense of cities and counties—the levels of government closest to the people and the problem. Many state programs are tending to limit the capacity of the local government and local citizens to affect their law enforcement systems, and the local say in state planning for local programs can often be best described as tokenism.

During the NLC and USCM examination of the Safe Streets program, LEAA officials have always been willing to discuss the issues of the Safe Streets program—its successes and failures—with an openness and candor which is refreshing. Though we have not always agreed with decisions made by LEAA, we believe that LEAA under the leadership of Administrator Charles H. Rogovin has been among the best of the Federal agencies administering grant-in-aid programs. The difficulties LEAA faces are primarily created by the restrictions imposed in the statute which limit LEAA's capacity to further stimulate expansion and improvement of programs in those states making a determined effort to upgrade state and local criminal justice programs, and deprive LEAA of sufficient flexibility to provide urgently needed assistance to cities in states which are failing to use Safe Streets funds responsibly to deal with their major crime problems.

Though review of the Safe Streets program indicates that serious problems exist in many states, several states appear to be acting responsibly in partnership with their local governments to improve their criminal justice systems. Programs in these states stood certain key tests in the NLC and USCM review of the Safe Streets program: (1) NLC and USCM staff identified no major flaws in the state's action plan; (2) No criticism of the state program was received from the largest cities in the state or from the State municipal league; and (3) No major criticisms of the state program were received from small and medium sized cities in the state. The states identified as a result of these tests were: Arizona, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Washington and Wisconsin.

Generally, however, the picture has not been good. The necessary change in legislation should not, however, reject a major role in the Safe Streets program for those few states which are administering the program responsibly.

Cities are ready, willing and able to work closely with state government where state government demonstrates that it is willing to seriously commit itself to aid in solution to urban problems. Most states have not demonstrated

that commitment today. Some have, and the Safe Streets Act should be restructured and program administration practices changed to recognize these differences among states, giving incentives for greater state involvement while at the same time guaranteeing that the urgent needs of all urban governments will be met by direct Federal aid in those many states which have little demonstrated commitment to aiding the solution of urban problems.

The following specific program modification are suggested:

1. In order that cities with serious crime problems will receive urgently needed assistance, the Safe Streets Act must be amended to assure that an adequate share of funds can be distributed directly to cities.

2. Concurrent with amendments allowing adequate amounts of grants to cities, the Safe Streets Act should be amended to give states incentives to deal responsibly with the crime problems of the major urban areas.

3. The LEAA must take a much more active role in overseeing state programs:

To demand that states give proper recognition to needs and priorities of urban governments in development of state plans.

To prevent states from using the local share of planning funds for what are essentially state purposes without first obtaining the consent of affected local governments.

To assure that states and their regional planning agencies in allocating planning and action funds concentrate support or improvement programs for areas with the most serious crime problems.

4. Once these basic substantive changes are made to assure more effective use of funds, the level of assistance available under the Safe Streets Act should be substantially increased and the program matching ratios reduced to allow comprehensive criminal justice improvement programs in all urban areas.

Study background

The NLC and USCM study of the first year state action plans covered a period of five months with a primary time commitment in January and February of 1970. The study included:

(a) A comprehensive analysis of 33 state action plans filed with LEAA and approved for funding during the summer of 1969. Action plans studied included those of:

Alabama	Massachusetts
Arizona	Michigan
Arkansas	Minnesota
California	Missouri
Colorado	Nebraska
Connecticut	New York
Florida	North Carolina
Georgia	Ohio
Idaho	Oklahoma
Illinois	Oregon
Indiana	Pennsylvania
Iowa	Tennessee
Kansas	Texas
Kentucky	Virginia
Louisiana	Washington
Maine	Wisconsin
Maryland	

(b) Communications in person, over the telephone or by mail with local officials or state municipal leagues executives in 45 states. In this regard NLC and USCM wish to express particular appreciation to the city officials who composed two task force groups who met in Washington during January of 1970 to share their experiences and ideas relating to the Safe Streets program with NLC and USCM staff. A list of these officials is included in Appendix A.

(c) Discussions of problems relating to the Safe Streets Act with officials of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and several directors of state law enforcement planning agencies.

(d) A review of other studies of administration of the Safe Streets Act published during the last five months of 1969.

THE PLANNING PROCESS

Congress, in writing the statute, clearly expressed its intent that there be substantial local involvement in planning by requiring that 40% of the planning funds be available to local governments, that the state planning agency be representative of local governments and that the state plan "adequately take into account the needs and requests of the units of local government." Many states had promised this participation in grant applications filed with LEAA. Despite general statements in grant applications about the high degree of local government involvement in the planning effort, examination of the 1969 plan development processes indicated that in many states the actual degree of local involvement in the planning process can best be described as tokenism.

Local representation

Mayors, county commissioners, and other local elected officials with general policy responsibilities have not been deeply involved in the planning process which is dominated by functional specialists in the various fields in criminal justice.

In September of 1969 the International City Management Association published a survey which showed that only 13% of the members of all state planning bodies were local policy making officials, that 15% were classed as "citizens" and the rest were either state officials or functional specialists in the various fields of law enforcement. At the regional planning level, functional specialists predominate to an even greater degree, with some states including Florida and Louisiana having regional boards made up almost entirely of local law enforcement officials. California has recently added several local policy making officials to its state board, and Pennsylvania has made a major effort to broaden the local policy making representation on regional boards. There has also been some expansion of local officials representation in other states, but generally representation of local policy making officials on state and regional planning boards remains inadequate.

Adequate representation of local policy making officials on state and regional boards is an absolute necessity as these officials provide an overall view of the problems and priority decisions facing local governments which can aid in structuring state and regional planning to assure that the programs developed from these planning efforts can be easily integrated into the overall local governmental processes. Adequate citizen representation on state and regional boards is also necessary to give state and local planning processes and resulting efforts to implement law enforcement plans a degree of legitimacy among those elements of the community who believe they will be most affected by improved law enforcement activity.

Funds for local planning

As NLC's 1969 study indicated, state practices in allocation of the 1969 planning funds severely limited local participation in the planning effort. The local share of planning funds was distributed in a manner which emphasized broad geographic coverage rather than the seriousness of local crime problems or the degree of need for planning assistance.

As a result, in many states a disproportionate share of the planning funds was allocated to benefit rural areas. Further, broad geographic distribution of funds resulted in many planning grants which were too small to have any significant impact in establishing and maintaining a competent local planning process. According to the ICMA survey, 24 states distributed the local share of their planning funds among local governments and regional planning units solely according to population while another 10 states made minimum allocations to regional planning units and then distributed the remainder of available funds to a formula basis.

Minimum allocations discriminate against heavily populated areas in distribution of funds. Superficially, such allocations can be justified as necessary to support a minimum planning competence. However, the manner in which most states drew the planning regions to receive the funds indicate that the regional dollar allocation structure may have been established to benefit the low density areas. Kentucky's plan notes that it has three major urban areas which account for 70% of the crime problems in the state, yet the state designated 16 law enforcement planning regions and allocated a \$5,000 base grant to each region. The result: rural regions received twice as much per capita in planning funds as the Louisville area. Oregon has over half its population concentrated in two of its 14 law enforcement planning regions, yet each region received a base grant for both

planning and action purposes. Colorado divided planning funds in \$2,000 base grants among 14 regions, though more than half the state's population and 70% of its index crime is concentrated in the one region including Denver. As law enforcement systems are similar in many rural regions of individual states, it would appear that these rural regions could have been combined with no significant reduction in effectiveness of the basic planning effort, freeing a substantial amount of the funds to concentrate on planning for solution of crime problems in areas of greater need.

The impact of regionalization

Involvement of individual cities and counties in the planning process has also been severely limited by state imposition of regional planning units to take charge of the local planning effort. In addition to the 50 state planning agencies required under the Safe Streets Act, approximately 40 states have designated regional planning agencies as a third level of bureaucratic activity for planning and the processing of local grant applications. There are currently between 350-400 of these regional law enforcement planning units in operation across the nation. Generally states have made the decision to establish these regional units, but most are supported by the 40% share of the planning funds which the Act requires be "available" to local units for their planning efforts.

Many of these state planning sub-units were developed specifically for the Safe Streets program, others had existed on paper without any source of support until Safe Streets funds were made available, and some of the regional planning agencies were already in operation when aid for the Safe Streets programs became available. The ICMA survey indicated local councils of government were used in only 12 states as the agency for regional law enforcement planning. State planning districts were used in 7 states, and economic development districts in 11 States, with the remainder emphasizing mainly regional planning districts which may or may not represent the interest of their local government.

Where they exist, states place primary reliance on regional planning units for direction on what the needs and priorities of local government should be. This saves the state planning agency the trouble of dealing with many local units having differing needs and complicated law enforcement problems. However, it makes it very difficult for individual local problems to gain expression at the state level. The City of Norfolk, Virginia noted the problem it faced in this regard:

Localities cannot report to the state planning agencies, instead they must refer all priorities to a regional planning commission for approval and new priorities formed, which will then be forwarded to the state planning commission.

Though regions are theoretically established to represent local interests, the ICMA survey indicated that 45% of its 637 reporting cities did not believe that regional planning operations would take city needs into account. The regional arrangements are particularly amicable and convenient for those states which control the staff and/or appointments to the regional boards. There the regional units first loyalty is to the state and not to the local governments it is designated to serve. Among the states in which local officials noted problems because the governor or another state agency controlled appointments to regional boards and staff were Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Oklahoma and South Carolina. One comment from South Carolina noted:

The State of South Carolina has been divided up into so-called planning districts by the governor. The local legislative delegation from each county has appointed people to a "planning commission" to plan under this Act.

A Georgia official noted that regional boards are picked by "political philosophy rather than competence." In Florida regional board members are chosen by the police chiefs and sheriffs of the particular regions. The governor then selects a board member as chairman. However, broadening of board membership to include local policy officials, private citizens, etc., has been foreclosed by the state decision that regions should be controlled by law enforcement professionals.

As a result of this emphasis on sub-state regions in planning dollar allocations, local governments have been unable to obtain their fair share of planning dollars for necessary local level planning. Cities in those states where all of the local planning funds are retained at the regional level have a much more difficult time to gaining adequate expression of their needs, particularly since there is no assurance that a commitment of substantial local resources to a locally funded planning effort will result in an action grant from the state agency. St. Paul, Minnesota, pinpointed these problems in its comments about the Safe Streets program:

Under the Minnesota plan no monies are forwarded to the cities of St. Paul or Minneapolis for planning purposes. In lieu of that the state has designated a Metropolitan Planning Council as the recipient of the funds. We recognize that there is a need for area-wide planning. However, the development of a data base suggests the need for input of the local units of government. Yet, these local units of government will be required to donate time to the state agency which is fully funded. In view of the financial distress of the cities it seems somewhat unrealistic.

Pennsylvania controls the regional boards but pays the board from state funds, freeing the local share of planning funds for expenditures in developing plans for individual local units. All local applications must filter through the regional planning boards, but the availability of planning funds to local units allows them to better analyze their needs and develop a more comprehensive case for assistance to submit to the regional board.

Some states have recognized the problems regional units create and are backing away from them. Kansas abandoned a regional structure which relied on state Congressional districts because of difficulties in establishing the regions and the projected inconsistency of the regional effort with local planning goals. New Jersey modified an initial planning program which emphasized regions to allow direct grants to aid local planning efforts in major cities of the state.

There has been some confusion over the role of LEAA in supporting regional planning structures. In discussion with NLC and USCM staff, several state planning directors have indicated much the same view as expressed by the Utah State Planning Director when he told a January 1970 meeting of executive directors of western leagues of municipalities that LEAA is urging states to establish regional structures for local planning. A publication of the Indiana Criminal Justice Planning Agency indicated regions were established "as requested by LEAA."

The Act says that state plans should: "encourage units of general local government to combine or provide for cooperative arrangements with respect to services, facilities, and equipment." When complaints about regional structures are presented to LEAA, it takes the position, consistent with the statute, that while multi-jurisdictional arrangements should be encouraged, LEAA is not urging regionalization upon state law enforcement planning systems."

NLC and USCM agree that multi-jurisdictional arrangements would be of great benefit to many areas to secure improvements in the criminal justice system, provided means are preserved for expression of individual local needs and problems. However, review of the Safe Streets program operations indicates that regional planning structures are essentially grant review and approval mechanisms which provide little positive leadership in efforts to secure coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice systems.

In a number of cases imposition of regions is actually frustrating local coordination efforts already in effect. The cities which are the focus of the three leading city-county consolidation efforts, Indianapolis, Indiana; Jacksonville, Florida; and Nashville, Tennessee were placed in regions with a number of other independent local jurisdictions. The planner in charge of the law enforcement planning region including Jacksonville, Florida did not know of the existence of the Jacksonville-Duval County Planning Board in the early stages of the development of the Jacksonville region law enforcement council. Further, officials in Jacksonville are concerned that the law enforcement planning council is proceeding completely independently of all other planning activities done in the community and acting without regard to capital budgets, community improvement schedules and other factors essential to successful operation of local government.

Limited local participation

The final result of these difficulties in the state planning process is that local government are effectively excluded from any meaningful participation in the planning process for their state. An NLC and USCM official attending a February, 1970 meeting with mayors, managers and selectment from 40 communities in Vermont discovered with surprise that none of the attending officials had been contacted by the state regarding the Safe Streets program. Officials of the cities of Savannah, Georgia and Dallas, Texas indicated that their cities were not consulted in the development of the 1970 action plan which their regional planning agencies were submitting to the state. In Dallas' case the officials stated that this lack of consultation really made no difference since the plan was so general it could accommodate anything Dallas wished to do within the program. (This being the case, the question arises: If the plan was so general that it could ac-

commodate anything proposed by a city what was the purpose of the whole regional and state planning process?). North Carolina designated 22 units to do criminal justice planning, but 14 of them had not received any funding when the state plan was submitted to LEAA. Likewise in Pennsylvania, funds were not distributed to regional planning agencies until June, 1969, after the state plan had been filed. The Alabama state plan was submitted to LEAA before the regional committees ever approved the regional plans which were to provide the local element of the state plan. Kansas used the questionnaire approach in developing information for its plan, but drew up and filed the state plan at a time when only 47% of the needs and priorities questionnaires had been returned.

Besides Kansas, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Montana and Ohio placed some reliance on questionnaires in developing fiscal 1969 needs and priorities. Questionnaires are valuable to gain data, but the danger of the questionnaire approach is that in adding up all of the votes, general needs, particularly needs of more numerous low crime communities, tend to be emphasized while specialized problems and situations peculiar to one or a few communities are relegated to positions of lesser importance. For example, in March 1969, Ohio requested a letter from each community stating its needs and made a compilation of those letters the basis of the local element of its first year plan. In response to a complaint that major city problems had been overlooked in the Ohio plan, the Ohio planning director justified placing primary emphasis in allocation of action funds on basic training because "the vast majority" of localities had expressed a need for training and that, "one of the basic lessons we learned . . . is that there is a great need for funds to support a minimum standard of law enforcement in the state."

In some states, the time constraints imposed on the local planning process belied the possibility of development of any real local input. The sub-regional board to take responsibility for planning in the Los Angeles area was not established until two weeks before the March 15, 1969 deadline when the comprehensive criminal justice plan for the Los Angeles area was to be filed with the states for inclusion of the state plan. One local official from North Carolina made this observation regarding the time constraints faced in his state: "We are rushing too fast to take advantage of the funds available—for fear they will be lost—without adequate planning and without establishment of proper priorities." Rockville, Maryland was given only two days from original notice to filing deadline to prepare a project application for submission to its regional planning body. Grand Rapids, Michigan had three days to prepare and file its application, then waited nine months for a response from the state.

PLAN RESULTS

Priority structure and program impact

The allocation of action funds resulting from the first year planning process has created much dissatisfaction among the nation's cities. Even those few major cities relatively satisfied with their first year allocation are concerned at the structure of the program for they recognize that next year their particular projects aimed at satisfying most urgent needs may be sacrificed to appease some of the more strident critics in other cities. These conflicts have developed because of a difference between needs and priorities perceived by cities and state governments. In a paper presented to the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, Douglas Harman, Professor of Urban Affairs at American University pinpointed the basic problem of the Safe Streets Act: "There is a significant conflict between the goals of fighting immediate urban crime problems and a grant-in-aid system dominated by state governments."

Few of the city officials with whom NLC and USCM have discussed the Safe Streets program believe that the needs and priorities identified in the plans of their states adequately deal with the most urgent law enforcement needs of the major urban areas. One Texas official noted bluntly his belief that, "the state plan mainly aimed at solving problems in rural and suburban areas," while he recognized that there were needs in these areas, he said that the program emphasis was misdirected. He noted further that to get what they wanted most under the need categories set out in their state plan, cities had to play "phony games with words."

Often the plan results reflected state dominance and limited recognition of local needs in the planning process by emphasizing programs which created much concern among local officials. The Tennessee plan placed major emphasis on programs to establish general minimum standards for personnel, and uniform

statewide systems in personnel, crime reporting and computer information, though local officials expressed concern at cost implications and other aspects of these programs and urged greater allocation of resources to deal with critical problem in individual jurisdictions. Local officials in Vermont believe that their greatest needs are for improved training and equipment. The Vermont League of Cities and Towns, reflecting these views, protested a proposal to put major emphasis on a statewide communications system and were told in defense of the communications system: "But, that's what the governor wants." Kansas planned to retain \$30,000 from the local share of action funds to establish a training academy though the League of Kansas Municipalities objected that localities had not been consulted about the projected use of local funds.

The city of Toledo, Ohio had four top priority needs in fiscal 1969: (1) modernization of its communications systems, (2) laboratory equipment to handle drug addiction, (3) improvement of a police training facility, and (4) an improved detention facility including a rehabilitation program. None of these were included in the priorities of the state plan. The only projects for which Toledo could apply for assistance under the fiscal 1969 plan were a closed circuit TV system, a mobile riot unit, or portable TV sets. Because the city had made complaints about the state planning process, it was encouraged to file an application. It did so, but the application was turned down because it was not in one of the three project areas set for assistance. Thus, Toledo did not receive a dime under the regular allocation of 1969 action monies, though it had received \$21,000 for a community relations unit as part of the allocation of riot funds made available in August of 1968.

Another city noting problems with the state priority determination was Norfolk, Virginia:

The states number one priority deals with law enforcement training, which we feel is not a critical priority in the larger metropolitan areas.

Denver, Colorado relating their dissatisfaction with program allocations stated:

The action program for Colorado reflected emphasis on the Colorado Law Enforcement Training Academy over the Denver Police Academy, riot equipment funds for the State Police and the State Penitentiary over the Denver Police Department needs, funds for numerous state juvenile facilities and none for Denver, funds for community relations for cities other than Denver, etc.

Boulder, Colorado—the fifth largest city in the state—did not fair much better:

Boulder's program request centered around crucial police-community relations and organized crime particularly in drug traffic . . . these program requests were rewarded with evaluations of priority 5 and priority 6. From a rating scale that ranges from 1 to 6, it is obvious that our program requests did very poorly . . . in view of this determination, the city of Boulder, is likely to receive no funding under the Omnibus Crime Control Bill in 1970.

Where did all the money go?

Difficulties a city faces in getting needs recognized at state level are compounded when it is placed under a regional planning structure with many other units of government with widely differing levels of needs and varying law enforcement capabilities. Los Angeles, California has been placed in a sub-region of a region which extends all the way to the Nevada border and includes part of the Mojave Desert. Grand Rapids, Michigan, a city of 200,000 population, placed in a rural dominated law enforcement planning region has received only \$188 of over \$54,000 allocated to its region under the program. Grand Rapids city officials contributed time worth substantially more than the grant received to developing local action program applications and participating in the regional planning body.

Two of the Nation's largest cities have been placed in regions with vote allocation patterns designed to shift power away from them. Cleveland, Ohio was placed in a seven county region in which the two urban counties get five votes each, and five rural counties get three votes each, result: urban interests and urban priorities outvoted 15 to 10. To avoid this structure Cleveland is attempting to establish a direct relationship with the state through a cooperative planning venture with Cuyahoga County. Houston, Texas contains two-thirds of the population in the council of governments which was responsible for developing its law enforcement plan, but it has only one-twelfth of the vote on the COG board. When time came for allocation of action dollars, Houston received a grant for \$126,000 to tie in all suburban jurisdictions to Houston's computer. Superficially,

this was a grant to Houston, but the suburban communities were the principal beneficiaries. Houston's operating costs may be increased because of the expanded maintenance requirements on its computer operations.

Though the plans generally did not deal adequately with the special crime problems of major urban areas, almost all plans reviewed by NLC and USCM placed major emphasis on providing basic training and equipment. Such programs will primarily benefit low crime areas serviced by small departments. In addition, many plans stressed broad geographic coverage as a goal to be achieved in allocating funds.

The Kentucky plan, for example, emphasizes that 75.65 percent of the state's action funds will be distributed among local governments on a "balanced geographical basis."

The Indiana plan often used the phrase: "appropriate geographic coverage will be stressed" in explaining how dollars would be distributed, and the Washington plan in aiming for broad geographic distribution stated: "certain other programs were chosen partly because of their suitability to rural areas."

States which have allocated funds among regions on a formula basis to assure that each region gets something and broad geographic coverage is achieved include: Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas. California has taken a more hard-nosed approach at the state level, judging each local application on its merits with the result that, as of January 30, 1970, no projects in three of its predominantly rural regions had been funded.

The net effect of these two policies, emphasizing geographic coverage and basic standards, has been dissipation of millions of Safe Street dollars in small grants to provide basic training and equipment for police operations in low crime areas. While the need for upgrading such police services cannot be questioned, its priority in most state Safe Streets plans, in face of the urgency of the urban crime crisis, pinpoints again the basic conflict between urban needs and traditional state dollar allocation practices.

State programs which emphasize improvement of basic services discriminate against communities which, because they face major crime problems, already have committed resources to acquire basic equipment but badly need more sophisticated equipment and training techniques to deal with their crime problems.

As a Lancaster, Pennsylvania official noted:

Under the present system, dominated by rural interests, those of us in the cities who have made substantial financial commitments on our own in the fight against crime will be subverted to the interests of those who have made little or no commitment and are using Safe Streets money as a substitute for local funds.

Essentially the same problem was recognized by Boulder, Colorado:

Those agencies who do nothing to improve the most basic enforcement tools seem inevitably to benefit most by grant programs.

Spreading funds around the state in many small grants prevents concentration of a sufficient amount of funds in any one area to have any significant impact in improving the criminal justice system.

A communication from San Jose, California stated:

Money allocated to the states for local use is being spread so thin as to make its effectiveness useless. This action ignores the mandate of the Act that priority should go to high crime areas: urban centers.

A representative of another California city asked: "What can you do with four or six thousand dollar grants?" And the City of Minneapolis indicated that though in total it has received a fairly substantial share of funds, the separate programs to which these funds were assigned by the state chopped them up into so many small pieces that their potential impact was minimized.

Commitment of large sums of money to support basic law enforcement services in low crime areas also contributes to continued fragmentation of the criminal justice system by providing a Federal subsidy for the continued independent operation of smaller agencies, which, without Federal support, would be forced by the economic pressures of rising costs to consider coordination or consolidation with agencies in neighboring jurisdictions. One Pennsylvania official stated that in several instances in his state grants had been made to establish independent county communications networks when combination with the communications system of the central city of the county would have been more economical and promoted coordination of law enforcement efforts.

Opportunities to foster interjurisdictional cooperation have also overlooked in establishment of many basic training programs. Funds have been allocated in

26 of the 50 states for regional training facilities to provide basic training for law enforcement officers. A large number of these regional facilities will be established for the first time under the Safe Streets Act. Local officials from Alabama, Georgia, Ohio and Texas noted that in their states it would have been much more economical if the state, instead of using the local share of action funds to establish new regional training facilities, had supported expansion of existing training facilities operated by the central city of the region.

Local efforts to coordinate criminal justice systems were also frustrated in many states by the structuring of state plans which presented localities long shopping lists of projects from which the localities had to pick and choose without any particular relation to the priorities at the local level. While these shopping lists often gave the state plans a superficial appearance of comprehensiveness, their net effect was to frustrate comprehensive planning and structure local programs and application processes on an individual project by project basis. A city must split its project applications into the separate categories suggested in the state plan and file separate applications for each with the state. Some of these projects may then receive funds, others may not. The final result is approval of bits and pieces of the local program with each separate part approved having various degrees of relevance to the needs of the local government. The city only knows what it will receive at the end of a long process of formal and informal negotiations.

As noted before, Toledo, Ohio's inability to reconcile its locally developed priorities with the list of projects presented by the state prevented that city from receiving any assistance under Ohio's regular allocation of action funds. The Massachusetts plan presented localities a list of 27 projects for which they could apply to receive federal assistance. The list of projects covered the whole field of criminal justice and gave the Massachusetts plan an aura of comprehensiveness. However, the city of Boston noted that any development of comprehensive local programs was frustrated because separate applications were required for each of the separate items listed in the plan, and the application process was further complicated because different deadlines were assigned for applying for various items on the state list. The 1969 Colorado plan presented a list of 31 projects. Of these, only 6 were to provide more than \$10,000 in federal assistance, and 16 provided under \$4,000 with one providing \$450 and another \$555 in federal aid. Eighteen of the twenty-nine projects listed in the Maryland plan called for federal aid of less than \$10,000. The Maryland plan particularly gave the appearance that federal aid fund allocations had been spread around among many projects to give the appearance of comprehensiveness. In a number of cases the share of project costs provided from the federal assistance was well below the level required by the Act. The total Maryland plan called for expenditures of \$1,321,348 of which only \$457,528 was to come from the federal government. Considerable bookkeeping costs may have been saved without any reduction in the effectiveness of Maryland's plan if the federal assistance could have been concentrated on a few projects rather than spread over many to comply with the comprehensiveness requirement.

Fund allocation patterns

Following are some examples of state priority systems and grant allocations patterns illustrating the defects discussed above:

Major goals stated in the Arkansas plan were:

Improving patrol equipment by replacing obsolete and private vehicles presently in use (These vehicles were mainly in smaller communities).

Improving training through use of mobile equipment and regional training centers, and

Development of a system of minimum standards for jails.

The Kentucky plan noted that there were 90 police and sheriff's vehicles in Kentucky without radios and consigned up to \$25,000 in federal aid for use in providing basic equipment such as car radios and teletype hookups. The Kentucky plan also noted that ten smaller agencies would receive grants from \$500 to \$1000 to procure services of management consultants.

The Massachusetts and Nebraska plans both indicated a major effort would be made to expand coverage of state teletype networks by installing teletype terminals in many smaller communities.

Idaho planned to split \$28,635 in federal aid into 32 subgrants ranging from \$395 to \$2,500 to provide basic communications equipment.

Alabama planned to use \$64,167 to establish seven regional training centers to provide basic training and proposed to divide another \$94,000 among 60 to 80 communities for police operations improvements.

Pennsylvania allocated at least 8 grants totaling \$186,611 for broadening the basic coverage of several local communications systems.

Michigan placed 23 grants in 22 communities to provide radio equipment. Of these grants, 8 were in amounts of less than \$750.

In Michigan, the city of Grand Rapids, with 200,000 population, and annual police expenditures of over \$2,900,000, received \$188 for a 75% share of two Polaroid cameras and a fingerprint kit while one community of 7,500 population received \$1,650 for an infra-red Varoscanner with accessories, \$1,275 for a surveillance camera, and \$2,400 for basic radio equipment. A rural county with a population of 38,600 and total police expenditure of \$197,000 was granted \$18,000 for basic radio equipment, and another rural county of 33,300 population won \$15,100 for a probation services program.

In Oregon, \$45,000 was allocated in \$5,000 base grants to 9 rural regions. A two county rural area with 31,800 population and an annual police budget of \$213,000 received a base grant of \$5,000 in action funds, while the four county region including Portland, with 833,500 population and combined annual police expenditures of well over \$13,000,000 received only \$89,358.

In Pennsylvania, the city of Scranton with 111,143 population and annual police expenditures of approximately \$1,000,000 received \$5,000 while a rural county with 16,483 population and annual police expenditures of \$12,000 received \$22,236 for a basic communications system. The city of Philadelphia was allocated \$207,536. To receive a comparable per capita allocation to that of the rural county, Philadelphia would have had to receive approximately \$2,800,000. To receive a comparable share of its annual police budget, Philadelphia would have had to receive approximately \$120,000,000.

There is every indication that allocation patterns which do not focus on areas of greatest need will continue in 1970. Pennsylvania has developed a complicated allocation formula involving crime index, defendants processed, incarcerated inmates and probationers, all related to population. Philadelphia is a region within itself and is assured of receiving one-third of the local share of action funds, or about \$2.6 million in fiscal 1970. However, as the allocations across the state are still directed to regions there is no guarantee that regional boards will divide funds to focus on the most pressing crime problems.

Florida and Georgia are planning to allocate fiscal 1970 funds among regions on a population formula as they did in fiscal 1969. Within its region Savannah, Georgia with 150,000 population and an annual police budget of \$1,500,000 will receive \$132,000 while a rural community of 7,000 population and annual police expenditures of \$24,000 will receive \$8,400 for basic communications equipment and an additional \$5,000 for hire a juvenile officer.

For fiscal 1970, Denver, Colorado has been told it will receive \$350,000 out of the state's total allocation of \$1,800,000. This is about 20% of the funds though the city contains 30% of the population and must deal with 70% of the crime in the state. In fiscal 1969, Denver and the 8 counties in its state designated region received 23.6% of the state crime funds.

Red tape and delay

The state and regional bureaucracies imposed between federal dollars and their application at the local level have also added a substantial element of delay and costly confusion in distribution of funds. Though all the states had received their action grants by June 30, 1969, funds did not begin to filter down to the local level until late fall. As 1970 began a substantial portion of the 1969 action funds remained to be distributed. Alabama did not begin allocating its fiscal 1969 action funds until the end of January 1970. Over \$500,000 remained to be allocated in sub-grants from the local share of the state of California's \$2.35 million action grant as of January 27, 1970. As of January 12, 1970 the state law enforcement planning region including Jacksonville, Florida had received only \$13,500 out of its \$34,500 allocation of fiscal 1969 action monies. Pennsylvania did not announce grant awards from its allocation of action funds until December 19, 1969.

The city of Boston has indicated that they expect the following schedule to apply with respect to allocation of the 1970 action funds: (a) The state plan is submitted to LEAA in April; (b) Money is expected to be received from LEAA around the first of June. Until the state receives money from LEAA, cities will

get no comprehensive guidelines on how to go about getting federal funds; (c) After the money is received and cities get the guidelines, they will have approximately two months to develop project applications which will have to be filed with the state sometime in early August; (d) The state will then approve local project application by comparing it with the programs listed in the state plan. Grant awards to cities are expected to be announced sometime in September.

Much confusion and delay has been added to state programs because of a high rate of staff turnover and uncertainties of funding for necessary state staff services. In the nine months from November 1968 when planning processes began in earnest in most states to August of 1969 when allocation of fiscal 1969 funds was completed, responsibility for program direction changed hands in 30 of the 50 states. Between August 1969 and January 1970 as states were gearing up for the second year planning process, responsibility for program direction changed hands in 18 states. One observer in New Mexico noted: "In thirteen months we have had three state directors of the program and we are working with an acting director at the present. All of this, plus insufficient staff, has put the entire state process way behind."

A number of states including Indiana, Maine, Nebraska and Nevada faced major difficulties because state legislatures were slow to authorize funds for staff to perform even the most essential state planning functions. In Indiana, the first planning agency director quit in frustration after eight months because of continuing inability to get staff under state cutback orders.

Several cities noted that difficulties attendant to direct federal-local financing were compounded when localities had to try to develop programs with regard not only to federal appropriations, application deadlines, and approval processes but also to these processes duplicated, often in a different time frame, at the state level. Following a request for assistance through the many levels involved in a block grant program can be an arduous task. One Southern California city in a sub-regional and regional structure noted:

A unit of government interested in applying for an action grant must submit a request at the local level, and the request must receive approval from a regional task force, the sub-regional advisory board, a regional advisory board, a state task force operations committee, and finally, by the California Council on Criminal Justice before it may receive the money. In each case there is a possibility the action grants will be denied.

In addition to possibilities of denial, at each level the risk increases that the priority attached to a city's specific problem will become lost in more general consideration and that the end result will be grant allocations which favor only generally appreciated needs.

Administrative costs

Some have to pay for all the check points in the grant process. To the extent that Safe Streets funds are being used to pay for program administration they cannot be used in action programs to combat crime.

Bookkeeping costs for this program appear to be substantially higher than in programs involving a direct relationship between the federal government and localities. Houston, Texas indicated there were four separate levels of paperwork in administration of its grant program: program substance and financial reporting requirements required by LEAA; another, and different set of requirements imposed by the state; paperwork involved with the regional planning unit, and entirely separate accounting requirements in effect at the local levels. Another Texas city noted that it did not believe that any grant under the Safe Streets program in an amount of less than \$15,000 which was worth the effort. The city of Boston decided to turn down one grant of nearly \$10,000 which had been offered to it because of the heavy bookkeeping and reporting requirement attached by the state. In addition, the state of Massachusetts has been withholding \$21,830 out of the city of Boston's \$31,830 allocation from under the special civil disorders program announced in August of 1968 because of the city has been unable to comply with reporting requirements imposed by the state. The following quotation from a letter sent to the city of Boston by the state indicates the information required:

The following information is needed before further funds can be released. When are the police-school seminars to be held, who is to be involved, what is the program format to be, and what expenditures are to be involved? With respect to the tactical patrol force training program we require:

1. A schedule of classes to be conducted including time, place and subject;

2. Lesson plan outlines for all classes to be conducted; and
3. Qualifications summaries of all instructors to be utilized.

With respect to the equipment purchases, we need to know what equipment has been ordered, when, from whom, and when delivery is expected. Many of the reporting requirements imposed by the state appear to be almost impossible to comply with before Boston received funds and began implementation of the project.

The question of bookkeeping costs is of particular concern with respect to the myriad of very small grants being given out by state agencies. If a locality must prepare an application and follow it through the approval processes of the region and the state, and then prepare reports satisfactory to LEAA, the state and regional agency and the regular accounting and reporting procedures at the local level, it does not appear that grants of only a few hundred can add much value to a city's operation. Many state plans indicated small grants were planned. The Idaho plan noted that grants as small as \$75 were contemplated. The state of Indiana allocated the city of Evansville two very small grants, one of \$112 for drug abuse education and another \$89 for drug detection kits. While many small grants such as these may satisfy the state goal of broad geographic distribution of funds, it is unlikely that such grants can be of any significant impact on the criminal justice system, and in many cases the heavy cost of bookkeeping may more than outweigh the value of the grant to the community.

Duplication of effort

Several consultants retained by LEAA noted with concern that a substantial amount of federal funds were being committed toward repetitive studies because of lack of coordination among the individual states.

Professor Harry I. Subin, of the New York University School of Law, after reviewing the state plans at the request of LEAA noted with concern: "... the heavy emphasis in many of the state 'action' grant proposals on 'study.'" Professor Subin continued "... It would appear that, in view of the urgency—and age—of many of the problems facing the criminal justice system, the emphasis upon "comprehensive studies" contained in the plans is misplaced."

A review for LEAA by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency noted that regarding state training programs:

Unless national direction and leadership is given to all these training activities, there may be needless duplication of effort substandard instruction and a training in self-defeating setting.

Loss of local control

Over the past year there has been developing a new protocol of federalism, strongly supported by many governors, which rests on a theory that direct federal-local contacts should be minimized and that all expressions of local needs and all federal actions, to meet these needs should be channelled through the middle man in the state house. Mayors and other local officials are concerned at the growing acceptance of this protocol in the Administration because many believe, as this and other recent studies point out, that generally state government is not willing to respond to the most crucial urban problems and that lines of communication to Washington must be preserved as the only channel through which vital assistance can be gained. Reduced contacts between federal and local officials will make it more difficult for federal officials to understand local problems and gear federal programs to aid in solving these problems in a manner which makes most productive use of the taxpayers' dollar.

Attempts to limit the lines of access between the federal government and cities reached what the *New York Times* described as an "almost comic peak" in April of 1969 after President Nixon invited eleven mayors to the White House to discuss urban problems. Within a week a meeting of governors passed a resolution criticizing this meeting and urging the President to do his talking with governors, not mayors, when he wanted to learn about urban problems.

State House to sensitivity to direct federal contacts has been particularly marked in the Safe Streets program. After LEAA announced grants from its 15% discretionary funds to eleven major cities in May of 1969, a strong criticism of these direct grants was filed by the National Governors Conference through their designated spokesman on urban crime matters, Utah Governor Calvin Rampton. Governor Rampton's telegram to LEAA asserted that governors, "expressed concern about your proposal to grant discretionary funds directly to the nation's ten largest cities. We questioned the wisdom of population

as sole criteria of need and confinement of funds to artificial city boundaries. Of greater importance is the departure from your commitment to deal through the state agency."

The point about population allocation of funds according to artificial boundaries is particularly interesting as this is precisely the allocation method which governors supported in amending the Act to provide a block grant approach, and it is an allocation method adopted by many states, including Utah, for allocation of part or all of the Safe Streets funds. In closing, Governor Rampton urged that all future discretionary funds be granted through state agencies, despite the legislative history of the discretionary grant section recently confirmed by a ruling of the General Accounting Office which clearly establishes that discretionary grants may be made directly to units of local government.

Although their authority to make discretionary grants directly to local governments is clear, LEAA is requiring that local applications to receive discretionary grants from fiscal 1970 appropriations receive a state certification of approval before the application is filed and that funds for the local governments under the discretionary grant program be channelled from LEAA through the state agencies to local governments.

This new attitude of federalism has created particular problems for some cities which have tried to communicate with the federal government about problems they saw developing with the program in their state. Mayor George Seibels of Birmingham, Alabama was severely criticized by Alabama state officials after he attempted to gain information about the program by meeting with LEAA officials in Washington. Mayor Seibels had previously been unsuccessful in attempts to obtain adequate information from state officials about ways Birmingham could participate in the program and had appealed to Washington because Birmingham, in the midst of a major effort to upgrade its law enforcement systems, needed indications of the type and level of federal assistance that could be expected. Because of his initiative in this matter, Mayor Seibels, in addition to being criticized, was excluded from membership on the regional board assigned to do local planning for the Birmingham area although Birmingham comprises two-thirds of the population of the region.

In Maine, the Director of the State Law Enforcement Planning and Assistance Agency, facing numerous complaints from local officials about a new plan for allocating the local share of planning funds, sent a strongly worded letter to directors of regional planning agencies claiming for the state ultimate and complete decision making authority on matters relating to interpretation and administration of the Safe Streets Act as it applies to local governments. The letter noted: "I cannot emphasize enough to you regional planners that it is the state agency that is administering this Act and it is the state agency that interprets whether there is need for waivers and everything else having to do with this particular legislation."

This trend for the state to assume for itself a greater share of power over planning and operation of criminal justice programs at the expense of local government is surfacing in many states. The Tennessee plan called for the state to establish mandatory minimum standards for the qualifications and training of police officers and proposed that the state set a basic scale for police salaries and benefits for all local governments. But the plan contemplated no state support for the substantial costs which would be required of local governments to meet the standards. The Tennessee Municipal League indicated that implementation of the plan would mean almost complete transfer of local police personnel administration authority to the state while cost responsibility would have been left with the local governments. The result of such transfer would be severe limitations of local government capacity to control its police and growth of police forces unresponsive to the needs and problems of local citizens. Observing the standards proposed for state imposition, the Executive Director of the Tennessee Municipal League warned:

Once an assumption is made that municipal governments do not have self-governing capabilities in such areas as personnel administration, then there is really no stopping point except a complete transfer of authority to the state.

In addition to Tennessee, plans of at least four other states, Delaware, Mississippi, Missouri and Wisconsin proposed that substantial new mandatory standards be imposed on local police departments, and several other states suggested that existing controls be broadened.

States also assumed substantial direct and indirect control over local criminal justice planning operations in a number of instances. A Boston, Massachusetts official noted that the state kept the city planning process "off balance" through use of guidelines, grant conditions, deadlines, reporting requirements and heavy demands for detail. The end result for Boston was that, "at every level of the program the state is putting on so many conditions that it is becoming more their program than ours."

The potential for over-concentration of power at the state level was noted with concern in a review of the state plans conducted for LEAA under sponsorship of the National Sheriffs Association.

There seems to be a distinct trend to a centralized rather than a local approach to most of the programs in the studied categories. Without adequate justification, study and careful planning for this approach, it might be claimed that a number of state "monuments" were being built.

The centralization of power at the state level under the Safe Streets program at the expense of local governments is at cross purposes with goals recently stated by the President and Congressional leaders to establish a flow of power and responsibility back to citizens at the local level. If the trend established by the Safe Streets program toward concentration of power at the state level continues, the capacity of local citizens to control those government operations which must directly affect their daily lives may be seriously compromised.

The Role of LEAA

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, to date, has not assumed any major responsibility to require that states deal fairly with local governments and concentrate crime control dollars in a manner which will be most effective. In large part, this is due to the mandate of the Safe Streets Act itself which directs that LEAA have only limited oversight functions regarding state use of funds. As Mr. James Spady, Executive Director of the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency in New Jersey related to a meeting of the New Jersey State League of Municipalities: "No matter how good or how bad your plan is (as long as it gets a "passing" grade) you get your population percentage share." In the first year plans, the passing grade required by LEAA was not very high. Further, LEAA has not been very forceful in following up on those actions it did initiate to protect the interests of local government and assure more effective use of crime control funds.

On April 5, 1969, soon after the National League of Cities had issued its critical report on allocation of planning funds under the Safe Streets Act, LEAA sent a directive to the state planning agencies urging that local governments be allowed greater involvement in decision making regarding law enforcement planning effecting them and that major urban areas receive a greater priority in allocation of funds. In June of 1969, LEAA administrator Charles H. Rogovin, told the annual meeting of the U.S. Conference of Mayors: "We have made it clear—and will continue to do so—that special attention must be given by the states to areas with high crime incidence." Apparently the states did not listen to LEAA's directives. By August of 1969, LEAA in reviewing the state plan was forced to conclude that most of the plans had not taken into account the special conditions and problems of the major urban high crime areas. More recently, local officials meeting with NLC and USCM staff in Washington generally agreed that the memo of April 5, 1969, has been completely ignored by the state planning agencies. And there has been some indication that the memo is even being ignored by LEAA itself. At one point in discussing regional planning units, the memo states "It is particularly important, where new regions have been established by states or where pre-existing regions constituted for federal aid programs not directly related to crime control have been used as local grantees, that efforts be made to obtain and document acceptability by the local governments concerned." Despite this statement, LEAA on January 15, 1970, approved a regional planning structure established by the state of Maine in disregard of the stated preference of many localities and the state organizations representing mayors, town and city managers, police chiefs and county sheriffs for an alternative planning structure and the strong opposition of many municipalities and the Maine Municipal Association to the planning structure being imposed by the state.

It is also a matter of concern to NLC and USCM that despite LEAA's recognition that the 1969 state plans generally did not take into account the special problems of major urban high crime areas, LEAA, on February 2, 1970, approved

allocation to the states of $\frac{1}{2}$ of their share of fiscal 1970 funds to be spent according to the 1969 plans deemed inadequate by LEAA.

Funding Problems

In addition to difficulties created by state administration, problems incident to raising the local share of program costs were also noted at a number of points. The Arkansas plan stated that local government capacity to put up necessary matching funds for the program was a "bold presumption."

Some cities lost funds because they were unable to provide the local matching share from their budgets at the time that state funds were made available. The city of Salisbury, Maryland noted:

Our only offer was received in June just prior to the end of the fiscal year and, therefore, we were unable to consider the offer as the city funds had already been obligated for fiscal year 1969 and it was impossible to purchase capital equipment.

The city of Arvada, Colorado noted a similar problem:

Many of the cities and counties can take advantage of the planning funds whereas the action funds generally require a higher percentage of funds which have not been available to the jurisdictions under the present budget.

A predicament faced by many communities was cited by Indianapolis, Indiana, where the city council makes appropriations for each year in August, but the city was unable to determine the funds it would receive and thus the matching share required at that time. With the small amount of money available from fiscal 1969 funds, Indianapolis was able to scrape together sufficient dollars to provide its share of matching costs. However, problems were anticipated for fiscal 1970 and future years when a larger amount of dollars will be available and a larger matching contribution required.

Many local officials have expressed concern that some localities will face great difficulties in providing the 40% matching funds required by the Act as larger amounts of assistance become available. This concern is particularly marked among officials of larger cities which have placed severe strains on local resources to substantially increase police budgets in recent years. The Philadelphia police budget, for example, jumped from \$30 million in 1960 to \$70 million in 1970. The cities over 100,000 population are currently paying nearly \$1.5 million for police services, better than 55% of the costs of police protection paid by all local governments. These cities hope to receive substantial assistance under the Safe Streets Act, but many have difficulty participating if they must come up with 40% of project costs in addition to maintaining the heavy expenditure increases for police services they have budgeted in recent years.

Several city officials noted that because salaries comprise from 80% to 90% of local law enforcement budgets, the provisions in the Act which limit the amount of assistance that may be provided for salaries impede local capacity to plan realistic improvements and result in overemphasis on equipment in law enforcement plans.

Kansas City, Kansas stated:

While we agree that the program must encourage new approaches and cannot be merely a means by which cities increase salaries of their existing force, we have found in attempting to develop applications that the one-third limitation is completely unrealistic.

PARTICIPANTS IN NLO AND UCSM TASK FORCE REVIEWS OF THE SAFE STREETS ACT, JANUARY 20 AND 22, 1970

John Craig, Inspector, Philadelphia Police Department, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

E. H. Denton, Assistant City Manager, Dallas, Texas.

Richard Devine, Administrative Assistant to the Mayor, Chicago, Illinois.

Raymond Duncan, Administrative Assistant to the Mayor, Jacksonville, Florida.

W. F. Dyson, Chief of Police, Dallas, Texas.

Richard E. Eckfield, Washington Assistant to the City Manager, Dayton, Ohio.

Winston E. Folkers, Director of Community Development, Toledo, Ohio.

Picot Floyd, City Manager, Savannah, Georgia.

Ken Gregor, Assistant to the Mayor, Atlanta, Georgia.

Thom Hargedon, Assistant to the Mayor, Boston, Massachusetts.

William B. Harral, Assistant Director, Pennsylvania League of Cities.

Mark Helper, Administrative Assistant to the Mayor, Houston, Texas.
 James C. Herron, Inspector, Philadelphia Police Department, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
 Louis A. Heyd, Criminal Sheriff, New Orleans, Louisiana.
 Robert M. Igleburger, Chief of Police, Dayton, Ohio.
 Alan Kimball, Director, Department of Public Safety, Indianapolis, Indiana.
 John C. Martin, Assistant to the City Manager, Rockville, Maryland.
 Richard G. McKean, Acting Public Safety Director, Cleveland, Ohio.
 Frank E. Nolan, Chief Inspector, Philadelphia Police Department, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
 James C. Parsons, Captain, Birmingham Police Department, Birmingham, Alabama.
 Frank J. Vaccarella, Federal Programs Coordinator, New Orleans, Louisiana.
 David Wallerstein, Federal Legislative Representative, Los Angeles, California.
 Herbert C. Yost, Director of Public Safety, Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

APPENDIX B

OVER \$150,000 AWARDED IN 1969 ACTION GRANTS

The Governor's Crime Commission awarded 97 subgrants totaling \$150,743.69 from its 1969 action money. The amount exceeds Nebraska's share of last year's federal anticrime funds (\$143,208.93) because only portions of the subgrants were used and the remainder was made available for later subgrants. The following is a list of the 97 subgrant recipients and the amount of each award:

Recipient and grant award

Nebraska State Patrol...	\$22,650.00	Geneva Police Depart-	
Nebraska penal complex...	6,011.30	ment	\$546.00
State fire marshal	2,400.00	Gresham Police Depart-	
Douglas County Sheriff...	2,040.00	ment	660.00
Ralston Police Depart-		Cedar Rapids Police De-	
ment	519.00	partment	600.00
La Vista Police Depart-		Petersburg Police Depart-	
ment	960.00	ment	684.00
Papillion Police Depart-		Madison Police Depart-	
ment	840.00	ment	480.00
South Sioux City Police		Stanton Police Depart-	
Department	3,035.40	ment	1,470.00
Emerson Police Depart-		Norfolk Police Depart-	
ment	375.00	ment	960.00
Nebraska City Police De-		Grand Island Police De-	
partment	1,182.60	partment	4,800.00
Cass County Sheriff	951.00	Central City Police De-	
Saunders County Sheriff...	1,020.00	partment	733.20
Plattsmouth Police De-		Cairo Police Department	396.00
partment	587.55	Wood River Police De-	
Ashland Police Depart-		partment	60.00
ment	600.00	Ruskin Police Depart-	
Blair Police Department...	2,589.39	ment	720.00
Fremont Police Depart-		Clay County Sheriff	840.00
ment	568.80	ment	570.00
Northeast Nebraska Joint		Guide Rock Police Depart-	
Planning Commission...	4,680.00	ment	570.00
Southeast Nebraska Joint		Blue Hill Police Depart-	
Planning Commission...	6,029.07	ment	720.00
Dorchester Police Depart-		Red Cloud Police Depart-	
ment	690.60	ment	720.00
Western Police Depart-		Superior Police Depart-	
ment	690.60	ment	720.00
Seward County Sheriff...	690.60	Beatrice Police Depart-	
Butler County Sheriff...	1,381.20	ment	365.40
Saline County Sheriff...	690.00	Jefferson County Sheriff	1,093.80
Fillmore County Sheriff...	630.00	Thayer County Sheriff...	795.00
York County Sheriff...	1,388.40	Plymouth Police Depart-	
Polk County Sheriff...	1,144.20	ment	570.00

Recipient and grant award—Continued

Diller Police Department	\$390.00	Palisade Police Department	\$720.00
Byron Police Department	776.70	Deuel County Sheriff	1,476.00
Daykin Police Department	540.00	Mitchell Police Department	1,553.00
Beatrice Police Department	390.00	Scottsbluff Police Department	6,240.00
Kearney Police Department	4,290.00	Sheridan County Sheriff	4,592.40
Eustis Police Department	480.00	Keya Paha County Sheriff	3,000.00
Smithfield Police Department ¹	600.00	Randolph Police Department	2,128.44
Alma Police Department	720.00	Ashton Police Department	390.00
Franklin Police Department	585.00	Loup County Sheriff	1,020.00
Bertrand Police Department	402.00	Blaine County Sheriff	300.00
Campbell Police Department	585.00	State tax commissioner	2,627.00
Franklin County Sheriff	585.00	Nebraska State Patrol	2,641.80
Hildreth Police Department	585.00	Omaha Police Department	2,550.00
Hershey Police Department	240.00	Lincoln Police Department	1,207.80
McPherson County Sheriff	480.00	Lincoln Police Department	600.00
Arthur County Sheriff	1,609.20	Lincoln Police Department	570.00
Grant Police Department	108.00	Lincoln Police Department	4,074.00
Chase County Sheriff	476.04	Lincoln Police Department	1,140.00
Perkins County Sheriff	1,800.00	Lancaster County Sheriff	1,326.00
Imperial Police Department	502.44	Fremont Police Department	1,500.00
Ogallala Police Department	360.00	Village of Lyman	1,500.00
Keith County Sheriff	840.00	Garden County Sheriff	600.00
Dundy County Sheriff	720.00	Omaha Police Department	2,762.76
Hayes Center Police Department	540.00	Nebraska State Patrol	750.00
		NU Extension Division	2,676.75
		Scottsbluff Police Department	1,345.25
		Total	150,743.69

¹ The Smithfield Police Dept. refused its \$600 subgrant following notification of the award.

APPENDIX C

[H.R. 15706, 91st Cong., 2d sess.]

A BILL To improve law enforcement in urban areas by making available funds to improve the effectiveness of police services

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Police Assistance Act of 1970".

SEC. 2. The Congress finds that (A) rising crime rates are having an increasingly harmful social and economic impact on life in our major urban areas, (B) primary responsibility for police protection rests with local governments, and (C) direct Federal assistance in the form of unrestricted grants to those cities and counties having primary responsibility to provide police services in major urban areas is necessary for effective action to control crime.

SEC. 3. (a) For the purpose of carrying out this Act, there is established in the Department of Justice the Office of Police Force Improvement (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "Office"). The Director of the Office shall be appointed, and his compensation shall be fixed, by the Attorney General. The Director of the Office may obtain from within the Department of Justice or elsewhere such professional, technical, and clerical personnel as may be necessary.

(b) The Attorney General, in consultation with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, shall direct the operations of the Office.

SEC. 4. (a) The Attorney General shall make grants under this Act for the improvement of police services to—

(1) any city with a population in excess of fifty thousand people, and

(2) any county within a standard metropolitan statistics area, as defined by the Department of Commerce, which exercises primary responsibility to provide police services to a population in excess of fifty thousand people.

(b) From funds appropriated under this Act, the Attorney General shall make grants to the cities and counties referred to in subsection (a) in direct proportion to their respective populations for which they provide primary police services.

(c) Funds received by cities and counties under this Act shall be used to improve police services.

(d) No city or county shall be eligible to receive funds under this Act unless it continues to contribute from its own sources such sums to police services as the Attorney General may require.

SEC. 5. (a) The Attorney General is authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

(b) Each recipient of assistance under this Act shall keep and make available to the Attorney General and the Comptroller General such records as the Attorney General may require, including detailed records of the amount and disposition of grants received under this Act.

SEC. 6. To finance the program under this Act, the Attorney General is authorized to incur obligations in the form of grant agreements, or otherwise, in amounts aggregating not to exceed \$2,500,000,000 over the next five years ending June 30, 1975. These amounts shall remain available until obligated. There are authorized for liquidation of obligations incurred under this subsection appropriations of \$500,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, \$500,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, \$500,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, \$500,000,000 for fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and \$500,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975. Sums so appropriated under this Act shall remain available until expended.

[H.R. 17825, 91st Cong., 2d sess.]

AMENDMENT Intended to be proposed by Mr. Kennedy to H.R. 17825, an Act to amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, viz: After the final title add the following title

SECTION 1. This title may be cited as the "Urban Crime Amendment of 1970".

GRANTS FOR COMBATING CRIME IN CITIES

SEC. 2. Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is amended by redesignating part E and part F of such title as part F and part G respectively and by inserting immediately after part D of the following new part:

"PART E—GRANTS FOR COMBATING CRIME IN CITIES

"SEC. 451. It is the purpose of this part to provide matching Federal financial assistance to urban areas in order to enable them to accelerate the initiation or expansion of programs and projects designed to cope with the unique and growing problem of urban crime.

"SEC. 452. (a) The Administration shall make a grant under this part to any eligible unit of general local government in the amount of \$5 per person multiplied by the population of the eligible unit as determined by the most recently available decennial census, for expenditure by the recipient for the purposes and under the conditions of this part, subject to the limits stated in this part.

"(b) For the purpose of this part the term 'eligible unit of general local government' means any city or county of any State, including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, having a population of one hundred thousand or more persons as determined by either of the two most recently published decennial censuses, but the population of any eligible city or part thereof within a county shall be excluded in computing the eligibility of such county: *Provided*, That if a State does not have a city with a population of one hundred thousand or more persons, its largest city shall be an eligible unit.

"SEC. 453. (a) Grants under this part may be used to match expenditures by the grantee from non-Federal funds to initiate or expand any allowable program or project designed to prevent, reduce, or control crime, including the operation of the criminal justice system and the rehabilitation of offenders within the area under the jurisdiction of the eligible unit of general local government, in-

cluding programs or projects of coordination and sharing with neighboring jurisdictions.

"(b) For the purpose of this part the term 'allowable program or project' means any program or project meeting one or more of the following descriptions:

"(1) the establishment or support of a criminal justice coordinating and planning agency with full-time staff;

"(2) the coordination or sharing of law enforcement functions with neighboring jurisdictions;

"(3) the establishment of the position of legal advisor to the chief of police;

"(4) drug abuse and narcotic addiction prevention, information, and rehabilitation activities;

"(5) work release programs;

"(6) community-based treatment, and rehabilitation services and facilities for those charged with or convicted of criminal offenses, including half-way houses;

"(7) high intensity street lighting in high crime areas;

"(8) pretrial and presentence diagnostic services;

"(9) court administrators;

"(10) implementation and support of procedures and facilities for diverting cases from the criminal justice system;

"(11) bail reform, including summons projects, stationhouse release, and enhanced supervision of bailed arrestees;

"(12) intensive short term programs to reduce court backlogs;

"(13) innovations in court procedures and machinery to accelerate permanently the flow of cases;

"(14) crime and delinquency prevention programs involving education, training, employment services, and the establishment of youth service bureaus;

"(15) police-community relations training;

"(16) the recruitment, training, and support of community service officers;

"(17) enhancement of parole and probation services and related functions;

"(18) short term programs to attract and recruit personnel for criminal justice agencies;

"(19) intensive enforcement of firearms control measures;

"(20) use of mental health agencies and personnel to assist criminal justice agencies;

"(21) establishment or improvement of diagnostic, rehabilitation, education, training, legal, and mental health services in local detention and jail facilities;

"(22) provision of full-time staff in prosecutor or defender agencies, whether through use of city personnel or reimbursement of State, county, or private agencies;

"(23) establishment and support of a centralized criminal justice information system to record progress and outcome of every case proceeding through criminal justice agencies; and

"(24) such other types of programs as the Administrator and Associate Administrators shall unanimously designate no sooner than forty-five days after publication in the Federal Register of the terms proposed designation.

"(c) (1) No portion of a grant received under this part may be used for the construction of buildings or other physical facilities or for the acquisition of land.

"(2) The amount of any grant received under this part expended on nonpolice functions must equal or exceed one-half the amount spent on police functions.

"(3) No portion of a grant received under this part may be used for projects or programs which would be eligible for Federal grants in the amount of 75-per centum of the costs of such project or program under section 301(c) if such grants were made under part C.

"Sec. 454. (a) Any eligible unit of general local government desiring a grant under this part shall submit to the Administration at such time in such manner and accompanied by such information as the Administration may provide, an application which—

"(1) Sets forth a program for utilizing the grant so as to carry out the purposes and meet the conditions set forth in section 453, and describes the source of the funds to be expended by the applicant on new or expended programs or projects, which the Federal grant will match.

"(2) Sets forth information demonstrating that a local criminal justice coordinating agency with representation from all parts of the criminal justice system, and from the public and with an adequate full-time staff, is in operation in the applicant's area, or that such agency will be immediately established with the grant received under this part, or other available funds.

"(3) Sets for the manner in which the public and the State planning agency have been informed of the proposed program for utilizing the grant, describes generally the views of the public and the State planning agency toward the proposed program, and sets forth the applicant's response to any adverse views.

"(4) States that such fiscal control and fund-accounting procedures as may be necessary to assure the proper disbursement of and accounting for Federal funds paid to the applicant under this title will be provided.

"(5) Provides for making an interim report on the actual expenditures under the grant not later than ninety days before the end of the fiscal year for which the report is made, and a final report not later than thirty days after the end of the fiscal year, in such form as the Administration may prescribe; and provides for keeping such records and for affording such access thereto as the Administration may find necessary to assure correctness and verification of such reports.

"(b) An application for a grant under this part may be approved only if the application or any modification thereof meets the requirements set forth in subsection (a).

"Sec. 455. If the sums appropriated for any fiscal year for making grants pursuant to this part are not sufficient to pay in full the total amounts which all eligible units of general local government are eligible to receive under this part for such year, then the amount available for grants to such eligible units shall be rately reduced if necessary.

"Sec. 456. There is authorized to be appropriated \$290,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971 for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this part, and such amounts for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1972 and June 30, 1973, as the Congress shall appropriate."

